v^;^ 
/(4' 

■K^* 


Please 

handle  this  volume 

with  care. 

The  University  of  Connecticut 
Libraries,  Storrs 


^w^s^?# 


■M. 


^ 


i 


6^ 

THE  ^  ^ 

*^3 


SCIENCE  OF  ETHICS: 


AN   ELEMENTARY   SYSTEM 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  MORALITY. 


BY 

HENRY   N.  DAY, 

AoTHOR  OF  "Psychology,"  "Logic,"  "Esthetics,"  "Art  of 
Discourse,"  etc 


NEW  YORK 
G.    P.    PUTNAM'S   SONS 

27  AND  29  West  230  Street 
1883 


^1 


Copyright, 

O.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS. 

1876. 


JS 


c^ 


.—  PREFACE. 

It  has  been  the  controlling  design  in  the  prepar- 
ation of  this  work  simply  to  introduce  to  ethical 
studies.     After  a  careful  analysis  of  an  act  of  duty 
0      by  which  the  essential  constituents  of   duty  are  as- 
^     certained,  the  science  is  unfolded  in  the  light  of  this 
^^      analysis,  with  logical  exactness,  into  a  full  presenta- 
2      tion  of  its  principles  and  truths  in  their  due  relations 
5      to  one  another — into  a  well-grounded,  comprehen- 
13      sive,  and  organic  system  of  theoretical  and  practical 
f^      morality.     The  elementary  character  of  the  work 
has  precluded  the  introduction  of  the  historical  and 
,>;>.      critical  discussion,  by  which  ethical  literature  is  so 
^\        generally  characterized.      The  peculiarities  of  the 
treatise  are  to  be  found  mainly  in  the  analysis  of  the 
concrete  act  of  duty  which  furnishes  the  f undamen- 
-*—     tal  principles  of  ethical  science ;  in  the  systematic 
vO     development  and  arrangement  of  these  principles  ; 
^     in  their  application  to  the  particulars  of  ethical  prac- 
tice ;  and  the  more  full  and  detailed  presentation  of 


"H        the  practical  part  of  ethics.     The  results  attained  in 
the  introductory  analysis  of  duty  are  supposed  to  be 


IV  PREFACE. 

accepted  generally  without  question.  The  recogni- 
tion throughout  of  the  essential  constituents  of  duty- 
attained  in  the  analysis  as  co-ordinate  and  comple- 
mentary, and,  therefore,  characterizing  all  duty,  has 
seemed  to  the  writer  to  give  to  the  treatise  a  solid 
and  unquestionable  basis,  together  with  thoroughly 
logical  harmony  and  completeness — the  characters, 
in  other  words,  of  a  truly  scientific  treatment.  As 
was  requisite,  however,  in  an  elementary  work,  the 
presentation  has  been  didactic  rather  than  argumen- 
tative ; — the  principles  and  truths  being  left  for  the 
most  part  to  appear  in  their  own  light 

New-Haven,  April,  1876. 


CONT  ENTS. 


INTRODUCTION.— §  i.  Ethics  Defined.  §  2. 
Founded  on  Psychology.  §  3.  One  of  the  Three 
Great  Departments  of  Mental  Science.  §  4. 
Method. 


BOOK  I. 


theoretical  morality THE  NATURE  OF  DUTY. 

CHAPTER  I.— Analysis  of  an  Act  of  Duty.— §  5.  The 
Duty  of  Regulus  to  return  to  Carthage. 

CHAPTER  II.— Subject  of  Duty— A  Moral  Person. — §  6. 
Moral  Person  Defined.  §§  7,  8.  An  Essentially  Active  Being.  §  9. 
Endowed  with  Sensibility.  §  10.  With  Intelligence.  §  11.  With 
Free  Will.  §  12.  The  Moral  Faculty— Practical  Reason,  Moral 
Sense,  Conscience.  §  13.  Threefold  Function  of  Conscience — 
Discriminative  of  Right  and  Wrong,  Obliging  to  Action,  Approv- 
ing or  Disapproving.  §  14.  Conscience  as  Source  of  Pleasure  or 
Pain. 


CHAPTER  III.  — Object  of  Duty.— §  15.  Object  of  Duty 
Defined.  §  16.  A  Person.  §  17.  Rights  Correlative  to  Duties. 
§  iS.  Good  Essential  Attribute  in  a  Duty  and  a  Right.  §  19 
Duties  Classified— (i)  to  Self;  (2)  to  Fellow-men  ;  {3)  to  God. 


VI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IV.— Moral  Action.— §  20.  Moral  Action  De- 
fined ;  implies  Love  in  Subject  of  Duty,  Good  in  Object  of  Duty, 
and  Rectitude  in  its  Essence.  §  21.  Systems  of  Morality  on  Each 
of  these  Elements. 

CHAPTER  V. — Love  as  Principle  of  Duty. — §  22.  Love 
Necessary  in  all  Duty.  §  23.  Fulfils  the  Whole  Law  of  Duty. 
§  24.  More  Exactly  Defined.  §  25.  Its  Three  Stages.  §  26.  The 
Opposite  of  Love,  or  Hate.  §  27.  Unsympathetic  Spirit  Opposed 
to  Duty. 

CHAPTER  VI.— Goodness  OR  Beneficence. — §  28.  Good  the 
One  Result  of  all  Perfect  Moral  Action.  §  29.  Different  Senses  of 
the  Term  Good;  Good  in  itself  as  Happiness,  the  Primary  and  Ul- 
timate Good ;  Good  as  means,  the  Secondary  and  Mediate  Good. 
§  30.  Good  in  itself  the  Gift  of  God  alone  ;  Secondary  Good  the 
only  Possible  Immediate  Effect  of  Human  Effort;  Secondary  Good 
either  Good  of  Character  or  of  Condition.  §  31.  The  Highest  and 
Largest  Good  Required  by  Duty.  §  32.  Summary  of  Doctrines 
Respecting  Good.  §  33.  Relation  of  Moral  Action  to  its  End 
§  34.  Evil,  the  Opposite  of  Good,  either  Physical  or  Moral 

CHAPTER  VII.— Rectitude.— §  35.  All  Perfect  Moral  Ac- 
tion must  be  Right.  §  36.  Rectitude  Respects  an  Action.  §  37. 
Particularly  the  Relation  in  an  Action  between  its  Source  and  its 
End.  §  38.  Implies  a  Natural  Fitness  or  Conformity  in  this  Rela- 
tion. §  39.  An  Unswerving  Directnesss  in  its  Movement.  §  40. 
And  a  Parallelism  with  all  Specific  Right  Acts.  §  41.  Wrong  the 
opposite  of  Right. 

CHAPTER  VIII.— Motives.— §  42.  Motive  Defined  as  Object 
of  the  Will.  §  43.  Two  Classes  of  Motives — Those  of  Character 
and  those  of  Condition.  §  44.  The  Three  Subordinate  Species  of 
the  First  Class.  §  45.  Three  Species  of  the  Second  Class.  §  46 
Motives  as  Ultimate  or  Proximate.  §  47.  Motives  not  Morally 
Right  or  Wrong.  §  48.  Selection  Among  Motives — In  What  Way 
Wrong. 

CHAPTER  IX.— Moral  Obligation.— §  49.  Moral  Obliga- 
tion Defined.    §  50.  Its  Ground. 

CHAPTER  X.  — Moral  Law.— §  51.  Moral  Law  Defined. 
§  52.  Divided  into   Physical  and  Moral.     §  53.  Harmonious  in  its 


CONTENTS.  VU 

Requirements.  §  54.  Commanding.  §  55.  Excites  Sense  of  Per- 
sonal Responsibility.  §  56.  Its  Sanctions.  §  57.  Merit,  Demerit, 
Praise,  Blame. 

CHAPTER  XI.— Authority.— §  58.  Authority  Defined.  §  59. 
Its  Seat  §  60.  How  Expressed.  §  61.  Natural  Law.  §  62.  Posi- 
tive Law.    §  63.  The  Bible. 

CHAPTER  XII.— Casuistry.— §  64.  Casuistry  Defined.  §65. 
Its  Leading  Principles. 


BOOK  II. 

PRACTICAL  MORALITY — DUTIES   AND    RIGHTS. 

INTRODUCTION.— §   66.  Division  of  Duties.  §  67.  Gen- 
ERAL  Recapitulation. 


DIVISION   FIRST — DUTIES   TO   SELF. 

CHAPTER  I.— Nature  and  Division.— §  68.  Personal  Duties 
Explained.  §  69.  The  Ground  of  Obligation  in  Them.  §  70. 
Self-Love.  §  71.  Defined.  §  72.  Two  Classes  of  Personal  Duties 
— in  Respect  to  Condition  and  to  Character. 

CHAPTER  II.— Personal  Duties  in  Respect  to  the  Body. 
— §  73.  Ground  of  Obligation  in  Personal  Duties.  §  74.  Duties 
Enumerated  :— I.  Of  Guarding  the  Body.  §  75.  II.  Of  Nourishing 
it— (I)  By  Food.  §  76.  (2)  By  Exercise.  §  -]-].  (3)  By  Rest.  §  78. 
III.  Of  Ruling  It,  §  79.  (i)  By  Overcoming  Sloth.  §  80.  (2)  By 
Regulating  Appetite.  §  81.  (3)  By  Training  to  Habits  of  Ministry. 
§  82.  (4)  By  Subordinating  Bodily  Wants. 

CHAPTER  III.— Personal  Duties  in  Respectto  External 
Condition.— §  "^-i^.  Nature  and  Divisions  of  Personal  Duties  in 
Respect  to  Condition.  §  84.  I.  In  Respect  to  External  Nature. 
§  85.  II.  In  Respect  to  Property.  §  86.  Institution  of  Property 
Beneficent.     §  %t.  Right  to  Property   Relative.     §  ZZ.  Relations  of 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

Duty  to  Property.  §  89.  Modes  of  Acquisition.  §  90.  Personal 
Duties  in  Respect  to  Property.  §  91.  III.  In  Respect  to  Station. 
§  92.  IV.  In  Respect  to  Friendship. 

CHAPTER  IV.— Personal  Duties  in  Respect  to  Charac- 
ter.— §  93.  Character  Defined.  §  94.  Formation  of  Character  In- 
volves an  Ideal,  Persistent  Endeavor,  Principle  of  Habit,  and  Use 
of  Outward  Occasions.  §  95.  Maxims.  §  96.  Culture  of  the  Sensi- 
bility. §  97.  Of  the  Imagination.  §  98.  Of  the  Intelligence — As 
Activity.  §  99.  In  Observing.  §  100.  In  Reflecting.  §  loi.  Of 
the  Regulative  Faculty.  §  102.  Of  the  Free  Will — As  a  Power. 
§  103.  As  Dominant.     §  104.  As  Free.    §  105.  As  Finite. 

DIVISION   SECOND — DUTIES   TO   OUR    FELLOW-MEN. 

PART   I. 

DUTIES  TO   PERSONS. 

INTRODUCTION.— §  106.    General  Division  of  Social 
Duties. 

CHAPTER  I.  —  Definition.— §  107.  Classification  Grounded 
on  Constituents  of  Duty — Love,  Good,  Right. 

CHAPTER  II. — Duties  to  Persons  Determined  from  the 
SUBJECT  OF  Duty  or  from  Love.  §  108,  Division.  §  109.  Sym- 
pathy. §  no.  Kindness.  §111.  Loving  Endeavor.  §  112.  Re- 
sentment.     §  113.  Fortitude.     §  114.   Anger.     §  115.  Forgiveness. 

CHAPTER  III. — Duties  of  Persons  Determined  from  the 
Object  of  Duty  or  from  Good. — §  116.  Divisions.  §  117.  Cour- 
tesy. §  118.  Truthfulness.  §  119.  Its  Two  Forms.  §  120.  Truth 
of  the  Heart.  §  121.  Veracity — Its  Objects.  §  122.  Its  Sphere. 
§  123.  Trustfulness.  §  124.  Justice  and  Beneficence — How  Re- 
lated and  How  Distinguished.  §125.  Beneficence,  as  Related  to 
Benevolence.  §  126.  The  Crowning  Virtue.  §  127.  Its  Specific 
Forms.  §  128.  Modes.  §  129.  Measure.  §  130.  Its  One  Object 
or  End.     §  131.  Justice  Defined.     §  132.  Its  Sphere. 

CHAPTER  IV.— Duties  TO  Persons  Determined  from  thb 
Act  OF  Duty.— §  133.  Two  Species  of  Duties   thus  Determined. 


CONTENTS.  IX 

§  134.  Aim  in  Duty.  §  135.  To  be  Governing.  §  136.  And  True 
to  Its  End.  §  137.  Straightforwardness  in  Performance.  §  138. 
Harmonj'  with  Things  and  Events. 


PART    II. — Duties  in  the  Family. 

CHAPTER  I.— The  Family  Institution.— §  139.  Family 
Defined.  §  140.  Rise  of  Obligation.  §  141.  A  Moral  Community. 
§  142.  Seat  of  Authority.     §  143.  Classes  of  Duties. 

CHAPTER  II.— Marital  Rights  and  Duties.— §  144.  Origin 
in  the  Marriage  Covenant.  §  145.  Polygamy.  §  146.  The  Parties 
to  this  Covenant  Intelligent  and  Free.  §  147.  Sanctitj-  of  the  Mar- 
riage Union.  §  148.  How  Solemnized.  §  149.  Rights  and  Duties 
of  Husband  and  Wife  Equal  and  Reciprocal.  §  150.  Authority 
Joint  and  Indivisible.     §  151.     Rights  and  Duties  Complementary. 

CHAPTER  III. — Parental  and  Filial  Rights  and  Duties. 
— §  152.  Origin  and  Limitation  of  these  Duties  in  the  Family  Re- 
lation. §  153.  Rights  and  Duties  Correlative.  §  154.  Duties  of 
Parents.  §155.  Duties  of  Children.  §156.  Finiteness  of  the  Obli- 
gation. 

CHAPTER  IV. — Fraternal  Rights  and  Duties. — §  157. 
Origin  and  Limit  m  the  Family.  §  158.  Equal,  Reciprocal,  and 
Complementary.     §  159.  Special  Duties. 


PART    III. — Duties  in  the  State. 

CHAPTER  I. — End  and  Moral  Nature  of  the  State. — 
§  160.  State  Defined.  §  161.  Its  Origin.  §  162.  Organized.  §  163. 
Sphere.  §  164.  A  Power.  §  165.  Seated  in  the  Free- Will.  §  166. 
Working  Through  Organs.  §  167.  The  End  of  the  State  Life. 
§  16S.  Its  Moral  Attributes.  §  169.  Not  a  Mere  Jural  Society 
§  170.  Comprehensive  Duties  of  the  State  as  Moral. 

CHAPTER  II.— The  Rights  and  Duties  of  a  State  in 


X  CONTENTS. 

Relation  TO  Itself. — i.  Existence. — §171.  Enumeration.  §172. 
Right  of  Existence.  §  173.  Origin  of  States.  §§  174,175.  Three- 
fold Duty  in  Self-Preservation.  §  176.  Support.  §  177.  Right  to 
Property  and  Service  of  Citizens.  §  178.  Taxes.  §  179.  Direct 
Taxes.  §  180.  Capitation  Taxes.  §  181.  Excise  Duties.  §  182. 
Imposts.  §  183.  Stamps.  §  184.  Income  Taxes.  §  185.  National 
Seif-Defense.  §  186.  Maintenance  of  Authority.  §  187.  Sanctions 
of  Law.  §  188.  Rewards.  §  189.  Penalties  and  their  Primary  End, 
Prevention  of  Disobedience.  §  190.  A  Second  End  of  Penalty, 
— Moral  Teaching  of  the  Community.  §  191.  A  Third  End — Re- 
formation of  the  Offender.  §  192.  Modes  of  Punishment.  §  193. 
Degrees  of  Penalty  Vary  with  the  Nature  of  the  Offence.  §  194. 
With  Facility  of  Detection.  §  195.  With  Number  and  Strength  of 
Offenders.    §  196.  With  the  Moral  Sentiment  of  the  Community. 

CHAPTER  III. — Political  Autonomy. — §  197.  Autonomy 
Defined.  §  198.  Ground  of  Right.  §  199.  Duty.  §  200.  Spheres. 
§  201.  Organic  Laws.  §  202.  The  Legislature.  §  203.  The  Judi- 
ciary.    §  204.  Legal  Rights  and  Equities.     §  205.  The  Executive. 

CHAPTER  IV.— Political  Growth.— §  206.  Right  and  Duty 
of  Growth.  §  207.  Spheres.  §  208.  Maxims.  §  209.  Rights  and 
Modes  of  Territorial  Extension.  §  210.  Increase  of  Population. 
§  211.  Internal  Strength.  §  212.  Public  Improvements.  §  213. 
Weights  and  Measures.  §  214.  Money  Defined.  §  215.  Standard 
and  Unit  of  Value  ;  Material.  §  216.  Elements  of  a  Sound  Mone- 
tary System.  §  217.  Postal  Facilities.  §  218.  Development  of 
Resources.  §  219.  Classes  of  Industries.  §  220.  Relation  of  the 
State  to  its  Productive  Industries  ; — Limitation  of  its  Duty. 
§221.  Modes  of  Fostering  Private  Productive  Industry.  §222. 
Free  Trade  and  its  Limitations.  §  223.  Public  Health.  §  224. 
Public  Education.  §  225.  Degree  of  Public  Education.  §  226. 
Modes.  §  227.  Public  Morals — The  Duty  of  the  State  to  Promote 
Morality.    §  228.  Modes. 

CHAPTER  v.— The  State  and  the  Citizen.— §  229.  Citizen 
Defined.  §  230.  Rights  of  Individuals  in  the  State — to  Pursue  the 
End  of  their  Being.  §  231.  Freedom  of  Thought  and  Action. 
§  232.  Protection.  §  233.  Special  Help.  §  234.  Duties  of  Indi- 
viduals to  the  State — Loyalty.  §  235.  Obedience.  §  236.  Support 
§  237.  Self-Expatriation. 


CONTENTS.  XI 

CHAPTER  VI. — International  Morality. — §  238.  Interna- 
tional Law — its  Divisions.  §  239.  Sources.  §  240.  Peculiarities  of 
International  Obligations.  §  241.  Specific  Duties — Sympathetic 
Good  Will,  §  242.  Lex  Taiu^is.  §  243.  Political  Retaliation  Vin- 
dictive or  Amicable.  §  244.  Comity  of  Nations.  §  245.  Rules  of 
Comit}'.  §  246.  Truthfulness.  §  247.  Justice.  §  248.  Benefi- 
cence. §  249.  International  Integrit}-.  §  250.  Rights  of  War. 
§  251.  Recognizable  War  Must  be  Public.  §  252.  Prosecuted  by 
Armed  Force.  §  253.  Have  Ostensible  Ground  of  Justice.  §  254. 
Parties  Affected  by  War — Non-Combatants.     §  255.  Neutrals. 


DIVISION    THIRD DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

CHAPTER  I.— §  256.  Nature  and  Ground.  §  257.  Will  ot 
God — How  Revealed.     §  258.  Classification  of  Religious  Duties. 

CHAPTER  II. — Personal  Religion — Piety  Towards  God. 
— §  259.  Piety  Defined.     §  260.  Religious  Gratitude. 

CHAPTER  III.— Personal  Religion— Reverence,  Prayer. 
— §  261.  Reverence.  §  262.  Prayer — its  Constituents.  §  263.  Its 
Characteristics.  §  264.  Obligations  to  Prayer.  §  265.  Objections 
to  Prayer.     §  266.  Irreverence. 

CHAPTER  IV.— Personal  Religion— Godly  Sincerity.— 
§  267.  Defined.  §  268.  True  Thought  of  God.  §  269.  True  Ex- 
pression to  Him.  §270.  Idolatr}-.  §271.  Superstition.  §272. 
Hypocrisy.     §  273.  Formality. 

CHAPTER  V. — Personal  Religion — Religious  Trust — 
Obkdience  and  Service. — §  274.  Religious  Trust.  §  275.  Quali- 
ties. §  276.  Obedience.  §  277.  Qualities.  §  278.  Ser\'ice.  §  279 
Qualiiies,     §  2S0.  Vows. 

CHAPTER  VI. — Personal  Religio.n — Religious  Integrity 
— §  281.  Singleheartedness.  §  282.  Unswerving  Directness.  §  283 
In  Parallelism  with  all  Lines  of  Dut>'.     §  284.  In  Moderation. 

A* 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII.— Social  Religion— Family  Religion.— 
§  285.  Spheres  of  Social  Religion.  §  286.  Obligations  to  Family 
Religion.  §  2S7.  Religious  Solemnization  of  Marriage.  §  288.  Reli- 
gious Ordering  of  the  Household.  |  289.  Special  Duties.  §  290. 
Worship. 

CHAPTER  VIII.— Social  Religion— State  Religion.— 
§  291.  Relations  of  Religion  to  the  Political  Community.  §  292. 
Special  Religious  Duties  in  the  State — (i.)  Must  not  Act  Irreligi- 
ously. §  293.  (2.)  Must  Protect  Citizens  in  their  Religion.  §  294. 
(3.)  May  Enlist  Religion  in  Marriage.  §  295.  (4.)  Recognize 
Religious  Seasons.  §  296.  (5.)  Appoint  Special  Religious  Obser- 
vances. §  297.  (6.)  Enlist  Religious  Sanctions — Oaths.  §  298.  Four 
Kinds  of  Oaths.     §  299.  Interpretation  of  Oaths. 

CHAPTER  IX.— Social  Religion— The  Church. — §  300. 
Religious  Association  Natural.  §  301.  Divers  Forms  and  Rela- 
tions to  the  State.  §  302.  Religious  Officials.  §  303.  Sacred  Sea- 
sons. §  304.  The  Sabbath.  §  305.  Obligations  to  Observe  the 
Sabbath.    §  306.  Sacred  Places.     §  307.  Worship. 


INTRODUCTION. 


§  I.  Ethics  is  well  defined  to  be  the 
Ethics  defined.   Science  of  Human  Duty, 

The  science  has  otherwise  been  named 
Moral  Science,  Moral  Philosophy  ;  also,  Deontology, 
from  the  Greek,  signifying  science  of  duty. 

In  analogy  with  other  sciences  which 
Methods.  relate  to  life  and  conduct,  a  system  of 

ethical  science  may  look  more  to  the 
principles  of  duty ;  or  to  the  application  of  these 
principles  to  practice  ;  or,  still  further,  to  the  result 
of  this  application  of  principles  to  practice  in  form- 
ing character.  The  definitions  have  varied  accord- 
ingly ;  and  the  respective  systems  founded  on  these 
definitions  become,  characteristically,  either  sciences 
of  the  Laws  of  Duty,  or  sciences  of  the  Duties  of 
Man,  or  sciences  of  Human  Character. 

While  the  method  of  unfolding  the  science  varies 
somewhat  with  these  various  modes  of  regarding 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

the  science,  the  substance  of  the  exposition  is  not, 
or  certainly  need  not  be,  materially  varied.  Ethics 
never  becomes,  like  Arithmetic  or  Rhetoric,  a  prop- 
er art ;  it  does  not,  by  apposite  examples  and  ex- 
ercises, put  the  learner  at  the  time  of  the  study 
upon  the  practice  of  one  after  another  of  the  par- 
ticular duties  which  it  enjoins,  nor  upon  the  specif- 
ic applications  of  its  principles  to  the  conduct.  It 
remains  a  proper  science,  whether  its  more  imme- 
diate aim  be  to  unfold  the  principles  of  duty,  or  the 
application  of  these  principles  to  conduct,  or  the 
character  which  the  principles  if  applied  would 
form. 

Moreover,  the  exposition  of  the  science  must 
cover  substantially  the  same  ground  whether  it 
founds  its  method  more  in  the  principles  of  duty, 
or  in  their  application  in  specific  duties,  or  in  the 
results  in  character. 

§  2.  Ethical  science  is  founded  direct- 
psTchdog^}"       ^y  ^^  psychology,  or  the  science  of  mind. 

It  accepts  thus  the  enumeration  and  the 
classification  of  mental  phenomena,  together  with 
their  origin  and  relations,  which  psychology  teaches. 
It  goes  beyond  that  science,  inasmuch  as  taking  up 
one  of  the  three  great  departments  of  mental  phe- 
nomena, or,  in  other  words,  one  of  these  depart- 
ments of  mental  activity  as  defined  and  explained 
in  psychology,  it  presents  that  in  respect  to  its  laws 
and  its  general  forms. 

Ethics,  accordingly,  accepts  from  psychology  its 
doctrine  in  regard  to  the  human  will  as  one  of  the 
three  great  functions  of  the  mind  ;  its  exposition  of 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

what  its  precise  function  is  ;  how  it  is  modified  in 
its  action ;  how  it  is  related  to  the  other  functions 
of  the  mind — the  sensibility  and  the  intelhgence. 
With  this  doctrine  of  the  nature  and  relations  of 
the  will  furnished  to  it  by  psychology,  Ethics  pro- 
ceeds to  unfold  the  laws  which  must  govern  in  a 
pure  and  perfect  act  of  will,  and  the  forms  in  which 
the  will  exerts  itself  under  these  laws. 

In  the  same  way,  Logical  Science  takes  from  psy- 
chology the  doctrine  of  the  intelligence — what  it  is 
in  its  essential  nature  and  relations — and  then  pro- 
ceeds to  derive  its  necessary  laws  and  its  valid 
forms.  As  thought  is  the  proper  product  of  the 
intelligence.  Logic  is  defined  as  the  science  of 
thought ;  or  inasmuch  as  the  perfect  in  thought  is 
truth,  logic  is  the  science  of  truth. 

^sthetical  science,  also,  accepts  the  psychological 
doctrine  of  the  sensibility — its  nature  and  modifica- 
tions—  and  then  proceeds  from  this  doctrine  to  un- 
fold its  laws  and  its  general  modes  or  states  under 
these  laws.  As  it  is  form  which  is  the  sole  object 
of  the  sensibility,  aesthetics  is  defined  as  the  science 
of  form.  Or  inasmuch  as  the  perfect  in  form  is 
known  as  the  beautiful,  aesthetics  is  the  science  of 
beauty. 

Inasmuch  as  a  perfect  act  of  will  in  man  is  duty. 
Ethics  is  the  science  of  duty. 

.     §  3.     Ethics,   accordingly,  with    Logic 

Coordinate  with  ^    ^      ^  .'  ,  ,  r 

Logic  and  ^s-   and  ^sthctics,  makes  up  the  group  oi 
sciences  founded  on  the  three  great  de- 
partments of  mental  phenomena  which  are  present- 
ed in  psychology.     The  three  sciences  have  a  com- 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

mon  parentage  and  are  related  to  one  another  as 
strictly  co-ordinate  sciences. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  calls  them  the  three  nomo- 
logical  sciences,  which  respectively  present  the  laws 
of  the  three  great  forms  of  mental  activity,  all  in 
like  manner  derived  from  psychology  which  pre- 
sents simply  the  facts  of  mental  activity. 

§  4.  The  proper  method  in  ethical 
Method.  science  will  be,  first,  by  a  careful  anal- 

ysis of  an  act  of  duty  to  ascertain  pre- 
cisely what  elements  necessarily  enter  into  duty  and 
make  it  what  it  is,  and  thus  ascertain  the  essential 
principles  of  duty  ;  and  then  to  enumerate  and  class- 
ify the  general  forms  in  which  acts  of  duty  appear, 
under  the  manifold  modifications  of  human  ex- 
perience. 

When  we  have  ascertained  precisely  what  it  is 
that  makes  an  act  one  of  duty — a  moral  act — then 
we  know  what  must  characterize  all  duty  ;  what 
characters  it  must  have  in  order  to  be  duty  ;  in 
other  words,  we  know  the  laws  of  duty  or  the  prin- 
ciples of  right  action.  And  when  we  have  ascer- 
tained the  general  forms  in  which  the  free-will  ex- 
erts itself  in  acts  of  duty,  by  a  careful  exploration  of 
the  field  of  human  experience  so  far  as  it  is  char- 
acterized as  moral,  we  are  enabled  to  apply  to  all 
these  forms  the  laws  of  duty  which  we  have  ascer- 
tained. We  are  enabled,  in  other  words,  to  deter- 
mine in  regard  to  all  human  action  what  is  truly 
moral  in  it,  and  also,  on  the  other  hand,  to  deter- 
mine  what  must  enter  into  every  form  of  human  ac- 
tion in  order  to  make  it  truly  moral. 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

This  treatise  will  therefore  present  in  the  first 
book — Theoretical  Morality — a  full  analysis  of  an 
act  of  duty,  in  order  to  determine  its  essential  na- 
ture ;  and  in  the  second — Practical  Morality — the 
specific  duties  pertaining  to  human  life. 


ANALYSIS   OF   AN   ACT   OF    DUTY. 


BOOK    I. 

THEORETICAL  MORAUTY THE  NATURE  OF  DUTY 


CHAPTER  I. 

ANALYSIS    OF    AN   ACT    OF    DUTY. 

§  5.  It  was  a  received  tradition  among 
Instance  of  duty,  the  Romans  that  some   two  centuries 

and  a  half  before  our  era,  a  certain  gen- 
eral of  theirs,  of  the  name  of  Regulus,  ha\-ing  been 
made  a  prisoner  by  the  Carthaginians,  was  sent 
back  to  Rome  to  efFect  an  exchange  of  prisoners 
under  an  oath  that  he  would  return  to  Carthage  in 
case  of  failure  ;  that  Regulus  failed  in  this  errand, 
but  resolutely  and  against  the  protestations  of 
friends,  kept  his  oath,  and  returned  to  Carthage  to 
certain  tortm-e  and  death.  Cicero  tells  us  that  such 
was  the  sentiment  of  the  age  in  regard  to  the  in- 
violable sanctity  of  an  oath,  that  Regulus  would  not 
have  been  allowed  to  do  otherwise. 

The  tradition  may  have  been  authentic  or  not. 
However  this  may  be,  the  stor}^  exemplifies  what 


8  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

will  be  recognized  by  all  as  an  act  of  duty.  It  was 
the  duty  of  Regulus  to  return  to  Carthage  in  fulfil- 
ment of  his  oath  ;  he  at  least  recognized  it  as  such  ; 
his  return  was  an  act  of  duty.  He  did  that  which 
was  due  to  the  Carthaginians — that  which  was  owed 
to  them ;  for  the  term  duty,  derived  to  our  language 
from  the  Latin  through  the  French,  means  simply 
that  which  is  owed.  Or,  at  least,  he  owed  it  to  him- 
self— to  his  self-respect,  to  his  conscience — to  keep 
his  oath.  By  returning,  he  simply  discharged  a 
debt. 

It  is  immaterial  how  the  debt  was  contracted  ; 
how  the  obligation  was  created.  It  is  enough  that, 
in  a  proper  sense  of  the  word,  Regulus  owed  his  re- 
turn to  Carthage,  and  his  act  of  returning  was,  con- 
sequently, an  act  of  duty. 

If  now  we  scrutinize  this  act  of  Regulus, 
eVements^.     ^^  discovcr  three  elements  in  it  which 

are  very  prominent,  and  which  imply 
one  another,  so  that  the  supposed  removal  of  either 
one  would  essentially  change  the  character  of  the  act 
and  would  also  involve  the  removal  of  the  other  ele- 
ments. They  are  (i)  a  person  owing — Regulus  ;  (2)  a 
person  or  persons — the  Carthaginians — or  at  least 
himself — to  whom  there  is  something  due  ;  and  (3) 
the  act  discharging  what  is  owed — the  return  to 
Carthage.  It  is  plain,  moreover,  that  these  three 
elements  are  the  exhaustive  elements  of  this  order 
or  class  in  the  act.  There  is  no  other.  They  are 
complementary  elements. 

We  have  thus  given  us  on  the  bare  inspection 
of  this  act  of  Regulus,  the  three  essential  elements 


ANALYSIS    OF    AN    ACT    OF    DUTY.  Q 

— a  personal  agent  owing  duty,  a  person  or  persons 
to  whom  this  duty  is  owed,  and  an  act  discharging 
this  duty.  We  use  language  correctly  in  denomin- 
ating these  elements  respectively  a  moral  person  or 
agent ;  a  moral  end  or  object ;  and  a  moral  action. 

We  shall  proceed  to  unfold  in  order,  in  separate 
chapters,  these  several  elements  and  the  several  con- 
stituents of  each. 


lO  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 


CHAPTEk  11. 

SUBJECT   OF    DUTY — A    MORAL    PERSON. 

§  6.  A  MORAL  PERSON  may  be  defined 
Moral  person       to  be  a  being  capable  of  duty. 

It  is  the  same  thing  to  say  that  a 
moral  person  is  a  being  capable  of  obligation, — that 
is,  a  being  capable  of  owing  and  of  fulfilling  obli- 
gation— as  to  say  that  he  is  a  being  capable  of 
duty — that  is,  a  being  capable  of  owing  and  ful- 
filling duty. 

In  the  present  treatise  we  confine  our  view  to 
human  duty ;  and  thus  we  speak  of  moral  persons 
so  far  as  subjects  of  duty  only  as  men.  In  this  re- 
stricted view,  the  term  duty  is  synonymous  with 
virtue,  which  is  a  term  from  the  Latin  signifying 
manhood ;  an  act  of  duty  being  in  the  case  of  men 
simply  an  act  of  true  or  perfect  manhood,  or  an  act 
which  a  true  and  perfect  man  would  do. 

§  7.  Indispensable  to  a  moral  person 
Mental  requisites,  ^hus  defined  as  a  being  Capable  of  duty, 

is  the  essential  attribute  of  a  human 
mind  or  soul,  viz. : — An  active  nature  endowed  with 
the  threefold  function  of  sensibility,  intelligence, 
and  free-will. 


SUBJECT  OF  DUTY — A  MORAL  PERSON.     II 

§  8.  A  moral  person  is  an  essentially 

I.  Active  natxure.  active  being. 

In  this  statement  are  involved  these 
two  particulars  : — 

1 .  That  a  person  is  moral  only  in  so  far  as  he  is 
active  ;  and 

2.  That  his  very  nature  impels  him  to  act. 

The  proof  of  the  first  of  these  two  particular 
propositions  is  found  in  the  very  notion  of  duty, 
as  already  indicated.  A  duty  is  an  act.  So  far  as 
it  is  owed  it  is  an  act  to  be  done :  and  when  it  is 
fulfilled,  it  is  fulfilled  only  by  an  act. 

All  morality,  hence,  respects  an  active  nature. 
Every  moral  person  must  be  one  capable  of  acting 
or  one  who  is  acting  or  who  has  acted.  If  we  speak 
of  a  moral  state,  or  a  moral  condition,  of  a  moral 
habit  or  a  moral  disposition,  of  moral  character, 
or  moral  responsibility,  there  is  necessarily  im- 
plied in  the  expression,  a  nature  capable  of  ac- 
tion, or  acting,  or  that  has  acted.  Simple  and 
clear  as  this  is,  ethical  theories  and  ethical  discus- 
sions have  run  into  pernicious  error  by  dropping 
out  of  view  this  essential  element  of  activity  which 
must  exist  in  everything  that  is  moral. 

Secondly,  every  moral  person  is  by  his  very 
nature  impelled  to  act.  It  is  as  natural  for  him  to 
act,  and  of  course,  to  act  morally,  as  it  is  for  a  stone, 
when  unsupported,  to  fall  to  the  ground,  or  for  a 
plant  to  put  forth  stalk  and  leaf,  or  for  an  animal  to 
take  food.  He  may  within  certain  limits  act  in  this 
way  or  in  that,  but  he  cannot  refrain  from  acting  in 
some  way.     He  may  act  feebly  or  he  may  act  with 


12  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

energy  ; — he  may,  to  some  extent,  control  the  de- 
gree of  activity  which  he  will  put  forth  ;  but  he 
must  act  in  some  degree.  Indolence  is  never  ab- 
solute inaction. 

§  9.  One  of  the  three  general  and  essen- 
2.  SensibiUtj'.     tial  functions  of  a  moral  nature  is  Sensi- 
bility. 

Regulus  felt  himself  bound  by  his  oath  to  return 
to  Carthage.  Without  this  feeling,  his  return  could 
not  possibly  have  been  a  moral  act :  so  far  as  any 
personal  morality  on  his  part  is  concerned,  he  might 
as  well  have  been  returned  a  corpse  or  in  a  state  of 
utter  unconsciousness.  Duty  to  be  fulfilled  must 
be  felt  to  be  owed. 

The  analysis  of  this  feeling  of  duty,  as  psychology 
teaches  us,  gives  as  its  constituent  elemsnts,  (i)  the 
impression  made  upon  the  sensibility  of  Regulus  by 
the  memory  of  his  oath  ;  and  (2)  the  impulse  or  in- 
stinctive tendency  occasioned  by  this  impression  to 
fulfil  the  oath,  by  returning  to  Carthage.  His 
memory  kept  pressing  on  his  sensibility  the  idea  of 
his  oath  and  this  kept  alive  the  impulse  to  fulfil  it. 
The  complex  feeling,  consisting  of  the  impression 
and  this  kind  of  impulse,  is  known  as  desire. 

In  the  case  of  Regulus,  as  in  common  instances 
of  duty,  desire  to  fulfil  duty  is  mingled  with  desires 
or  tendencies  in  an  opposite  direction.  Regulus, 
doubtless,  felt  a  strong  desire  to  avoid  the  ignominy, 
the  torture,  and  the  cruel  death  which  threatened 
his  return  to  his  enemies  who  would  be  infuriated 
by  his  failure  to  bring  the  prisoners  ;  a  strong  de- 
sire also  to  gratify  the  earnest  wishes  of  his  coun- 


SUBJECT  OF  DUTY — A  MORAL  PERSON.    1 3 

trymen,  of  his  friends,  of  his  family,  to  remain  in 
Rome.  But  with  these  desires,  there  was  also  the 
desire  of  fulfilling  duty.  It  was  this  desire  that 
prevailed  over  the  others  ;  at  least,  it  was  this  desire 
which  was  the  occasion  of  his  determining  to  return. 
Without  that,  such  a  determination  is  inconceivable 
as  a  moral  action. 

§  10.  The  second  general  function  es- 
3.  Intelligence,  scntial  in  a  moral  nature,  is  Intelligetice. 
Regulus  knew  his  duty  as  well  as  felt  it. 
Nor  could  there  be  duty  or  fulfilment  of  it  without 
such  intelligence.  He  must  have  known  his  oath. 
As  his  memory  recalled  it,  he  recognized  it  as  real,  as 
binding,  as  involving  certain  acts  which  he  under- 
stood very  well.  Had  he  been  without  any  knowl- 
edge of  any  such  oath  ever  having  been  made,  or  of 
its  having  any  binding  force  upon  him,  or  of  the 
acts  which  it  required  of  him,  there  could  have  been 
no  fulfilment  of  duty,  no  morality,  even  if  he  had 
in  some  way  been  taken  back  to  Carthage. 

Intelligence  or  knowledge  of  duty,  thus,  is  essen- 
tial in  all  morality.  This  knowledge  respects  the 
three  general  attributes  of  duty  : — 

First,  That  it  is  real — that  it  exists  ; 

Secondly,  That  it  is  in  its  essential  character 
binding  or  obligatory ;  and 

Thirdly,  That  it  involves  action,  which  action, 
also,  is  intelligible  as  to  its  particular  attributes. 

Among  these  attributes  of  the  particular  action 
which  must  be  recognized  in  all  duty  or  morality 
are : — 

First,  The  end  or  object  of  the  action  ; 


14  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

Secondly,  The  particular  activity  to  be  exerted  in 
accomplishing  this  end  ;  and 

Thirdly,  The  mode  of  exerting  this  activity. 

It  is  plain  that  a  person  is  incapable  of  duty  un- 
less he  is  capable  of  knowing  it  in  respect  to  all 
these  attributes. 

§  II.  The  third  general  function  es- 
4  Free-will        scntial  to  3.  moral  nature  is  Free-will. 

Regulus  determined  to  return  to  Car- 
thage ;  and  determination  in  such  a  case  is  known 
as  volition  or  act  of  will.  His  determination  was 
a  true  act  of  will  before  he  left  Rome  ;  before 
he  took  leave  of  family  and  friends  and  Senators  ; — 
before  he  had  taken  a  step  in  his  journey.  These 
were  but  the  so-called  executive  volitions  by  which 
his  determination  was  carried  out.  Had  he  been 
suddenly  struck  down  with  mortal  disease  before 
he  had  left  the  Senate  Chamber  in  which  he  had 
uttered  his  inflexible  purpose  to  return  to  Carthage 
and  in  this  way  or  in  any  other  way  had  been  pre- 
vented from  returning,  this  unexecuted  determina- 
tion would,  nevertheless,  have  been  moral, — would 
have  been  a  fulfilment,  so  far,  of  duty.  Even  if  he 
had  afterwards  changed  his  mind  and  refused  to  re- 
turn, the  first  determination,  if  sincere,  would  have 
been  moral.  It  might  have  been  too  weak  ;  it  might 
not  have  drawn  into  it  the  strength  from  feeling, 
from  intelligence,  from  vigor  of  soul,  that  it  should  ; 
it  was  yet  a  true,  if  imperfect,  act  of  duty.  His 
f alterings,  for  any  cause,  in  putting  forth  any  of  the 
subsequent  executive  volitions,  in  taking  any  of  the 
s>teps  involved  in  his  return,  may  have  been  each 


SUBJECT    OF    DUTY A    MORAL    PERSON.  I  5 

immoral  in  themselves  ;  they  could  not  have  altered 
the  moral  character  of  the  previous  sincere  deter- 
mination to  return. 

This  determination  was  free  ;  it  was  an  act  of 
free-will.  Freedom,  as  psychology  teaches,  is  an 
essential  attribute  of  the  human  will.  It  is  equally 
essential  in  all  duty — in  all  morality.  Regulus 
might  have  been  prevented  from  taking  a  single 
step  towards  carrying  out  his  determination  to  re- 
turn ;  this  did  not  reach  back  to  the  determination 
itself.  No  irresistible  force  hindered  that.  None, 
indeed,  compelled  him  to  determine  to  return  ; — he 
could  have  yielded  to  the  importunate  entreaties  of 
his  friends  and  determined  not  to  return.  He  was 
free  in  this  respect — that,  while  the  alternative  of 
determining  to  go  or  not  to  go  was  before  him  as 
an  active  being,  one  of  whose  essential  functions  is 
that  of  free-will,  and  one  or  the  other  determina- 
tion he  was  compelled  to  make,  he  was  as  truly 
capable  of  the  one  determination  as  of  the  other. 
In  all  probability  the  determination  not  to  return 
was  the  easier  in  a  certain  sense  :  the  predominance 
in  strength  of  inducement  may  have  been,  in  a  cer- 
tain sense,  in  that  direction  ;  but  he  proved  him- 
self to  be  free  in  his  determining,  notwithstanding, 
to  return  to  Carthage. 

Free-will  thus  is  an  essential  element  in  all  moral- 
ity. An  act  of  duty,  a  moral  act,  is  inconceivable  if 
this  element  be  wanting.  Free-will  implies,  first, 
the  general  capability  of  choice — of  determination  ; 
and,  secondly,  the  inherence  in  the  moral  person 


1 6  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

himself  of  this  capability  beyond  the  compulsory 
constraint  of  any  external  force. 

§  12.     This  activity,  which  in  its  three- 
dlfined^'"^*^    fold  function  is  concerned  in  all  duty,  is 

known  as  the  Moral  Faculty. 
The  Moral  Faculty  may  accordingly  be  defined 
to  be  that  endowment  in  man  which  makes   him 
capable  of  duty.     It  embraces  the  three-fold  func- 
tion of  sense,  intelligence,  and  free-will. 

The  Moral  Faculty  differs  from  the  intellectual 
faculty  in  this :  that  in  its  exercise,  duty  is  promi- 
nently concerned,  while  in  the  exercise  of  the  intel- 
lectual faculty,  knowledge  is  prominently  concerned. 
The  same  act  may  be  a  moral  act  and  a  knowing  act. 
In  truth  every  act  of  man,  so  far  as  it  is  rational,  is 
both  a  moral  act  and  a  knowing  act — ^is  both  moral 
and  intellectual.  It  is  denominated  the  one  or  the 
other  simply  because  the  one  or  the  other  is  more 
prominent,  or  because  the  one  or  the  other  is  select- 
ed at  the  time  for  consideration  to  the  temporary 
suppression  of  the  other  from  view.  The  moral 
faculty  differs  from  moral  feeling  only  as  a  faculty 
differs  from  a  capacity.  The  one  is  active  ;  the 
other  is  characteristically  passive.  But  every  ration- 
al act  of  man  has  its  active  side  and  its  passive 
side,  and  is  denominated  an  act  or  a  feeling  only  be- 
cause the  one  or  the  other  is  made  more  prominent 
to  view  either  in  fact  or  for  contemplation. 

The  expression,  Moral  Facility ^  has  been 
Synonyms.        in  a  narrower  sense  used  as  synonymous 

with  Practical    Reason,   Moral    Sense, 
Conscience.     In  this  narrower  use  it  embraces  only 


SUBJECT  OF  DUTY — A  MORAL  PERSON.    1/ 

the  feelings  and  the  intellectual  states  concerned 
with  duty  or  with  acts  of  free-will,  and  does 
not  include  the  free-will  itself.  An  act  of  duty  may 
be  so  analyzed  as  to  give  these  two  parts  :  (i)  The 
free-will  itself  ;  (2)  the  combined  feeling  and  intel- 
ligence which  ever  accompany  this  act  of  free-will. 
To  this  second  constituent,  the  term  Moral  Faculty 
has  sometimes  been  applied,  as  also  the  other  de- 
nominations— the  Practical  Reason,  Moral  Sense, 
Conscience. 

The  first  of  these  designations,  Moral  Faculty,  is 
founded  on  the  general  nature  of  the  mind  as  an 
activity.  It  denotes  that  part  of  the  mind's  activity 
which  is  concerned  with  duty — in  knowing  it,  in 
feeling  it,  in  doing  it. 

The  designation,  Practical  Reason,  is  founded  in 
the  characteristic  of  man  as  rational,  distinguishing 
him  from  the  brute  creation.  It  denotes  that  de- 
partment of  rational  activity  which  is  concerned  in 
duty.  It  includes  all  moral  feeling,  however,  as 
well  as  all  moral  intelligence. 

The  designation,  Moral  Sense,  is  founded  in  the 
nature  of  man  as  feeling,  as  impressible  by  the 
idea  of  duty,  and  as  capable  of  impressing  it  on 
the  free-will.  It  denotes  simply  sensibility  so  far 
as  concerned  in  duty.  It  includes,  however,  the. 
intelligence  associated  with  it  in  an  act  of  free- 
will. 

The  term,  Conscience,  is  but  the  consciousness 
limited  to  the  moral  sphere.  It  denotes  all  that  in- 
tzlligence  and  feeling  of  which  a  man  is  conscious 
in  an  act  of  duty. 


1 8  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

^u    r,jr       §  13-     Conscience,  as  an  act  or  state  of 

Threefold  func-  ,  .       , 

tion  of  con-       a  moral  person,  includes  three  principal 

functions,  all  present  in  it,  either  one  of 
which,  however,  may  be  contemplated  separately 
from  the  others.  The  first  function  of  conscience 
is  to  recognize  and  feel  duty. 

When  a  moral  action  is  brought  before 
1.  Sense  of  duty.  US,  whether  it  be  our  own  or  another's, 

or  whether  it  be  already  done  or  only 
proposed  to  be  done,  we  immediately  and,  if  our  view 
be  turned  towards  this  attribute  of  it,  necessarily  feel 
it  to  be  right,  to  be  a  duty,  an  action  that  ought  to 
be  done,  or  the  contrary.  Every  act  of  duty,  every 
moral  act,  has  this  attribute,  which  accordingly  can 
always  be  recognized  and  felt.  Conscience  always 
includes  this  recognition  and  feeling  whenever  it 
contemplates  an  act  of  duty. 

A  second  function  of  conscience  con- 
forS!*^^^^^^       templating  a  proposed  act  of  duty,  is  to 

impel  or  oblige  to  the  performance  of  it. 
Conscience  has  a  peremptory,  commanding,  con- 
straining character.  We  attribute  to  it  an  author- 
ity. Its  purpose  may  be  overborne  by  other  in- 
fluences, its  authority  may  be  resisted  ;  but  so  far 
as  it  has  existence  it  presses  to  duty. 

This  impelling  or  constraining  force  of  conscience, 
is  of  the  nature  of  an  instinct.  It  is,  like  the  im- 
pulsive or  constraining  force  of  appetite,  seated  in 
our  very  being.  It  is,  however,  the  strongest  and 
most  commanding  instinct  of  our  nature,  for  it 
is  seated  in  the  highest  department  of  our  being. 
It  is,  unlike  the  appetite,  authoritative,  because  its 


SUBJECT  OF  DUTY — A  MORAL  PERSON.     1 9 

constraining  force  bears  immediately  on  the  free- 
will, which  by  reason  of  its  freedom  becomes  capa- 
ble of  obedience  or  disobedience,  and  accordingly 
subject  to  authority. 

Conscience,  thus,  is  properly  denominated  the 
sovereign  of  the  soul.  It  is  the  sole  function  of  the 
mind  by  which  authority  can  be  recognized,  or  felt, 
or  imposed.  Every  command,  as  every  obligation, 
coming  from  whatever  source— from  our  own  being, 
from  our  fellow  men,  or  from  our  creator, — reaches 
us  only  through  the  conscience.  To  it  belongs  the 
rightful  supremacy  in  the  soul  over  all  other  facul- 
ties and  capacities.  It  is  the  lawgiver,  either 
through  its  original  nature  and  by  its  working  as 
left  to  itself,  or  as  organ  and  medium  of  all  external 
authority  ; — it  is  either  sovereign  by  right  of  nat- 
ural constitution,  or  is  vicegerent  of  all  external 
sovereignty. 

But  conscience  is  law-giver,  not  doer  of  the  law  ; 
its  function  is  legislative,  not  executive.  It  pre- 
scribes law ;  it  is  the  free-will  that  obeys  or  dis- 
obeys. 

This  function  of  conscience  has  a  passive  as  well 
as  an  active  side.  It  feels  as  well  as  acts.  When 
viewed  on  this  side  it  is  often  called  sense  of  obli- 
gation. 

The  psychological  analysis  is  obvious  and  is  ex- 
actly analogous  to  that  which  is  applicable  to  most 
concrete  mental  states.  An  action  is  proposed  to 
the  free-will.  Every  such  action  possesses  the  at- 
tribute of  right  or  wrong,  which  is  discernible  just 
as  the  attribute  of  bright  or  round  is  discernible  in 


20    SUBJECT  OF  DUTY— A  MORAL  PERSON. 

the  sun.  The  soul  is  impressed  by  this  attribute, 
that  is,  feels  it.  But  the  impression  or  bare  feehng 
continues  in  the  form  of  an  idea  of  right  or  wrong, 
which  is  kept  before  the  intelUgence  as  before  the 
free-will.  The  intelligence  recognizes  the  attribute 
of  right  or  wrong  as  real,  as  belonging  to  the  action, 
and  the  like.  In  this  feeling  from  the  sensibility 
and  this  hght  from  the  intelligence,  the  free-will  by 
the  very  force  of  its  nature  is  constrained  to  act  by 
choosing  or  refusing.  But  the  legitimate  tendency 
of  this  activity  is  to  the  doing  of  the  action  if  felt 
and  recognized  to  be  right,  or  refusing  to  do  it,  if 
felt  and  seen  to  be  wrong.  This  tendency  is  felt 
also,  and  in  this  feeling  of  the  force  pressing  to 
duty  consists  the  sense  of  obligation. 

The  third  function  of  conscience  is  to 
bia^^^^^  ^"^  praise  or  blame ;  to  approve  or  con- 
demn. 
We  cannot  contemplate  a  moral  action  in  its  full 
light  and  character  without  recognizing  and  feeling 
that  it  is  to  be  praised  or  blamed.  We  praise 
Regulus  for  observing  his  oath  ;  while  we  should 
have  severely  blamed  him  if  he  had,  when  under  no 
obligation  and  without  any  occasion,  freely  exposed 
himself  to  torture  and  death  by  returning  to 
Carthage. 

Such  is  the  threefold  function  of  conscience  : 
(i)  to  recognize  and  feel  duty ;  (2)  to  oblige  to  the 
performance  of  it ;  and  (3)  to  praise  or  blame. 

§  14.     To  this   threefold    function     of 

^°"J"''°^J°y°' conscience  must  be  added  a  fourth,  if 

conscience  be  extended  to  include  the 


THEORETICAL    MORALITY.  21 

pleasure  or  pain  that  naturally  attends  all  right  or 
wrong  action.  Good  usage  sanctions  this  extension. 
But  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  this  function  of  con- 
science immediately  and  properly  respects  only  one's 
own  acts,  never  those  of  others.  It  differs  there- 
fore in  this  respect  from  the  three  other  functions 
named.  There  is  a  propriety,  therefore,  in  main- 
taining the  threefoldness  of  the  functions  of  con- 
science. This  fourth  function  deserves,  however, 
a  distinct  and  marked  consideration  in  Ethics. 

The  fulfilment  of  duty  brings  along  with  it  by 
the  law  of  a  moral  nature  a  certain  satisfaction,  a 
pleasure.  We  say  conscience  is  satisfied  with  it,  is 
pleased  with  it.  If  the  act  is  only  proposed  to  be 
done,  this  pleasure  or  satisfaction  is  expected  as 
certain  to  be  felt  in  the  doing  of  it  or  when  it  is 
done.  If  the  act  be  that  of  another  person,  we  un- 
hesitatingly believe  that  it  brings  to  him  the  same 
pleasure  or  satisfaction. 

This  pleasure  is  precisely  analogous  to  that  which 
attends  the  legitimate  exercise  of  the  intellect  or  of 
the  sensibility.  It  is  only  higher,  more  intense,  be- 
cause the  moral  nature  is  the  higher,  more  predom- 
inating nature  in  man. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  violation  of  duty  brings 
in,  by  the  very  constitution  of  our  moral  being,  dis- 
satisfaction, pain,  which,  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
pain  from  other  causes,  is  called  remorse. 

This  pleasure  of  a  good,  that  is  of  an  approving, 
conscience,  and  this  pain  of  a  disapproving  con- 
science,   regarded    in   relation   to  the  law    which 


22    SUBJECT  OF  DUTY — A  MORAL  PERSON. 

imposes  duty,  constitute  in  part  the  satictions  of  the 
law  ;  the  rewards  of  right  or  wrong  action. 

The  doer  of  the  action,  moreover,  is  said  to  be 
deserving  of  the  reward  or  penalty.  His  action 
places  him  in  a  certain  relation  to  the  pleasure  or 
pain  naturally  attending  it,  which  we  call  desert  or 
me}  it.  This  relation  to  wrong  action  is  called  ill- 
desert  or  demerit. 

It  will  have  been  observed  that  conscience  in- 
cludes an  exercise  both  of  the  intelligence  and  of 
the  sensibility.  It  involves  perception  or  intuition 
and  judgment  on  the  one  hand,  and  feeling  on  the 
other,  both  as  impression  and  also  as  natural  pleas- 
ure or  pain.  Much  confusion  and  disagreement 
have  arisen  in  ethical  discussions  from  the  exclusion 
of  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  elements.  Those 
writers  who  have  regarded  conscience  as  the  same 
as  the  Practical  Reason  have  inclined  to  shut  out 
of  view  the  element  of  feeling  ;  and  the  advocates 
of  a  Moral  Sense,  on  the  other  hand,  have  depressed 
from  view  the  intelligence  side  of  conscience. 


OBJECT    OF   DUTY — A   MORAL    PERSON.  23 

CHAPTER  III. 

OBJECT    OF    DUTY. 

§  15.  By  the  object  of  duty  is  meant 
Object  of  duty   i\^Q  person  to  whom  duty  is  owing. 

Our  analysis  gave  the  three  essential 
elements  in  an  act  of  duty  as  a  subject  of  duty,  or 
a  person  owing  and  fulfilling  the  duty ;  a  person  to 
whom  this  duty  is  owed  and  fulfilled  ;  and  the  ac- 
tion itself  of  fulfilling  the  duty.  Regulus  owed  the 
duty  of  return  to  the  Carthaginians,  who  were  ac- 
cordingly the  object  of  this  duty. 

§  16.     Only  persons  can  be  objects  of 

Eva-  a  person.     dutV. 

Regulus  was  bound  in  duty  not  to  the 
city  walls  of  Carthage;  not  to  the  prison  from 
which  he  was  taken ;  not  to  any  law  or  principle ; 
but  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  certainly  to  himself 
as  a  man.  The  duty  of  returning  was  owed  to 
them,  or  at  least  to  himself. 

Duty  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  owed  to  a 
stone.  It  is  certainly  a  duty  not  wantonly  to  break 
or  otherwise  destroy  a  precious  gem.  In  a  loose 
sense  we  may  speak  of  its  being  due  to  the  gem  as 
a  thing  of  great  value  that  it  be  kept  from  injury. 
But  the  duty  here  is  properly  due  to  the  maker  of 
the  gem,  that  his  creative  design  be  not  frustrated ; 
to  the  owner  of  the  gem  from  whom  so  much  value 
would  be  taken  by  its  destruction  ;  to  one's  self 
whose  moral  nature  would  be  harmed  by  an  act  of 


24  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

reckless  waste.  The  stone  can  know  no  duty  to 
itself.  It  can  put  up  no  claim.  It  can  receive  no 
redress  from  a  withholding  of  its  due. 

Nor,  any  more,  can  duty  properly  be  said'  to  be 
owed  to  a  plant.  It  would  undoubtedly  be  wrong 
needlessly  to  trample  under  foot  a  beautiful  flower, 
or  to  withhold  the  care  which  may  be  necessary  for 
its  preservation  or  for  perfecting  its  growth.  But 
this  duty  is  not  properly  due  to  the  plant,  but  only 
to  Him  who  made  it,  to  those  who  can  enjoy  its 
beauty,  to  one's  self  to  whom  it  is  due  that  his  own 
nature  be  not  marred  by  an  act  of  wanton  destruc- 
tion or  of  inexcusable  neglect. 

Nor,  still  further,  can  duty  properly  be  said  to  be 
owed  to  mere  animal  nature.  We  say  in  loose 
language  that  the  horse  is  a  noble  animal  and  care 
and  kindness  are  due  to  it.  But  these  duties  are 
not  properly  owed  to  the  animal,  but  to  the  Creator, 
to  them  who  can  be  benefited  by  it,  or  to  one's 
self,  to  whom  wanton  cruelty  is  forbidden.  The 
animal  cannot  be  sensible  of  any  duty  owed  to 
itself  ;  cannot  exact  or  be  sensible  of  proper  re- 
dress.    The  animal,  as  such,  has  no  rights. 

§  1 7.    The  correlative  of  duty  in  a  moral 
A  right.  subject  is,  in  an  object  of  duty,  a  right. 

What  was  his  duty  in  Regulus,  viz. : 
his  return,  as  owed  and  fulfilled  to  the  Carthagi- 
nians, was  to  them  their  right.  Rights  are  the  cor- 
relates of  duties.  The  one  implies  the  other.  There 
can  be  no  duty  where  there  is  no  right  ;  to  every 
right  theri  must  be  a  corresponding  duty.  Every 
creature  has  a  right  to  reach  the  end  for  which  i 
was  made  ;  and  so  we  say  with  reverence,  it  is  due 


OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  2$ 

from  its  Creator  that  he  enable  it  to  reach  this  end 
of  its  being.  The  creation  shows  its  own  perfect- 
ness  in  this  that  the  means  are  furnished  to  the 
creature  of  fulfilHng  the  ends  of  its  being.  This  at 
least  is  the  general  truth ;  the  modifications  of  the 
statement  are  to  be  found  only  in  the  case  of  crea- 
tures made  subservient  to  the  ends  of  other  beings. 
Creatures,  moreover,  so  far  as  parts  of  a  universe 
affecting  one  another,  owe  mutual  duties  to  one 
another,  and  accordingly  have  respectively  rights 
to  which  such  duties  correspond.  The  same  act  is 
a  duty  in  respect  to  the  subject  of  duty,  which  is  a 
right  in  respect  to  the  object  of  duty.  The  return 
of  Regulus  to  the  Carthaginians,  as  stated,  is  his 
duty,  and  their  right. 

§  1 8.    The  essential  character  in  every- 
Goodinduty      thinsc   which  can   be   conceived   of   as 

and  nght.  '^ 

duty  or  as  a  right  is,  that  it  is  Good. 

By  good  here  is  meant  good  that  lies  in  experi- 
ence ;  good  that  is  felt.  In  other  words,  by  good 
is  meant  happiness — blessedness — or  that  which 
occasions  it. 

The  good  which  is  thus  to  be  rendered  in  the 
fulfilment  of  duty  and  which  is  claimed  in  the  exac- 
tion of  every  right,  may  be  only  good  in  estimation, 
not  necessarily  a  real  good.  The  return  of  Regulus 
might  have  proved  a  real  evil  to  the  Carthaginians  ; 
but  it  was  to  them  a  good,  fitted  in  their  estimation, 
perhaps  erroneous,  to  occasion  to  them  happiness. 
His  return  doubtless  was  a  satisfaction  to  them. 

The  good  in  duty  and  in  a  right  may  be  indirect 
or  remote.  The  only  good  expected  by  the  Car- 
thaginians might  have  been  that  it  would  deprive 


26  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

Rome  of  her  ablest  general,  and  save  them  from 
their  most  formidable  enemy,  or  it  might  be  the 
good  there  might  have  been  in  the  revenge  which 
they  would  be  quick  to  execute  on  their  victim 
when  he  should  return  into  their  power. 

A  good,  real  or  supposed,  immediate  or  remote, 
thus  enters  essentially  into  duty  and  into  its  cor- 
relative right.  A  duty  that,  fulfilled,  should  work 
no  conceivable  good  in  any  way,  and  a  right  that 
satisfied  brings  no  good,  are  alike  inconceivable. 

§  19.  Human  duties  are  most  conveni- 
of?utf^*^°"  ently  classified  in  reference  to  the  ob- 
ject of  duty.  Inasmuch  as  human  duty 
from  its  nature  as  pertaining  to  an  act,  can  exist 
only  where  human  action  can  reach,  the  only  ob- 
jects of  duty  to  man  are  those  beings  which  this 
action  can  affect. 

A  man's  acts  affect  himself  most  nearly  and 
directly.  By  the  law  of  his  being  every  legitimate 
exercise  of  his  powers  brings  a  kind  of  pleasure — 
is  a  good.  His  acts,  directly  and  also  indirectly, 
affect  his  fellow-men.  They  also,  in  a  certain  way, 
reach  to  God.  They  may  reach,  moreover,  other 
beings,  as  the  world  of  angelic  and  of  disembodied 
spirits  ;  but  this  relation  of  human  duty  is  suffi- 
ciently illustrated  in  the  light  of  the  other  relations 
and,  therefore,  requires  no  distinct  treatment.  The 
three  great  classes  of  human  duties,  accordingly, 
which  the  object  of  duty  gives  us,  are  : — 
I.  Duties  to  Self  ; 
II.  Duties  to  Fellow-men  ;  and 

III.  Duty  to  God. 


MORAL  ACTION.  27 


CHAPTER  IV. 

MORAL     ACTION. 

§  20.  A  MORAL  ACTION  is  3.  performance 
J^^^c^o"      or  fulfilment  of  duty. 

More  particularly,  a  moral  action  is 
the  action  of  a  subject  of  duty  by  which  he  fulfils 
or  discharges  what  is  owed  to  the  object  of  duty. 

A  moral  action  implies  an  agent  and  an  ob- 
ject, as  also  the  movement  of  the  agent  to  or  to- 
wards the  object.  It  implies,  moreover,  a  certain 
kind  of  agent,  a  certain  kind  of  object,  and  a  certain 
kind  of  movement,  each  of  which  may  properly  be 
denominated  moral.  It  follows  from  this  that  a 
moral  action  may  properly  be  characterized  in  ref- 
erence to  the  agent,  or  in  reference  to  the  object,  or 
more  exclusively  in  reference  to  the  essential  nature 
of  the  act  itself. 

We  may  thus  characterize  a  moral  action  in  refer- 
ence to  the  agent ;  and  if,  in  seeking  to  do  this, 
we  inquire  what  it  is  in  a  subject  of  duty  which 
makes  his  action  moral,  we  find  the  answer  to  be 
love.  Every  perfect  moral  act  must  be  a  loving 
act. 


28  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

We  may  in  like  manner  characterize  a  moral  ac- 
tion in  reference  to  the  object  of  duty  ;  and  we  find 
that,  as  good  in  the  object  is  that  which  a  moral 
action  aims  at,  so  every  perfect  moral  action  must 
be  a  good  action.  It  must  be  good  in  the  sense  of 
being  beneficent. 

Characterizing  a  moral  action  simply  in  reference 
to  its  own  intrinsic  nature,  in  a  similar  way,  we  say 
it  is  right.  Every  perfect  moral  action  is  a  right 
action. 

If  we  analyze  a  perfect  moral  action  thus  we  find 
it  includes  the  three  elements  of  love,  goodness  or 
beneficence,  rectitude,  essentially  related  to  one  an- 
other. It  must,  proceeding  from  a  moral  subject, 
be  a  movement  from  love.  As  resulting  in  amoral 
object  it  must  be  a  movement  that  is  beneficent, 
bringing  good  as  its  proper  result.  As  an  action 
from  such  a  subject  towards  such  an  object,  it  must 
be  direct  in  its  movement  from  starting-point  to 
goal,  and  so  be  characterized  as  right. 

§  21.  It  follows  from  this  exposition  that 
Diversely  de-     with   a  Certain  correctness    a    perfect 

nominated.  ,  ,  ^ 

moral  action  may  be  denominated  as  an 
act  of  perfect  love  ;  or  as  an  act  of  perfect  goodness 
or  beneficence  ;  or  as  an  act  of  perfect  rectitude. 

It  also  follows  that  love  as  fulfilment  of 
The  three  eie-     (ju^y  canuot  be  cxccpt  as  both  benefi- 

ments  essential.  ^  ^ 

cent  in  its  proper  result  and  right  in  its 
movement.  Nor,  any  more,  can  any  moral  good- 
ness or  beneficence  be  conceived  of  apart  from  love 
as  its  source  and  rectitude  as  its  procedure.  Nor  still 


MORAL   ACTION.  29 

further  is  any  right  action  possible  or  conceivable 
without  love  or  without  goodness  or  beneficence. 

It  follows,  still  further,  that  in  the  discussion  of 
moral  questions,  while  the  principles  of  human 
thought  and  human  speech  allow  the  designation  of 
a  perfect  moral  act,  either  as  an  act  of  love,  or  as  an 
act  of  goodness  or  beneficence,  or  as  an  act  of  recti- 
tude ;  if  yet  either  element  be  excluded  from  view, 
error  must  be  the  inevitable  result. 

Hence  a  perfect  system  of  morals  may 
Threefold  sys-     ^g  founded  either  on  love,  on  goodness 

tem  of  morality. 

or  beneficence,  or  on  right,  as  its  prin- 
ciple, provided  always  due  regard  be  had  to  its  re- 
lation to  the  other  co-ordinate  principles. 

There  may  thus  be  a  system  founded  on 
okkfvl°'^'^^'^     love  which  shall  have  full  validity,  and 

also  completeness.  It  may  plant  itself 
on  a  moral  action  and  turn  its  view  to  the  subject 
of  duty  concerned  in  it.  As  morality  cannot  reach 
beyond  the  endowments  of  the  agent  whom  it  re- 
spects, a  system  of  morality  which  reaches  to  the 
entire  nature  of  a  moraf  subject  must  be  complete. 
It  may  be  valid  and  authoritative,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
founded  in  the  very  attributes  of  a  moral  subject. 
Love  is  obligatory  on  man  because  his  is  a  loving 
nature.  He  is  endowed  with  the  faculties  of  love 
and  is  made  to  love.  It  is  hence  the  law  of  his 
being  that  he  love. 

Again,  a  system  of  morality  may  be  founded  on 
the  principle  of  goodness  or  beneficence — on  the 
good  that  the  subject  of  duty  may  effect  in  the  ob^ 
ject  of  duty.     Such  a  system  may  take  its  stand  in 


30  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

a  moral  action  and  direct  its  look  to  the  object  or 
end  of  the  action.  This  principle,  unfolded  in  the 
full  light  of  the  co-ordinate  principles  of  love 
and  rectitude,  may  give  a  system  of  morality  at 
once  valid  and  complete.  It  must  be  valid,  for 
as  all  moral  action  respects  good  as  its  end 
and  object,  and  as  man  as  a  creature  of  God 
is  made  for  this  end — to  work  good — this  end  or 
object  must  contain  in  it  the  law  of  life,  just  as  the 
destined  end  of  a  journey  prescribes  the  progress 
to  be  made  and  the  way  by  which  it  is  to  be  made. 
It  will,  also,  in  a  certain  sense,  be  complete  if  it 
embrace  the  entire  good  in  the  object  of  duty  which 
can  be  effected  by  the  subject  of  duty  in  the  way  in 
which  he  must  work  to  this  end. 

Once  more,  a  moral  system  may  be  founded  on 
the  principle  of  right  and  be  both  valid  and  com- 
plete. It  may  take  its  stand-point  in  a  moral  action 
and  turn  its  view  in  the  direction  of  the  essential 
nature  of  such  an  action.  It  may  be  valid,  because 
its  foundation  is  in  the  essential  nature  of  an  act  of 
duty — a  movement  of  love  to  good  as  its  end.  It 
may  be,  in  a  certain  sense,  complete,  because  it  may 
comprehend  the  entire  movement  of  a  moral  sub- 
ject in  reference  to  the  end  of  all  his  action. 

Systems  of  morality  have  accordingly  been  con- 
structed on  each  of  these  principles  respectively. 
There  are  systems  founded  on  love  which  unfold  the 
law  of  love  in  its  nature  and  its  applications  to  human 
conduct.  There  are  systems  founded  on  good — on 
happiness  or  blessedness — which  unfold  the  law  of 
benevolence  in  its  nature  and  application  to   the 


MORAL    ACTION.  3r 

life  and  conduct.  There  are,  moreover,  systems 
founded  on  rectitude,  which  unfold  the  law  or  the 
rule  of  right  in  its  nature  and  applications.  None 
of  these  systems  fail  in  their  validity  and  com- 
pleteness because  founded  on  a  wrong  or  unreal 
principle  ;  but  only  as  they  fail  severally  to  recog- 
nize the  co-ordinate  validity  of  the  other  systems, 
and  to  develope  their  respective  laws  or  supreme 
rules  in  due  regard  to  the  others.  In  other  words, 
their  failure,  so  far  as  it  exists,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  omission  to  recognize  the  principle  on  which 
they  have  been  founded,  as  but  one  of  those 
principles  which  are  essentially  concerned  in  all 
morality.  The  reason  is  plain.  As  there  can  be 
no  morality  where  there  is  not  a  moral  agent,  a 
moral  end,  and  a  moral  action  proceeding  from  this 
agent  to  this  end,  so  no  system  of  morality  can 
be  in  the  fullest  sense  perfect  and  entire,  which 
does  not  recognize  the  relationship  between  these 
elements  of  duty  as  co-ordinate  and  co-essential  in 
all  morality. 


32  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 


CHAPTER  V. 

LOVE   AS    PRINCIPLE   OF   DUTY. 

§  22.  We  have  found  that  we  may,  in 
^ubTec^^F  D^^.  an  act  of  duty,  view  it  as  an  act  pro- 
ceeding from  a  moral  subject ;  and  that, 
so  regarded,  it  must  be  an  act  of  love.  In  other 
words  duty,  regarded  in  the  light  of  the  subject 
performing  it,  appears  as  love.  Duty,  moreover, 
inasmuch  as  it  necessarily  implies  a  doer,  that  is, 
a  subject  of  duty,  must  ever  be  pervaded  through 
and  through  with  love — ^with  the  loving  disposition 
and  soul  of  the  doer  penetrating  it. 

§  23.  Love  is  not  only  necessary  in  all 
Fumis  obiiga-    ^^^y^  ^^^  -^  ig  ^YiQ  fulfilling  of  the  law 

of  duty  so  far  as  it  respects  the  subject 
of  duty. 

All  that  the  subject  of  duty  can  put  into  the  acts 
of  duty  is  love ;  for  this  is  all  that  appears  of  the 
doer  in  such  an  act.  This  love,  which  fills  out  the 
measure  of  duty,  so  far  as  the  subject  is  concerned, 
must  have,  it  is  true,  the  characteristics  of  a  perfect 
love.  It  must  be  intelligent,  else  it  could  not  be 
the  love  of  a  rational  being.     It  must  be  sincere, 


LOVE  AS  PRINCIPLE  OF  DUTY.        33 

and,  in  this  sense,  disinterested,  having  for  its  end 
the  good  of  its  object,  and  not  looking  beyond  that. 
It  must  be  in  due  measure  and  degree.  It  must  be 
simple  and  direct,  moving  unswervingly  to  its  end, 
With  these  characteristics  of  a  true  and  perfect 
love  in  a  being  like  man,  it  fulfils  all  duty  ;  all  that 
can  be  morally  required  of  man. 

§  24.  Love,  as  a  principle  of  duty,  may 
Love  defined,     accordingly  be  defined  to  consist  in  a 

sympathetic  endeavor,  put  forth  directly 
for  the  good  of  the  object  of  duty. 

In  order  to  love,  therefore,  that  in  the  object  of 
duty  which  alone  can  be  regarded  in  a  moral  act, 
his  good,  must  first  be  brought  before  the  instinc- 
tive sympathies  of  the  soul,  and  then  the  action  be 
put  forth  which  the  securing  of  that  good  shall 
require.  Love  must  be  in  sympathy  throughout, 
and  must  be  active  in  obedience  to  that  sympathy. 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  an  act  of  duty, 
either  one  of  the  three  elements,  love,  good,  right, 
may  so  predominate  as  to  throw  the  others  rela- 
tively into  the  shade.  We  speak  of  duty  thus  as 
often  truly  done,  when  there  is  no  consciousness  of 
love — when  there  seems  to  be  absence  of  all  affec- 
tion, while  yet  the  act  relieves  a  want,  as  bread 
thrown  to  a  beggar  ;  or  discharges  an  obligation  as 
in  the  payment  of  money  to  an  exacting  creditor. 
The  act  in  such  case  may  be  so  far  morally  imper- 
fect ;  or  the  love  may  be  actually  present,  but  is 
not  consciously  noticed.  It  still  remains  that  there 
can  be  no  morally  right  act  without  a  loving 
intention. 

2* 


34  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

§  25.  The  term  love  is  applied  to  each 
stages.  of    several   stages   of    experience.     Of 

these,  three  are  particularly  to  be  dis- 
tinguished, respectively  characterized  as  a  mere 
natural  affection,  a  grace,  or  a  virtue. 

The  first  and  lowest  of  these  stages  is 
akectioJh^^        mere  instinctive  sympathy,  or  natural 

affection.  The  sensibility  of  man  is 
sympathetic,  inasmuch  as  he  is  not  only  impressible 
by  the  condition  of  his  fellow  beings,  but  is 
instinctively  disposed  either  to  the  same  feeling 
which  that  condition  awakens  in  them,  as  in  proper 
sympathy ;  or  to  some  responsive  feeling,  as  in 
gratitude  answering  to  kindness.  This  sympathy 
may  exist  independently  of  any  immediate  control 
of  the  will.  So  far,  accordingly,  it  is  not  moral.  It 
is  mere  natural  affection.  If  the  affection  give 
pleasure,  it  takes  the  name  of  complacency  ;  if  pain 
or  dissatisfaction,  of  displacency  or  dislike. 

The  second  stage  is  that  in  which  the 
2.  As  a  grace,  affection  is  the  predominant  character- 
istic, but  yet  the  free-will  enters  as  a 
directing  or  controlling  element.  Just  so  far  as  the 
natural  affection  is  thus  reached  by  the  will,  either 
in  simply  allowing  it,  or  by  selecting  its  object,  or 
regulating  itself,  it  becomes  moral.  But  inasmuch 
as  the  feeling  predominates  over  the  free-will  in 
giving  it  character,  this  stage  of  love  is  called  2i  grace 
in  distinction  from  a  virtue^  in  which  the  will 
predominates. 

The  third  stage  is  that  in  which  the 
3^sactof       free-will    gives    the   character   to    the 


LOVE   AS    PRINCIPLE    OF    DUTY.  35 

exercise,  not  only  awakening  and  directing  the  sym- 
pathy,  but  leading  it  forth  in  appropriate  action 
towards  its  object.  This  is  love  in  its  fullest  sense. 
This  is  the  love  which  fulfils  duty. 

§  26.  The  opposite  of  love  is  hate. 
iteopposite,       Hate    is,  like   love,    marked   by   three 

distinguishable  stages — simple  dislike  or 
displacency  ;  misanthropic  or  unlovijtg  spiy  it  allowed 
or  cherished  by  the  free-will  ;  and  positive  malevo- 
lence  appearing  in   acts   of  evil  to  others. 

§  27.  Inasmuch  as  man's  nature  is  essentially 
active,  and  therefore  must  go  out  in  positive  action, 
duty  admits  no  neutrality  and  therefore  disallows  all 
disposition  or  action  which  does  not  seek  positive 
good.  Not  to  sympathize  is  therefore  wrong.  An 
unsympathetic  spirit,  so  far  as  sustained  or  cher- 
ished by  the  free-will,  if  not  so  heinous,  is  as  truly 
opposed  to  duty  as  positive  hate  and  ill  will. 


.36  THEORETICAL    MORALITY 


CHAPTER  VI. 

GOODNESS    OR   BENEFICENCE, 

§  28.  All  action,  in  so  far  as  it  is  moral, 
S^aUduty""^  aims  at  good  in  the  experience  of  the 
object  of  duty  as  its  one  comprehensive 
result. 

Every  act  of  an  infinite  and  perfect  being,  as  of 
God,  must  not  only  aim  at,  but  actually  effect,  good 
and  good  only.  Perfect  love  can  seek  only  good  : 
and  as  God  is  perfect  love  and  can  accomplish  all 
he  seeks,  all  his  actions  must  result  in  good.  Per- 
fect goodness  or  beneficence  accordingly  charac- 
terizes all  he  does. 

The  action  of  a  finite  and  dependent  being  cannot 
in  itself  always  assure  the  result  which  it  seeks. 
But  his  endeavor  must  seek  that  result  and  that 
result  only.  This  is  implied  in  good,  as  the  only 
end  or  result  of  love  as  an  act,  and  as  thus  its 
correlative.  Love  and  good  imply  each  other — one 
being  the  source  of  action,  the  other  its  result.  In 
more  general  terms  the  only  end  or  aim  of  the 
human  will  is  good,  as  truth  is  the  only  object  of 
the  intelligence.     All  volition,  whatsoever  object  it 


GOODNESS    OR   BENEFICENCE.  3/ 

may  respect,  whether  act  or  pursuit,  or  plan,  or 
thing,  chooses  its  object  only  so  far  as  it  is,  or  at 
least  appears  to  be,  good.  It  is  in  strictness  of 
thought,  the  good  in  it  with  which  alone  the  will  is 
concerned.  Even  a  wrong  will,  a  sinful  choice, 
seeks  a  good  ;  and  the  wrong  and  the  sin  lie  in  the 
choice  not  of  pure  unmixed  evil,  but  of  an  inferior 
good  or  of  the  wrong  kind  of  good.  Even 
malignity  itself  moves  to  the  good  there  is  in 
gratifying  its  hate  ;  and,  but  for  that,  could  not 
move  at  all. 

§  29.  The  term  good  is  used  in  a 
Jf^'good  ^^"^^    primary  and  also  a  secondary  sense  ; — 

to  denote  (i)  good  in  itself,  that  is, 
happiness,  blessedness,  or  enjoyment ;  and  (2)  what 
works  or  occasions  good,  that  is,  the  agent,  means, 
instrument,  or  condition  of  this  good  in  itself.  In 
the  latter  sense  it  is  applied  to  an  agent  or  means  ; 
as  God  is  good,  that  is,  works  good  ;  water  is  good, 
that  is,  is  a  means  of  health  and  so  of  enjoyment. 
In  the  former  sense  it  is  applied  to  a  state  of 
experience,  as  he  is  reaping  the  good  of  his  virtuous 
conduct,  that  is,  is  experiencing  the  happiness  that 
attends  his  virtuous  conduct. 

Moralists  have  thus  distinguished  three  kinds  of 
good  ; — the  good  of  pleasure,  the  good  of  interest, 
and  the  good  of  virtue.  The  first  named,  the  good 
of  pleasure,  is  good  in  itself — happiness.  The  last 
two  are  means  or  occasions  of  happiness  ;  the  good 
of  interest  being  that  which  is  instrumental  of 
happiness,  and  the  good  of  virtue  or  character 
being  that  which  is  naturally  attended  by  happiness. 


38  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

S  30.     It  will  be  evident  on  a  little  re- 

Happiness  not     ^ 

immediate  end  flection  that  man  cannot  be  said  in  strict 
use  of  language  to  work  or  produce  good 
in  itself  or  happiness  immediately  and  directly, 
that  is,  otherwise  than  instrumentally  and  mediate- 
ly, either  in  himself  or  in  others. 

He  can  bestow  a  favor — can  give  bread  to  a  hun- 
gry man,  and  the  reception  of  that  favor  may  re- 
lieve a  want  and  awaken  gratitude.  The  relief  of 
the  want,  the  taking  of  the  bread,  may  give  its  ap- 
propriate happiness,  and  the  exercise  of  the  grate- 
ful spirit  may  give  its  peculiar  joy.  But  the  giver 
of  the  bounty  has  only  furnished  the  means  or  the 
occasion  of  the  happiness.  In  the  same  way,  a  man 
cannot  directly  create  happiness  for  himself  ;  he 
can  at  best  only  secure  the  occasions  or  means  of 
happiness.  He  can  acquire  treasures  in  health, 
reputation,  character,  outward  possessions  ;  from 
these,  the  happiness  comes  which  his  creator  has 
connected  with  them.  He  can  contemplate  his 
blessings,  and  the  contemplation  may  bring  joy ; 
still  it  is  not  the  joy,  but  the  contemplation  which 
is  the  immediate  object  and  effect  of  his  endeavor. 
He  can  form  a  perfect  character  ;  he  may  give 
himself  to  virtuous  pursuits  ;  he  may  do  noble 
deeds  ;  this  character,  these  pursuits,  these  deeds, 
are  through  the  laws  of  his  nature  attended  by  hap- 
piness, by  the  pleasures,  the  joys  of  an  approving 
conscience,  by  the  happiness  immediately  waiting 
on  all  lawful  exertion.  Character,  virtue,  is  a 
means  only  of  happiness.  But  it  obviously  stands 
in  a  closer   relation  to   happiness    than   property, 


GOODNESS   OR   BENEFICENCE.  39 

friends,  and  other  outward  good.  This  outward 
good  is  means  or  occasion  of  virtue  ;  and  this  vir- 
tue is  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  happiness. 

There  is  no  other  good  conceivable  besides  these 
— good  in  itself  or  happiness,  and  good  as  means 
or  occasion  of  happiness.  This  latter  species,  how- 
ever, is  distinguished  into  the  two  varieties,  (i)  out- 
ward good,  as  property  and  the  like  ;  and  (2)  in- 
ternal good,  as  character,  virtue,  action  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  man's  being.  Of  these  vari- 
eties, it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  first  or  outward 
good  can  effect  happiness  only  through  the  second 
or  internal  good. 

§  31.     The  inquiry,   what  is  the  chief 

Summum  i       .  1  r  1  ,1 

bonum.  good — the  suMinum  bonum — has  greatly 

engaged  the  attention  of  philosophers, 
who  have  been  far  from  harmonious  in  their 
answers.  It  is  apparent  that  much  at  least  of  the 
difficulty  has  arisen  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  term 
good,  and  from  overlooking  the  fact  that  while  on 
the  one  hand  it  is  not  within  the  province  of  man 
to  produce  happiness  immediately,  but  only  mediate- 
ly and  instrumentally,  still  the  secondary  or  instru- 
mental good  which  he  may  produce  is  good  only  by 
reason  of  the  happiness  which  it  brings.  If  the 
meaning  of  the  inquiry  be,  what  is  the  chief  good 
in  man's  nature,  then  certainly  the  answer  must  be, 
the  highest  happiness  of  which  that  nature  is  ca 
pable.  Accordingly  when  it  is  asked  what  is  the 
chief  end  in  the  creation  of  man  by  his  maker,  it 
must  be  replied,  the  fullest  and  highest  happiness 
of  man.     For  to  suppose  that  it  is  the  perfecting  of 


40  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

that  nature — a  perfect  character — is  to  exclude 
from  the  act  of  God  in  creating  man  all  love,  and  to 
reduce  man  to  the  rank  of  a  mere  machine  or  a 
plant.  We  can  indeed  conceive  of  a  creature  en- 
dowed with  sensibility,  with  intelligence,  with  free 
power,  who  should  be  insensible  of  all  happi- 
ness ;  and  such  a  creature  might  be  conceived  to 
advance  from  comparative  weakness  to  a  perfect 
maturity  of  capabilities.  But  we  should  be  con- 
strained in  reason  to  rank  such  a  being  infinitely  be- 
low man,  and  deny  to  it  any  proper  moral  nature. 
The  chief  good  then  in  man's  nature  is  his  capabil- 
ity of  the  highest  and  completest  happiness,  and  the 
chief  good  in  man's  experience  is  such  happiness. 

If  it  be  asked  what  is  the  chief  good  for  man  to 
desire,  the  answer  must  be  the  same.  He  was 
made  not  ultimately  and  chiefly  to  be  a  perfect  ma- 
chine, but  to  be  supremely  blessed  ;  and  it  is  the 
instinct  of  his  nature  to  desire  this  end  of  his  being 
as  his  chief  good. 

But  if  it  be  asked  what  is  the  chief  good  which 
man  is  to  seek  to  effect  as  the  immediate  product 
of  his  endeavor,  the  answer  is,  first,  to  perfect  his 
character  as  a  man,  and,  secondly,  in  connection 
with  this,  to  perfect  his  condition.  For  this  is  all 
he  can  do  directly,  perfect  his  own  capabilities  and 
place  them  in  the  right  relation  to  all  those  things 
which  can  minister  to  his  welfare.  Character — the 
most  perfect  virtue — is  indeed  the  most  important, 
perhaps,  in  a  certain  sense,  the  highest  of  the  two. 
But  condition  is  as  needful  of  his  pursuit.  In  order 
to  happiness,  he  must  have  not  only  character,  but 


GOODNESS    OR   BENEFICENCE.  4 1 

also  right  position  to  the  objects  which  the  virtues 
of  that  character  respect.  And  this  right  position, 
this  needful  relation  to  those  outer  objects,  is  as 
truly,  if  not  as  fully,  within  the  reach  of  his  deter- 
mination as  character.  Property,  friends,  and  the 
like,  are  a  good  to  man  ;  indeed  are  a  good  in  such 
sense  that  character  cannot  be  without  them. 

The  truth  remains,  however,  that  good  in  itself 
or  happiness  is  not  within  the  power  of  man  direct- 
ly to  produce.  The  best,  and  indeed  all  he  can  do^ 
is  to  produce  that  which  under  the  appointments  of 
his  creator  will  bring  in  this  good  in  itself  or  hap- 
piness. Man's  effort  ends  ever  with  secondary  or 
instrumental  good. 

The  highest  good — summum  bonum — is  thus, 
either  a  good  of  experience^  which  consists  of 
blessedness  and  is  the  sole  gift  of  God  as  creator 
and  ruler,  or  a  good  of  attainment  in  character 
or  condition,  which  is  the  result  of  effort  and 
is  the  occasion  of  that  blessedness  which  is  the 
direct  gift  of  God.  Between  this  right  char- 
acter and  condition  as  possible  to  be  attained  by 
man,  and  this  blessedness  as  possible  to  be  ex- 
perienced by  man,  the  creator  has  established  a 
necessary  relation — a  relation  designated  some- 
times as  worthiness  to  be  blessed.  This  worthiness 
expresses,  however,  it  will  be  observed,  no  essential 
attribute  of  perfect  goodness  or  rectitude,  but  only 
a  mere  relative  attribute — a  mere  relation  between 
character  and  blessedness. 

We  are  enabled  in  the  light  of  this  general  survey 
of  the  subject  to  advance  the  distinctions  and  pro- 
positions that  follow. 


42  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

§  32.     Good  as  the  end  in  all  duty  is  of 
Two  kinds.        two  kinds  I     I,  good  in  itself,  or  hap- 
piness ;  2,  good  as  means  of  happiness. 
Good  in  itself — happiness — is  the  pri- 
1.  Goodin  itself,  niary  and  ultimate  good.     It  is  the  im- 
mediate product  of  the  creator  alone. 
Good  as  means  is  secondary  and  mediate  or  in- 
strumental.    It  is  good  only  as  the  means  or  instru- 
ment or  condition  of  good  in  itself. 

Secondary  good  is  the  only  good  which 
meSTs!^^'  the  effort  of  man  should  aim  to  effect ; 
which  nevertheless  he  should  aim  to  ef- 
fect only  because  of  the  ultimate  good  in  itself 
which  it  may  bring  under  the  ordinance  of  heaven. 
Secondary  good  is  of  two  varieties,  which  are  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other  by  their  being  more  or 
less  immediately  productive  of  happiness.  They 
may  be  denominated  the  good  of  condition  and  the 
good  of  character. 

The  good  of  condition  embraces  all  the 

objects,    occasions,  means,    or  helps  of 

any  legitimate   energy  in   man — every 

thing  which  can  occasion  or  facilitate  or  enhance 

any  exercise  of  any  of  the  faculties  or  capacities  of 

man's  nature. 

The  good  of  character  embraces  all  the 
Sef  °^  ^^^'  g<^od  which  springs  from  the  energies 
of  man's  nature,  whether  habitual  and 
so  forming  character,  or  only  specific  in  single  acts 
or  states,  so  far  as  they  are  naturally  and  imme- 
diately followed  by  happiness. 

Exemplifications  of  this  last  variety  are  such  as  a 
virtuous  habit.     Beneficence,  or  the  habitual  exer- 


Good  of  condi- 
tion. 


GOODNESS   OR   BENEFICENCE.  43 

cise  of  a  loving  spirit,  is  a  source  of  joy  and  hap- 
piness. Even  when  it  is  not  in  special  exercise,  but 
only  cherished  as  a  fixed  governing  principle  of  the 
soul — the  beneficent  spirit  itself  when  not  working 
out  special  deeds  of  charity — sheds  a  light  and  a 
cheer  over  a  man's  experience.  In  contemplation, 
or  in  directing  a  particular  act  of  kindness,  this 
light  and  cheer  often  brighten  and  warm  into  a  joy 
and  delight  that  is  as  rapturous  as  it  is  pure.  It  is 
the  inheritance  of  virtue  that  cannot  be  taken  away^ 
Another  exemplification  is  such  a  special  act  of 
kindness  itself.  The  consciousness  of  the  act  gives 
a  legitimate  pleasure,  and,  it  may  be,  a  more  in- 
tense delight ;  but  a  virtuous  act  by  the  very  con- 
stitution of  our  nature  brings  happiness,  even  if  it 
be  not  taken  up  into  distinct  consciousness.  Even 
acts  that  in  themselves  have  no  special  moral  char- 
acter, as  the  exertions  of  power  or  skill,  physical  or 
mental,  the  exercises  of  any  of  our  faculties  or  ca- 
pacities, are  followed  by  pleasure.  The  active  man 
is  a  happier  man  than  the  idler  or  the  sluggard. 

§  33.  We  may  now  set  forth  more  exactly  and 
definitely  the  relation  of  moral  action  to  its  end  or 
result. 

.  The  ultimate  end  and  object  of  all  moral  action 
is  happiness.  No  action  can  be  regarded  as  moral 
the  last  end  of  which  is  not  to  be  found  in  hap- 
piness. 

As  happiness  is  the  immediate  gift  of  God  alone, 
the  more  immediate  end  of  all  human  action,  so 
far  as  moral,  must  be  found  in  some  secondary  or 
mediate  good  either  of  character  or  of  condition. 


44  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

To  aim  to  produce  happiness,  accordingly,  direct- 
ly and  not  through  character  or  condition,  is  for 
man  ever  vain  and  futile.  To  attempt  it  is  to  usurp 
the  prerogative  of  heaven.  Man  can  only  produce 
happiness  mediately  and  instrumentally.  His  ac- 
tion to  be  moral  must  ever  seek  this  ultimate  re- 
sult of  happiness  only  by  securing  that  in  which 
this  happiness  rests  as  its  necessary  condition. 

Perfect  moral  action  must  aim  at  the  highest 
good  in  the  object  of  duty  which  is  practicable  in 
the  case  ; — must  aim  at  that  highest  perfection  of 
character  or  condition  to  which  the  Creator  has  at- 
tached the  highest  blessedness. 

For  the  same  reason  that  all  free  action  should 
seek  to  work  good  in  its  object,  it  is  bound  to  seek 
all  the  good,  the  highest  and  largest  good,  that  is 
practicable. 

Inasmuch  as  happiness  is  of  divers  grades  or 
ranks,  the  highest  grade  of  happiness  is  to  be 
sought  in  preference  to  any  lower  kind.  And  inas- 
much as  an  act  may  by  the  doer  be  determined  or 
shaped  to  work  a  larger  or  smaller  amount  of  good, 
duty  requires  that  the  largest  amount  should  be  in- 
tended, rather  than  a  lower  amount.  The  rule  of 
duty  is  :  the  highest  and  largest  good  must  be  thp 
designed  effect  of  all  moral  action. 

§  34.     Evil  is  the  opposite  of  good. 
j-^ii  Like  good,   evil  is  either   natural  ox 

7noral. 

Natural  evil  is  evil  in  experience,  as  pain, 
suffering,  unhappiness. 

Moral  evil  is  wrong  moral  action. 


GOODNESS    OR   BENEFICENCE.  45 

To  work  natural  evil,  that  is,  to  produce  unhap- 
piness  as  the  ultimate  end  of  the  action,  is  ever 
wrong. 

It  is  a  perversion  of  the  proper  design  and  ten- 
dency of  the  natural  faculties  of  man,  which  are 
designed  to  work  good  only.  It  is  directly  opposed 
to  the  character  and  will  of  God,  who  works  good 
only,  and  constituted  all  his  creatures  to  work  good 
only.  It  is,  in  the  object  of  an  action,  the  correla- 
tive of  malevolence  or  hate  in  the  subject  or  doer, 
and  possesses  consequently  the  same  moral  char- 
acter. 

To  produce  unhappiness  as  the  designed  means 
and  condition  of  a  higher  and  larger  happiness  is  not 
necessarily  contrary  to  duty.  On  the  other  hand 
it  may  be,  for  the  time,  the  most  imperative  duty. 

The  amputation  of  a  limb  by  which  life  may  be 
saved  and  pain  relieved,  although  itself  for  the  time 
causing  immediate  and  severe  pain,  may  be  an  act 
of  love,  and  often  is  an  imperative  duty.  No  hap- 
piness arising  from  condition,  as  from  wealth,  fame, 
friendship,  is  unmingled  with  evil.  Even  under 
the  rule  of  perfect  love  armed  with  infinite  wisdom 
and  power,  evil  exists.  We  may  be  unable  to  con- 
jecture why  it  was  not  excluded,  or  why  it  is  not 
prevented  ;  but  we  must  recognize  the  fact  that  it 
exists  under  this  perfect  rule.  We  may  reasonably 
presume  that  its  existence  may  be  justified  in  con- 
sistency with  perfect  love  and  infinite  wisdom  and 
power.  We  must  at  the  same  time  believe  that 
the  permission  of  evil  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
the  highest  and  largest  good. 


46  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

RECTITUDE. 

§  35.  All  moral  action,  so  far  as  per- 
mlft^of'dity.     ^ect,  must  be  right  in  its  procedure. 

All  action  has  a  direction  as  well  as  a 
source  and  an  end.  All  perfect  moral  action,  as  we 
have  seen,  proceeds  from  love  as  its  source  to  good 
as  its  end.  This  procedure  in  a  perfect  moral  ac- 
tion has  the  attribute  of  rightness  or  rectitude.  The 
term  rectitude,  accordingly,  as  applied  to  moral  ac- 
tion, respects  immediately  this  procedure — the  ac- 
tion itself — so  as  relatively  to  repress  from  view  for 
the  time  the  doer  and  also  the  object  of  duty. 

The  idea  of  right  is  so  extremely  simple  that  it 
baffles  effort  to  explain  it.  The  best  that  can  be 
done  is  to  set  forth  the  leading  attributes  that  be- 
long to  it  as  it  is  applied  in  morals. 

§  36.  First,  moral  rectitude  always  re- 
i^^^impiiesac-    spects  an  action. 

To  conceive  of  an  absolute  right  as 
independent  of  all  action  is  impossible.  It  is  an 
attribute,  and  an  attribute  of  action. 

§  37.  Secondly,  moral  rectitude  always 
2^Reiation  of    ^espccts  the  relation  of  an  action— the 

interior  relation  of  its  source  to  its  end. 


RECTITUDE.  47 

As  has  been  already  stated,  moral  rectitude  re- 
spects the  relation  of  love  to  its  end  in  good.  It 
has  this  feature  of  relativeness  always  attaching  to 
it.  It  includes,  of  course,  as  involved  in  this  rela- 
tion, the  proper  proportion  between  the  love  in  the 
subject  and  the  good  effected  in  the  object  of  duty. 
§  38.  Thirdly,  moral  rectitude  implies 
3.  Fitness.  that  there  is  a  natural,  a  fitting  move- 
ment in  the  action  from  its  source  to 
its  end  ;  and  it  denotes  properly  and  strictly  this 
naturalness  or  fitness  in  the  relation  of  an  action 
between  its  origin  or  seat  and  its  end  or  result. 

The  moral  nature  of  the  soul  is  its  loving  nature, 
and  the  end  for  which  it  is  designed  and  fashioned 
to  act  is  good.  Its  action  is  right  so  far  as  fitting 
this  nature  and  end.  Rectitude  is  thus  so  far  cor- 
rectly conceived  as  consisting  in  fitness. 

Rectitude  is  also  correctly  conceived  as  consist- 
ing in  conformity  to  rule  or  law  ;  for  conformity  to 
rule  can  mean  nothing  else  than  conformity  to  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  and  to  that  of  the  end  for  which 
it  was  designed  by  its  maker. 

The  objection  to  such  definitions  of  rectitude  is 
that  they  are  interpreted  and  applied  to  rectitude  as 
if  it  were  an  absolute  or  independent  entity,  sub- 
sisting of  itself  separate  from  action  and  from  an 
agent.  But  we  can  as  easily  conceive  of  an  abso- 
lute love  without  an  object  in  good  to  be  effected  by 
the  love,  as  of  an  absolute  rectitude.  It  cannot  be 
too  frequently  declared  that  love,  good,  right,  are 
inconceivable  as  independent  separable  entities ; 
they  necessarily  imply  one  another  in  all  cases. 


48  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

Right  is  absolute,  accordingly,  only  in  this  sense  : 
that,  given  the  action  and  the  conditions  in  which 
it  is  to  be  exerted,  there  is  a  mode  of  action  which 
is  universally  and  necessarily  to  be  recognized  as 
right.  It  is  the  same  when  the  same  subject,  ob- 
ject, and  circumstances  are  given,  always,  and  every 
where.  It  will  be  pronounced  right  in  the  same 
way  by  every  mind  equally  informed  of  all  the  ele- 
ments in  the  case.  It  is  in  this  sense  a  necessary 
idea.  The  mind  is  necessitated  to  recognize  the 
right  when  the  action  with  its  subject,  object,  and 
circumstances  are  given. 

The  idea  of  right  is  absolute,  universal,  and  neces- 
sary, in  the  same  sense  as  the  idea  of  the  angularity 
of  the  triangle.  The  triangle  cannot  be  without 
angles.  The  angularity  does  not  exist  before  the 
lines  are  constructed  into  the  triangle  ;  but  it  at- 
taches necessarily  to  the  triangle  as  it  is  formed. 
The  sides  as  mere  lines  have  no  angularity ;  but 
constructed  or  put  together  in  a  certain  way  the 
angularity  exists.  No  construction  can  exclude  it. 
§  39.  Fourthly,  rectitude  implies  an 
4.  Directness,  unswerving  procedure  in  the  action  from 
its  source  to  its  end. 

We  may  conceive  of  a  perfect  love  and  a  perfect 
good  intended  and  effected  by  its  expression,  while 
its  movement  is  irregular,  circuitous,  indirect.  So 
far  moral  action  is  imperfect. 

When,  as  is  often  the  case,  we  limit  our  consider 
ation  to  the  movement  of  love  towards  its  end,  leav- 
ing out  of  our  view  for  the  time  the  source  and  the 
result,  this  direction  of  the  action,  whether  direct 


RECTITUDE.  49 

or  circuitous,  whether,  in  other  words,  the  fitting 
direction  for  love  to  take  in  the  case,  is  the  feature 
that  determines  to  our  judgment  whether  the  action 
is  right  or  wrong.  In  a  similar  way,  we  pronounce 
the  solution  of  a  mathematical  problem  to  be  im- 
perfect, if  it  does  not  proceed  in  the  directest  way 
to  the  result,  even  although  the  principles  on  which 
the  solution  starts  and  the  result  itself  are  correct. 
§  40.     Fifthly,  all  specific  right  action 

5.  Parallelism      p    ^         ,,    ,         /'        ,,     ^,  °  ^         .    . 

with  au  other    IS  parallel  With  all  other  specific  right 

duty, 

action. 
This  characteristic  of  right  is  founded  in  the  as- 
sumption that  the  universe  is  a  perfect  creation,  so 
that  all  beings  in  it  are  exactly  fitted  to  their  own 
ends,  and  also  each  is  in  harmonious  relation  to 
every  other.  All  rectitude  consequently  is  har 
monious  ;  right  can  never  cross,  or  trip,  or  oppose 
right.  In  the  eternity  of  consequences  of  perfect 
moral  acts,  no  clashing  can  ever  occur.  All  their 
movements  in  the  flow  of  eternal  consequence  are 
in  parallel  lines. 

§  41.  Wrong  is  the  opposite  of  right. 
Wrong.  It  respects  an  action  and  the  relation 

between  its  source  and  its  end.  It  im- 
plies a  fitness  or  conformity  in  this  relation  which  is 
not  regarded  in  the  action,  and  consequently  an 
indirectness  in  the  procedure  which  necessarily 
crosses  and  disturbs  the  lines  of  rectitude. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  term  r/>///  is  fre- 
quently used  in  the  sense  of  perfect,  and  the  term 
wrong  in  the  sense  of  imperfect,  in  whichever  of 
the  three  elements  in  all  morality — subject,  object, 

3 


50  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

and  action  of  subject  in  relation  to  object — the  im- 
perfection may  exist.  Action  is  equally  pronounced 
wrong  if  the  love  is  imperfect  ;  if  it  be  too  feeble 
or  too  strong,  or  if  the  object  be  an  improper  one, 
or  if  in  effecting  it,  a  devious  way  be  pursued. 
Sometimes,  moreover,  only  the  incidental  manner 
of  the  action  is  regarded  and  the  act  is  recognized 
as  right  or  wrong,  according  as  that  is  perfect  or 
otherwise.  Thus  good  counsel  may  be  imparted  in 
blunt  words  ;  there  maybe  true  love  prompting  the 
counsel,  a  real  good  aimed  at,  but  the  manner  of 
carrying  the  love  into  its  effect  may  be  imperfect 
by  reason  of  previous  defective  culture,  and  the  act 
may  be  judged  so  far  to  be  wrong.  Strictly,  how- 
ever, the  act  should  be  recognized  as  right ;  only 
the  manner  wrong.  The  morality  of  the  manner 
attaches  only  to  the  culture  which  has  failed  to 
furnish  a  proper  body  of  words  in  which  loving  ac- 
tion is  to  be  embodied. 


MOTIVES.  5 1 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MOTIVES. 

§  42.  By  motive  is  to  be  understood 
Motive  defined,  the  good  which,  as  apprehended  by  the 
mind,  is  the  object  of  the  free-will  or 
the  end  to  which  the  action  of  the  will  tends. 

The  term  motive,  properly  signifying  that  which 
moves,  is  employed  in  ethical  discussions,  in  a 
modified  sense.  It  denotes  not  the  physical  cause, 
but  rather  the  occasion  of  the  mind's  action.  It 
denotes  the  occasion  of  such  acting,  however,  in 
the  peculiar  sense  of  an  object  or  end  so  related  to 
the  mind  as  to  invite  and  call  forth  its  endeavors. 
It  is  thus  not  merely  the  necessary  negative  con- 
dition of  a  moral  action,  as  a  weight  is  necessary 
condition  to  the  act  of  lifting  a  weight,  but  is  so 
related  to  the  mind  as  positively  to  attract  or  pro- 
voke its  action.  It  is  of  course  in  moral  discus- 
sions used  only  as  it  can  be  viewed  in  relation  to 
the  action  of  the  free-will. 

The  only  possible  object  of  will,  the  only  end  to 
which  the  will  can  be  moved,  as  we  have  already 
recognized,  is  good.  As  essentially  active  the  free- 
will must  act ;  and  as  made  for  good  only,  it  can 


52  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

act  only  in  reference  to  good  as  the  object  or  end  of 
its  action. 

This  good,  however,  in  order  to  be  an  end  to  the 
free-will,  must  be  apprehended  by  the  mind.  It  is 
only  as  so  apprehended  that  it  can  be  chosen.  It 
must  be  brought  to  the  mind  through  the  mind's 
capacity  of  receiving  external  objects  ;  it  must  be 
felt  ;  it  must  not  only  be  felt,  but  felt  as  good.  In 
other  words,  there  must  be  sympathy  with  it ;  there 
must  be  instinctive  tendency  towards  it ;  there 
must  be  desire  for  it.  It  must  also  be  apprehended 
by  the  intelligence ;  it  must  with  this  feeling  be 
perceived,  be  known  as  real,  as  attainable  by  the 
will.  Only  as  so  apprehended  by  the  mind  through 
its  sensibility  and  intelligence  can  any  good  be  a 
motive. 

It  should  be  observed,  moreover,  that  the  good 
which  is  proper  object  or  end  to  the  will,  may  be 
only  a  supposed  or  believed  good.  It  must  be 
apprehended  as  good  by  the  mind ;  but  this  appre- 
hension may  be  a  mistaken  one.  The  object 
addressed  to  the  sensibility  may  be  a  phantom  ;  it 
may  be  erroneously  perceived  or  known  in  its 
character  and  also  in  its  practicability.  The  imper- 
fect mind  of  man  often  pursues  unreal  objects, 
unattainable  ends.  But  it  fancies  its  objects  and 
its  ends  are  good  and  also  attainable.  So  far  as 
mere  motive  is  concerned,  it  is  what  is  apprehended 
as  good  only,  whether  that  apprehension  be  well 
grounded  or  not,  which  gives  it  its  effect  on  the 
will. 

Still  further,  as  we  have  found,  the  primary  good 


MOTIVES.  53 

— good  in  itself,  happiness — is  immediately  of  God 
alone.  The  only  good  that  man  can  effect  is  the 
secondary  good,  the  means  of  good,  which  lies 
either  in  character  —  that  is,  in  perfecting  the 
faculties  and  capacities  of  his  nature,  or  in  condition 
— that  is,  in  securing  the  objects  or  occasions  for 
the  exercise  of  these  faculties  and  capacities. 

§  43.  Motives,  accordingly,  are  of  two 
Two  classes.      classcs  : — I.  those  which  have  their  end 

in  character ;  2.  those  which  have  their 
end  171  conditio7t. 

As  character  is  to  man  more  than  condition,  as 
the  energy,  the  capability  of  acting  is  more  in 
itself  than  the  object  on  which  the  energy  is  to  act 
or  the  occasion  of  its  acting,  the  motives  of  the 
first  class  are  generally  of  a  higher  nature  than 
those  of  the  second  class.  The  highest  duty  to 
man  is  accordingly  to  perfect  his  nature  ;  to  train 
and  mature  his  faculties  and  capacities  to  their 
highest  and  largest  perfection,  so  as  to  bring  in  by 
their  exercise  the  fullest  good  in  itself,  the  com- 
pletest  happiness  for  which  he  was  destined  and 
fashioned  by  his  creator.  In  this  good  of  perfect- 
ing character,  is  to  be  found  the  highest  motive  by 
which  human  action  is  to  be  determined. 

§  44.  Each  of  these  classes  of  motives 
chamber!'  ^      IS  Subdivided  into  lower  classes. 

Those  of  the  first  class — those  which 
respect  character — may  be  distributed  into  the 
three  species  of  i.  those  which  lie  in  the  training 
and  developing  the  moral  nature ;  2.  those  which 
lie  in  the  culture  of  the  intelligence  and  the  sensi- 


54  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

bility  ;  and  3.  those  which  lie  in  the  regulation  of 
the  animal  nature. 

These  three  species  stand  in  rank  relatively  to 
one  another  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  stated. 
Those  motives,  that  is,  those  ends  or  objects  to  be 
pursued  by  the  free-will  which  lie  in  the  moral 
nature,  are  of  the  highest  rank  and  should  be  taken 
in  preference  to  determine  the  action  and  the  life. 
They  should  be  kept  nearest  and  most  constantly 
before  the  will.  He  that  thus  ever  sets  before  him 
as  the  end  which  he  will  pursue  in  preference  to 
all  things  else,  this  perfecting  of  character,  will 
secure  the  highest  good  possible  to  him  to  secure  ; 
he  will,  in  other  words,  put  the  object  of  duty 
whether  himself  or  his  fellow  men,  in  the  state  or 
condition  to  which  his  creator  has  attached  the 
highest  welfare,  the  fullest  blessedness. 

The  ends  which  lie  in  the  perfecting  of  the 
other  departments  of  the  spiritual  nature  of  man 
— his  intelligence  and  his  sensibility  both  as  feeling 
and  as  imagination — are  subordinate  to  the  first 
named  and  are  properly  conditioned  to  them.  To 
place  these  first  is  to  degrade  man's  nature  and  so 
far  to  hinder  the  attainment  of  the  highest  good. 
The  predominant  culture  of  the  intellect  and  the 
taste,  is  therefore  an  immorality.  To  make  it  the 
cliief  and  commanding  motive  in  action,  whether 
for  one's  self  or  for  others,  is  wrong,  because  exalt- 
ing to  supremacy  what  should  be  subordinate. 

The  ends  which  lie  in  the  perfecting  of  the 
animal  nature  of  man  are  lowest  in  rank.  To  pur- 
sue them  otherwise  than  in  subordination  to  the 


MOTIVES.  55 

Other  species  is  contrary  to  morality — is  sinful.  It 
is  most  effectually  to  hinder  the  attainment  of  the 
highest  good. 

§  45.  The    motives   which    have   their 

lonlti^^ '"     ^"<^s  in  perfecting  the  condition  of  man 

so  as  to  make  it  most  serviceable  to  his 

faculties  and  capacities,  are  of  three  species,  as  th«y 

are  found  in  persons,  or  in  things,  or  in  relations. 

It  should  be  a  motive  or  end  in  life  to  place 
ourselves  in  such  relation  to  other  persons  as  that 
they  may,  as  objects  of  duty,  both  invite  right 
action  in  reference  to  them  and  also  facilitate  it. 

Hence  arises  the  duty  of  friendship,  of  compan- 
ionship, of  society  generally.  Only  as  a  man  is 
within  reach  of  others  can  he  exercise  towards 
them  the  faculties  and  capacities  on  the  exercise  of 
which  his  highest  good  depends.  He  cannot  other- 
wise be  beneficent  ;  he  cannot  be  in  sympathy  ;  he 
cannot  receive  good.  To  provide  objects  of  duty 
is  a  leading  end,  a  prominent  motive  in  a  well 
ordered  life. 

Things  are  helpful  and  sometimes  indispensable 
conditions  of  acting.  All  those  objects  accordingly 
which  can  minister  to  right  action,  are  within  the 
scope  of  man's  lawful  pursuit.  They  furnish  le- 
gitimate motives  or  ends  to  pursue.  Hence  the 
duty  of  industry,  of  care  and  economy  in  acquiring 
and  preserving ;  for  possessions  are  needful  condi- 
tions of  acting. 

Not  only  persons  and  things  in  themselves  thus 
furnish   motives   or   ends   of  pursuit,    but   certain 


56  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

relations  to  them  are  to  be  sought   as   furnishing 
worthy  motives. 

Rank,  thus,  and  station  are  often  conditions  of 
beneficence  ;  and  remotely  of  respect  and  gratitude 
and  trust.  Positions  of  control  and  direction  in  the 
administration  of  authority  and  of  power  in  any 
way,  are  legitimate  objects  to  be  sought.  In  them 
men  are  placed  in  relations  favorable  to  that  activity 
on  which  their  highest  good  depends. 

§  46.  Motives  are  classed,  moreover,  in 
Pro-d^^te"^     reference  to  one  another,   as  tdtimaie 
and  proximate^  according  as   their  ends 
are  final,  or  only  subservient  to  other  ends. 

The  ultimate  motive  relatively  to  all  others,  or 
that  to  which  all  others  should  be  subservient,  is  for 
man  the  highest  and  fullest  development  and 
exercise  of  his  faculties ;  in  other  words,  the 
perfection  of  his  character. 

There  can  be  no  higher  end  to  a  creature  of 
perfect  wisdom  and  goodness,  than  to  fulfil  the  end 
for  which  it  was  made.  The  nature  of  man  as  a 
spirit  is  essentially  an  active  and,  at  the  same  time, 
a  growing  nature.  As  an  activity  capable  of 
growth,  the  ultimate  end  for  which  he  was  made 
must  be  found  in  the  fullest  development  of  his 
powers  for  the  action  to  which  they  are  designed. 
His  creator  can  design  or  expect  nothing  beyond 
this.  In  this  man  most  perfectly  "  glorifies  "  his 
creator,  by  realizing  the  end  of  his  creation.  The 
joy  or  happiness  which  comes  from  this  perfecting 
of  his  character,  it  is  his  creator's  to  bestow,  not 
man's  to  create,  except  by  furnishing  the  condition 


MOTIVES.  57 

on  which  it  is  bestowed  in  this  perfect  character. 
We  may  accordingly  make  this  distinction  :  God's 
ultimate  end  in  the  creation  of  man  is  man's 
blessedness  ;  man's  ultimate  end  under  this  creation 
is  to  become  and  do  what  his  creator  designed. 
The  absolutely  ultimate  motive  for  man  is  therefore 
the  perfecting  of  his  character,  implying  not  only 
the  full  development  of  all  his  capacities,  but  also 
the  full  exercise  of  these  capacities  under  the  law 
of  their  nature. 

But  there  are  relatively  ultimate  motives.  They 
are  all  subordinate  to  the  one  absolutely  ultimate 
end — perfecting  of  character,  but  to  them  other 
ends  may  be  subservient. 

Wealth,  thus,  may  be  a  proximate  motive  as 
subservient  to  health,  to  usefulness,  to  the  best 
character.  But  it  may  be  ultimate,  in  reference  to 
other  subservient  motives,  as,  among  many  others, 
punctuality,  order,  temperance. 

§  47.  Motives   in   themselves   are   not, 
iottri""     strictly     speaking,     morally    right     or 
wrong. 

Right  and  wrong  belong  only  to  actions  ;  but 
motives  are  only  prompting  occasions  of  actions. 
But  the  free-will  can,  by  virtue  of  its  very  freedom, 
adopt  and  pursue  any  one  of  divers  ends  presented 
to  it.  Regulus  had  before  him  two  ends  or  objects 
to  be  pursued  ;  both  true  motives,  being  each  a 
good,  and  each  being  a  worthy  good  to  be  pursued, 
each  being,  therefore,  a  proper  motive  ; — the  good  in 
home  and  country  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  good 
in  fidelity  to  his  promise  on  the  other.     His  free- 

3* 


58  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

will  tastened  on  the  latter  good.  It  is  conse- 
quently in  the  selection  among  divers  motives  of 
action,  that  we  are  to  find  the  proper  morality  or 
the  right  or  wrong  in  the  case.  A  motive  can  only 
be  regarded  as  right  or  wrong,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the 
proper  motive  to  be  selected  or  otherwise,  and  so  im- 
plies that  the  action  of  the  will  in  the  selection  was 
morally  right  or  wrong.  To  adopt  and  pursue  a  lower 
end  in  preference  to  a  higher  is  against  morality. 

§  48.  There  are  three  ways  in  which 
Wrong  seec-      ^-^^    selection    among    divers    motives 

may  be  wrong. 

1.  The  end  may  be  sought  immediately 
acts^or  mlans"'^   which  should  be  sought  Only  through 

other  ends. 
To  seek  good  in  itself  or  happiness  directly  and 
not  through  character  primarily,  and  condition 
secondarily,  is  wrong,  because  only  God  gives  hap- 
piness itself,  and  man  can  obtain  it  only  by  placing 
himself  in  the  state  to  which  his  creator  accords  it. 
In  the  same  way  to  seek  intelligence  without  the 
labor  of  study,  or  wealth  without  industry,  is  against 
morality. 

2.  A  subordinate  end  may  be  adopted 
L^lnd?'"^'     as  the  chief  and  governing  end. 

To  make  condition  thus  predominate, 
as  to  seek  wealth  without  subordination  to  the 
higher  end  of  character  or  ability  to  use  it  aright, 
to  amass  for  the  sake  of  having,  with  no  reference 
to  a  better  doing,  is  a  sin  against  a  pure  morality. 
It  debases  the  higher  nature  of  acting,  and  thus 
hinders  the  higher  good. 


MOTIVES.  59 

3.  The  end,  rightly  selected  and  subor- 
3.  Excess.        dinated,  may  be  pursued  to  excess. 

The  wrong  here  is  really  but  an  incom- 
plete subordination.  Food,  thus,  is  a  condition  of 
a  healthy  body,  which  is  itself  a  condition  of  the 
highest  spiritual  character.  But  food  taken  in 
excess  is  wrong,  because  although  taken  for  the 
sustenance  of  the  body,  yet  its  limitations  being 
transcended,  the  very  object  in  taking  it  is  defeated 
or  impaired. 


60  THEORETICAL  MORALITY. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MORAL    OBLIGATION. 

§  49.  By  Moral  Obligation  is  meant 
Jfordefinef'     that  attribute  of  duty  by  which  it  holds 

and  draws  to  its  fulfilment. 
We  have  recognized  the  fact  that  when  certain 
actions  are  presented  to  us  we  feel  ourselves  bound 
to  perform  them  ;  such  actions  are  duties.  All 
duty  has  thus  an  obliging  force  ;  it  holds  the  soul 
and  draws  to  the  performance  of  it.  The  soul  feels 
itself  bound,  as  both  held  to  it  and  also  impelled  to 
perform  it. 

Of  this  obligation  it  may  be  said,  first,  that  it  is 
inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  duty  and  inseparable 
from  it.  As  well  may  the  sun  be  conceived  with- 
out figure  or  brightness  as  duty  without  obligation. 

Duty  and  obligation  are  accordingly 
of  dlit*^^^"*^      ^^^^  interchangeably  to  a  certain  extent, 

just  as  the  sun  and  the  luminary.  To 
fulfil  or  discharge  duty  is  the  same  as  to  fulfil  or 
discharge  obligation.  They  are,  however,  distin- 
guishable in  meaning.  Obligation  is  best  conceived 
of  as  being  an  essential  attribute  of  duty  regarded 


MORAL    OBLIGATION.  6 1 

as  a  concrete — as  an  essential  attribute  of  a  right 
action. 

In  the  next  place,  obligation  is  inexor- 

2.  Inexorable,     able  in  its  demand. 

It  holds  till  the  duty  is  discharged  by 
performance,  or  till  it  is  abrogated  by  the  authority 
which  imposes  it. 

In  the  third  place,  obligation  has  a  cer- 

3.  Impelling       tain  power  drawing  to  its  fulfilment. 
^'^''''^^'  This  has  been  included  in  the  defini- 
tion ;  obligation  draws  to  duty.     No  one  who  has  a 
sense  of  duty  or  feels  obligation  fails  to  experience 
a  certain  impulse  from  within  to  do  it. 

In  the  fourth  place,  obligation  is  resist- 

4.  Resistible.        ible. 

This  follows  from  the  very  nature  of 
duty  which  ever  respects  freedom  of  will  in  the  agent. 
As  free,  by  very  virtue  of  this  essential  attribute 
of  freedom  in  the  will,  the  soul  is  superior  to  all 
outward  force.  So  soon  as  an  irresistible  necessity 
arises  which  destroys  the  possibility  of  performing 
an  act,  or  which  constrains  performance  without 
the  free  consent  of  the  will,  duty  disappears,  obliga- 
tion ceases. 

§  50.  The  ground  of  obligation  is  to  be 
Its  ground.        fouud   ultimately  in  the  nature  of  man 
and  his   relations  to  other  beings  and 
things. 

Several  perplexing  questions  have  been  raised  in 
regard  to  the  ground  of  obligation  which  are  easily 
resolved  when  the  obscurity  and  ambiguity  involved 
in  the  use  of  words  are  removed.     It  is  asked  thus  : 


62  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

why  am   I  bound  to  do  right ;  to  be  virtuous  ;  to 
love  other  beings  ;  to  do  good  to  them  ?     These 
questions  are  generally  to  be  interpreted  as  equiva- 
lent to  the  question — why  am  I  bound  to  duty.     If 
to  be  understood  in  any  other  sense,  they  are  to  be 
answered  each  according  to  its  own  special  sense  in 
the  application  which  is  made  of  the  language,  and 
may  be    answered    in    terms    showing    their    re- 
lation to  this  one  common  element — that  of  duty 
— involved  in  them.      Thus:  I    am    bound  to    do 
right,    because    duty    obhges    me  to   do   good    in 
hearty  love   m    the  direct    way  of  nature — to    ex- 
press  my   love   in    beneficence  to    others    in    the 
way  proper  to  my  nature  and  theirs.     I  am  bound  to 
be  virtuous  because  duty  obliges  me  to  be  what  I 
was  made  to  be,  namely — a  true  man.     I  am  bound 
to  love  other  beings,  because  duty  obliges  me  to  act 
out  my  loving  nature  to  them.     I  am   bound  to  do 
good  to  others,  because  duty  obliges  me  to  work 
good  in  all  my  free  action.     If  these  questions  are 
equivalent  to  the    question, — why  am   I  bound  to 
duty,  and  respect  merely  the  ground  of  obligation 
the-  one  answer  is :  such  is  my  nature  in  relation  to 
other  beings  and  things  ;  this  is  what  I  was  made 
for.     Duty  is  loving  beneficence   to  others  in  the 
way  in  which  it  can  most  directly  be  done.     I  have 
a  nature  which  is  essentially  loving,  which,  there- 
fore, seeks  the  good  of  others  ;  and  a  way  is  opened 
to  me  by  which  this  love  can  go  out  and  effect  this 
good ;  therefore  am  I  bound  to  duty.     Or,  in  other 
words  :  I  was  purposely  created  lovingly  to  do  good 
to  others  and  was  placed  in  a  condition  in  which  by 


MORAL   OBLIGATION.  63 

following  a  certain  course  I  might  act  thus.  Or, 
still  again  :  I  am  bound  to  duty  because  all  duty  is 
essentially  grounded  in  the  nature  of  the  subject  of 
duty  in  relation  to  other  beings  and  things.  The 
objective  ground  of  duty,  and,  consequently,  of  obli- 
gation, for,  as  we  have  seen,  duty  has  obligation  for 
its  essential  attribute,  is  to  be  found  thus  in  the 
nature  of  man  and  his  relations. 

The  doctrine  that  duty  is  ultimately  grounded  in 
the  fitness  of  things,  differs  from  this  view  only  in 
its  being  less  comprehensive  ;  as  it  seems  to  look 
only  at  the  one  phase  or  element  in  a  perfect  moral 
action,  its  rectitude  or  the  relation  between  the 
loving  subject  and  the  benefited  object  of  duty. 

The  doctrine  that  all  duty  is  grounded  in  love 
equally  founds  duty  in  the  nature  of  man,  inasmuch 
as  to  love  is  what  he  was  made  to  do.  It  only  so 
emphasizes  that  element  of  duty  which  is  given  in 
the  subject  of  duty  as  to  overshadow  the  other  two 
elements  given  in  the  object  of  duty  and  the  rela- 
tion between  love  and  good. 

That  doctrine,  once  more,  which  grounds  obliga- 
tion in  good,  grounds  itself  in  the  nature  of  man  as 
made  for  good,  and  is  faulty  only  as  depressing  from 
view  the  other  essential  constituents  of  duty — love 
and  rectitude. 

The  objective  ground  of  human  duty,  then,  is  ul- 
timately to  be  found  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
man.  The  question  ;  why  am  I  bound  to  duty,  re- 
ceives the  only  answer  of  which  it  is  capable  in  any 
proper  meaning  of  the  words,  in  this  statement. 
The  subjective  ground  of  duty  in  the  narrower  sense 


64  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

of  the  phiase,  as  presented  in  the  question  :  how  do 
I  come  to  have  a  sense  of  duty,  or  why  do  I  feel 
myself  under  obligation,  demands  a  slightly  modi- 
fied answer.  The  subjective  ground  of  obligation  in 
this  sense  is  in  the  rational  nature  of  man,  as 
capable  of  apprehending  duty.  I  come  to  have  a 
sense  of  duty,  by  my  natural  capacity  of  feeling 
duty  when  it  is  properly  brought  before  me,  just  as 
I  come  to  have  a  sense  of  warmth  when  a  heated 
object  is  brought  properly  to  me  :  it  is  my  nature  to 
feel  in  both  cases  and  therefore  I  feel. 

There  is  a  twofold  function  in  man's  rational 
nature  carefully  to  be  recognized.  First,  there  is 
the  sensibility  or  capacity  of  being  impressed,  and 
then,  there  is  the  intelligence  or  faculty  of  perceiv- 
ing and  judging.  This  twofold  function  of  feeling 
and  knowing  can  be  called  into  exercise  only  on 
condition  of  its  proper  object  being  furnished  to  it. 
Duty  must  then  first  be  presented  ;  that  is,  a  moral 
action,  either  done  or  to  be  done.  When  thus  pre- 
sented, there  is  first  the  impression  or  the  feeling ; 
then  the  perceiving  with  a  discrimination  of  attri- 
butes ;  and  finally  recognition  followed  by  the  feel- 
ings that  such  recognition  produces.  Necessarily 
in  this  way  when  an  act  of  duty  is  presented,  there 
is,  through  the  impression  which  it  makes,  a  recog- 
nition of  the  attribute  of  obligation  as  essentially 
belonging  to  it.  Just  as  the  presentation  of  the 
sun  through  the  outward  sense  to  the  mind  is  follow- 
ed by  the  recognition  of  the  attribute  of  brightness 
—that  it  shines — so  is  the  presentation  of  an  act  of 
duty   necessarily  followed  by  the  attribute  of  obli- 


MORAL  OBLIGATION.  65 

gation  belonging  to  it — that  it  obliges  and  so  that 
the  subject  of  duty  is  bound  to  it.  The  discernment 
of  obligation  thus  is  intuitive.  We  recognize  obli- 
gation when  an  act  of  duty  is  brought  before  us 
simply  by  contemplation — by  intuition,  not  at  all  by 
any  reasoning  from  antecedent  truths.  The  obli- 
gation belonging  to  all  duty  may,  indeed,  be  proved 
by  a  form  of  reasoning,  because  all  truth  is  consist- 
ent with  itself  and  one  lower  truth  implies  other 
lower  truths.  Thus,  a  basis  of  argument  may  be 
found  in  other  truths  ;  just  as  I  can  prove  that  the 
sun  is  bright  from  many  facts,  as  for  instance,  from 
the  fact  that  plants  modify  their  growth  under 
the  effect  of  its  light.  But  just  as  I  know  that  the 
sun  is  bright  primarily  because  I  see  the  sun,  so  I 
know  duty  is  obligatory  because  my  reason  im- 
mediately discerns  it 

This  intuitive  recognition  of  obHgation  is  followed 
by  appropriate  feelings,  among  which  is  prominent 
that  of  an  impulse  to  fulfil  it.  This  is  the  obliging 
function  of  conscience,  as  we  have  recognized  it. 


66  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 


CHAPTER   X. 


MORAL     LAW. 


§  51.  Law  is  well  defined  to  be  a  rule 

Law  defined.        of  action. 

Such  is  the  definition  of  law  in  its 
widest  sense  and  largest  application.  In  this  sense, 
law  applies  to  all  things  that  are  made.  "All  things 
in  heaven  and  earth  do  her  homage  ;  the  very  least 
as  feeling  her  care,  and  the  greatest  as  not  exempt- 
ed from  her  power." 

The  law  of  everything  that  exists  is  written  in 
its  very  nature  and  its  relations  to  the  universe  of 
being  around.  We  read  this  law  in  the  respective 
attributes  that  belong  to  existing  things.  The  stone 
falls  to  the  ground,  the  tree  grows,  the  bird  flies, 
because  gravitation,  growth,  flying,  are  the  respec- 
tive attributes  of  these  objects. 

These  are  all  attributes  of  action.  Law  is  read  in 
these  attributes  rather  than  in  the  so-called  attri- 
butes of  quality  belonging  to  simple  being.  Law 
more  immediately  respects  action.  The  compre- 
hensive law  of  every  being  is  nothing  else  in  its 
content  than  the  sum  of  the  attributes  which  con- 


MORAL   LAW.  6^ 

stitute  it  regarded  as  an  acting  thing.  Quality  is 
regarded  in  law  only  indirectly  and  impliedly.  We 
say  the  law  of  the  crystal  of  common  salt  is  that  it 
be  cubical,  by  which  we  only  mean  that  in  the  ac- 
tion by  which  it  comes  to  exist,  it  must,  according 
to  its  nature,  assume  this  form.  The  law  of  this 
action — the  law  of  crystallization  in  the  case  of  this 
salt — is  that  it  be  cubiform.  This  attribute, 
although  one  strictly  of  quality,  yet  implicitly  looks 
back  to  the  action  that  forms  it.  Law  thus  properly 
respects  action. 

Farther,  law  respects  a  mode  of  action  and  pre 
scribes  that  it  be  in  this  rather  than  in  that  particu- 
lar way.  The  stone  falls  to  the  earth — does  not  of 
itself  move  along  the  surface  :  falls,  if  left  to  itself, 
directly  not  in  zigzag  lines  to  the  earth  ;  falls  with 
a  certain  accelerated  velocity.  The  tree  grows  up- 
ward, not  downward  ;  it  grows  by  an  inward  force, 
not  by  mere  accumulation  or  by  adding  on  part  to 
part  from  without.  The  bird  flies  by  the  action  of 
its  wings,  not  by  leaping ;  forward  not  backward. 
When  it  is  said  it  is  the  law  of  the  stone,  of  the 
tree,  of  the  bird,  that  they  respectively  fall,  grow, 
fly,  it  is  meant  that  these  are  the  prescribed  or  es- 
tablished modes  of  their  action. 

Once  more,  law  implies  a  lawgiver.  The  very 
term  signifies  that  which  is  laid  down  or  establish- 
ed ;  and  thus  imports  a  being  that  lays  down  or  es- 
tablishes. 

§  52.  Law  is  conveniently  distributed  v[i\.o  phys- 
ical law  and  moral  lazu.  The  former  respects 
physical  action  ;  the  latter,  moral  action. 


6S  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

Physical  Law  comprehends  and  is 
Physical  law.      j-gad  in  the  attributes  that  belong  to  all 

things  in  nature,  that  is,  to  all  things 
outside  of  the  properly  moral  world.  Its  essential 
character  is  what  is  denominated  necessity.  As  a 
thing  cannot  be  other  than  its  attributes,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  law  which  is  read  in  these  attributes 
remain  an  unchanging  rule.  Otherwise,  the  attri- 
butes, more  or  less,  cease  to  be  and  the  being  to 
which  they  belong  likewise  so  far  ceases  to  be. 

The  whole  natural  world,  the  universe  without  and 
all  of  men  within,  save  only  his  freedom  or  moral 
nature,  conceived  of  as  a  creation,  is  thus  under  the 
law  of  the  Creator  which  is  established  and  pre- 
scribed in  the  respective  attributes  with  which  he 
has  endowed  whatever  he  has  made.  The  law  of 
the  physical  world  is,  in  fact,  thus  but  the  expres- 
sion of  the  creative  will.  Accordingly,  almost  of 
necessity,  against  their  inclinations,  the  men  of 
science  whose  sphere  is  bounded  by  the  world  of 
mere  phenomena,  the  mere  modes  and  sequences  of 
things,  are  constrained  to  speak  of  the  attributes 
of  the  several  things  of  which  they  treat  as  laws, 
because  things  are  what  they  are  by  reason  of 
the  will  of  their  Creator;  and  hence  the  essential 
attributes  of  these  things,  which  it  is  the  province 
of  science  to  discover  and  to  disclose,  are  very 
laws  ;  being  expressions  of  a  will,  even  of  that 
will  which  gave  them  being  and  made  them  what 
they  are. 

Moral  Law  is  the  law  of  moral  action, 
Moral  law.        that  is,  of  duty. 


MORAL    LAW.  69 

It  ever  respects  action  that  is  free — free  in  this 
sense,  that  the  action  which  it  prescribes  may  be 
withheld.  The  action  prescribed  is  not  necessary 
to  the  being  of  the  agent,  because  unlike  the 
physical  world,  the  essential  attribute — the  law — 
of  the  free-will  is  an  alternative  of  action — doing 
or  refusing. 

Everything  in  man,  accordingly,  except  this  free- 
dom of  action  in  doing  or  refusing,  is  under  physical 
law.  Man  gravitates  to  the  ground,  grows,  moves, 
breathes,  under  the  law  of  necessity.  The  happi- 
ness that  attends  on  right  action  and  the  unhap- 
piness  that  attends  on  wrong  action  are  equally 
under  the  law  of  necessity  ;  they  are  not  alterable 
at  his  pleasure,  except  through  the  action  which  is 
free  to  him.  This  happiness  that  waits  on  the 
legitimate  use  of  his  endowments  is  beyond  his  con- 
trol otherwise  than  thus  mediately.  It  is  as  wrong, 
therefore,  as  it  is  idle  for  him  to  attempt  to  control 
it  except  thus  mediately. 

The  Creator  has  invested  man  with  the  attribute 
of  freedom — the  alternative  of  doing  or  refusing. 
The  action  of  the  free-will  is  necessary  in  so  far  as 
that  it  must  act,  and  must  act  by  choosing  or  refus- 
ing ;  but  it  is  free  in  this  respect  that  it  may  choose 
or  it  may  refuse.  The  law,  however,  reaches  to  this 
alternative  so  far  as  to  prescribe  one  as  well  as  the 
other.  The  law  of  man's  nature  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  law  of  loving  i)eneficence  in  the  way  of 
rectitude,  rather  than  of  malignant  ill-doing  in  the 
way  of  evil.  This  is  his  nature :  for  this  he  was 
made  and  constituted;  this  is  his  distinguishing  at- 


70  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

tribute,  that  he  be  freely  thus  beneficent ;  and  in 
this  attribute  is  read  the  will  of  his  Creator. 

But  man  is  but  a  part  of  a  universe.  As  but  a 
part  he  is  constituted  to  act  only  as  a  part — in  har- 
monious relation  to  the  universe  of  which  he  is  a 
part.  And  this  attribute  of  his  nature  implies  two 
things  ;  first,  that  his  action  respect  other  beings  so 
as  to  further  the  end  of  their  creation — that  is,  their 
well-being  or  happiness  ;  and  secondly,  that  this 
action  go  out  without  disturbing  the  harmonious 
relations  in  which  all  the  parts  of  the  creation  have 
been  established  by  the  one  perfect  will.  In  this 
light  we  discover  the  essential  elements  of  all  moral- 
ity, of  all  perfect  moral  action.  Man  in  himself  was 
made  to  love  ;  but  as  a  part  of  a  universe  his  loving 
action  must  respect  the  good  of  others  in  it  ;  and 
lastly,  this  action  must  be  in  accordance  with  the 
established  relationships  of  the  universe.  Love, 
beneficence,  rectitude,  are  the  constituent  elements 
of  all  morality. 

We  are  brought  thus  both  in  physical 
An  expression    ^nd  in  moral  law,  to  the  recoo:nition  of 

of  will.  ^ 

the  innermost  characteristic  of  law  that 
it  is  the  expression  of  a  will.  No  truer  doctrine  can 
be  found  than  this  grand  utterance  of  Hooker,  that 
"  of  law  there  can  be  no  less  acknowledged  than 
that  her  seat  is  the  bosom  of  God  ;  her  voice  the 
harmony  of  the  world." 

Physical  law  expresses  the  will  of  the  Creator  that 
the  things  which  he  has  made  be  what  he  has  made 
then  and  so  act  as  he  has  constituted  them  to  act. 

Moral  law  expresses  the  will  of  the  Creator  that 


MORAL    LAW.  7 1 

the  beings  he  has  endowed  with  freedom,  in  the  use 
of  this  freedom  choose  ever  the  end  for  which  they 
were  made — loving  beneficence ;  that,  as  active,  in 
this  freedom  they  ever  do  good  ;  and  that  as  parts 
of  a  universe  they  act  in  harmony  with  all  the  other 
parts. 

§  53.  Inasmuch  as  the  one  Creator  has 
hw'^""°"^°^  one  all-comprehensive  end  in  his  crea- 
tive work,  making  all  things  in  their 
legitimate  action  to  conspire  harmoniously  towards 
this  end — the  highest  good  of  his  creatures — all  law, 
physical  and  moral,  must  be  consistent  and  har- 
monious with  itself. 

All  the  specific  diversities  of  action  which  the 
creative  law  prescribes  must  accordingly  flow  on  to- 
gether in  one  peaceful  current,  never  hindering  nor 
disturbing  the  movement  one  of  another,  but  rather 
each  aiding  on  every  other,  just  like  drops  of  water 
in  one  stream,  since  all  are  subject  to  the  one  law 
bearing  all  to  the  same  sea  of  love.  The  loving  bosom 
of  God  being  the  one  seat  and  source  of  all  law  for 
every  creature  he  has  made,  his  creative  word  which 
is  the  voice  or  utterance  of  this  word  is  the  har 
mony  of  the  world. 

§  54.  Law  as  thus  implying  and  presup- 
its  obliging        posiug  a  Dcrsonal  will   as   its    ultimate 

power.  X  o  X 

seat  and  source,  gives  at  once  to  the 
sense  of  obligation  the  character  and  force  of  com- 
mand. 

The  feeling  of  obligation  ever  carries  with  it  the 
feeling  of  an  imperative.  Conscience,  which  is  the 
organ  through  which   God  makes  known  his  will. 


72  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

not  only  holds  to  duty  and  draws  to  it,  but  com- 
mands duty.  It  speaks  with  the  voice  of  authority. 
It  utters  a  will  back  of  the  action,  back  even  of  the 
obligation  ;  or,  rather,  it  utters  a  will  penetrating 
the  obligation  and  the  action  so  as  to  make  it  im- 
perative duty. 

§  55.     Law,  as  presupposing  a  personal 
sibuTty.''''^^''"  will  as  its  seat  and  source,  gives  to  the 

sense  of  obligation  the  character  of  re- 
sponsibility. 

The  fact  that  this  feeling  of  responsibility  natu- 
rally accom.panies  the  feeling  of  obligation,  is  unde- 
niable. It  is  witnessed  by  universal  experience. 
The  recognition  of  duty  gives  not  only  ar  sense  of 
an  imperative  obligation,  but  carries  with  it,  or 
rather  bears  in  it,  the  feeling  that  there  is  a  power 
back  of  duty  that  in  prescribing  it  will  enforce  it ; 
and  that  to  this  power,  the  subject  of  duty  must  in 
some  way  be  accountable.  This  character  of  re- 
sponsibility comes  into  duty  and  obligation  and 
law,  from  the  presence  of  the  personal  will  that 
makes  law  what  it  is.  A  will  pressing  on  in  resist- 
less might  to  its  purposed  end  must  sweep  along 
every  obstacle  with  it.  The  drop  in  the  mighty 
current  that  should  refuse  to  flow  on  or  should  seek 
to  move  up  the  stream  or  across  and  away  from  its 
prescribed  direction,  must  inevitably  be  crossed  and 
borne  down. 

In  the  necessity  of  things,  therefore,  the  law  of 
the  universe,  bearing  the  personal  will  of  its  creator, 
moving  to  its  end  in  good,  must  bring  every  crea- 
ture into  its  current.     Man,  created  with  freedom, 


MORAL   LAW.  73 

while  created  to  gravitate  in  the  same  current  to 
good  as  his  end,  yet,  as  free,  capable  of  withholding 
this  gravitating  movement  or  opposing  or  crossing 
it,  cannot  but  experience  the  consequences  of  such 
opposition  or  resistance.  He  is  made  capable  of 
discerning  these  consequences  as  appointed  by  the 
creator  and  necessitated  in  the  divinely  instituted 
order  of  things.  He  cannot,  therefore,  when  he  free- 
ly contemplates  duty,  but  recognize  and  feel  himself 
subject  to  these  prescribed  consequences;  in  other 
words,  feel  himself  responsible  to  a  personal  will  to 
the  creator  and  disposer  of  the  universe  of  which  he 
is  a  part ;  who  will  certainly,  as  he  is  true  to  him- 
self, enforce  his  will  in  some  suitable  way. 

§  56.     That  element  of  law  by  which  it 
Sanction  of  law.  enforces  itsclf  upon  the  subject  of  duty, 

is  called  its  sanction. 
Law  not  only  prescribes,  not  only  commands ;  jt 
also  enforces.  The  sanction  of  the  creative  law  is 
discovered  legitimately  and  primitively  in  the  con- 
sequences experienced  by  the  subject  of  duty  who, 
in  his  freedom,  disobeys  its  command.  These  con- 
sequences consist  primarily  in  the  defeat  of  the  end 
for  which  he  was  made.  As  he  was  made  for  good, 
to  do  and  to  enjoy  good,  the  inevitable  consequence 
of  disobedience  to  the  fundamental  law  of  his  being 
is  that  he  fails  so  far  of  the  end  of  his  being — fails 
of  good.  He  fails  of  good  both  in  doing  and  in 
enjoying  it.  The  consequences  are  not,  however, 
merely  negative,  consisting  merely  in  the  loss  of  the 
good  which  his  fulfilment  of  duty  would  have 
brought.     But   the   whole   tendency  of   his  active 

4 


74  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

nature,  being  under  the  beneficent  law  of  his  crea- 
tion to  perfect  happiness  as  the  immediate  and 
necessary  result  of  his  obedience,  is  by  this  disobe- 
dience crossed  and  opposed  by  the  entire  flow  of  the 
universe.  Positive  unhappiness  or  misery  is  thus 
experienced. 

This  result  is  the  effect  of  the  creator's  will.  It 
is  what  he  purposes,  what  thus  he  effects.  It  is  the 
f  ul'filment  of  what  he  implicitly  declared  in  the  very 
creative  law  which  made  things  as  they  are.  The 
fundamental  law  of  the  universe  contains  thus  both 
precept  and  sanction. 

It  is,  however,  a  very  low,  a  very  unworthy  and 
erroneous  conception  of  the  relations  of  the  creator 
to  his  creatures,  that  he  creates  them  with  certain 
attributes  and  relations  and  then  dismisses  them  to 
experience  the  sunshine  or  the  storm,  the  favoring 
breezes  or  the  desolating  gales,  which  may  befall 
them  on  their  voyage  towards  the  haven  for  which 
he  made  and  destined  them.  Reason  forbids  any 
other  notion  than  this,  that  he  as  truly  concerns 
himself  personally  with  the  action  of  his  creatures 
as  he  did  with  their  creation ;  that  he  superintends 
that  as  truly  as  he  effected  this ;  that  he  brings  by 
his  own  direction  the  happiness  that  attends  every 
act  of  obedience,  as  well  as  the  unhappiness  that 
waits  on  disobedience. 

The  truest  notion,  therefore,  and  the  only  one 
which  reason  sanctions,  is  that  the  consequences  of 
fulfilling  or  resisting  duty  express  the  feelings  of 
the  creator  himself,  and  that  these  feelings  are  those 
of  satisfaction  and  approval  in  the  one  case,  and  of 


MORAL   LAW.  75 

displeasure  and  disapproval  in  the  other.  We  are 
to  remember  here  that  man  is  utterly  impotent  to 
produce  directly  any  happiness ;  that  the  most  he 
can  do  is  to  effect  that  action  on  which  his  creator 
has  made  happiness  to  depend.  We  are  to  remem. 
ber,  also,  that  approval  of  another's  acts  is  naturally 
expressed  and  can  be  appropriately  expressed  only 
by  return  of  good,  of  happiness.  There  is,  more- 
over, no  conceivable  way  in  which  any  action  or 
line  of  conduct  can  be  enforced  on  a  free  being,  save 
through  the  governing  appetences  of  his  nature, 
which  in  man  at  least  are  comprehensive  for  good — 
save  through  his  desire  for  good  and  his  corre- 
sponding aversion  to  misery.  The  inevitable  con- 
clusion is  that  the  sanction  of  moral  law  is  the 
happiness  or  unhappiness  declared  by  the  lawgiver 
to  wait  on  obedience  or  disobedience,  as  the  expres- 
sion of  his  approval  or  disapproval,  and  for  the  sake 
of  enforcing  compliance  with  his  law. 

The  sanctions  of  moral  law  are  the  good  attending 
on  obedience  and  the  evil  waiting  on  disobedience. 
They  are  also  called  the  rewards  of  moral  action. 

The  sanctions  of  law  enforce  obedience  through 
the  hope  of  the  good  that  follows  right  action  and 
the  fear  of  the  evil  that  follows  wrong  action. 

§  57.     The  relation  of  the  subject  of 
St.""^'^"'     duty  to  the  sanctions  of  law  is  that  of 
merit  or  demerit. 

Merit,  otherwise  named  desert,  is  that  relation 
in  which  the  obedient  subject  of  duty  stands  to  the 
good  promised  to  obedience. 

Demerit,  otherwise  named  ill-desert,  is  that  rela 


"jS  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 

tion  in  which  the  disobedient  subject  stands  to  the 
evil  threatened  to  disobedience. 

Praise  and  Blame  are  the  expressions 
Blame.  ^'''^        of  the  lawgiver  through  the  sanctions 
of  the  law — the  expressions  of  his  ap- 
proval of  obedience  and  disapproval  of  disobedience. 

Under  the  perfect  administration  of  God  merit  and 
demerit  are  unalterably  connected  with  praise  and 
blame.  The  full  expression  of  approval  or  disap- 
proval may  not  be  immediate ;  but  conscience,  the 
faithful  oracle  of  God,  expresses  ever  his  approval 
or  his  displeasure,  in  some  degree,  thus  declaring 
the  merit  or  desert  on  the  one  hand  or  the  demerit 
or  ill-desert  on  the  other  hand,  which  attaches  to 
every  moral  act. 

The  third  function  of  conscience,  as  before  stated, 
is  but  this  recognition  of  merit  and  demerit — of  the 
relation  between  obedience  or  disobedience  and 
good  or  evil.  A  right  moral  action  reveals  to  the 
eye  of  conscience  this  relation  established  in  the 
very  nature  of  man — the  relation  between  right  and 
good  on  the  one  hand  and  between  wrong  and  evil 
on  the  other.  Its  voice  in  praising  or  condemning 
is  the  utterance  of  its  creator  through  it,  affirming 
ever  the  constancy  of  this  relation. 


AUTHORITY.  ^^ 


CHAPTER   XL 


AUTHORITY. 


§  $8.     By  AUTHORITY  is  properly  meant 
de&l'ed*^         the  essential  attribute  of  a  lawgiver — 
that  which  makes  him  what  he  is. 

It  includes  both  the  power  and  the  right  to  make 
and  enforce  law. 

It  consequently  gives  all  its  peculiar  character 
and  force  to  law. 

It  is  the  immediate  ground  of  obligation. 

It  is,  moreover,  that  personal  element  in  law  which 
addresses  its  imperative  to  the  conscience  and  lends 
to  it  its  commanding  power. 

§  59.  The  ultimate  seat  and  source  of 
Its  seat.  authority  is  in  the  creator. 

The  power  and  right  to  create  implies 
the  power  and  right  to  determine  the  special  end  for 
which  the  creature  is  made  and  the  faculties  and 
endowments  by  which  that  end  is  to  be  attained. 

The  moral  perfection  of  the  creator  involves  a 
like  perfection  in  the  creature,  to  the  extent  of  his 
endowments  in  so  far  as  there  is  likeness  in  natural 
attributes ;  so  that  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  rational 


^8  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

and  free,  must  be  made  to  be  like  his  creator — 
sympathizingly  and  intelligently  loving,  beneficent, 
and  righteous.  Man  was  in  fact  thus  made  in  the 
image  of  his  creator ;  and  hence  in  this  creative 
will,  determining  the  end  for  which  he  should  be 
created  and  the  endowments  by  which  he  should 
fulfil  this  end,  is  to  be  found  the  law  of  his  being. 
The  seat  of  law  is  in  the  bosom  of  God  ;  in  his  sym- 
pathizing, intelligent,  loving,  beneficent,  righteous, 
creative  will. 

There  is  nothing  below  or  beyond  this  creative 
will  of  a  self-existent  creator.  Only  as  we  can  con- 
ceive of  a  creator  of  the  creator  of  all  things,  can 
we  conceive  of  a  law  in  the  created  universe  back 
of  the  will  of  God.  If,  as  language  sometimes 
seems  to  imply,  there  be  a  standard  by  which  the 
action  of  God  can  be  judged,  such  a  standard  can 
only  respect  the  relation  which  we  think  between 
love  as  source  of  all  his  action  and  good  as  end  of 
all  his  action.  This  relation,  lying  in  the  action 
itself,  which  we  can  characterize  only  in  respect  of 
its  continuousness,  its  directness,  and  parallelism 
with  all  other  right  actions,  we  can  conceive  to  be 
right  or  wrong  in  these  respects.  But  as  a  relation, 
it  can  not  exist  in  either  term  of  the  relation,  either 
in  the  law  as  source,  or  in  the  good  as  end,  and  is, 
therefore,  in  a  sense  independent  of  either,  just  as 
in  the  equation  2  x  4:^8,  the  equality  is  not  in  either 
term — either  2  X4  or  8 — and  is  therefore  in  a  sense 
independent  of  each  taken  separately.  But  as  it 
would  be  absurd  to  conceive  of  an  equality  existing 
antecedent  to  all  quantities,  so  it  is  equally  absurd 


AUTHORITY.  79 

to  conceive  of  a  rectitude  which  is  antecedent  to  all 
action.  God  is  absolutely  his  own  law.  The  out- 
goings of  his  own  perfect  nature,  which  is  love  to- 
wards the  one  end  of  all  his  activity,  even  the  good 
of  his  creatures,  are  the  precedent  ground  in  fact  of 
all  rectitude,  before  which  all  attempted  conception 
of  a  pre-existing  rectitude  is  absurd  and  self-contra- 
dictory. 

§  60.     The  authority  of  God  is  expressed 

S^^eibn.        i^  ^  twofold  way :    first,  in  the  nature 

of  the  beings  that  he  creates  and  the 

condition  in  which  he  places  them ;  secondly,  in 

some  expressed  command. 

The  former  expression  of  divine  authority  is  called 
natural  law  ;  the  latter,  positive  law. 

§  61.     The  NATURAL  LAW  is  to  be  iutcr- 
I,  Natural  law.    prctcd  out  of  the  nature  and  Condition 
of  the  subject  of  law. 

Man,  as  endowed  with  sense  and  reason,  is  quali- 
fied to  read  this  law  of  his  action.  This  is  an  essen- 
tial function  of  his  conscience.  It  were  no  more 
necessary  to  speak  forth  specific  commands  or  rules 
for  all  the  particular  acts  of  his  life  than  to  tell  him 
in  audible  voice  every  time  that  he  opens  his  eye  to 
the  sunlight,  "  this  light  is  from  the  sun." 

The  facility  to  read  this  natural  law,  as  we  should 
presume  on  every  ground  it  would,  grows  with  the 
readiness  to  obey  it.  "  He  that  will  do  his  will 
shall  know  of  his  doctrine."  The  reading  of  the 
law,  the  knowing  of  duty,  is  conditioned,  to  a  great 
extent,  as  in  reason  it  should  be,  as  from  the  neces- 
sity of  things  it  must  be,  on  the  will  to  do  it. 


So  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  whole  fash 
ioning  of  man's  nature  by  his  creator  is  for  duty, 
and  of  course  furthering  to  duty.  The  impelling 
power  of  conscience  takes  into  itself  to  augment  its 
own  force  this  created  tendency  in  the  way  of  duty. 
This  circumstance  prompts  and  helps  to  the  reading 
of  the  divine  law  as  it  is  written  in  the  nature  of 
things.  It  puts  upon  the  right  way  to  discover  and 
to  interpret  it.  It  aids  in  detecting  mistakes  and 
errors.  A  supposed  duty  which  is  hostile  to  sym- 
pathizing love  or  to  good  in  its  result,  or  to  the 
established  relations  and  harmonies  of  things,  must 
at  once  be  suspected  as  an  erroneous  reading  of  the 
divine  will.  The  promptings  of  a  loving  nature 
point  to  the  line  of  duty.  The  good  resulting  from 
an  action  raises  a  presumption  that  it  was  right — a 
presumption,  indeed,  too  often  allowed  excessive 
weight,  yet  a  valid  presumption  and  worthy  of  trust 
when  lawfully  applied. 

§  62.     The  POSITIVE  LAW  of  God  con- 
2.  Positive  Law.    sists  in    thosc    Special  revelations  of 
his  will  which  on  particular  occasions 
he  has  made  to  men. 

That  the  creator  would  communicate,  as  oc- 
casion might  require,  with  his  rational  creatures  in 
a  rational  way,  that  is,  by  means  of  language,  is  a 
most  natural  presumption.  It  is  a  presumption 
which  there  is  nothing  in  his  known  character  or 
works  or  in  their  nature  or  condition  to  rebut.  That 
there  might  be  occasion  in  their  experience  for 
fresher,  fuller,  more  articulate  revelations  of  his 
will,  than  they  could  well  intepret  out  of  the  ordi- 


AUTHORITY.  8 1 

nances  of  nature,  is  an  equally  lawful  presumption. 
If  morally  perfect,  their  imperfection  in  knowledge 
might  reasonably  be  supposed  to  furnish  occasion 
for  some  fuller  light  from  him,  and  their  immaturity 
and  consequent  weakness  in  will  might  furnish  like 
occasion  for  the  encouragement  and  cheer  which 
comes  from  expressed  sympathy  and  reiterated  ex- 
pressions of  his  will.  It  is  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  God  would  withhold  all  communion  with  his  ra- 
tional creatures  continuing  obedient  to  all  his  will, 
and  especially  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  he 
would  withhold  all  reinforcements  of  his  authority 
by  fresh  revelations  of  his  will  in  the  times  of  their 
weakness  and  ignorance.  If  morally  imperfect, 
men  might  reasonably  be  supposed  still  more  to 
need  divine  interposition  to  recover  them  to  obe- 
dience, to  reclaim  them  from  their  wanderings,  and 
guide  them  back  to  duty. 

With  such  presumption  in  favor  of  special  reve- 
lations of  the  divine  will,  only  ordinary  evidence  is 
necessary  to  convince  us  of  the  fact  that  he  has 
made  such  revelations.  Such  evidence  we  have  giv- 
en us  in  the  history  of  the  race  in  a  most  ample 
measure.  His  actual  interpositions  to  confirm  and 
reinforce  the  law  of  nature,  and  to  point  out  new 
lines  of  conduct  which  the  changes  in  their  history 
might  require,  have  been  authenticated  as  truly  his 
by  supernatural  signs  and  works.  While  it  may  be 
safely  admitted  that  the  proof  of  such  interposi- 
tions without  some  supposable  design  or  end  is  im- 
possible, on  the  other  hand,  if  we  can  apprehend 
some  worthy  rational  end  or  design  in  such  inter 

4* 


H-^G^l 


S2  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

positions,  the  proof  of  the  fact  is  as  simple,  and 
easy,  and  valid  as  of  any  action  within  the  province 
of  man  which  we  may  happen  to  know  he  had  de- 
signed or  intended. 

§  63.  The  Bible  is  such  a  special 
The  Bible.  revelation  of  the  creator's  will. 

The  Bible  is  supernatural,  inasmuch  as 
while  it  confirms  and  reinforces  the  revelations  of  the 
divine  will  in  the  ordinances  of  nature,  it  also,  in  ad- 
dition to  this,  sets  forth  other  commands  which 
could  not  easily  be  interpreted  out  of  nature  by  man 
in  his  mental  and  moral  weakness,  certainly  not  in 
their  fulness  and  completeness  and  authoritative  dis- 
tinctness. These  special  supernatural  revelations, 
indeed,  are  all  in  perfect  harmony  with  all  that  ap- 
pears in  the  constitution  and  on-goings  of  nature ; 
but  these  last  are  only  as  the  enwrapped  germs  to 
the  expanded  flowers  and  the  matured  fruit. 

The  Bible  discloses  an  end  and  object  to  be  ac- 
complished by  its  revelations,  that  is  altogether 
worthy  of  God,  and  that  commends  itself  to  human 
.  <,  reason.  Its  revelations  are  attested  by  those  marks 
and  signs  which  should  be  expected  to  accompany 
divine  interjpositions  that  they  may  be  identified 
as  coming  from  him  and  be  fully  accredited.  It  is 
supported,  moreover,  by  testimony  which,  when  it 
is  admitted  that  there  was  a  worthy  reason  for 
divine  interposition,  should  at  once  command  belief 
that  he  has  thus  interposed. 

The  Bible  contains  all  the  special  revelations  of 
God  to  man  that  have  been  sufficiently  accredited 
for  man's  acceptance. 


MORAL    LAW.  83 

The  revelations  of  the  divine  will  in  the  Bible 
are  in  the  form  of  express  positive  precepts  or  com- 
mands, and  also  in  the  form  of  inspired  examples. 

There  are  manifold  precepts  given  in  the  Bible, 
to  individuals — ^as  to  Abraham,  to  Moses,  to  the 
prophets — and  to  communities,  as  especially  to  the 
Jewish  people  through  Moses.  The  life  of  Christ, 
as  the  divine  incarnate  or  embodied  in  the  human,  is 
an  exemplification  of  the  will  of  God  in  all  the 
specific  acts  of  his  which  are  imitable  by  men. 
These  imitable  acts  of  condescending,  self-denying, 
sympathizing,  righteous  beneficence,  are  so  many 
expressions  of  the  divine  will,  and  thus  are  laws  or 
commands  of  his,  binding  the  consciences  of  men. 


84  THEORETICAL   MORALITY. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


CASUISTRY. 


§  64.  By  Casuistry  is  to  be  under- 
Casuistry  defined,  stood  the  application  of  the  principles 
of  morality  to  particular  instances  of 
duty. 

The  term  casuistry  has  been  extensively  used  in 
a  bad  sense,  to  denote  a  sophistical  or  perverted 
application  of  moral  principles  to  action.  But  it 
has  a  good  sense,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the 
term  is  here  employed. 

It  not  frequently  occurs  that  rules  of  duty  seem 
to  conflict.  In  a  loose  and  popular  way  of  speak- 
ing, we  say  duties  conflict.  But  the  line  of  duty, 
strictly  speaking,  is  ever  single  and  direct.  No  one 
is  ever  bound  in  duty  in  opposite  or  diverging  di- 
rections at  the  same  time.  A  weak  conscience  need 
never  be  disturbed  by  the  thought  that  two  conflict- 
ing calls  of  duty  cannot  be  followed.  Regulus  could 
not  listen  to  the  calls  of  country  and  of  family,  and  to 
the  calls  of  his  oath  to  the  Carthaginians,  at  the  same 
time.  When  the  decision  was  fairly  arrived  at 
that  the  obligations  of  his  oath  were  paramount, 


CASUISTRY.  85 

his  conscience  could  not  reasonably  be  dis- 
turbed because  his  country  and  his  friends  were 
given  up,  however  much  his  natural  affection  may 
have  been  pained.  The  field  of  casuistry  is  as  ex- 
tended as  the  conflicts  of  authority,  or  of  rule. 
The  law  of  self  preservation  seems,  sometimes,  to 
be  in  collision  with  the  calls  of  patriotism  bidding 
the  soldier  to  expose  his  life  for  his  country.  The 
command  of  a  parent,  or  of  a  superior,  sometimes 
comes  into  conflict  with  the  laws  of  the  land ;  or 
either  may  be  opposed  to  the  law  of  God.  It  is 
the  province  of  casuistry  to  resolve  such  conflict- 
ing claims,  and  to  determine  in  which  direction 
the  single  duty  leads.  It  fulfils  its  function  by  a 
comparison  of  the  rules  that  seem  to  come  into 
conflict,  and  a  selection  of  the  rule  which  is  of 
paramount  obligation  in  the  particular  case. 

If  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  life  of  man  on 
earth  is  ever  meeting  these  conflicts  of  authority ; 
that,  too,  a  man's  character  depends  greatly  on  the 
promptness  and  correctness  with  which  he  resolves 
them,  as  a  weak  spirit  hesitates  and  falters  from 
irresoluteness,  while  one  of  low  morality  mistakes 
or  prefers  the  lower  claim  instead  of  the  higher ; 
that  thus,  a  great  part  of  the  discipline  of  life  con- 
sists in  the  treatment  of  these  conflicting  calls  to 
duty;  and,  moreover,  that  there  are  principles 
which  may  greatly  help  to  the  settlement  of  those 
conflicts,  and  which  must  indeed  be  recognized  and 
acted  upon  in  any  right  settlement  of  them,  it  will  be 
understood,  how  casuistry  comes  to  claim  a  distinct 
recognition  in  a  system  of  morality. 


S6  THEORETICAL    MORALITY. 

It  will  at  once  be  perceived  that  it  is  the  simple 
province  of  casuistry  to  resolve  the  doubts  as  to 
duty  when  different  specific  rules  call  to  different 
lines  of  action. 

§  65.  The  leading  principles  of  casuis- 
its  principles,     try,    which   help    to   the    solution    of 

doubts  in  regard  to  duty  arising  from 
conflicts  of  authority  or  of  rule,  are  the  following: — 

First,  the  subordinate  authority  should, 
authority.^'^^''  all  other  things  being  equal,  yield  to 

the  higher. 
The  rule  of  parental  duty  thus  is  paramount  to 
that  of  neighborly  duty  ;  consequently,  all  other 
things  being  equal,  the  relief  of  the  wants  of  one's 
own  child  is  binding  in  duty  in  preference  to  such 
relief  of  the  wants  of  a  neighbor.  The  claims  of 
the  bodily  nature  again  are  to  be  subordinated  to 
those  of  the  spiritual  nature. 

Secondly,,  the  higher  the  source  of  au. 

2.  Higher  source,  thority,  Other  things  being  equal,  the. 

more  obligatory  the  claim. 
The  will  of  an  elder  brother,  thus,  is  to  be  sub- 
ordinated to  that  of  a  parent ;    of   the  parent  to 
the  law  of  the  state  ;  the  law  of  the  state  to  the 
law  of  God. 

Thirdly,  a  clear  and  definite  rule  of  ob- 

3.  Clear  rule,      ligation  is  to  be  preferred  before  one 

that  is  obscure  and  doubtful. 

Fourthly,  the  rule  which  favors  law  is 
than  freedom'    ^afer  to  follow   than   that  which  favors 

freedom,  a  restrictive  than  a  permissive 
rule. 


CASUISTRY.  8y 

If,  for  instance,  the  doubt  in  conscience  arises 
whether  a  certain  amusement  should  be  forborne 
because  of  evil  influence  on  others,  or  be  allowed 
on  the  ground  of  personal  freedom  and  indepen- 
dence, it  is  safer  for  conscience  to  follow  the  prohib- 
itory principle,  because,  by  reason  of  the  general  bias 
of  our  nature  towards  indulgence,  we  are  most  like- 
ly to  err  in  this  direction. 

Fifthly,  that  line  of  conduct  which  im- 
acter^^^"^  '^^^^'    pi"oves  character  and  strengthens  virtu- 
ous principle,  should  be  taken  in  prefer- 
ence to  that  which  degrades  or  enervates. 

Sixthly,    the   more   beneficent   act   or 
mof/tneficent.  course  is  to  be  preferred. 

Seventhly,  the  line  of  conduct  which  is 
to  thelifdirect.  ^ircct  to  the  end  of  all  virtue  or  good 
ness  or  beneficence,  is  to  be  preferred 
to  that  which  is  indirect  or  circuitous  ;  that  which 
is  parallel  with  the  general  current  of  rectitude  to 
that  which  crosses  or  is  counter  to  it. 

It  should  be  observed  that  these  very  principles 
of  casuistry  will  often  come  into  collision  as  applied 
to  a  given  case  of  doubt.  It  becomes  necessary 
then  to  weigh  their  respective  claims  and  determine 
which  has  the  preponderance. 


SS  PRACTICAL    MORALITY,   ETC. 


BOOK     II, 


PRACTICAL  MORALITY— DUTIES  AND    RIGHTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

§  66.     Having,  in  the  preceding  book,  explained 
the  nature  of  duty,  we  proceed  in  this  second  book 
to  enumerate  the  particular  acts  of  men  which  come 
under  the  law  of  duty.     As  has  been  in- 
ciassification.     timatcd,  §  IQ,  wc  shall  classify  them  in 
reference  to  the  respective  objects  of 
human  duty.     This  classification  gives  us  at  once 
the  three  general  divisions  of  : 
I.  Duties  to  self  ; 
II.  Duties  to  fellow  men  ;  and 
III.  Duties  to  God. 

§  6y.     Before  entering  upon  the  study 
Recapitulation,  of  this  sccond  part  of  our  treatise,  it  will 
be  of  use  to  recall  the  several  steps  we 
have  taken  in  unfolding  the  nature  of  duty. 


INTRODUCTION.  89 

We  defined  Ethics  or  Moral  Science  to 
Ethics  defined   ^g  fj^g  Science  of  Hiimaii  Duty. 

The  nature  of  duty  was  exemplified  in 
mty  exempH-  ^j^^  fulfilment  by  Regulus  of  his  promise 
to  return  to  Carthage.  An  analysis  of 
this  act  as  a  duty  gave  us  at  once  three  elements 
of  all  duty  :  First,  subject  of  duty  ;  secondly,  ob- 
ject of  duty  ;  thirdly,  act  of  duty. 

A  subject  of  duty,  or  a  moral  person, 
Subject  of  duty,  must  be  a  being  essentially  active,  hav- 
ing the  three  endowments  of  sensibility, 
intelligence,  and  free-will. 

Conscience  includes  the  first  two  of 
Conscience.  these  three  elements — sensibility  and 
intelligence.  It  has  a  threefold  func- 
tion :  first,  to  recognize  and  feel  duty ;  second- 
ly, to  impel  or  oblige  to  the  performance  of  duty ; 
thirdly,  to  praise  or  blame.  In  conscience,  more 
over,  is  seated  the  peculiar  feeling  of  pleasure  or 
pain  consequent  on  the  performance  or  the  viola- 
tion of  duty. 

The  object  of  duty  is  the  person   to 
Object  of  duty,   whom  duty  is  owing  and  is  ever  a  per- 
son— that  is,  a  being,  having  sensibility, 
intelligence,  and  free-will. 

Rights   are   the   correlative  of   duties. 

Rights.  Rights  belong  to  the  object  of  duty ; 

duties,  to   the    subject  of  duty.      The 

Carthaginians  had  a  right  to  what  was  due  to  them 

from  Regulus. 

The  essential  quality  of   a  duty  or  a 
Good  in  duty,     right,  in  the  experience  of  the  objec< 


90  PRACTICAL    MORALITY. 

of   duty,  is  good  —  happiness  or  blessedness.     A 
moral    action,    as    the  performance   of 
Moral  action,     duty,    includcs     three    necessary    ele- 
ments :    love  in   the  subject  of   duty ; 
good  in  the  object  of  duty;  and  rectitude  in  the  act 
or  doing  of  duty.     In  other  words,  all  moral  action 
must  be  loving,  good  or  beneficent,  and  right.     It 
cannot  be  loving  without  aiming  at  good  in  the  ob- 
ject of  duty,  or  without  proceeding  directly  towards 
this  result.     It  cannot  be  good,  except  as  it  pro- 
ceeds from  love  and  moves  in  rectitude.     It  cannot 
be  right,  without  being  also  loving  and  beneficent. 
Love  consists  in  a  sympathetic  endeavor 
Love.  directly  for  the  good  of  the  object  of 

duty. 
The  opposite  of  love  is  hate. 

Good  as  the  end  in  all  duty  is  of  two 
Good.  kinds  :     I.  Good  in  itself,  or  happiness, 

which  is   the  gift  of  the  Creator ;    2. 
Good  as  means  of  happiness.     This  secondary  good 
is  either  the  good  of  condition,  as  wealth,  friends, 
health,  etc.,  or  the  good  of  character. 
The  opposite  of  good  is  evil. 
Rectitude  respects  the  procedure  in  a  moral  ac- 
tion, as  love  regards  its  source,  and  good  its  end  oi 
result.     It  accordingly  respects  the  relation  in  an 
action  between  its  source  and  its  end.     This  rela- 
tion is  that  of  an  unswerving  procedure  from  love, 
its  source,  to  good,  its  end.     This  pro- 
Right,  cedure  must  be  parallel  with  all   right 
moral  action. 
The  opposite  of  right  is  wrong. 


INTRODUCTION.  QI 

All  right  moral  action  proceeds  from  a 
Motives.  motive  which  is  defined  to  be  the  appre- 

hended end  or  result  at  which  the  action 
aims.     This  end  must  always  be  some  good. 

Motives  are  of  two  classes  :  i.  Those  which  have 
their  ends  in  character  ;  2.  Those  which  have  their 
ends  in  condition. 

By  moral  obligation  is  meant  that  attri- 
tio^  °^^^"     bute  of  duty  by  which  it  holds  and  draws 

to  its  fulfilment.  It  is  inherent  in  all 
duty ;  it  is  inexorable  in  its  demand  ;  it  impels  to 
the  performance  of  duty,  but  may  be  resisted  by 
the  free-will. 

The  ground  of  obligation  is  ultimately 
Its  ground.        in  the  nature  of  man  and  his  relations 

to  other  beings  and  things. 

Law  is  a  rule  of  action.  Moral  law  is 
Law.  the  law  of  duty.     It  implies  a  law-giver ; 

it  is  the  expression  of  his  will.  It  gives 
to  the  sense  of  obligation  the  character  of  responsi- 
bility. It  enforces  itself  upon  the  subject  of  duty 
by  its  sanctions,  which  are  the  good  attending  on 
obedience  to  law  and  the  evil  waiting  on  disobe- 
dience. 

Authority  is  the  essential  attribute  of  a 
Authority.         law-giver.      It  includes  both  the  right 

and  the  power  to  make  and  enforce  law. 
It  is  the  immediate  ground  of  obligation.  Its  ulti- 
mate seat  and  source  is  in  the  Creator. 

Casuistry  is  that  department  of  moral 
Casuistry.         scicncc  which  applies   the  principles  of 

morality  to  particular  instances  of  duty. 


92  DUTIES   TO    SELF. 


DIVISION  I. 


DUTIES     TO    SELF, 


CHAPTER    I. 

NATURE  AND  CLASSES. 

§  68.  The  first  named  of  the  three 
Personal  duty,    great  classes  of  human  duties  is  that  of 

duties  to  ones  self]  or,  as  they  have  been 
termed,  perso7ial  duties. 

In  this  class  of  duties,  the  object  of  the 
Explained.        duty  is  Self — the  duty  is  owing  to  one's 

self.  The  propriety  of  such  language, 
importing  that  I  am  under  obligation  to  myself,  will 
be  recognized  at  once  if  we  consider  that  some  of 
our  free  actions  terminate  on  ourselves.  A  large 
share,  indeed,  of  our  active  life  has  immediate  respect 
to  ourselves,  not  to  our  fellow  beings,  nor  to  God. 
Our  nature  is  complex,  constituted  of  manifold  ele- 
ments, to  any  one  of  which,  separately  from  the 
others,  we  may  direct  our  care  and  our  endeavors. 
The  act  of  duty  finds  its  end  in  such  case  in  that 
part  or  element  of  our  nature.  Care  is  due  thus  to 
our  body  that  it  be  kept  in  health,  and  to  the  mind 


NATURE   AND    CLASSES.  93 

that  it  be  instructed  and  exercised.  The  aggregate 
of  these  acts  of  duty,  terminating  in  specific  parts 
of  our  being  or  condition,  makes  up  the  sum  of  per- 
sonal duty. 

§  69.  The  ground  of  obligation  in  the 
u  Tti"n  °^  °^   ^^^^  ^^  personal  duty  is  found  in  this 

complex  nature  of  man  capable  of  re- 
ceiving care  and  effort  in  its  several  parts  or  ele- 
ments and  of  his  free  active  nature  capable  of  ex- 
pending this  care  and  effort. 

While  the  ultimate  ground  may  be  traced  to  the 
Creator's  will  in  forming  man  with  this  two-fold  re- 
ceptive and  active  nature,  or  still  more  remotely  to 
the  character  of  the  Creator  himself  as  the  ever 
loving  worker  of  good  in  the  line  of  perfect  recti- 
tude, the  more  immediate  ground  of  obligation  must 
be  laid  in  this  nature  of  man  himself  as  constituted 
by  his  maker. 

§  70.  This  department  of  moral  activ- 
Seif-iove.  ity  has  been  denominated  self-love.    The 

field  of  self-love  is  thus  the  same  as 
that  of  personal  duty,  the  exercise  of  proper  self- 
love  being  nothing  else  than  performance  of  per- 
sonal duty  or  of  duty  to  one's  self. 

Self-love  should  be  carefully  distin- 
Seifishness.       guished  from  selfishness.      Self-love  is 

a  proper  regard  to  self,  to  one's  own 
condition  and  character;  selfishness  is  an  inor- 
dinate regard  to  self.  Selfishness  is  thus  an  abuse 
of  the  principle  of  self-love. 

This  principle  of  self-love  is  as  necessary  to  the 
best  interests  of  the  universe  and  as  fundamental 


94  DUTIES   TO    SELF. 

in  the  nature  of  man  as  the  principle  of  love  to 
other  beings.  There  is  in  every  one,  on  the  one 
hand,  a  strong  instinct  to  the  exercise  of  this  self- 
love,  and  on  the  other,  an  urgent  demand  for  it.  It 
is,  accordingly,  a  law  of  man's  being,  ordained  by 
his  maker  in  constituting  him  what  he  is.  In  the 
form  of  self-preservation,  this  principle  of  self-love 
is  one  of  the  highest  and  most  sacred  principles  by 
which  we  are  governed.  As  a  creature  of  God,  and 
as  subject  to  wants  and  having  rights,  a  man  is  at 
least  as  worthy  to  receive  the  offices  of  a  kind  and 
watchful  care  from  himself  as  from  his  fellow  men. 

Self-love  may  be  defined  to  be  sympa- 
Seif-iove defined,  thizing  beneficencc  to  one's  self. 

Like  love  generally,  it  is  sympathizing. 
In  self-love  the  soul  considers  one's  personal  needs 
and  demands ;  it  suffers  itself  to  be  duly  impressed 
by  those  needs  ;  it  cherishes  these  impressions  ;  and 
finally  it  yields  itself  to  be  moved  by  them. 

The  action  to  which  in  self-love  the  soul  is 
prompted  is  beneficence — doing  good  to  one's  self, 
as  one's  needs  require  or  his  nature  admits.  The 
good,  which  self-love  seeks,  is  various,  according  to 
the  variety  of  a  man's  needs ;  it  varies  in  degree 
and  in  quality.  It  is,  however,  always  a  secondary 
good ;  not  happiness  itself,  but  the  condition  and 
means  of  happiness.  A  proper  self-love  can  only 
seek  to  secure  for  one's  self  that  character  and  that 
condition  on  which  the  Creator  has  made  happiness 
to  depend,  and  with  which  he  has  indissolubly  con- 
nected it. 

As  love  generally,  so  self-love  must  ever  be  in 


NATURE    AND    CLASSES.  9^ 

rectitude  ;  it  must  move  directly  to  its  object — good 
in  one's  self,  and  in  a  line  parallel  with  all  perfect 
moral  action.  Self-love  is  right  in  so  far  as  its 
movement  is  thus  direct  to  its  lawful  end  and  just 
in  degree,  entrenching  on  no  other  duty. 

§  71.  All  personal  duty  is  thus  under  the 
foidkw"  threefold  law  of  morality:     i.  It  must 

proceed  from  a  sympathizing  and  kindly 
impulse  —  from  true  love  to  one's  self;  2.  It  must 
seek  this  single  end,  the  truest  and  highest  good  of 
one's  self;  and  3.  It  must  move  unswervingly 
towards  this  end  and  thus  infringe  on  no  other  line 
of  duty  or  of  right.  It  must  be  loving,  beneficent, 
right. 

§  72. .    Self-love  is  of  a  twofold  nature, 
SnS^uh^^  ^^  according  as  its  immediate  end  is  condi- 
tion or  character.     The  several  classes 
of  personal  duties  may  be  conveniently  considered 
under  this  twofold  division  : 

I.  Personal  duties  in  respect  to  condition. 
II.  Personal  duties  in  respect  to  character 
The  first  class  embraces  the  two  divisions  of  du- 
ties pertaining  to  the  body  and  duties  pertaining  to 
outward  possessions. 


9^  PERSONAL   DUTIES 


CHAPTER  II. 


PERSONAL   DUTIES    IN   RESPECT   TO   THE   BODY. 

§  73.  The  moral  relationship  of  the  body 
Ground  of  duty.  |-q  tj^g  rational  spirit,  which  so  far  de- 
termines the  duties  to  the  body,  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  body  is  the  medium  between  the 
soul  and  all  outer  things. 

The  body  is  the  condition  both  of  all  outgoing 
activity  of  the  spirit  and  also  of  all  receptive  capac- 
ity of  impression  or  influence  from  without.  Even 
in  the  most  private  personal  thought,  the  brain  is 
moved  ;  it  may  be  that  the  nerves  also  quiver  ;  and 
sometimes,  as  in  remorse  or  in  sense  of  wrong,  the 
heart  beats  and  the  blood  rushes  with  strong  vehe- 
mence. The  soul  is  bound  to  the  body  in  fastest 
bonds  of  dependence.  In  this  is  seen  the  force  of 
the  great  Latin  satirist's  maxim  :  Pray  for  a  sound 
mind  in  a  sound  body — Qrandiim  est  ut  sit  mens 
Sana  in  corpore  sano.  The  guardianship  of  the  body 
is,  to  a  large  degree,  entrusted  to  the  mind.  Duty 
to  itself  requires  that,  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
guardianship  thus  entrusted  to  it  by  its  Creator,  the 
mind  secure  this  soundness  of  body. 


IN    RESPECT    TO    THE   BODY.  9/ 

It  is  a  well  established  fact  that  instinct  de- 
creases as  intelligence  rises.  Life  in  the  lowest 
order  of  animals  goes  on  through  the  force  of  mere 
natural  laws  without  the  need  of  the  guidance  and 
help  of  intelligence.  In  the  higher  order,  there  is 
required  intelligent  selection  of  food  and  of  shelter. 
In  man,  while  mere  natural  constitution  does  much, 
reason  is  required  to  direct,  control,  and  supplement 
the  merely  automatic  functions  of  the  body.  In 
childhood  and  youth,  more  may  be  left  to  instinct 
and  impulse ;  in  advancing  age,  the  appetites  and 
the  instinctive  tendencies  need  more  the  supervision 
and  direction  and  active  control  of  the  reason  and 
intelligence. 

The  degree  of  care  and  thoughtf  ulness  due  to  the 
body  is  measured  by  its  relation  to  the  soul  as  being 
simply  subservient.  The  function  of  the  body  is, 
as  stated,  that  of  medium  and  condition  ;  the  soul 
lives  in  it  and  through  it,  but  not  for  it.  On  the 
contrary,  the  body  is  for  the  soul.  Hence  the  rule, 
that  the  body  receive  such  care  only  as  best  to  fit 
it  for  the  soul's  uses.  To  guard  and  nourish  the 
body  for  its  own  sake,  in  order  to  perfect  it  as  a 
mere  animal  organism,  is  as  truly  wrong  as  to  be  in- 
different to  its  wants.  As  an  animal  organism  it 
has  no  rights  {§  i6)  ;  to  treat  it  as  having  rights  is 
contrary  to  morahty.  For  the  greater  good  of  the 
soul  it  may  even  for  the  time  be  thrust  out  from 
consideration  ;  it  may  be  left  to  exposure  ;  it  may 
be  allowed  to  suffer  ;  even  its  dissolution  may  be 
welcomed  rather  than  the  soul  itself  perish. 

§  74.  The  duties  which  the  soul  thus  owes  to 
5 


98  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

'teSf^d^''^^  the  body  are  those  of  guarding  it,  nouV' 
ishing  it,  and  rulmg  it. 
I.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  one  to  guard 
I.  To  guard  it.    j^ig  own  body  from  all  harm. 

This  law  of  duty  prohibits  suicide.  Cer- 
Suicide.  tainly  never  until  it  can  be  shown  be- 

yond all  reasonable  doubt  that  the  death 
of  the  body  is  necessary  to  the  higher  interest  of 
the  spirit,  can  suicide  be  thought  of  as  justifiable. 
But  this,  it  is  safe  here  to  hold,  can  never  be  done. 
Man  is  too  ignorant  of  the  condition  of  a  disem- 
bodied spirit  to  assume  that  death  by  one's  own 
hands  can  be  for  the  spirit's  good.  The  presump- 
tion is  all  against  it.  No  pressure  of  outward  evils 
can  warrant  the  destruction  of  the  body ;  for  the 
rational  relief  from  such  evils  is  through  the  virtues 
of  fortitude  and  of  trust  in  the  wise  and  beneficent 
ordering  of  all  events.  No  evils  of  spirit,  as  re- 
morse or  vicious  habit,  can  warrant  it ;  for  the 
proper  relief  here  is  in  repentance  and  trust  in  the 
forgiving  and  gracious  ordering  of  all  human  inter- 
ests. 

The  law  also  prohibits  all  maiming  and 
MutUation.  miUilatio>i  of  the  body,  by  which  it  shall 
suffer  in  its  own  integrity  or  in  its  fit- 
ness as  the  outer  organ  of  the  soul.  The  amputa- 
tion of  an  injured  or  diseased  limb  is  justified  when 
needful  to  save  the  whole  body.  That  maiming  for 
any  moral  interest  can  ever  be  necessary,  is  not 
susceptible  of  proof  ;  and  all  presumption  is  against 
it. 

The  law  prohibits  such  ascetic  practices  as  are 


IN    RESPECT    TO   THE    BODY.  99 

Asceticism.  hurtful  to  the  body,  whether  of  positive 
infliction  of  pain  or  of  abstinence  from 
needful  food  or  protection,  except  under  the  limita- 
tions stated.  The  improvement  of  the  bodily  or 
the  spiritual  condition  must  be  made  to  appear  be- 
fore there  can  be  ground  and  warrant  for  such  viola- 
tions of  the  natural  laws  of  physical  health  and 
soundness.  Fasting  or  other  "  mortifications  of  the 
body  "  can  be  justified  only  as  remedial  of  other  ills 
of  body  or  soul. 

This  law  of  duty,  further,  requires  a 
Positive  care,  positive  carc  for  the  body  by  a  sympa- 
thetic attention  to  its  exposures ;  by 
vigilance  in  discerning  and  timely  effort  in  avoiding 
dangers  that  may  threaten  it ;  by  vigorous  resis- 
tance to  violence  that  assails  it.  Needless  exposure 
to  cold  or  heat  or  wet,  to  contagious  disease,  to 
danger  of  any  kind,  is  a  sin,  as  real  if  not  as  flagrant 
as  suicide,  or  falsehood,  or  theft.  Excessive  strains 
on  the  bodily  powers  in  violent  or  prolonged  labor, 
when  no  higher  law  of  duty  prescribes,  are  equally 
wrong,  whether  for  curiosity,  in  idle  competition  or 
strife,  or  for  heedless  sport.  Prohibiting  indiffer- 
ence, negligence,  and  recklessness,  the  law  enjoins 
a  reasonable  care  and  prudence  in  regard  to  all 
bodily  needs. 

More  specifically,  the  law  requires  such 
Shelter  and        provisiou  of  shelter  and   dress  as  shall 

dress.  *■ 

secure  the  highest  degree  of  bodily  com- 
fort and  well-being  compatible  with  higher  inter- 
ests. The  provision  for  these  wants  must  of  course 
be  measured  by  one's  resources,  and  be  shaped  by 


100  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

his  surroundings  in  life.  Moreover,  it  must  be 
made  in  a  certain  subordination  to  the  demands  of 
the  aesthetic  and  moral  nature.  But  both  in  re- 
spect to  the  dwelling  and  also  in  respect  to  dress, 
the  highest  moral  refinement  and  the  truest  taste 
may  be  regarded  while  the  physical  wants  are  best 
consulted. 

§  75.  II.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  one  to 
2.  To  nourish  it.  nouvish  his  body. 

This  is  more  positive  in  its  character 
than  the  preceding  rule.  The  particular  acts  which 
it  enjoins  include  to  some  extent  those  that  have 
been  specified,  as  the  duty  of  nourishing  involves 
that  of  guarding. 

This  rule  requires,  in  the  first  place,  that 
Food.  every  one  provide  and  use  such  food  as 

the  body  needs,  in  kind  and  in  quantity. 
The  grand  dietetic  rule  is :  choose  what  is  health- 
ful, not  what  is  palatable.  The  natural  appetite  is 
a  trustworthy  guide  to  a  certain  extent ;  it  resents 
too  close  watching.  Its  suggestions  are  worthy  of 
heed ;  but  they  must  ever  be  kept  subject  to 
reason.  It  is  often  vitiated,  often  morbid  ;  and  even 
when  sound  it  is  insufficient  of  itself  and  is  liable  to 
mislead.  It  is  subject  to  change ;  artificial  appe- 
tites are  common  among  all  peoples.  As  the  general 
rule,  the  most  healthful  diet  will,  in  time,  prove  to  be 
the  most  palatable.  On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the 
soundest  maxims  for  the  promotion  of  health  is  : 
forbear  all  unnecessary  anxiety  in  selecting,  taking, 
and  digesting  food.  The  function  of  digestion,  like 
those  of  respiration  and  circulation,  is  best  left  to 


IN    RESPECT   TO   THE   BODY.  lOI 

itself  ;  nature  takes  the  care  of  that  into  her  own 
hands  and  resents  all  needless  interference. 

The  general  hygienic  rules  of  food  require,  i,  in 
respect  to  quality  or  kind,  the  provision  of  such  as 
will  furnish  all  the  elements  that  enter  into  the  con- 
stitution of  the  body  to  form  its  bones,  its  muscles, 
its  brains  and  nerves,  and  supply  its  motive  force  ; 
2,  in  respect  to  quantity,  so  much  as  will  satisfy  the 
cravings  of  a  sound  appetite  ;  3,  in  respect  to  time, 
that  it  be  taken  at  regular  intervals  and  at  leisure  ; 
and  4,  in  respect  to  place  and  condition,  that  it  be 
in  retirement,  in  relaxation  from  care  and  thought, 
in  society  and  with  entertaining  conversation. 

§  'jG.  This  rule  requires,  in  the  second 
Exercise.  place,  a  Certain  amount  of  well-regulated 

exercise  for  the  healthy  maintenance 
and  development  of  the  body.  The  vitality  and 
restlessness  of  childhood  are  nature's  provisions  for 
that  activity  which  is  necessary  at  that  period  of 
life  for  the  sound  and  vigorous  condition  of  bodily 
organs.  As  intelligence  advances,  this  duty  of  se- 
curing needful  physical  exercise  is  left  more  and 
more  to  the  control  of  the  reason,  till  old  age  comes 
on  with  its  infirmities  and  its  indisposition  to  bodily 
movement,  when  healthy  activity  of  body  is  left  to 
be  sustained  almost  wholly  by  the  spirit's  activity. 
The  involuntary  functions,  indeed,  such  as  those  of 
respiration  and  circulation  continue  ;  and  there  is, 
besides,  the  strong  force  of  fixed  habit  which,  if 
right  and  sound,  will  go  far  in  maintaining  sound- 
ness and  vigor  of  body.  Still  the  bodily  organism, 
which  in  childhood  was   redundant  with  life  and 


102  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

vigor  and  had  no  need  of  spur  or  goad,  but  rather 
of  check  and  bridle,  becomes  in  age  inert  and  in- 
disposed to  effort  and  needs  nursing  and  animation 
from  the  spirit  which  inhabits  it.  The  case  is  now 
reversed  .in  the  relations  of  body  and  spirit ;  in 
childhood  the  instinctive  activity  of  the  bodily  or- 
ganism kept  the  spirit  awake  and  earnest ;  in  old 
age  the  great  source  of  activity  and  life  to  the  body 
is  in  the  spirit  itself. 

The  relation  of  muscular  exercise  to  health  con- 
sists in  this :  that  sound  health  depends  on  the  con- 
stancy and  amount  of  the  change  effected  in  the 
body  by  the  processes  of  waste  and  repair ;  and  it  is 
the  action  of  the  muscles  in  alternate  contraction 
and  relaxation,  which  acting  immediately  on  the 
circulating  organs,  starts  and  sustains  these  proces- 
ses, supplying  thus  the  force  which  carries  forward 
the  whole  machinery  of  life.  By  this  muscular  ac- 
tion the  blood  is  propelled  in  more  rapid  currents, 
forcing  more  rapid  changes  in  all  the  minute  cells  to 
which  it  is  carried,  and  thus  stimulating  the  digest- 
ive, the  respiratory,  excretive,  and  formative  func- 
tions of  the  living  body.  It  is  a  force  called  in  by 
the  will,  supplementing  the  proper  instinctive  move- 
ments of  the  bodily  system.  Most  evidently  the 
body  was  not  designed  to  be  left  to  its  own  instincts 
so  as  to  take  exclusive  care  of  itself ;  it  is  dependent 
on  the  care  of  the  rational  spirit.  This  care,  being 
voluntary,  comes  under  the  control  of  morality  which 
prescribes  the  duty,  on  the  part  of  the  rational 
spirit,  to  render  this  ministry  freely  and  faithfully. 
Exercise  is   thus  brought    under  rational  control. 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  BODY.         TO3 

It  should  be  intelligently  adapted  to  the  wants  and 
conditions  of  the  body  in  respect  of  time  and  of  de- 
gree. It  should  be  systematic  and  habitual,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  should  be  held  to  be  simply 
subservient  to  the  higher  interests  of  the  spirit  in 
so  far  as  these  interests  are  involved  in  the  sound 
condition  of  the  body. 

§  JJ .  Together  with  food  and  exercise, 
Rest  this  general  duty  of  nourishing  the  body 

involves  a  due  provision  for  rest.  There, 
is  a  tidal  character  to  the  bodily  life  ;  it  has  its  ebbs 
and  flows.  While  it  demands  exercise,  it  demands 
also  responsive  rest.  Nature  has  thus  ordained 
sleep,  in  which  voluntary  action  and  communication 
with  things  without  are  suspended.  The  needful 
amount  of  sleep  to  the  soundest  health  varies  with 
individual  natures  and  conditions.  To  determine 
this  amount  for  one's  self  is  the  task  assigned  to  his 
rational  nature.  There  may  be  such  a  thing  here 
as  excess  or  there  may  be  deficiency.  The  rule  of 
duty  requires  that  it  be  intelligently  determined  in 
amount  ;  that  it  be  regular  ;  and  that  it  be  brought 
under  the  control  of  the  laws  of  sound  habit. 

There  are  other  modes  of  rest  needful 
Recreation.       for  the  bcst  Condition  of  the  body.  They 

are,  for  the  most  part  at  least,  for  wake- 
ful life,  comprehended  under  the  general  denomina- 
tion of  recreation.  If  by  this  term  in  its  most  gen- 
eric application  only  change  of  employment  be  un- 
derstood, it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  for  the  most 
part  the  labor  to  be  interchanged  with  rest  is  im- 
posed by  some  law  or  principle,  or  necessity  from 


T04  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

without,  and  that  the  most  effective  and  most  salu- 
tary change  must  be  a  change  from  such  activity  to 
activity  that  is  free  and  spontaneous.  The  highest 
and  best  recreation,  simply  as  recreation,  is  thus 
proper  play.  And  as  competitive  play  calls  forth 
the  highest  and  freest  exertion,  games  of  skill  or 
agility  furnish  the  best  kind  of  recreation,  particu- 
larly for  youth  who  are  yet  comparatively  strangers 
to  the  satisfaction  that  comes,  through  habit  or 
through  interest  awakened  by  experience,  from 
chosen  employments.  With  the  well-trained  man 
of  mature  age,  simple  change  of  pursuit  wisely  di- 
rected, may  constitute  the  best  recreation.  But  the 
need  of  this  rest  by  means  of  recreation  or  change 
of  activity,  in  order  to  the  soundest  physical  condi- 
tion, remains  the  unquestioned  fact ;  and  the  law  of 
duty  requires  that  it  be  wisely  and  of  set  purpose 
provided  in  character  and  amount  to  meet  those 
wants  'of  the  body. 

§  ^S.  III.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  one  to 
3-  To  rule  it.      ^^^/^  his  own  body. 

The  union  in  one  being  of  two  such 
opposites  as  body  and  spirit  makes  it  necessary  that 
one  or  the  other  should  have  the  mastery.  There 
cannot  be  two  masters  here.  A  divided  sovereignty 
is  the  worst  of  anarchies.  The  higher  nature  of  the 
spirit  determines  that  it  should  wield  the  scepter. 
The  wretchedness  of  a  bondage  to  bodily  appetite 
evinces  that  the  body  was  never  designed  by  its 
Creator  to  rule  the  spirit.  Its  function  and  station 
is  that  of  organ  and  minister.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
spirit  to  maintain  this  relation  and  keep  the   body 


IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  BODY.         I05 

ever  in  subjection.  It  is  practicable  to  meet  the 
legitimate  demands  of  the  body  in  accordance  with 
the  true  interests  of  the  spirit.  The  apostolic  in- 
junction to  eat  and  drink  to  the  glory  of  the  Creator 
presupposes  this  practicability  of  gratifying  the 
wants  of  the  body  in  subserviency  to  the  higher  in- 
terests of  morality  and  religion  which  concern  the 
spirit  only.  The  body  is  adapted  in  perfect  wisdom 
to  be  the  organ  of  the  spirit  and  its  best  condition 
is  that  in  which  it  can  serve  the  spirit  best  as  such 
organ. 

§  79.  The  particulars  of  this  rule  by  the 
Us  merSr^""^    Spirit  ovcr  the  body  are  the  following  : — 
I.  It  is  the  part  of  the  spirit  to  resist 
the   bodily  tendency  to  inertness — to   ease,   inac- 
tion, sloth. 

This  is  the  perpetual  bent  of  the  body  as  mate- 
rial, which  requires  perpetual  watchfulness  and  re- 
sistance. 

§  80.  2.  It  is  the  part  of  the  spirit  to  direct 
2.  By  regulating  and  regulate  the  appetites  of  the  body. 

its  appetites.  *^  ^  ^  •' 

Being  planted  in  our  natures,  they  have 
a  lawful  position  and  existence  there.  They  are  not 
to  be  extirpated  ;  they  are  to  be  trained  and  regu- 
lated in  respect  to  the  degree  and  manner  in  which 
they  are  to  be  indulged.  They  easily  become  inor- 
dinate in  their  cravings,  and  through  unbridled  al- 
lowance come  to  be  beyond  easy  control.  They  are 
to  be  indulged  also,  in  entire  subordination  to  the 
interests  of  the  spirit.  Hunger,  however  intense, 
may  not  satiate  itself  on  anything  and  everything 
on  which  it  can  seize.     It  must  respect  the  rights  oi 

5* 


I06  PERSONAL   DUTIES. 

Others,  as  well  as  the  decencies  and  proprieties  of 
personal  life  They  need  to  be  kept  in  subjection 
to  the  respective  end  and  design  which  they  were 
created  to  subserve.  The  very  indulgence  of  them 
should  be  not  only  intelligent,  decent,  and  rightful ; 
it  should  in  addition  be  made  habitually  serviceable 
to  the  interests  of  the  spirit. 

§  8 1.  3.  The  body  should  be  trained  to 

3.  By  training  it  habits  of  direct  ministry  to  the  spirit. 

to  right  habits.  -^  ^ 

The  senses,  the  limbs,  the  body  gen- 
erally should  be  used  and  controlled  for  this  service. 
In  manifold  ways  and  applications  may  this  minis- 
try of  the  body  to  the  spirit  be  enforced.  The  ques- 
tions that  press  in  common  upon  all  men  :  "  What 
shall  we  eat,  what  shall  we  drink,  and  wherewithal 
shall  we  be  clothed,"  are  not  to  be  held  as  para- 
mount, but  as  subordinate  to  those  higher  questions 
which  pertain  to  the  nourishment,  and  protection, 
and  gratification  of  the  spirit. 

§  82.  4.  The  spirit  should,  in  a  certain 

4.  By  being  su-   sensc,  live  abovc  bodily  infirmities  and 

penor  to  its  in-        _  -' 

firmities.  distrCSSCS. 

There  is  such  a  thing  as  tranquillity 
and  joy  even  in  sickness  and  anguish  of  body. 
These  conditions  may  be  made  to  work  for  the 
spirit's  good  ;  even  in  them,  therefore,  the  spirit 
may  rejoice.  Not  infrequently  Christian  submis- 
sion and  Christian  hope  lift  the  soul  to  higher  peace 
and  enjoyment  by  means  of  bodily  weakness  and 
pain.  In  such  cases  we  recognize  the  true  relation 
of  the  soul  as  one  of  mastery  and  supremacy  to  the 
body. 


PERSONAL   DUTIES,    ETC.  10/ 


CHAPTER  III. 

PERSONAL     DUTIES     IN    RESPECT    TO    EXTERNAL 
CONDITION. 

§  83.  Every  man  exists  in  a  moral 
Nahireand  relationship  to  other  things  around  him. 
He  is  a  part  of  a  great  whole,  and  must 
recognize  himself  as  such  in  determining  his  duties. 
From  this  relationship,  looking  only  on  his  side  of 
the  relation,  there  are  seen  to  spring  obligations 
which  may  properly  be  ranked  as  personal  ;  while, 
at  the  same  time,  in  perfect  harmony  with  these 
and  in  part  exactly  corresponding  to  them,  there 
are  seen,  as  we  look  on  the  things  around  him,  to 
arise  on  their  part  claims  on  his  care  and  effort, 
which  take  the  proper  character  of  social  duties. 

Simply  because  man  exists  as  one  member  of 
this  relation,  from  a  regard  to  his  own  being  and 
destiny,  and  irrespectively  of  all  claim  of  other 
objects  on  him,  there  are  duties  of  this  personal 
class  : — duties  owing  to  himself,  arising  out  of  his 
own  nature  as  formed  in  relationship  to  other  things 
around  him. 

These  personal  duties  which  respect  the  external 


I08  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

condition  may  be  classed  under  those  which  respect 
external  nature  ;  property  ;  station  ;  and  friends. 

•§  84.  Personal   Duties    in    respect     to 

Nature. 

Man  is  a  part  of  a  system  of  things  with  which, 
for  his  own  good,  he  is  bound  to  keep  himself  in 
sympathetic  and  harmonious  relation.  This  system 
embraces  objects  existing  in  space  and  events 
occurring  in  time.  Amid  these  objects  and  these 
events  his  life  is  cast.  He  must  come  in  contact 
with  them  every  moment.  He  is  dependent  on 
them  as  well  as  able  to  influence  them.  As  all  are 
ordered  and  disposed  by  the  same  loving  intelli- 
gence, his  course  among  them  may,  if  he  order  it 
aright,  be  peaceable,  prosperous,  happy ;  whereas 
if  he  misdirect  his  course  or  his  individual  actions, 
collision,  difficulty,  evil  of  manifold  forms,  must 
certainly  arise. 

The  particular  personal  duties  springing 
pathywiththingsout  of  this  relation  are  the  following: 

and  events.  ^      .     .  >       i    ^      ^ 

I.  It  is  every  man  s  duty  to  recognize 
himself  as  placed  in  this  relation  to  the  objects 
around  him  and  the  course  of  events,  as  a  part ;  to 
be  and  to  act  in  them  and  with  them  in  perfect 
harmony,  in  cordial  sympathy,  and  in  reciprocal 
inter-dependence.  The  fundamental  maxim  of 
reason  here  is :  maintain  yourself  ever  in  kindly 
sympathy  with  the  order  of  nature  and  of 
providence. 
^,         .     2.  It  is  every  man's  duty  to  view  and 

2 .  Of  recogniz-  ^  •'  . 

ing  their  benefi-  treat  the  ordcr  of  nature  and  of  provi- 

cent  mission .        ,  •      1         i      •  i      ^        v        • 

dence,    as   wisely    designed    to    be   m 


IN    RESPECT   TO    CONDITION.  IO9 

perpetual  ministry  of  good  to  him.  The  evils  that 
come  along  to  be  borne  in  this  system  of  things 
are  in  consequence  of  a  thwarting  of  this  design 
directly  or  indirectly  by  himself  or  by  others  ;  and 
what  there  are  may  be  turned  to  profit,  if  not 
otherwise,  at  least  through  the  better  furtherance 
of  higher  spiritual  interests.  In  the  ordering  of 
affairs  the  wise  and  beneficent  power  that  created, 
ever  holds  the  sceptre,  and  is  ever  out  of  seeming 
evil  educing  a  higher  good.  It  is  man's  own  fault 
if  all  things  do  not  work  together  for  his  good. 

3.  It  is  every  man's  duty  to  uphold,  so 

3.  Of  furthering  ;f  ^  ,     ^        •  , 

their  end  or  de-  tar  as  he  may,  and  to  improve  and 
^^^""  perfect  the  disposition  and  condition  of 

things  in  nature  and  the  general  course  of  events. 
This  disposition  of  things  and  course  of  events 
have  a  good  end  and  design.  Every  thing  exists 
or  occurs  for  some  good.  Every  plant  that  grows 
has  a  nature  and  an  end  of  its  own.  It  is  every 
man's  duty,  not  to  destroy,  not  to  waste,  not  to 
prevent,  but  rather,  as  in  the  case  of  his  body,  to 
nourish  and  protect.  Crystalline  symmetry,  vege- 
table beauty,  animal  grace,  are  to  be  admired, 
enjoyed,  improved,  not  maimed  or  marred. 

4.  It  is  every  man's  duty  to  make  the 

4.  Of  profiting  -^  ^ 

by  their  minis-  order  of  things  and  events  subservient 
^^'  to  his  own    highest   uses,    and    not   l)e 

servilely  ruled  by  it.  He  may  not  be  able  in 
manifold  respects  to  change  or  break  up  this  order  ; 
but  he  can  direct  and  control  its  influence  upon 
himself  so  as  that  he  shall,  after  all  and  in  the 
whole,  be  the  master  and  not  the  slave. 


no  PERSONAL    DUTIES 

§  85.  Personal  Duties  in  respect  to 

fo7oArty'°"  Property. 

While  there  are  some  things  existing 
about  us  which  cannot  be  appropriated,  as  for  the 
most  part  air  and  Hght,  there  are  others  which 
may  be  held  as  property — as  one's  own,  and  not 
another's.  Corresponding  to  this  is  the  instinct,  the 
desire  of  property,  founded  in  man's  nature.  This 
is  the  ultimate  ground  for  the  rights  and  duties  in 
regard  to  property — the  constitution  of  things  in 
which  on  the  one  hand  are  objects  to  be  appro- 
priated or  held  as  one's  own,  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  instinct  to  possess  such  objects.  This  is  the 
foundation  for  the  general  right  of  property  only, 
however,  and  is  not  the  foundation  for  the  right  to 
hold  any  specific  object  or  property.  That  I  have 
a  right  to  hold  property  is  proved  from  the  nature 
of  things  around  me  and  of  my  own  person ;  that  I 
have  a  right  to  hold  this  house  or  this  book,  or  any 
specific  property,  depends  on  something  besides  this 
general,  absolute  right  of  property  founded  in  my 
nature. 

§  86.  The  institution  of  property  is  one 
Uses  of  prop-  ^f  the  wiscst  beneficencc.  This  prop- 
osition remains  true  although  it  should 
be  conceded  that  the  history  of  property,  of  the 
working  of  the  greed  for  gain  in  self-torture  and 
degradation,  and  in  wrongs  and  distresses  to  others, 
in  frauds  and  thefts  and  robberies,  and  quarrels, 
and  wars,  makes  up  a  great  part  of  the  history  of 
evil  among  men.  These  evils  are  but  the  abuses 
of  the  native  instinct  for  property  in  man.     The 


IN   RESPECT   TO   CONDITION.  Ill 

great  evil  in  the  abuse  proves  the  great  good  lying 
in  the  right  use.  The  beneficent  working  of  this 
institution  of  property  is  seen  in  the  immediate 
effect  on  the  individual,  keeping  him  awake  and 
vigilant,  careful  and  prudent,  earnest  and  enterpri- 
sing, frugal  and  industrious,  keeping  him  thus  from 
vicious  sloth  and  recklessness  ;  and  on  the  general 
welfare  in  increasing  the  supply  of  necessaries  and 
of  comforts  for  the  good  of  the  race,  as  well  as 
of  those  things  which  minister  to  the  elevation  and 
refinement  of  mankind.  In  the  expressive  language 
of  Chancellor  Kent :  "  The  sense  of  property  is 
graciously  bestowed  upon  mankind  for  the  purpose 
of  raising  them  from  sloth  and  stimulating  them  to 
action.  It  leads  to  the  cultivation  of  the  earth,  the 
institution  of  government,  the  establishment  of 
justice,  the  acquisition  of  the  comforts  of  life,  the 
growth  of  the  useful  arts,  the  spirit  of  commerce, 
the  productions  of  taste,  the  exertions  of  charity, 
and  the  display  of  the  benevolent  affections." 

§  8y.  The  right  to  property  in  any 
properttrda-  spccific  thing  is  cvcr  only  relative, 
tive.  My  right  to  my  house  may  be  perfect 

as  against  my  neighbor  ;  but  my  ownership  is  not 
absolute,  for  the  state  may  rightfully  take  it  from 
me  on  occasions  of  its  necessity.  The  house,  which 
is  mine  to  the  fullest  extent  as  against  all  other 
individuals,  may  be  destroyed  to  stop  a  general  con- 
flagration without  any  consent  on  my  part  ;  it  may 
be  removed  if  standing  in  the  way  of  a  great  pub- 
lic improvement  ;  it  may  be  appropriated  for  the 
government's  uses  in  pestilence  or  in  war.      So  if  I 


112  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

have  found  money  in  the  highway,  it  is  mine  as 
against  any  other  person,  except  the  owner  or  his 
representative,  or  the  pubUc  officer  ;  no  other  one 
has  a  right  to  take  it  from  me  or  to  interfere  with 
my  treatment  of  it,  except  in  the  simple  interest  of 
the  loser  or  of  the  public.  Farther  than  this,  all 
rights  of  property  in  man  are  but  the  rights  of 
stewards,  holding  all  subject  to  the  higher  and  all 
embracing  ownership  of  God.  The  right  of  property 
thus  is  ever  relative,  not  absolute. 

§  88.  There  are  three  relations  of  right 
tioSpI"^''^^'  and  duty  in  which  man  stands  to  prop- 
erty:— of  acquisition,  holding,  and  dis- 
posal. Man  brought  nothing  into  the  world  ;  he 
carries  nothing  out.  He  must  acquire  whatever 
he  comes  to  hold  ;  he  holds  only  for  a  time ;  he 
must  sooner  or  later  dispose  of  all  he  ever  holds. 

§  89.  Property  is  acquired  in  the  several 
Jfdsltion^  ^'''  ways  of:  i.  Appropriation  of  what  is 
common  or  unappropriated,  as  of  new- 
discovered  land  ;  2.  Labor,  as  by  imparting  new 
value  to  material  or  extracting  new  values  from 
the  earth  by  mining  or  by  culture  ;  3.  Exckaftge  of 
one  commodity  for  another  ;  4.  Gift,  or  inheritance 
from  others. 

§  90.  The  personal  duties  in  respect  to 
quiringyop'er'ty.  propcrty  are  the  following  : 

I.  It  is  man's  duty  to  acquire  property. 

The   law   of  instinct   as   to   property  he  should 

obey  for  his  own  good — for  the  cultivation   of  all 

those  manifold  and    most   important  virtues  which 

are   fostered   in  the    right  acquisition  and  use  of 


IN   RESPECT   TO    CONDITION.  II3 

property  and  the  avoidance  of  all  those  vices  which 
spring  from  a  disregard  of  this  instinct.  He 
should  obey  this  law  of  his  nature  for  the  good  of 
others,  that  he  may  be  more  capable  of  minister- 
ing to  their  welfare.  This  is  the  general  rule  of 
duty,  that  he  seek  to  increase  the  general  stock 
of  goods  that  may  be  held  as  property  by  men, 
avoiding  all  unnecessary  waste  and  destruction  of 
property. 

2.  It  is  man's  duty  to  acquire,  hold,  and 
blsuL^rSifon.  use  property  only  in  strict  subordination 

to  higher  principles. 
Property,  wealth,  is  to  be  considered  and  treated 
only  as  a  means,  not  as  an  end.  Not  for  itself,  but 
for  what  it  may  occasion  or  effect,  is  it  to  be  sought 
or  held.  It  is  to  be  acquired  and  held,  moreover, 
in  conformity  with  principles  of  equity,  and  in 
deference  to  the  higher  claims  to  it  of  the  state  and 
of  God.  It  is  to  be  sought  and  managed  so  as  to 
promote  the  virtues  in  character  with  which  it  is 
so  clearly  associated,  such  as  those  of  wakefulness, 
enterprise,  industry,  prudence,  economy,  benefi- 
cence. It  is  to  be  pursued  in  moderation,  subject 
ever  to  the  duties  of  personal  health  and  capacity, 
to  other  interests  of  the  body  and  spirit,  as  well  as 
to  the  interests  and  rights  of  others.  It  is  to  be 
disposed  of  wisely  and  usefully,  as  a  most  important 
trust,  so  as  on  the  one  hand  to  nurture  the  spirit 
of  self-denial  and  of  beneficence,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  particularly  in  the  final  parting  with 
it,  so  as  to  save  from  waste  and  misappropria- 
tion. 


114  personal  duties. 

§  91.  Personal  Duties  in  respect  to  Sta- 
tion. 

Under  the  comprehensive  term  station,  is  here 

included  all  that  in  a  man's  condition  which  gives 

him  power  and  influence  over  others.     It  includes 

the  distinctions  of  family,  of  personal 

spectlo  slatiin.'^^  worth  and  ability,  of  social  position,  and 

of  civil  rank  and  office. 

There  is  in  human  nature  this  instinct 
iSctive?'°''''  o^  ambition— of  desire   of   power   and 

influence  over  others,  and  men  are  so 
constituted  as  to  be  susceptible  to  this  influence. 
The  very  notion  of  a  social  nature  in  beings,  like 
men,  involves  this  relation  of  influence  and  depend- 
ence. The  proper  culture  and  regulation  of  this 
instinct  is  thus  imposed  on  man  by  his  very  nature 
and  his  relations  to  his  fellow  men. 

The  desire  of  power,  like  the  desire  of  wealth,  is 
an  instinct  of  man's  nature,  giving  rise  thus  to  a 
peculiar  species  of  personal  duty.  It  differs  widely- 
from  that  desire  in  respect  to  the  character  of  its 
object :  the  desire  of  property  fastens  on  things 
that  have  no  rights  ;  the  desire  of  power  is  directed 
towards  men  endowed  with  rights.  We  do  not 
hold  men  as  we  hold  property.  We  can  manage 
property  with  no  regard  to  any  claim  inherent  in 
itself  to  be  respected  ;  we  can  manage  men  right- 
fully, only  as  free  beings,  only  as  having  rights 
equally  with  ourselves.  We  may  lawfully  desire 
the  power  to  influence  their  condition,  to  mould 
their  opinions,  to  draw  their  affections,  to  determine 
their  actions ;    but  only  in  the  way  in  which  free, 


IN    RESPECT   TO    CONDITION.  II5 

intelligent,  and  loving  beings  are  to  be  influenced 
and  in  accordance  with  all  the  principles  of  social 
duty.  Emphatically  no  true  or  lawful  ambition  can 
ever  seek  power  over  others  by  lowering  or  crip- 
pling them  in  any  way.  In  its  lawful  workings, 
ambition  can  only  aim  at  the  advancement  and 
elevation  of  the  condition  of  others. 

The  evils  rightly  attributable  to  wrong  or  false 
ambition,  are  to  be  paralleled  in  extent  and  severity 
with  those  that  have  flowed  from  the  evil  thirst  for 
gain.  Such  evils  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  results 
of  the  abuse  of  this  principle.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  blessings  to  mankind,  which  are  traceable  to 
this  instinct,  may  well  be  set  over  against  the  evils 
from  its  abuse.  The  elevation  of  the  individual, 
the  advancement  of  society,  the  promotion  of  all 
industrial  and  elegant  arts,  the  extension  of  science 
and  learning,  the  furtherance  of  freedom,  the 
accumulation  of  the  blessings  generally  which  make 
up  our  idea  of  a  true  civilization,  could  hardly  be 
conceived  of  as  attainable,  except  through  the  labor 
and  sufferings  of  men  actuated  by  a  worthy 
ambition. 

To  be  without  any  aspiration  for  the  esteem,  the 
confidence,  the  gratitude,  the  respect  of  others,  on 
which  a  lawful  ambition  must  ever  rely  as  the  con- 
dition of  its  proper  power  to  bless  them,  and, 
moreover,  to  be  without  any  aspiration  to  be  able  to 
influence  favorably  their  welfare,  is  to  be  without 
one  of  the  noblest  endowments  of  man.  His  own 
perfection,  irrespectively  of  the  effects  on  others, 
demands  the  recognition  and  the  careful  culture  of 


Il6  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

this  instinctive  desire  of  power.  It  is  to  be  cul- 
tivated, however,  only  in  moderation,  that  is,  in 
due  subordination  to  other  principles  of  our  own 
nature  and  to  the  rights  and  needs  of  others.  It 
is  to  be  exercised,  moreover,  as  well  as  cultivated, 
in  strict  regard  to  all  those  principles  which 
regulate  our  actions  towards  our  fellow  men. 

§  92.  Personal  Duties  in  respect  to 

Friendship.  FRIENDSHIP. 

In  conjunction  with  the  desires  for 
property  and  for  power,  we  find  in  man's  nature  the 
desire  for  friendship.  This  instinct  finds  its  fitting 
objects  in  society. 

We  discover  at  once  a  line  of  personal  duty 
leading  from  this  natural  relationship.  Its  signifi- 
cance to  human  life  is  well  likened  by  Cicero  to 
that  of  the  sun  to  the  external  world. 

Like  property  and  power,  friends  are  to 
dutS?"^^        be  acquired,  and  held,  and  treated,  under 

certain  clear  and  familiar  moral  princi- 
ples. The  particulars  of  personal  duty  here  may  be 
thus  summarily  enounced : 

1.  The  spirit  of  friendship  is  to  be  considerately 
nourished  and  developed. 

2.  The  acquisition  of  friends  is  to  be  effected  by 
a  right  regard  to  the  conditions  of  friendship. 
Friendship  is  a  reciprocity  ;  it  cannot  exist  except 
as  what  is  required  shall  be  freely  given,  of  confi- 
dence, esteem,  forbearance,  good-will.  We  win 
friends  only  by  being  friendly :  we  gain  the 
confidence  and  esteem  of  others  by  trusting  and 
esteeming  them.     The  selection  is  to  be  governed 


IN   RESPECT   TO    CONDITION.  11/ 

by  considerations  of  fitness,  congeniality,  moral  wor- 
thiness, and  helpfulness. 

3.  The  maintenance  of  friendship  is  to  be  sought 
through  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  friendly 
offices,  not  with  self-seeking,  but  in  disinterested 
affection.  True  love,  here  as  everywhere,  is  so  far 
a  setting  aside  of  self  as  object.  Charitable  con- 
structions of  fault,  and  forbearance  towards  imper- 
fections, are  eminent  duties  in  the  maintenance  of 
friendship. 

4.  The  particular  rights  and  duties  of  friendship 
are  to  be  determined  in  intelligent  consideration  of 
the  general  principles  of  morality.  Friendly  feeling 
and  acting  are  to  be  held  in  due  moderation.  They 
should  never  be  allowed  to  transgress  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  truth  and  justice,  of  patriotism  and 
piety. 


Il8  PERSONAL    DUTIES 


CHAPTER    IV. 

PERSONAL    DUTIES    IN    RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER. 

§  93.     By  CHARACTER,  as  the  term  is 
Sfi^!^  applied  to  a  moral  being,  is  meant  a  form 

of  spirit,  and  by  a  perfect  character  is 
meant  a  perfect  form  of  spirit. 

The  moral  relation  of  a  man  to  his  character  lies 
in  the  fact  that  as  a  free  being  he  is  charged  with 
the  shaping  of  his  own  character  under  the  condi- 
tions in  which  he  is  placed.  He  has  a  certain  in- 
stinct of  character — an  innate  desire  to  be  perfect. 
This  instinct,  unrepressed  and  unperverted,  prompts 
towards  an  ideal  of  excellence  both  in  regard  to 
character  generally,  and  also  in  respect  to  particular 
actions,  the  aggregate  of  which  constitutes  char- 
acter. It  is  thus  a  law  of  man's  nature  that  he  pre- 
fers perfection  in  everything  that  he  does  or  is. 
His  sense  of  freedom  causes  him  to  feel  that  the 
formation  of  his  own  character  is,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, in  his  own  hands.  He  feels,  consequently, 
that  he  is  responsible  for  what  he  is  and  may  become, 
so  far  as  his  moral  nature  is  concerned.     He  is  free 


IN    RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  IIQ 

to  choose  his  ideal  of  character  ;  he  is  free  to  bring 
his  actions  under  this  ideal  ;  he  is  free  to  observe 
the  conditions  by  which  his  particular  activity  may 
go  to  nourish  up  and  shape  a  perfect  character. 

Personal  duties  in  respect  to  character  fill  out  a 
great  part  of  the  whole  field  of  personal  duty.  The 
duties  of  condition  are,  in  fact,  subordinate  and  sub- 
servient to  the  duties  of  character.  And  all  relative 
duty  is  harmonious  with  duty  here,  and  also,  in  fact, 
subservient.  Every  right  act  goes  to  form  a  perfect 
character ;  as  every  wrong  act  mars  or  enfeebles  it. 
The  consciousness  of  perfect  character,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  divine  favor,  which  is  indeed  the  life 
of  such  a  consciousness,  is  the  condition  of  the 
highest  possible  blessedness. 

§  94.     There  are  several  things  involved 
S^puS*-^*^  in  the  formation  of  character  which  may 

advantageously  be  separately  presented. 

First,  the  formation  of  character  implies 

1.  An  ideal.       an  ideal — a  model — to  which  the  spirit 

is  to  be  developed  and  shaped. 
Secondly,  it  implies  also  a  well-directed 

2.  Endeavor,      and  persistent  endeavor  to  mould  the 

spirit  into  this  ideal. 

Thirdly,  it  presupposes  the  principle  of 

3.  Habit.  habit  as  the  condition  of  spiritual  growth 

and  shaping,  and  involves  compliance 
with  the  laws  of  habit. 

The  nature  of  habit  and  its  necessary  laws  may 
be  exhibited  very  summarily  thus  The  most 
essential  attribute  of  the  human  spirit  is  activity. 
We  accordingly  most  perfectly  represent  it  to  our- 


120  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

selves  under  the  ideas  of  motion.  The  activity  of 
the  spirit  moves  toward  an  end  ;  and  of  this  motion, 
as  of  all  motion,  the  two  comprehensive  views  are 
those  which  respect  its  direction  or  tendency  and 
its  momentum  or  intensity.  We  seek,  accordingly, 
as  the  first  things  in  a  perfect  character,  first,  a  right 
tendency  or  disposition,  meaning  by  this  a  right 
direction  in  the  general  activity  of  the  spirit ;  and 
secondly,  the  putting  forth  the  full  energy  of  the 
spirit  in  this  activity. 

The  two  great  principles  of  habit  are,  accordingly, 
first,  that  the  spirit  moves  in  the  direction  and  with 
the  energy  given  it  by  any  and  every  impulse  on  its 
activity  ;  and  secondly,  that  it  holds  on  in  this  given 
direction  and  with  this  imparted  energy  till  impressed 
by  a  new  force. 

Fourthly,  it   presupposes    such    a  wise 
4.^Providentiai   ordering  of  things  and  of  events  in  the 
world  around  it  as  to  further  the  forma- 
tion of  a  perfect  character. 

This  outer  world  presents  the  chief  objects  and 
occasions  which  call  forth  the  activity  of  the  spirit. 
On  a  priori  grounds  we  must  suppose  that  the  in- 
finite wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Creator  and  Ruler 
of  the  world  would  frame  and  govern  it  so  as  to 
work  harmoniously  and  helpfully  in  respect  to  the 
spirit's  growth  and  perfection.  Actual  scrutiny  re- 
veals to  us  the  truth  that  the  influences  from  with- 
out ourselves  either  are  positive  helps  or  they  are 
hindrances  which,  with  the  divine  help,  may  be 
overcome,  and  so,  through  the  very  struggle  which 
they  occasion,  be  made  helpful.     The  actual  expe- 


IN   RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  121 

rience  of  men  demonstrates  the  practicability  of 
perfecting  character  in  the  gracious  conditions  which 
are  thus  furnished  to  them. 

§  95.  The  general  maxims  by  which  we 
JharaSer°^        are  to  bc  govcmed  in  the  formation  of 

character  may  be  derived  from  this  sum- 
mary view  of  what  it  implies  : 

First,    keep   ever   before   the    forming 

1.  Ideal.  spirit  the  highest  and  most  perfect  ideal 

of  character. 
This  ideal  is  to  be  formed  by  contemplation  of 
examples  or  models  of  excellence ;  by  study  of  the 
divine  will  as  revealed  in  his  acts  and  ways,  but 
especially  in  his  word  ;  and  by  reflection  on  our  own 
capabilities.  This  ideal,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind, 
will  in  the  progress  of  experience  be  ever  rising, 
enlarging,  perfecting  itself.  To  it  as  it  is  formed,  are 
to  be  conformed  all  the  free  movements  of  the  spirit, 
so  that  its  whole  activity  shall  be  shaping  it  into  the 
proposed  ideal. 

It  is  the  proper  function  of  the  imagination  to 
shape  this  ideal,  and  also  to  keep  it  before  the 
spirit.  Its  province  here  will  be  more  fully  pre- 
sented under  the  culture  of  that  faculty. 

Secondly,    yield   freely   to   every  right 

2.  Impulse.        impulse  from  within  or  from   without, 

and  vigorously  resist  and  overpower 
every  impulse  in  a  wrong  direction. 

The  nature  of  habit  instructs  us  that  every  im- 
pression on  the  mind  and  heart,  as  well  as  every 
exertion  we  put  forth  in  thought,  or  in  feeling,  or  in 

purpose,  sets  the  spirit  further  on  its  way,  or  turns 

6 


122  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

it  back  or  aside.  Not  an  impression,  not  a  thought 
or  feeling,  is  without  its  effect  on  the  spirit's  condi- 
tion and  character.  A  wrong  influence,  an  evil 
yielding,  may  be  afterwards  thrown  off  or  repented 
of ;  but  the  spirit  remains  different  from  what  it 
would  have  been  had  the  resistance  been  effectual 
at  the  beginning.  All  received  truths  or  errors,  all 
pure  or  corrupt  affections  and  desires,  all  good  or 
evil  purposes,  enter  into  character  and  leave  inef- 
faceable traces  in  it.  All  the  indiscretions,  the 
vices,  the  sins  of  earlier  life,  unite  to  make  up  and 
disfigure  the  character  of  mature  age,  as  does  every 
just  thought  and  pure  desire  and  kind  endeavor 
leave  its  impress  on  the  permanent  state  of  the 
spirit.  The  omniscient  eye  reads  in  the  actual  con- 
dition and  character  of  the  soul's  moral  nature  its 
whole  past  moral  history.  And  this  history,  re- 
corded in  the  very  condition  of  the  spirit,  makes 
practicable  a  just  retribution  for  every  past  thought 
and  deed. 

Thirdly,  maintain  a  cheerful  faith  in  the 
3.  Trust.  general    helpfulness    of    all   influences 

from  without — from  the  world  of  objects 
and  events  around,  from  fellow  men,  from  God 
himself. 

The  positive  aids  are  abundant  and  ample.  The 
seeming  hindrances  turn  to  helps  when  rightly  met 
and  trusted.  All  true  virtue  in  man  presupposes 
struggle.  Temptations  to  evil  resisted  and  over- 
come are  the  chief  est  conditions  of  advancing  virtue. 
The  power  for  good  is  greater  than  all  the  forces  of 
evil,  and  controls  them  all. 


IN   RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  1 23 

Fourthly,    Cultivate   with    special    and 
4.  Culture  of      separate  care  the   three   great   depart- 
ments of  spiritual  activity — the  sensibil- 
ity, the  intelligence,  and  the  free  will. 

§  96,  The  particulars  of  duty  in  the 
Snsrbiufy.'''''^  culture  of  the  sensibility  are,  first,  in 
respect  to  the  passive  sensibility,  that 
the  soul  be  kept  in  wakeful,  responsive  sympathy 
with  the  world  around — with  the  objects  and  beings, 
the  events  and  actions,  which  make  up  the  system 
of  things  of  which  it  is  a  part ;  that  it  allow  its  sus- 
ceptibilities to  be  engaged  by  the  fitting  objects  and 
scenes,  turning  itself  away  from  all  that  is  unworthy, 
and  keeping  ever  right  impressions  within  due 
measure  and  degree. 

§  97.  Secondly,  the  duty  in  regard  to 
OMhe  imagina-  ^^^  activc  Sensibility  or  the  proper  im- 
agination, embraces  that  of  keeping  it 
active  and  that  of  regulating  its  direction  and 
degree.  In  this  department  of  the  mind's  activity 
we  find  the  chief  instrument  of  self-culture.  It  is 
the  function  of  the  imagination  to  put  into  form  all 
the  material  of  character  that  comes  to  the  mind 
through  sense  and  reflection,  and  all  conscious  expe- 
rience. The  impression  which  the  outer  world 
makes  upon  the  mind,  it  takes  and  re -presents, 
more  or  less  modified,  to  re-impress  the  soul  and 
furnish  thus  material  for  ever  new  forms  by  which 
to  reproduce  the  impression  on  itself.  Thus  the 
feeling  of  anger  which  an  insult  or  an  injury  pro- 
duces, the  imagination  takes  up  and  re-impresses, 
but  now  in  deeper  characters,  and  so  goes  on  repeat- 


124  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

ing  the  impression,  or  more  truly  perhaps,  branding 
it  deeper  and  deeper,  till  the  angry  feeling  becomes 
a  passion.  All  truth,  all  emotion,  all  endeavor,  the 
imagination  thus  puts  and  keeps  in  form  before  and 
upon  the  soul  so  as  to  impress  it,  and  ever  in  its 
continued  exercises  to  make  the  impression  deeper 
and  deeper.  It  is  in  this  way  character  forms  itself 
and  grows  and  strengthens.  The  spirit  takes  shape 
from  these  ideals  which  the  ever  active  imagination 
is  holding  up  before  it  and  impressing  upon  it.  Its 
character  thus  is  much  according  to  the  imagina- 
tion. The  vigorous  imagination,  impressing  more 
energetically,  develops  a  vigorous  character.  An 
imagination  that  is  bright  and  sunny,  and  so  ever 
holds  up  forms  of  hope  and  cheer  before  the  spirit, 
makes  a  joyous,  hopeful  character.  An  impure 
imagination  is  ever  busy,  shaping  to  low  and  base 
thought  and  vicious  desire  and  evil  practice.  A 
sound  imagination,  that  takes  up  just  and  reasonably 
impressions,  and  represents  them  again  to  the  soul 
in  their  harmony,  and  proportion,  and  exactness, 
forms  the  character  to  reasonableness  and  fairness 
and  truthfulness. 

Thus  it  is  through  the  whole  catalogue  of  specific 
virtues  and  vices  ;  it  is  the  imagination  which  is  the 
chief  instrumentality  that  determines  their  growth 
and  so  shapes  the  character  which  they  constitute. 
It  is  a  power  that  the  will  may  awaken  and  direct 
and  regulate  to  a  degree ;  but  it  works  on  sponta- 
neously when  it  is  left  to  itself,  with  equal  power  to 
benefit  or  injure,  to  mend  or  mar  the  character  of 
the   spirit.     A   leading   maxim,   therefore,  in   self- 


IN   RESPECT  TO   CHARACTER.  1 25 

culture  respects  the  imagination,  and  enjoins  that  it 
be  kept  ahve  and  active,  but  that  it  be  furnished  with 
ideals  that  are  true  and  pure  and  beneficent,  while 
every  impression  or  thought  or  act  that  can  debase, 
or  distort,  or  corrupt,  are  scrupulously  kept  from 
becoming  part  of  the  mass  out  of  which  it  creates 
its  forms  and  its  images  with  which  to  impress  the 
soul. 

There  is  a  twofold  training  here  imposed.  There 
is  the  training  of  the  mind  in  respect  of  its  mere 
automatic  nature,  through  which  it  tends  to  hold  on 
in  any  activity  awakened  in  it ;  and  there  is  the 
training  also  of  the  mind  through  its  volitional 
nature,  by  which  particular  forms  of  its  activity  are 
freshly  awakened  and  determined.  A  familiar  illus- 
tration of  the  bearing  of  this  principle  of  self-culture 
is  in  the  training  of  the  mind  to  the  ready  repro- 
duction of  previous  thoughts — of  objects,  facts, 
truths,  words,  previously  in  the  mind.  This  power 
to  reproduce  the  past  on  occasion  of  need,  in  the 
form  of  a  reproductive  memory,  is  mainly  the  result 
of  the  observance  of  two  conditions  :  First,  of 
giving  what  is  thus  to  be  remembered  deep  and 
distinct  impression,  giving  the  activity  of  the  mind 
thus  a  strong,  lasting  impulse  ;  and  secondly,  of 
practicing  the  mind  in  formal  exercises  of  recalling 
what  has  thus  been  received.  The  usefulness  of 
committing  to  memory,  and  then  of  frequently  re- 
peating passages  in  discourse  that  are  rich  in  senti- 
ment, or  beautiful  in  expression,  or  animating  in 
effect,  exemplifies  and  enforces  this  general  prin- 
ciple of  self-culture. 


126  PERSONAL    DUTIES 

The  obvious  maxims  accordingly  of  self-culture 
here,  are  :  First,  in  respect  to  impressions  received, 
keep  the  soul  free  only  to  pure  and  just  and  true 
impressions,  and  let  the  best  impressions  be  deepest 
and  strongest.  Secondly,  keep  the  highest  and  best 
ideals  from  these  impressions  of  truth  and  nobleness 
and  energy  most  before  the  spirit,  and  practice 
much  the  voluntary  reproduction  of  these  ideals. 

§  98.  The  particulars  of  duty  in  the 
Seiiigence.*^^    culture  of  the  intelligence  respect  the 

several  operations  of  the  mind  in  know- 
ing. There  is,  however,  first  of  all,  and  ever  to  be 
borne  in  mind,  the  fundamental  duty  here  of  keep- 
ing the  intellect  or  faculty  of  knowledge  awake  and 
active,  with  due  observance  of  its  needs  of  rest — of 
absolute  rest  for  a  time  from  all  voluntary  intellec- 
tual exertion  or  of  relative  rest,  recreation,  by  change 
of  intellectual  activity. 

§  99.  The  primary  operation  of  the  in- 
Observation.       telligcnce  is  that  of  observatioji,  or,  as  it 

is  technically  named,  of  perception  and 
intuition.  The  duty  in  self-culture  here  is  to  exer- 
cise and  train  the  faculty  of  observing.  There  are 
two  sides  in  this  operation — the  passive  side  of 
receiving  impressions  from  objects,  and  the  active 
side  of  noticing  or  perceiving  them.  The  two 
should  be  kept  in  responsive  relation  to  each  other, 
so  that  the  perception  or  the  intuition  shall  ex- 
actly answer  to  the  impression  on  the  sense, 
whether  the  outer  or  the  inner.  It  is  needful  that, 
as  has  been  indicated,  the  soul  should  train  itself 
to  be  in  wakeful  sympathy  and  impressibility  to- 


IN   RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  \2^ 

wards  all  that  concerns  it,  and  receive  true  and  full 
impressions  from  these  objects  and  occurrences, 
and  then  that  the  mind  perceive  these  impressions — 
that  the  intelligence  actively  apprehend  them  both 
in  respect  to  kind  and  degree.  The  specific  maxims 
here  are  :  Cultivate  and  train  the  instinct  to  know, 
developing  a  well  directed  curiosity — seek  to  hiow. 
Conform  the  perception  accurately  to  the  impres- 
sion, avoiding  the  confusion  of  impressions  from 
divers  objects  and  taking  in  the  full  impression — 
perceive  as  yoii  feeL  Make  quick,  accurate  observa- 
tion a  habit,  that  knowledge  may  be  fed  up  and 
grow  spontaneously  and  without  labor  of  will,  and 
at  all  times  and  in  all  occupations — observe  habitu- 
ally. The  intelligence  may  thus  be  trained  to  a 
constant  and  perpetual  growth,  which  shall  be  main- 
tained in  the  engrossment  of  active  life,  as  well  as 
also  in  the  lassitude  or  weakness  of  fatigue  and 
sickness,  and  the  heaviness  of  old  age,  so  long  as 
there  can  be  sense  to  be  impressed  from  without  or 
from  within. 

§  lOO.  The  second  stage  of  intelli- 
Thought.  gence    is    the   reflective — the   stage   of 

proper  thought.  Perception  is  compar- 
atively worthless  except  it  lead  to  reflection.  Ani- 
mals observe  ;  it  is  the  attribute  of  man  to  reflect. 
Observation  is  not  thinking ;  it  is,  however,  the 
indispensable  condition  of  thinking,  and  naturally 
leads  to  thinking. 

There  are  three  stages  in  reflection  or  thought, 
presenting  so  many  forms  of  our  knowing  activ- 
ity, to  be  separately  and  systematically  cultivated 

4* 


128  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

Judging.  The  first  is  that  of  simply  judging — \J 

recognizing,  in  what  we  observe,  a  sub- 
ject with  its  attribute.  Every  object  of  our  knowl- 
edge presents  to  our  thought  that  of  which  we 
think — the  subject  of  our  thought — and  also  that 
which  we  think  of  it — the  attribute  which  we  con- 
nect with  this  subject. 

The  second  stage  of  thought  is  the 
Classing.  grouping  of  objects  that  have  the  same 

attribute — the  logical  ge7ie7'alizationy  or 
its  counterpart,  the  grouping  of  attributes  belonging 
to  the  same  subject — logical  determination. 

The  third  stage  of  thought  is  the  deri- 
Reasoning.        vation  of  One  thought  from  another — 

logical  reasoning. 
The  duty  in  intellectual  self-culture  is  thus  com- 
prehensively that  of  training  to  ready,  systematic, 
and  accurate  habits  of  judging,  of  generalizing  and 
determining,  and  of  reasoning.  The  principles  ap- 
plicable to  all  training  prescribe  that  in  this  intel- 
lectual self-culture  these  forms  of  thinking  be  sepa- 
rately recognized  and  practiced  and  regulated,  so 
that  habit  shall  keep  the  mind  ever  active  in  free, 
spontaneous,  and  therefore  unwearying  thought. 
In  this  lies  the  secret  of  great  intellectual  power — 
the  result  of  wise  and  careful  culture  in  a  habit  of 
ready,  free  or  spontaneous,  and  accurate  th  pught. 

§  loi.  The  third  stage  of  intelligence  is 
fS^ctfor  ^^  directive  or  regulative.     Man  is  not 

only  a  reflective  being ;  he  is  also  rational. 
That  is,  he  is  made  to  observe  and  reflect  in  refer- 
ence to  some  intelligent  end  or  aim.     Without  this 


IN    RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  1 29 

aiming  intelligence,  observation  and  reflection  lead 
to  no  useful  results  ;  they  amount  to  little  more  than 
empty  dreamings.  The  two  stages  in  this  form  of 
intelligence  are  the  selective  and  the  proper  regu- 
lative. 

First,  in  all  observation  and  in  all  group- 
Selection.  ing  of  subjccts  or  attributes — all  logical 

generalization  and  determination — and 
all  reasoning,  the  end  or  aim  in  respect  to  which 
the  observation  or  the  grouping  or  the  reasoning  is 
made,  is  to  be  consciously  determined  upon. 

Secondly,  the  actual  observing,  and  gen- 
Regulation,       eralizing,  and  reasoning,  must  be  intel- 
ligently  directed   in    reference   to  this 
selected  end  or  aim. 

The  duty  in  intellectual  self  culture  here,  then,  is 
thus  shaped  and  particularized :  i .  Have  consciously 
an  end  or  aim  in  all  observing  and  thinking  ;  2. 
Select  the  true  and  proper  aim  in  the  case ;  3.  Gov- 
ern the  whole  movement  of  the  intelligence  in 
subordination  to  this  selected  aim  ;  4.  Make  this  reg- 
ulative mental  action  habitual,  so  that  it  shall  spon- 
taneously take  place  and  properly  direct  in  all 
intellectual  effort. 

§  102.  The  particulars  of  duty  in  the 
Frelwiii."^  '^'   culture  of    the  free-will  are  suggested 

by  the  leading  attributes  of  this  func- 
tion of  the  mind. 

First,  the  free-will  is  essentially  a /^Tc^r. 
I.  As  a  power.    It  is,  accordingly,  to  be  cultivated  as  a 

power  by  supplying  to  it  the  suitable 
occasions  for  its  exertion,  and  by  actually  exciting 

6* 


I30  PERSONAL    DUTIES 

it  in  conformity  with  its  nature,  and  to  the  highest 
degree.  Human  life  offers  ample  occasions  for  the 
exercise  of  choice—determination.  These  occasions 
are  to  be  sought,  and  such  as  are  best  fitted  to  the 
culture  of  the  spirit  selected.  One  may  throw 
himself  into  a  condition  where  there  is  little  call 
for  selection  or  decision,  where  all  is  stagnation,  or 
quiet,  changeless  drift ;  or  he  may  place  himself 
where  there  is  call  for  determinati^on  and  effort. 
All  choice  involves  responsibility ;  but  to  shun  oc- 
casions for  free  determination  in  shrinking  from  the 
responsibilities  which  attend  it,  is  a  mark  of  weak- 
ness, and  inevitably  stunts  and  dwarfs  character. 
Strength  grows  by  use.  That  the  free-will  as  a  power 
may  increase,  it  must  be  judiciously  exercised.  This 
is  the  first  injunction  of  duty  in  self -culture,  so  far 
as  it  respects  the  free-will. 

§  103.  Secondly,  the  free-will  is  the 
2.  As  sovereign,  dominant  element  in  man.     Its  proper 

culture  must  train  it  to  the  maintenance 
of  this  sovereignty  over  the  rest  of  his  being.  It 
must  rule  the  body  in  its  appetites  and  propensi- 
ties and  tendencies,  and  never  suffer  itself  to  be 
overpowered  by  them.  It  must  rule  the  sensibility, 
keeping  it  awake  to  its  duty,  sympathetic,  and  im- 
pressible by  the  objects  around  it,  and  never  suffer 
it  to  be  swept  away  in  any  torrent  of  temptation  or 
of  evil  influence.  It  must  rule  the  intelligence, 
keeping  it  active,  quick-sighted,  reflective,  and  mov- 
ing ever  in  the  line  of  principle  or  rational  aim  and 
purpose,  and  never  suffer  itself  to  be  overborne 
and  lost  in  the  accumulations  of  learning.     It  must 


IN    RESPECT    TO    CHARACTER.  I3I 

rule  ever  the  culture  of  all  the  other  capacities  and 
powers,  both  enforcing  this  culture  and  controlling 
its  direction  and  its  proportionate  degree  in  the 
several  departments  of  man's  nature.  It  is  to  rule, 
and  in  order  to  maintain  its  rule  must  actually  ex- 
ert its  sway,  and  act  out  its  ruling  power.  It  is 
to  train  itself  to  this  habitual  sway  over  the  whole 
being  in  order  to  secure  its  highest  perfection. 
Duty  in  self -culture  enjoins  that  the  free-will  be 
trained  to  rule  as  sovereign  over  the  whole  man. 

§  104.     Thirdly,  the  will  is  free.     Free- 
3.  As  free.       dom  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  will. 

Its  originative  and  determining  power 
is  to  be  recognized  and  put  in  exercise  in  order  to 
its  proper  growth.  There  is  meaning  and  force  in 
this  direction  :  be  determined ; — be  determined  in 
particular  acts  of  will,  in  particular  choices  and  de- 
terminations ;  be  determined  as  a  habit ;  seek  to 
make  it  a  settled  thing,  that  determination  is  de- 
termination ;  that  it  is  one's  self  that  determines 
and  not  another,  and  that  each  determination 
shoulders  the  full  responsibility  that  properly  at- 
taches to  it ;  that  each  determination  is  sovereign 
for  the  whole  mind  and  body.  In  this  recognition 
and  culture  of  the  will  as  free,  it  must  not  be  for- 
gotten that,  like  the  whole  active  nature  of  man, 
the  will  is  truly  automatic — that  is,  that  once  im- 
pelled it  keeps  on  its  action,  as  thus  impelled  in 
direction  and  force,  till  a  new  determination  comes 
in  to  change  its  course  or  energy.  Without  this  au- 
tomatic attribute,  it  could  not  be  subject  to  any 
true  culture,  it  could  attain  no  proper  character.    I 


132  PERSONAL   DUTIES 

determine  thus  to  walk  to  a  certain  spot ;  the  deter, 
mination,  by  virtue  of  this  automatic  characteristic, 
acts  on,  moving  my  steps  with  no  necessary  fresh 
act  of  consciousness,  bending  my  course  along  the 
determined  way,  bringing  me  to  the  purposed  des- 
tination, with  no  necessary  repetition  of  the  deter- 
mining act.  The  path  of  human  experience  is 
ever  forking,  and  so  calling  for  true  selecting  and 
determining  action.  To  train  one's  self  to  habits 
of  quick  and  just  resolve,  in  all  these  experiences, 
is  one  of  the  most  important  parts  of  self-culture. 
A  resolute  character,  while  it  is  the  result  of  judi- 
cious and  faithful  training,  is  one  of  man's  highest 
attainments.  A  weak,  hesitating,  vacillating,  irres- 
olute spirit  has  none  to  blame  but  itself  for  what 
it  is.  The  dictate  of  duty  here,  is  :  Train  the 
free-will  to  be  really  free  in  all  free  action,  uncon- 
strained by  any  force  foreign  to  its  nature  or  its 
sphere. 

§  105.  Fourthly,  the  human  will  is 
4.  As  finite.      finite.     It  bcgius  its  actiou  in  wcakncss, 

and  has  in  its  own  nature  the  limits  of 
its  particular  exertions  and  of  its  attainments  of 
power.  Its  nature  is  that  of  dependence.  It  is 
dependent  for  every  occasion  of  its  exercise,  with 
the  small  exception,  perhaps,  of  what  is  furnished 
by  its  own  previous  acts.  It  is  dependent  on  the 
other  mental  functions — the  sensibility  and  the  intel- 
ligence. It  can  act  only  as  it  feels  and  has  its  ob- 
ject presented  before  it  in  suitable  form  by  the 
imagination;  and  only  as  it  acts  intelligently,  in 
the  light  of  the  properties  and  relations  of  its  ob- 


IN    RESPECT   TO    CHARACTER.  1 33 

jects.  At  least  the  free-will  can  never  act  as  it 
should,  except  under  the  lead  and  prompting  of 
the  enlightened  sensibility.  True  freedom  is  not 
arbitrariness,  nor  obstinacy ;  it  is  rational, — that  is, 
sympathetic  with  things  around  and  moving  in 
light  and  knowledge.  When  it  sinks  to  dogged- 
ness  or  mulishness,  it  sinks  from  rationality  to  ani- 
malism. A  finite,  rational  free-will,  such  as  is  that 
of  man,  is  accordingly  believing.  It  is  animated  by 
a  true  depending  faith  on  objects  and  powers  with- 
out itself.  It  accepts  the  occasions  for  its  exercise 
which  are  offered  to  it,  and  makes  no  quarrel  with 
fate,  as  assured  that  in  its  high  prerogative  of  free- 
dom, under  the  rule  of  a  gracious  Providence,  it  de- 
termines its  own  destiny,  of  perfectness  or  of  ruin. 
The  rule  of  duty  here  is :  Train  the  free-will  to 
habits  of  trustful  dependence. 

We  have  thus  the  summary  of  maxims  for  the 
culture  of  the  free-will :  i.  Exercise  it  in  sought 
occasions ;  2.  Let  it  rule,  and  ever  be  the  domi- 
nant power  of  the  soul ;  3.  Be  freely  determined, 
and  grow  to  a  resolute  habit ;  4.  Depend  with  a 
trustful  faith  on  nature,  and  on  Providence. 


134  DUTIES   TO   OUR   FELLOW-MEN. 


BOOK  n. 


DIVISION  II. 
DUTIES   TO   OUR   FELLOW-MEN. 


INTRODUCTION. 

§  1 06.  The  general  division  of  duties 
Classes.  to     our    fellow-men     embraces    those 

which  respect  men  individually  or  sim- 
ply as  persons,  and  those  which  respect  men  collec- 
tively or  as  united  in  society.  This  latter  class 
includes  the  two  species  of  duties,  which  arise  un- 
der the  two  great  social  organizations  established 
among  men — the  family  and  the  state. 

We  have  thus  the  several  sub-divisions  of    the 
duties  to  our  fellow-men,  as  follows  : — 
I.     Duties  to  Persons  ; 
II.     Duties  in  the  Family;  and 
III.     Duties  in  the  State. 
We  will  consider  them  in  this  order. 


DUTIES   TO   PERSONS.  1 35 


PART   I. 


DUTIES  TO  PERSONS. 


CHAPTER  I, 


CLASSIFICATION    OF  DUTIES    TO   PERSONS, 

§  107.  Classifications  of  duties  to  per. 
^J"^P^^  °^  ^"   sons  may  properly  be  grounded  on  either 

one  of  the  three  constituents  enter- 
ing into  all  duty — love  in  the  subject  of  duty,  good 
in  the  object  of  duty,  and  right  in  the  act  of  duty. 
In  fact,  duties  are  named  in  common  speech,  accord- 
ing as  one  or  the  other  of  these  constituents  is 
made  prominent  It  should  be  ever  borne  in  mind, 
however,  that  there  can  be  no  instance  of  duty  in 
which  is  not  to  be  found  each  of  these  constitu- 
ents— ^love,  good,  right  In  the  classification  of  du- 
ties, which  we  shall  adopt  as  seeming  to  be  most  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  true  science, 
each  of  these  three  constituents  will  be  recognized 
as  a  principle  of  enumeration.  It  is  necessary, 
however,  to  caution  against  the  possible  notion  that 
a  duty  mentioned  in  one  class  does  not  embrace 
the  constituent,  which  is  the  principle  in  another 


136  DUTIES    TO    PERSONS. 

class — against  supposing,  for  example,  that  vera- 
city excludes  sympathy,  or  that  benevolence  excludes 
justice.  There  cannot  be,  in  the  possibility  of 
things,  moral  veracity  without  a  loving  subject,  nor 
moral  benevolence  without  rectitude.  But,  as  gen- 
erally in  the  case  of  mental  phenomena,  the  partic- 
ular act  is  characterized  by  the  predominant  feature 
in  it. 


DUTIES   TO    PERSONS,   ETC.  13/ 


CHAPTER  11. 

DUTIES    TO    PERSONS   DETERMINED    FROM    THE    SUB- 
JECT OF    DUTY. 

§  1 08.  Duties  to  persons  founded  on 
Threefold  divi-   ^^^  principle  of  love  in  the  subject  of 

duty  are  distinguishable  into  three  clas  • 
ses,  in  respect  to  the  three  stages  or  degrees  in 
which  the  moral  nature  of  the  subject  is  engaged  : — 
loving  sentiment,  appearing  in  the  duty  of  sy7/i- 
pathy ;  loving  disposition,  appearing  in  the  gener- 
ic duty  of  kindliness  ;  loving  act,  appearing  in  the 
generic  duty  of  benevolence. 

§  109.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to 
1.  Sympathy,    chcrish  a  scntimcut  of  sympathy  with 

all  his  fellow  men. 
They  are  entitled  to  this  sentiment  by  virtue  of 
their  being  men ;  it  is  one  of  their  rights.  Pagan 
and  christian  morality,  alike,  recognize  this  duty. 
The  classic  sentiment  that  to  man  as  man  nothing 
of  human  concern  can  be  foreign  to  his  interest ; 
Homo  Slim  ;  hnmani  ?iihil  a  vie  alienum  pnto,  is 
embodied  in  the  christian  injunction  to  "  rejoice 
with  them  that  do  rejoice,  and  weep  with  those  that 


138  DUTIES   TO    PERSONS. 

weep."  The  fundamental  duty  of  man  to  his  fel- 
low man,  as  determined  by  his  very  nature,  is  that 
he  sympathize  and  cherish  a  true  and  ever  growing 
sympathy  with  every  true  interest  of  his  fellow  man. 

This  duty  of  sympathy  is  universal.  It  is  owing 
to  man  as  man. 

The  degrees  and  the  forms  of  this  sympathy  vary 
with  the  degrees  of  relationship,  and  with  the  con- 
ditions of  men  as  affording  occasions  for  this 
sympathy. 

It  is  variously  modified,  also,  in  respect  to  the 
object  of  sympathy.  The  English  language 
abounds  in  works  derived  from  the  Greek,  the 
Latin,  and  the  vernacular  Anglo-Saxon,  signifying 
the  divers  degrees  or  forms  of  this  affection.  We 
have  thus  condolence  in  reference  to  persons  in  sor- 
row ;  compassion,  commiseration,  pity,  in  reference 
to  persons  in  suffering  need  ;  mercy,  clemency,  leni- 
ency, in  reference  to  the  ill-deserving.  There  are 
also  corresponding  words,  signifying  the  negative 
or  opposite  of  these  graces  of  character,  such  as  ; 
hard-hearted,  inhuman,  rancorous. 

§110.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to 
2.  Kindliness,  embody  this  sympathetic  spirit  in  the 
active  instincts  of  his  nature,  thus  form- 
ing a  proper  disposition  which  unites  to  the  funda- 
mental sympathy,  desire  and  tendency  to  expres- 
sion. This  is  the  general  duty  of  kmdliness,  of 
being  genial. 

This  class  of  duties  embraces  the  divers  modifi- 
cations expressed  in  such  terms  as  liberality,  gen- 
erosity, charitableness,  bounteousness,  and  the  neg- 


DETERMINED    FROM   SUBJECT   OF    DUTY.        1 39 

atives  or  opposites  of  the  disposition,  such  as : 
illiberal,  churlish,  grudging,  jealous,  envious,  and 
those  denoting  the  different  forms  of  selfishness, 
as  miserly,  niggardly,  sordid,  mercenary,  greedy, 
and  the  like. 

§  III.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man, 
3.  Benevolence,  still  farther,  to  Carry  out  this  sympa- 
thetic disposition  into  positive  act  on 
every  occasion  that  may  properly  invite — to  put  his 
kindly  disposition  into  actual  expression,  in  loving 
endeavors  or  benevolence. 

The  comprehensive  maxim  in  this  general  divis 
ion  of  duties  to  persons,  is :  Be  habitually  loving 
to  all  men.  The  specific  maxims,  founded  on  the 
several  distinguishable  stages  of  development  of 
the  principle  of  love,  are :  Be  sympathetic ;  be 
kindly  or  genial ;  love  all  men. 

§  II 2.  Under  this  general  duty  is  inclu- 
Resentments.  dcd  a  spccics  of  dutics  which  are  in  their 
nature  responsive,  and  are  by  this  char- 
acteristic distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the  class. 
They  are  proper  resentments — in  the  old  and  more 
comprehensive  meaning  of  the  word,  denoting 
properly, /<?^/z;2^j  back  or  in  retur7i  for  what  we  have 
experienced  from  others.  This  species  includes  the 
several  duties  arising  in  response  to  good  and  to 
evil  experienced  from  another. 

§  113.     Gratitude  is  the  duty  respon- 
Gratitude.         sive  to  the  reception  of  good.     It  is  an 
instinctive  impulse  of  man's  nature  to 
be  thankful  for  kindness. 

Gratitude  is  a  sentiment,  the  cherishing  and  ex- 


140  DUTIES   TO   PERSONS, 

pression  of  which  not  only  meets  a  demand  of  con- 
science, but  gives  itself  a  peculiar  joy ;  the  good,  the 
blessedness,  for  which  man  is  made,  is,  in  large  part, 
to  be  secured  by  the  exercise  of  gratitude.  The 
obligation  arising  from  favors  can  often  be  dis- 
charged only  by  a  grateful  spirit.  Our  great  poet 
well  says : 

A  grateful  mind, 

By  owing,  owes  not,  but  still  pays,  at  once, 

Indebted  and  discharged. 

But  gratitude  is  not  merely  a  grace — a  sentiment 
cherished  in  the  bosom  of  the  recipient  of  favors, 
or  merely  expressed  in  words  ;  it  is  a  virtue  also — an 
outward  act  of  good  to  the  benefactor  in  appropri- 
ate ways  and  measures.  The  simple  law  of  grati- 
tude is  that  for  every  good  received,  a  correspond- 
ing good  be  returned  to  the  benefactor. 

As  a  moral  exercise,  gratitude  is  due  only  to  in- 
tentional benefactors.  It  is  due  only  to  moral  per- 
sons ;  and  is  due  to  them  only  so  far  as  they  act 
morally,  that  is,  intentionally.  The  good  that  comes 
to  us  through  others  acting  without  intention  as 
mere  occasions,  calls  for  gratitude  only  to  the  ben- 
eficent Disposer  of  all  things.  For  this  good,  in- 
asmuch as  it  is  unceasing,  gratitude  as  unceasing  is 
due  to  Him.  Hence,  one  of  the  most  fundamental 
and  comprehensive  duties  of  man  is  an  habitually 
grateful  spirit. 

§  114.     The  resentment  responsive  to 
Anger.  ill  received  takes  a  two-fold  form  :  that 

of  anger  prompting   to  retaliation,  and 
that  of  forgiveness. 


DETERMINED    FROM    SUBJECT   OF    DUTY.         I4I 

Anger  is  an  instinct  of  man's  nature,  arising  at 
once  and  spontaneously,  on  receiving  an  injury 
from  another. 

So  deeply  implanted  in  man  is  the  feeling  that 
evil  comes  from  a  person,  and  that  all  suffering 
comes  from  a  wrong-doer,  that  in  children  and  in 
uncultivated  men  anger  is  freely  exercised  towards 
brutes  and  inanimate  objects  when  occasioning  pain 
or  suffering,  where  there  cannot  be  supposed  to  be 
any  intention.  But  anger  properly  respects  only 
persons  intending  the  evil  which  awakens  it,  and  is 
in  fact  but  the  natural  sentiment  of  justice  in  re- 
spect to  a  wrong-doer. 

In  selfish  natures,  like  man's,  the  duty  in  refer- 
ence to  anger  is  chiefly  that  of  moderating  it,  so 
that  it  shall  only  be  exercised  towards  real  wrong- 
doers and  shall  never  be  allowed  to  be  excessive, 
either  in  respect  to  the  evil  which  arouses  it  or  the 
character  and  condition  of  the  sufferer.  The  retal- 
iation to  which  anger  naturally  prompts  in  man,  is 
not,  necessarily,  a  retaliation  to  be  inflicted  by  his 
own  hands,  but  only  a  retaliation  which  the  rightful 
Avenger  of  wrong  may  administer.  The  main  uses 
of  anger  in  man  are,  accordingly,  that  it  prepares 
for  a  free  recognition  and  expectation  of  the  divine 
justice,  which  redresses  all  wrong,  and  for  free  ser- 
vice as  his  instrument  when  bidden  to  that  minis- 
try. A  vindictiv^e  spirit  is  inhuman  ;  it  is  a  usurper 
of  divine  prerogative :  "  Vengeance  is  mine,"  saith 
the  Lord. 

§  115.     Peculiarly  fitting  for  man  in  his 
Forgiveness.      present  Condition  is  the  other   resent- 


142  DUTIES   TO    PERSONS. 

ment  of  this  s^&c\qs— forgiveness,  in  which  the  evil 
received  is  resented  in  good  returned. 

In  this  form  of  duty,  the  instinct  of  angry  re- 
sentment is  suppressed  ;  the  instinct  of  generosity 
and  good-will  becomes  sovereign  ;  the  suffering  is 
borne  in  meekness  ;  the  injury  is  forborne  ;  the 
blessing  overmasters  the  wrong.  To  forgive  does 
not  necessitate  entire  forgetfulnessj^but  only  ex- 
tends so  far  as  suppression"^of  the  spirit  of  retalia- 
tion/ We  need  to  remember  even  to  forgive.  X  As 
consciously  needing  forgiveness,  man  should  be  for- 
giving, for  the  just  rule  is  that  only  as  he  forgives, 
can  he  be  forgiven.  Penitence  and  acknowledg- 
ment with  redress  of  the  wrong  are  not  always  to 
be  exacted  as  conditions  of  forgiveness  with  men, 
however  it  may  be  with  the  divine  administration. 
There  is  this  wide  difference  between  their  relations 
to  offenses  and  His  :  they  need  forgiveness  them- 
selves, and  their  wrongs  He  will  amply  redress. 
The  rule  for  men,  therefore,  is  to  bear,  to  forbear, 
to  forgive,  even  although  the  wrong-doer  persists 
in  his  malice — to  bless  when  he  curses  and  despite- 
fully  uses  them.  A  tranquil  trust  in  the  sufficien- 
cy of  the  divine  rule,  a  proper  sense  of  one's  own 
imperfections,  and  the  growth  of  the  spirit  into  the 
divine  fulness  of  mercy  and  forbearance,  all  enforce 
on  man  the  duty  of  cherishing  a  forgiving  spirit. 

(i^tnrf\A^  '>vnv-^  J^f^vt  ^MryALjl&nsetit ! 


DUTIES   TO   PERSONS,    ETC.  I43 


CHAPTER   III. 

DUTIES  TO  PERSONS  DETERMINED  FROM  THE  OBJECT 
OF  DUTY. 

§  116.  Duties  to  persons  founded  on  the  princi- 
ple suggested  by  the  object  of  duty  are 
Three  species,  distributed  into  three  species,  corres- 
ponding to  the  three  departments  of  his 
personal  nature — those  of  courtesy,  which  more  im- 
mediately respect  the  feelings  ;  those  of  iiiitJifnl- 
ness,  which  respect  the  intellectual  nature  ;  and 
those  of  triistftdness^  beneficence,  and  justice,  which 
are  respectively  founded  in  the  proper  moral  nature 
of  man,  as  interdependent,  as  made  for  blessedness, 
and  as  having  rights. 

It  is  true  that  to  all  duties  there  are  correspond- 
ing rights,  and  that,  accordingly,  as  it  is  man's  duty 
to  be  courteous  to  his  fellow  man,  so  it  is  each  one's 
right  as  a  man  to  be  treated  with  courtesy  ;  still  the 
closer  scrutiny  of  these  three  classes  of  duties  will 
evince  that  they  severally  respect  more  directly  and 
immediately  the  several  departments  of  our  per- 
sonal being  which  have  been  named. 

§  117.    Courtesy  respects  more  directly  the  out- 


144  DUTIES    TO    PERSONS, 

I  Courtesy       ward  carriage  and  deportment  by  which 
the    sensibilities     of     others     are    im- 
pressed. 

The  essence  of  the  duty  lies  in  this  :  that  the 
form  of  our  intercourse  with  our  fellow-men  should 
be  such  as  befits  man  towards  man ;  that  this  form 
of  our  behavior  by  which  he  is  affected  be  loving, 
right,  benignant. 

The  obligation  to  courtesy  is  founded 
ObUgation  ^^  ^^^  social  relationship  of  man  to  man. 
On  the  one  hand  is  the  acting  spirit 
made  to  impress  favorably,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  recipient  spirit  to  be  thus  favorably  impressed, 
the  two  made  for  each  other,  to  act  reciprocally  on 
each  other.  Man  is  made  to  be  courteous  ;  and 
also  to  be  blest  by  courtesy. 

The  sphere  of  courtesy  lies  properly 
Sphere.  within  that  of  good  manners.     The  syn- 

onyms by  which  the  duty  is  denominated 
point  to  the  condition  of  social  intercourse,  and  to 
the  highest  degree  of  that  condition,  as  that  in  which 
this  grace  of  character  is  best  developed.  Such 
synonyms  are  courtliness,  urbanity,  civility,  good 
manners,  and  the  like. 

The  forms  of  courtesy  vary  with  the 
Forms.  relative  condition  of  the  subject  and  the 

object  of  the  duty.  Towards  superiors, 
it  takes  the  form  of  respect,  reverence,  homage, 
worship  ;  towards  equals  it  appears  as  comity  ; 
towards  inferiors,  as  gentleness,  suavity,  affability. 
The  vices  of  character  here  or  the 
Discourtesy.       forms  of  discourtcsy  are  such  as  those 


DETERMINED    FROM    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  I45 

of  insolence,  irreverence,  incivility,  rudeness,  arro- 
gance, haughtiness,  scornfulness. 

Although  courtesy  looks  more  immediately  to  the 
outward  form  of  conduct,  yet  it  necessarily  engages 
the  heart — must  be  loving  ;  since  to  be  insincere  or 
hypocritical,  or  to  endeavor  to  seem  what  one  is  not, 
is  radically  immoral ;  and,  moreover,  all  assumed  or 
pretended  courtesy  will  betray  itself,  and  therefore 
can  never  be  as  true  courtesy  to  the  hearts  of  others. 
Still,  as  the  acts  of  courtesy  engage  less  or  more 
the  inward  feeling  and  disposition,  it  is  variously 
characterized  in  language  which  sometimes  points 
more  to  the  inner  nature  or  spirit  of  a  man  and  de- 
nominates him  as  bland,  sunny,  gracious,  friendly, 
or,  on  the  contrary,  as  austere,  sour,  testy,  cross  ;  or 
more  to  the  outward  expression,  and  designates  him 
as  polite,  refined,  urbane,  courtly,  complaisant,  or  as 
rude,  unmannerly,  rustic,  surly. 

Courtesy  sustains  this  important  relation  to  other 
duties  to  persons  that  it  is  generally  needful  in  or- 
der to  their  perfect  effect.  The  manner  of  doing 
affects  the  doing  itself  in  its  essential  character. 
Acts  of  beneficence  and  kindness  lose  much  of  their 
moral  worth  if  done  in  violation  of  those  principles 
which  regulate  the  forms  of  our  intercourse  with 
our  fellow  men.  Good  intent  acted  out  in  a  savage 
way  is  well  exemplified  in  the  fable  of  the  lion  that, 
in  gratitude  for  the  healing  of  his  wound,  strikes  a 
heavy  blow  at  the  fly  that  disturbs  his  benefactor's 
rest  ;  he  kills  the  fly  but  crushes  his  master's  face  as 
well. 

§  118.  Truthfulness  is  a  duty  which  is  root- 
7 


146  DUTIES   TO   PERSONS, 

2.  Truthfulness.  ^^  ^^  ^^^  intellectual  nature  or  the  men- 
tal faculty  of  the  true,  as  courtesy  is 
more  immediately  seated  in  the  sensibility  or  men- 
tal capacity  of  form.  It  may  be  defined  as  the 
duty  of  conforming  ourselves  to  the  truth  in  our 
thoughts  and  feelings,  and  in  our  expressions  of 
them. 

The  obligation  to  be  truthful  both  in 
Obligation.  thought  and  in  expression  is  founded  in 
the  nature  of  man  as  related  to  other 
men  in  the  harmonious  system  of  things.  The  truth 
of  things  is  the  harmony  of  things  as  parts  of  one 
whole.  A  disturbance  of  the  truth  of  things  works 
disharmony  in  the  system  of  things,  and  so  far  as  it 
extends,  is  the  frustration  of  the  divine  end  in 
creating.  The  active  nature  of  man  must  act  thus 
truthfully,  or  the  machinery  must  so  far  move  dis- 
orderly and  ill.  In  being  truthful,  man  only  acts 
out  himself  just  as  he  is,  in  respect  to  other  beings 
or  things  as  they  are.  His  fellow-men  depend 
on  this  truthful  expression  of  himself  as  one  wheel 
in  a  well  constructed  machine  depends  on  the  true 
play  of  the  other  wheels  in  connection  with  which 
it  moves  and  performs  its  function.  The  unper- 
verted  tendency  of  man's  spirit  is  to  truthfulness  in 
thought  and  expression  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  a 
trustful  dependence  on  what  is  expressed  as  true 
on  the  other  ;  it  is  a  perverse  will  that  is  at  the  bot- 
tom of  all  untruthfulness.  The  very  end  of  man's 
being  must  fail  if  he  is  not  truthful  himself,  or  can- 
not move  in  trustful  dependence  on  others  as  truth- 
ful  to   him.      The   obligation   to   truthfulness,   as 


DETERMINED    FROM    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  I47 

founded  in  the  duty  to  form  a  perfect  character,  is 
well  implied  in  the  apostolic  direction  to  grow  up 
into  perfection  by  the  one  means  of  "  speaking  truth 
in  love,"  in  the  general  sense  of  observing  and  con- 
forming to  truth  in  the  spirit  of  love.  And  the  ne- 
cessarily fatal  result  to  blessedness — to  all  good  in 
experience — if  truthfulness  were  disregarded  and  the 
lives  and  actions  of  men  were  but  phantoms  or  lies, 
is  but  too  apparent.  The  social  nature  of  man 
would  be,  but  for  truth,  a  cheat  and  a  curse. 

§  119.  Truthfulness,  as  implied  in  what 
Twofold,  has  been  said,  is    either   internal,  con- 

formity to  the  truth  of  things  in  the 
shaping  of  our  feelings,  our  thoughts,  and  our  en- 
deavors —  "  truth  in  the  inward  part "  —  truth  of 
heart ;  or  externaly  conformity  to  truth  in  expression 
— truth  of  the  lip.  This  second  form  of  the  general 
duty  is  more  specifically  known  as  veracity. 

§  120.  The  virtue  of  inward  truthful- 
fuineS^'^^  *'^*^"  ^^^^  involves,  first,  candor,  or  perfect 
freedom  from  all  bias,  from  all  distorted 
or  discolored  apprehension  of  the  words  or  acts  or 
condition  of  our  fellow-men ;  and,  secondly,  impar- 
tiality, or^he  free  reception  into  our  view  of  all  the 
particulars  which  should  affect  our  judgment  in  the 
case,  and  the  fair  allowance  to  each  of  its  own  weight 
and  importance. 

Not  only  have  our  fellow-men  a  right  to  the  ex- 
ercise on  our  part  of  this  candor  and  impartiality, 
but,  as  already  intimated,  the  perfect  working  of  the 
social  system  of  which  they  and  we  are  integral 
parts  enjoins  these  duties.     Still  further,  our  own 


148  DUTIES   TO    PERSONS, 

highest  perfection  and  interest  require  them.     It  is 
not  well  for  man  to  hold  a  lie. 

§   121.     The  objects  to  which  veracity 

2.  Veracity-due  jg  ^^q  ^j-g  actual  DCrSOnS. 
to  persons.  ^ 

As  animals  have  no  proper  rights  by  vir- 
tue of  their  own  natures,  but  only  by  reason  of  the 
persons  to  whom  they  are  related  and  by  virtue  of 
that  relation,  {§  1 7,)  so  there  can  be  no  obligation  of 
veracity  to  them.  Traps,  snares,  scare-crows,  are 
designed  to  deceive ;  but  they  are  not  necessarily 
forbidden  by  any  principle  of  morality.  So  men, 
who  have  lost  their  proper  personality,  as  the  insane, 
are  not  objects  to  which  veracity  is  properly  due. 
In  so  far  as  their  rational  nature  remains  to  them, 
and,  it  should  be  noted,  seldom  if  ever  is  insanity 
the  wreck  of  all  rationality,  the  obligation  may  sub- 
sist, but  no  further.  To  men,  moreover,  who  so  act 
as  for  the  time  to  forfeit  the  rights  of  persons,  as 
robbers  and  assassins,  it  is  certain  that  they  can  set 
up  no  claim  that  others,  to  whom  they  have  for- 
feited this  right,  observe  the  truth  in  communica- 
tions to  them.  The  highwayman  clearly  cannot 
enforce  the  moral  obligation  of  speaking  truth  in 
the  interest  of  his  wicked  purpose.  Whether  it  be 
morally  right  to  deceive  for  the  purpose  of  saving 
life,  or  generally  of  preventing  wrong,  is  a  question 
of  casuistry  that  it  has  been  found  very  difficult  to 
resolve.  Generally,  if  not  always,  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  question  may  actually  arise  will  be 
such  as  to  evince  either  that  the  deception  is  not 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  the  crime 
or  that  greater  evil  might  result  from  the  deception 


DETERMINED    FROM   OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  1 49 

than  from  the  perpetration  of  the  crime.  Martyr- 
dom is  not  always  the  worst  evil  to  be  suffered. 
We  cannot  suppose  that  any  deception  could  be  re- 
garded as  of  doubtful  morality  in  a  perfect  being 
under  a  perfect  rule.  That  the  Infinite  One  should 
be  untruthful  in  any  way  or  degree,  it  is  irreverent 
to  imagine.  It  must  be  difficult  to  show  that  de- 
viation from  a  perfect  standard  is  ever  right.  Man 
certainly  may  not  seek  to  prevent  evil  by  doing 
wrong.  If  deception  be  not  in  every  supposable 
case  wrong,  still  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  say  that 
in  any  circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed  in  the 
ordering  of  Divine  Providence,  it  is  right.  We  may 
safely  conclude  that,  on  the  one  hand,  idiocy,  insan- 
ity, wicked  intent,  can  have  no  rights,  and  can  ori- 
ginate no  obligations  ;  while  on  the  other  hand  there 
ever  exist  the  obligations  to  respect  our  own  natures 
and  also  the  perfect  rule  of  God  over  us.  Duty  to 
ourselves  and  to  Him  may  require  of  us  that  which 
would  not  be  required  of  us  by  beings  devoid  of 
rationality  or  of  morality.  In  passing  judgment  in 
such  cases  of  doubt,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  moral  intent  may  be  right,  may  be  as  perfect  as 
the  imperfections  of  man's  nature  will  permit,  while 
the  outward  action  itself  is  not  that  which  a  perfect 
being  in  a  perfect  condition  of  things  would  per- 
form. 

§   122.     The  comprehensive  duty  of  ve- 
Sphere.  racity  respects  both  the  habitual  deport- 

ment and  the  specific  act. 
Every  man  owes  it  to  his  fellow-men  to  make  his 
outward  life  a  truthful  expression  of  his  inner  spirit ; 


150  DUTIES   TO    PERSONS, 

to  be  ingenuous  and  frank  ;  to  be  open  and  sincere ; 
to  be  simple-minded  and  straightforward,  and  care- 
fully to  shun  the  opposite  vices  of  character.  His 
own  highest  well-being  and  the  welfare  of  society 
demand  it  of  him  that  his  outer  life  be  the  fair  ex- 
pression of  what  he  is — of  what  he  feels  and  thinks 
and  intends  inwardly.  The  very  basis  of  society  is 
mutual  trust  and  confidence,  to  which  disingen- 
uousness,  double-facedness,  dissimulation,  are  de- 
structive. If  his  Creator  designed  man  to  be  social, 
He  designed  him  to  be  veracious. 

The  specific  duties  of  honest  statement,  faithful 
representation,  accurate  expression  in  every  form, 
are  so  obviously  comprehended  in  this  generic  vir- 
tue of  veracity  that  they  demand  no  additional  or 
more  specific  enforcement. 

The  obligations  of  veracity  reach  to  all 
Modes  ^^^  modes  by  which  one  man  commu- 

nicates with  another — by  the  general 
life,  by  words,  by  signs,  by  any  expressive  acts 
whatever.  Lying,  vicious  deception,  may  be  prac- 
ticed by  means  of  signs  as  fully  as  in  actual  speech. 

These  obligations  may  be  violated,  moreover,  by 
exaggeration  or  by  suppression.  Veracity  implies 
exactness  or  accuracy  in  expression,  and  forbids  both 
overstatement  and  excess  of  coloring,  as  well  as  also 
all  garbling,  understating,  shading. 

Veracity  forbids,  moreover,  falsification  in  any  re- 
spect of  the  intention,  in  representing  or  expressing 
— ^forbids  all  prevarication  and  quibbling,  as  also  all 
deceptive  evasion. 

It  forbids,  still  further,  duplicity  and  equivoca- 


DETERMINED    FROM    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  I5I 

tion,  all  juggling  in  the  use  of  words,  by  which  the 
expression,  although  true  in  a  certain  construction, 
is  designed  to  lead  to  false  opinion. 

It  forbids,  once  more,  all  feigning,  as  well  as  all 
cloaking  of  the  true — simulation  as  well  as  dissimu- 
lation— setting  forth  what  is  not  as  well  as  disguis- 
ing what  is. 

It  is  ever  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  lying  involves 
the  guilty  intent  to  deceive.  A  man  may  utter  what 
is  untrue,  not  knowing  it  to  be  so  ;  such  utterance 
is  not  necessarily  blameworthy.  Even  veracity  may 
thus  occasion  false  representation,  as  the  utterance 
is  of  what,  although  false,  is  supposed  to  be  true. 
Works  of  fiction,  parables,  and  romances,  are  not 
necessarily  in  violation  of  veracity,  since  there  may 
be  no  intent  to  deceive. 

Moreover,  the  obligations  of  veracity  are  not  ne- 
cessarily violated  by  withholding  the  truth.  Re- 
ticence is  as  truly  a  duty  as  utterance.  Even  eva- 
sion may  not  offend  against  veracity,  which  requires 
only  that,  if  we  undertake  to  speak,  we  utter  only 
truth.  We  are  not  always  under  obligation  to  tell 
all  we  know  ;  but  what  we  tell  must  be  told  truly. 

§123.    Trustfulness  is  a  duty  founded 
Trustfulness.      ^^  ^^^  interdependence  of  men  as  con- 
stituent parts  of  the  same  moral  system. 

Men  are  made  to  be  dependent  one  upon  another. 
They  exist  towards  each  other  reciprocally  as  be- 
ings to  trust  and  be  trusted.  The  good  for  which 
they  were  made  comes  to  them  in  large  degree 
through  their  fellow-men  ;  they  must  look  to  them 
for  its  supply.     They  were  made  also  to  do  good, 


152  DUTIES   TO   PERSONS, 

and  their  active  nature  must  go  out  to  work  this 
good  for  others.  Men  honor  themselves  in  trusting, 
and  are  honored  in  being  trusted.  The  depravity 
of  men  has  not  wholly  extirpated  these  native  roots 
of  confidence.  Honor  is  found  even  among  thieves. 
As  dependence  in  man  is  not  absolute,  is  limited 
by  reason  of  his  moral  imperfection  far  beyond 
what  it  should  be,  so  the  trust  which  is  grounded  in 
it  must  not  be  absolute,  must  be  limited.  A  blind 
trust  may  be  ruinous,  inasmuch  as  dependence  on 
man  is  insecure.  But  a  rational  trust  is  yet  the 
duty  and  the  interest  of  men.  Human  nature 'may 
be  relied  on  to  a  certain  extent ;  it  is  safe  to  trust 
thus  far.  To  trust,  to  show  confidence,  begets  a 
spirit  of  fidelity  in  answer  to  what  is  expected. 
The  trusting  man  is  less  likely  to  be  wronged  than 
he  who  manifestly  expects  to  be  defrauded  or  mis- 
used. To  show  expectation  of  evil  invites  the  doing 
of  the  evil.  Even  a  knave  will  honor  the  confi- 
dence that  is  reposed  in  him.  To  trust  another  nat- 
urally awakens  in  him  sense  of  responsibility  that 
may  of  itself  prevent  wrong-doing.  The  trustful 
spirit  is  intrinsically  bright  and  cheerful  and  joyous  ; 
distrust  saddens  and  sours.  The  small  losses  from 
occasional  betrayal  of  trust  are  counterbalanced  by 
the  habitual  cheer  of  a  confiding  spirit.  The  col- 
lective interests  of  humanity  are  furthered  just  in 
proportion  to  the  prevalence  of  a  true  rational  trust 
j.nd  confidence  between  individuals  and  between 
communities. 
„     ^  ^  §  124.     Beneficence  respects  wants  : 

Beneficence  and  o  t  r  ' 

Justice.  Justice  respects  rights  in  others. 


DETERMINED    FROM    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  1 53 

These  are  duties  which,  stilL  more  character- 
istically than  trustfulness,  respect  the  individual 
moral  nature  of  man  as  object  of  duty.  The 
twofold  character  of  the  duty  thus  determined  re- 
sults from  the  twofold  view  we  are  obliged  to  take 
of  this  moral  nature.  We  recognize  man  as  having 
wants  and  having  rights.  As  made  for  blessed- 
ness, the  fundamental  instinct  of  his  being  is  towards 
blessedness.  This  he  craves ;  it  is  his  deepest, 
broadest  want.  Duty  is  owing  to  him  as  such  crea- 
ture of  wants.  Every  man  is  bound  in  duty  to  do 
good  to  his  fellow  man,  to  be  beneficent.      But, 

again,  being  made  for  blessedness  as  the 
Distinguished,    g^eat  end  of  his  being,  he  must  have  the 

right  to  attain  this  end.  The  observ- 
ance of  this  right, — in  other  words,  the  practical  re- 
cognition of  man  as  having  rights, — is  the  duty  of 
justice.  Beneficence  regards  wants  ;  justice  re- 
gards rights  as  the  proper  natural  outgrowth  of 
those  wants.  Sometimes  the  naked  want  presents 
itself  to  our  regard,  and  sometimes  the  want  in  the 
garb  of  a  right.  Beneficence  and  justice  are,  there- 
fore, distinguishable  duties.  They  are,  however, 
never  in  proper  contradiction,  any  more  than  love 
and  goodness,  or  knowledge  and  freedom.  When 
they  seem  to  be  opposed,  or  when  they  lead  to 
opposite  effects  in  the  experience  of  the  object  of 
duty,  as  when  justice  bids  punishment  and  goodness 
suggests  forgiveness,  it  is  where  they  are  determined 
by  different  relations.  In  the  subject  of  duty,  mercy 
can  never  conflict  with  justice,  for  the  right  which 
justice  respects  can  be  but  an  embodiment  of  some 

7* 


154  DUTIES    TO    PERSONS. 

want  which  mercy  or  goodness  could  relieve.  Be- 
neficence and  justice  come  into  conflict,  therefore, 
only  as  they  respect  different  objects  or  different 
interests  in  the  same  moral  person.  Thus  it  may 
be  justice  to  society  to  punish  while  it  is  mercy  to 
the  offender  to  pardon  ;  and  a  son  may  have  a  right 
to  paternal  bounty  as  a  son,  while  goodness  may 
withhold  that  which  he  would  use  only  to  his  ruin. 
Wants  crave,  rights  demand.  Beneficence,  as  a 
duty,  responsive  to  wants,  accordingly  obliges 
through  the  nature  of  the  subject  of  duty  as  loving. 
Justice,  on  the  other  hand,  obliges  through  the  na- 
ture of  the  object  of  duty.  The  claims  of  the  two 
come  to  the  conscience  by  those  opposite  directions. 
Beneficence  is  by  its  nature,  thus,  as  ever  respec- 
tive of  a  want,  entreating,  soliciting,  persuasive. 
Justice,  as  respecting  a  right,  is  exacting,  enforcing, 
imperative.  To  be  perfectly  good  is  a  higher  virtue 
of  character  than  to  be  perfectly  just,  inasmuch  as 
a  self-moved  spirit  ranks  higher  than  one  impelled 
from  without.  On  the  other  hand,  justice  is  a  more 
sacred  duty  in  society  than  goodness  ;  because  when 
rights  are  disregarded,  wants  will  go  unrelieved. 
To  be  wanting  in  justice  imports  looser  morals  than 
to  be  wanting  in  goodness. 

§  125.  Beneficence  is  the  exact  cor- 
S'n^vdlTc"^  relative  of  benevolence.  The  benevo- 
lence seated  in  the  soul  as  subject  of 
duty  appears  as  beneficence  in  the  object  of  duty. 
Love  felt  in  the  subject  is  expressed  as  good  effected 
in  the  experience  of  the  object. 

The  two  may  be  correctly  regarded  as  the  oppo- 


DETERMINED    FROM    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.  1 55 

site  sides  of  the  same  duty.  The  consideration  of 
our  own  moral  nature  enforces  upon  us  the  obHga- 
tions  of  benevolence  ;  the  consideration  of  the  na- 
ture of  our  fellow-man  enforces  the  obligations  of 
beneficence.  The  subjective  virtuous  disposition 
and  endeavor  of  benevolence  must,  in  order  to  its 
own  perfection,  have  its  outcome  and  full  maturity 
in  beneficence. 

§  126.  Beneficence  is,  in  a  true  sense, 
The^crowning  ^^^  crowning  virtuc.  To  do  good  is  god- 
like. The  ultimate  and  comprehensive 
end  to  be  realized  in  the  experience  of  man  is  good. 
In  doing  good  the  doer  brings  to  himself  his  high- 
est happiness.  "  The  way  to  be  happy,"  says  Bar- 
row, "  is  to  do  well." 

§  127.  In  the  exercise  and  culture  of 
Species.  bencficcnce  the  view  is  to  be  turned  out- 

ward on  the  object.  The  specific  duties 
here  involved  are  sympathetic  contemplation  of  hu- 
man wants ;  kindly  disposition  to  relieve  them  ; 
positive  acts  of  bounty. 

§  128.  The  modes  of  beneficence  are 
Modes.  as  various  as  the  ways  in  which  we  can 

affect  any  of  the  interests  of  our  fellow- 
men  in  their  persons,  character,  or  condition,  by 
our  habits  and  modes  of  life,  by  our  words,  by  our 
actions.  The  disposition  and  the  determination  to 
be  beneficent  should  be  so  formed  and  fixed  within 
as  to  be  ready  to  flow  out  in  any  appropriate  way 
which  occasion  may  open. 

§  129.  The  measure  of  benevolence  is 
Measure.  given  in  the  golden   rule  :     "  Do  unto 


156  DUTIES    TO    PERSONS, 

Others  as  you  would  that  they  should  do  unto  you." 
The  instinctive  craving  for  good  in  them  is  to  be 
ranked  with  the  craving  for  good  in  ourselves,  equally 
and  alike  to  be  satisfied,  with  like  sympathetic  in- 
terest and  with  like  earnest  and  hearty  endeavor. 
The  principle  of  nearness  of  relationship  by  nature 
or  occasion  must  of  course  come  in  to  determine  the 
measure  of  the  endeavor.  Our  own  well-being  is 
our  nearest  concern ;  and  the  opportunities  to  do 
good,  which  are  given  us  under  the  divine  rule  as 
calls  to  duty,  are  more  to  ourselves  than  to  any  other 
being.  But  to  exalt  our  own  cravings  for  happiness 
above  those  of  others  around  us,  and  especially  to 
exclude  or  depress  them  from  their  due  considera- 
tion, is  selfishness.  Kindred  and  neighborhood 
possess  lower  degrees  of  demand  on  our  beneficence 
than  our  own  well-being,  but  yet  higher  than  those 
which  belong  to  strangers.  We  are  to  do  good  only 
as  we  have  opportunity:  The  principle  of  oppor- 
tunity thus,  as  a  rightful  measure  of  beneficence, 
determines  its  degree  in  reference  to  ourselves,  to 
kindred,  to  neighbors,  to  foreigners. 

§  130.  The  one  object  in  true  benefi- 
its  one  object,    cencc,  in  real  goodness,  is  the  relief  of 

want  in  a  fellow  being,  the  satisfying  of 
his  craving  for  good.  To  confer  benefits  for  the 
sake  of  procuring  his  favor  or  for  any  other  purpose, 
or  even  for  the  mere  purpose  of  strengthening  the 
principle  of  beneficence  in  our  own  hearts,  is  not 
true  beneficence.  This  virtue  looks  exclusively  to 
the  good  in  the  experience  of  the  receiver  of  the 
benefit.     It  does  not  seek  as  its  motive  even  grati- 


DETERMINED    FROM   THE    OBJECT    OF    DUTY.    1 57 

tude  in  return  ;  although  favor  may  rightly  be  with 
held  simply  on  the  ground  of  a  heartless  or  un- 
grateful reception  of  it.  It  may  be  wrong  to  encour- 
age such  a  disposition,  just  as  it  is  wrong  to  encour- 
age profligacy  or  indolence  by  beneficence.  The 
type  and  model  of  true  beneficence  is  given  to  man 
in  the  example  of  Him  who  "  is  kind  unto  the  un- 
thankful and  to  the  evil." 

§  131.  Justice  is  the  satisfaction  of 
Justice  defined,   rights.     It  supposcs  Hghts  in  the  object 

of  duty  and  aims  at  good  only  as  it 
recognizes  a  right  to  claim  it.  Its  immediate  motive 
is  a  right  to  be  satisfied  in  the  experience  of  the  ob- 
ject of  duty. 

The  elements  of  justice  as  a  duty  are  ready  rec- 
ognition of  the  rights  of  others,  and  ungrudging 
satisfaction  of  them.  Impliedly,  also,  justice  re- 
quires all  reasonable  protection  and  upholding  of 
the  rights  of  others.  Hardly  less  atrocious  thap  in- 
cendiarism would  be  the  refusal  to  extinguish  a 
kindling  fire  that  threatens  the  destruction  of  an- 
other's dwelling ;  hardly  less  atrocious  than  down- 
right murder,  a  refusal  to  rescue,  when  in  our 
power,  a  human  life  from  peril. 

Justice  has  been  regarded  by  moralists  as  two- 
fold :  (i).  Distributive,  as  it  awards  what  is  due  to 
merit  or  demerit :  (2).  Commutative,  as  it  practically 
recognizes  what  is  equal  and  right  in  exchanges  and 
in  promises  and  contracts. 

§  132.  Justice  has  for  its   sphere  all  the 
'^  ^^^'  rights  of  men,  whether  they  respect  per- 

sonal enjoyments,  condition,  reputation,  or  property. 


1 58  DUTIES   TO   PERSONS. 

It  enjoins  a  practical  recognition  of  the  right  to 
be  and  to  be  happy  ;  and  forbids  all  wanton  and  all 
inconsiderate  harm  to  any  interest  of  our  fellow  man. 

It  recognizes  his  right  to  place — in  roads  and 
walks,  in  conveyances  and  at  inns,  in  the  family,  in 
the  schools,  m  the  assembly,  at  work  and  at  play. 
It  recognizes  his  rights  in  time  also,  to  labor  and 
to  rest,  to  speak  and  to  be  silent,  to  be  in  public  or 
in  private. 

It  requires  the  vindication  of  his  good  name  ;  and 
forbids  any  direct  or  indirect,  any  intentional  or 
thoughtless  sullying  of  his  fair  reputation.  It  con- 
demns the  idle  gossip  which  plays  with  a  man's 
good  name  as  if  he  had  no  rights,  as  well  as  the 
malignant  slander  which  would  banish  him  from  the 
courtesies  of  social  life. 

It  enjoins  equity  in  our  dealings,  equal  balances 
for  his  and  for  our  interests ;  and  forbids  all  con- 
ceahnent  that  would  hinder  satisfaction  of  actual 
rights,  all  double-dealing,  all  substitution  of  the  let- 
ter for  the  intention  in  covenants,  all  use  of  superior 
vantage-ground  for  enforcing  or  exacting  rights. 

Inasmuch  as  rights  often  change  in  their  specific 
form  with  change  of  condition  or  of  circumstances, 
with  lapse  of  time  and  change  of  place,  the  law  of 
justice  requires  that  the  literal  and  specific  right 
acquired  in  any  way  be  not  allowed  in  any  such  way 
to  work  a  higher  injury.  The  exact  justice  is  some- 
times the  worst  wrong: — Sicmmum  jus  injuria 
siimvia.  Not  the  letter,  but  the  spirit  of  the  law  is 
to  be  regarded. 


DUTIES   TO    PERSONS,    ETC.  1 59 


CHAPTER  IV. 

DUTIES  TO  PERSONS  DETERMINED  FROM  THE  ACT  OF 
DUTY. 

§  133.  Duties  looking  more  directly  to 
Two  species.      tbe  act  of  duty  constitute  the  third  class 

of  duties  to  persons.  They  may  be  dis- 
tributed into  species,  according  as  they  are  viewed 
in  their  own  nature  or  in  relation  to  other  duties. 

§  134.  Of  the  first  species  mentioned 
I.  straightfor-     ^rc  the  dutics  of  havinsf  an  aim  in  our 

wardness.  ° 

conduct,  of  keeping  our  aims  ever  true 
to  the  ends  proposed  in  our  actions,  and  of  being 
straightforward  in  carrying  out  our  aims  in  fulfil- 
ment to  their  ends. 

These  several  species  are  given  at  once  in  an 
analysis  of  rectitude  as  distinguished  from  love  and 
from  goodness.  Rectitude  or  rightness  in  action 
implies  an  aim  or  intention,  an  end  or  object,  and  a 
direct  motion  from  aim  to  object. 

§  135.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to 
GoTerning  aim.  have  3.  governing  aim  or  purpose  in  his 

livinsf. 


l60  DUTIES   TO   PERSONS, 

The  first  dictate  of  man's  nature  as  rational  is 
that  he  regulate  his  conduct  ever  by  such  a  govern- 
ing aim.  An  aimless  life  is  so  far  a  wasted  life  ;  an 
aimless  act  is  an  irrational  act.  It  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  in  the  formation  of  character  our  great 
duty  is  to  bring  even  our  automatic  or  spontaneous 
life  under  the  rule  of  a  rational  aim. 

§  136.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to 
True  to  its  end.  ^ggp  his  aim  truc  to  its  end. 

Inconceivable  as  it  is  in  physical 
nature,  it  is  unhappily  true  in  moral  history,  that  a 
man  often  aims  one  way  while  his  action  somehow 
terminates  elsewhere  than  in  that  purposed  way. 
The  aim  is  feebly  held  or  the  end  is  faintly  dis- 
cerned ;  and  aim  and  end  fail  to  meet.  There  is 
such  a  thing  as  to  have  a  sinister  end  in  an  action  ; 
it  is  a  vice  to  be  shunned.  Men  often  confer  bene 
fits  not  to  relieve  wants  but  to  procure  merit  or 
favor,  or  to  hush  conscience,  or  to  win  esteem.  They 
have  an  aim,  but  it  looks  to  something  else  than  its 
proper  and  rightful  end. 

§  137.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  man  to  be 
Direct  in  pur-  straightforward  in  execution  of  his  pur- 
pose. 
Uprightness  in  life  we  recognize  as  a  virtue  in 
which  not  so  much  the  loving  spirit  or  the  bene- 
ficent effect,  but  the  rectitude  of  the  acting,  is  re- 
garded. The  straightforward,  upright  life  is  the 
efficient  life  for  all  life's  purposes.  The  devious 
walk  is  tardy  or  fails  altogether  of  its  purpose.  The 
habit  of  directing  all  our  action  unswervingly  to  its 
designed  end  not  only  gives  confidence  and   minis- 


DETERMINED  FROM  ACT  OF  DUTY.      l6l 

ters  to  energy,  but  more  than  almost  anything  else 
in  ourselves  ensures  success. 

§  138.  Of  the  second  species  of  duties 
"ovSiatrL  to   persons   indicated   by  the  essential 

nature  of  rectitude  in  action,  are  the 
several  duties  involved  in  keeping  our  life  and  con- 
duct in  harmony  with  the  divinely  ordered  course 
of  nature  and  of  events. 

All  duties  are  parallel ;  they  never  cross  one  an- 
other. It  is  good  ground  of  suspicion  that  we  are 
wrong,  when  our  actions  clash  with  the  rightful  ac- 
tions of  other,  or  with  the  equal  flow  of  Providence. 
The  man  that  is  ever  chafing  from  his  collisions 
with  the  progress  of  events  may  well  question 
whether  his  own  course  is  not  cross  to  the  will  of 
his  master.  Guizot  well  argues  that  mere  duration 
in  society  proves  the  presence  and  power  of  order 
and  truth  and  justice.  If,  therefore,  in  settled  social 
life  a  man  finds  his  way  perpetually  obstructed  or 
crossed,  it  is  a  sign  that  his  course  is  oblique  and 
tortuous.  Virtue,  so  long  as  man  is  imperfect, 
must,  of  course,  at  times  antagonize  itself  with  vice. 
Hence  even  virtuous  acts  may  be  often  in  conflict 
with  settled  customs.  Still  the  truth  remains  that 
order  and  rectitude  rule  human  affairs  ;  and  to  be 
ever  in  accord  with  the  divine  will,  as  it  manifests 
itself  in  the  disposition  of  things  and  the  course  of 
events,  is  man's  highest  privilege  and  unfailing  duty. 
It  is  a  vice  in  him  to  put  himself  in  disharmony 
with  things  around  him  ;  to  distrust  the  divine 
order.  His  duty  lies  in  perfect  harmony  and  paral- 
lelism with  this  outward  ordering.      The  correction 


1 62  DUTIES    TO   PERSONS. 

of  existing  abuses  in  the  community  is  generally 
best  accomplished  by  imparting  greater  energy  to 
what  is  right  ;  weeds  die  when  overshadowed  by  the 
thrifty  plants. 

Involved  in  this  duty  of  directing  our  actions  in 
parallelism  and  harmony  with  the  divine  ordering 
of  things  is  the  duty  of  regulating  them  as  to  de- 
gree, so  that  relatively  to  the  condition  and  course 
of  outward  tilings  our  actions  be  allowed  to  be  neither 
excessive  nor  deficient. 

The  particular  maxims  of  uprightness  in  duty  are 
then  these  two  : — Be  straightforzvard — having  an 
aim,  keeping  it  true  and  level  to  its  end,  and  acting 
unswervingly  towards  it  ;  and  Be  in  harmony  with 
all  lines  of  rectitude  without,  maintaining  parallel- 
ism in  direction  and  moderation  in  degree. 


THE   FAMILY   INSTITUTION. 


163 


PART   II. 


DUTIES    IN   THE   FAMILY. 


CHAPTER  L 


THE   FAMILY   INSTITUTION. 


A  divine  instl 
tution. 


§  139.  The   Family   is    an    organized 
The  family  de-    community  divinely  established  for  the 
continuance  and  training  of   the  race 
of  man. 

That  the  family  constitution  is  an  ap- 
pointment of  the  Creator  we  should 
believe  on  the  simple  ground  that 
families  come  to  be  in  the  natural  course  of 
things.  The  very  nature  of  man,  also,  in  its  in- 
stincts, its  consultations  for  its  comfort,  peace,  and 
well-being  generally,  its  necessities  and  its  spon- 
taneous activities,  leads  him  into  the  family.  Reason 
and  revelation  agree  in  teaching  that  the  family  is 
a  divine  ordinance. 

The  twofold  end  of  the  family  is  the 
Its  twofold  end.  continuance  of  the  race  of  man  and  the 
training  of  it  to  its  best  and  highest 
condition. 


164  DUTIES    IN   THE    FAMILY. 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  fam 
Distinctive  fea-  [[y  society  as  Compared  with  other  so- 
cieties existing  among  men,  is  that  its 
membership  is  constituted  by  community  of  blood. 
It  is  by  virtue  of  this  participation  in  a  common 
origin  and  line  of  descent — a  participation  so  far  in 
the  same  blood — that  the  peculiar  duties  arise  to 
kindred  and  to  persons  not  in  the  family  proper  but 
yet  of  the  family.  It  is  this  community  of  blood  in 
which  originates  the  prohibition  of  marriages  with- 
in the  near  lines  of  consanguinity.  It  is  hence  that 
inspiration,  history,  instincts  of  man,  agree  in  the 
reprobation  of  transgressions  of  such  inter-mar- 
riages. It  is  this  community  of  blood  from  the 
original  singleness  of  the  primitive  parentage  and 
the  consequent  unity  of  the  race,  that  brings  all 
mankind — men  as  men — into  true  relation  of  broth- 
erhood. 

As  a  permanently  established  community,  the 
family  society  needs  for  its  most  salutary  working 
to  be  organized  ;  to  be  constituted  under  the  rela- 
tions of  higher  and  lower  in  moral  order.  It  de- 
mands a  head  and  implies  subordinates  in  its  mem- 
bership. 

§  140.  Inasmuch  as  the  duties  incum- 
Rise  of  duties     bent  ou  men  follow  them  into  every  de- 

init.  .      ,     .       .  .    .  /    . 

partment  of  their  tree  activity,  duties 
arise  at  once  on  the  organization  of  the  family 
state, — on  the  simple  rise  and  coming  to  be  of  a 
family. 

As  morality  must  exist  in  the  family,  as  there 
must  be  order,  and  as  the  family  is  a  community 


THE   FAMILY    INSTITUTION.  1 65 

of  moral  persons,  there  must  be  duties  and  there 
must  be  correlative  rights.  The  ground  of  ob- 
ligation here  is  in  the  nature  of  man  as  made  for 
duty,  both  as  subject  of  duty  and  object  of  duty, 
in  connection  with  the  accompanying  fact  that 
the  family  is  a  divinely  instituted  sphere  of  man's 
free  activity. 

§  141.  As   instituted    by  God,    and   as 

Moral  in  its  made     Up  of    moral    persons    bound    to- 

character.  ^  ^ 

gether  in  a  community  of  life,  which 
embraces  the  interests,  the  sympathies,  and  the  en- 
deavors of  all  the  members  in  a  singleness  of  ex- 
perience and  of  destiny,  the  family  life  must  be  ac- 
cepted as  being  truly  moral. 

In  addition  to  his  personal  responsibility,  each 
member  of  the  family  participates  in  a  joint  respon- 
sibility, attaching  to  the  whole  membership.  Most 
important  moral  interests  are  bound  up  in  the  family 
life.  The  character  of  each  member  is  shaped  by 
the  influences  that  rule  in  the  household.  Each 
family  has  a  character  of  its  own  by  which  it  is 
recognized  by  others,  and  by  which  it  influences 
others.  The  peace,  order,  refinement  of  a  well 
ordered  household  radiate  all  around  light  and 
blessing ;  the  abode  of  ignorance,  strife,  vice,  is 
a  moral  curse  to  the  neighborhood.  Each  mem- 
ber helps  to  form  the  character,  and  shape  the 
experience  and  life  of  the  whole.  Each  mem- 
ber has  a  sense  of  shame  in  the  moral  discredit 
of  the  family  and  a  satisfaction  in  its  moral  thrift. 
Indeed  this  unity  of  the  moral  life  in  the  family 
is  such  that  each  member  feels  this  shame  or  satis- 


l66  DUTIES    IN   THE   FAMILY. 

faction  in  the  moral  failure  or  success  of  every  other 
member. 

The  family  life  is  thus  a  true  moral  life,  specific- 
ally differing,  indeed,  from  the  personal  moral  life, 
as  the  social  differs  from  the  individual,  but  posses- 
sing like  that  the  great  determining  attributes  of  a 
proper  moral  life,  being  under  a  divine  constitution, 
engaging  largely  man's  free  moral  activity,  and 
charged  throughout  with  a  true  moral  respon- 
sibility which  reaches  both  to  the  joint  and  in- 
dividual character  and  action  of  the  members.  This 
is  further  witnessed  in  the  sense  of  pride  or  of 
shame  that  is  felt  by  them  as  the  family  life  moves 
in  the  line  of  a  pure  morality  or  otherwise,  and  in 
the  ready  praise  or  censure  bestowed  by  other  men, 
and  also  in  the  ordinary  retributions  visited  in  the 
course  of  Providence  on  the  family  life  as  moral  or 
vicious. 

§  142.    The   seat    of    authority   in   the 
Seat  of  author-    family,  while  it  is  primarily  and  pre-. 

dominantly  in  the  will  of  God,is  seconda- 
rily and  subordinately  in  the  parental  head. 

As  a  derived  and  subordinate  seat  of  authority, 
parental  rule  is  never  legitimate  when  it  violates  the 
law  of  God,  that  is,  when  it  contravenes  the  settled 
principles  of  morality.  The  parent  is  yet  presump- 
tively the  rightful  interpreter  of  the  law  ;  and  no 
disregard  of  that  authority  can  be  justified  unless 
such  authority  is  in  its  exercise  clearly  subversive 
of  morality. 

§  143.  The   classes    of    duties    in    the 

Classes  of.  ?         f  ,  -        ^     r  1 

duties.  family  are  determmed  from  the  consti- 


THE   FAMILY    INSTITUTION.  16/ 

tuent  relationships  of  the  members.  They  are 
three  in  number:  i.  Marital  duties  between  the 
parents  ;  2.  Parental  duties  between  parents  and 
children ;  and  3.  Fraternal  duties  between  the 
children. 

We  will  consider  these  classes  in  their  order,  and 
in  connection  with  their  correlative  rights. 


1 68  DUTIES    IN   THE   FAMILY. 


CHAPTER   II. 

MARITAL   RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES. 

§  144.  Marital  rights  and  duties 
Nature  and        subsist  between  the  husband  and  the 

wife  as  the  joint  head  of  the  family  com- 
munity. These  rights  and  duties  have  their  foun- 
dation in  the  covenant  of  marriage. 

The  marital  life  has  its  proper  origin  in 
Origin.  ^his   covenant   in  which  one  man   and 

one  woman  unite  themselves  in  recipro- 
cal affection  and  helpfulnefs  for  life. 

§  145.  Polygamy  is  forbidden  most 
Monogamy.       clearly   in  the   divine   ordering  of  the 

equality  in  number  of  males  and  females 
in  the  human  race. 

There  could  be  no  more  authoritative  ordinance 
than  this  which  is  written  in  the  very  constitution 
of  the  race — that  there  be  in  the  family  institution 
one  man  and  one  woman  as  its  constituents. 

That  polygamy  is  morally  wrong,  is  also  infer- 
rible from  the  consideration  that  it  necessarily  de- 
grades woman  and  is  incompatible  with  a  true 
family  life. 


MARITAL    RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES.  1 69 

§  146.  The  marriage  covenant  as  a  recip- 
Marriage  cove-    rocation  of  affection  and  interest,  must 

nant 

be  freely  entered  into  by  the  parties  in 
the  exercise  of  their  best  intelHgence  and  heartiest 
determination. 

They  must  hence  be  of  suitable  age  to  act  with 
discretion  and  a  full  understanding  of  the  engage- 
ments by  which  they  bind  themselves.  They  should 
be  guided  by  parental  counsel  rather  than  coerced 
by  parental  authority  and  constraint,  that  their 
perfect  freedom  be  not  overborne.  It  imports  a 
moral  imperfection  in  the  customs  of  society  that 
children  should  be  betrothed  in  their  mental  imma- 
turity or  be  contracted  to  strangers  for  whom  there 
has  been  given  no  opportunity  for  the  rise  of  a  free 
affection,  or  be  urged  into  matrimonial  alliances  in 
any  way  or  for  any  object  which  do  not  admit  the 
exercise  of  a  free  intelligent  affection. 

§  147.  The  marriage  covenant  is  moral- 
indissoiubie.      \y  indissoluble  but  by  death.    ' 

The  marriage  union  is  the  closest  and 
most  inviolable  that  can  be  formed  between  human 
beings.  Even  the  filial  relation,  we  are  emphatically 
taught  in  the  Scriptures,  must  be  held  in  subordi- 
nation to  it.  The  parties  in  it  must  leave  father 
and  mother,  if  need  be,  to  perfect  the  union  which 
is  to  be  as  that  of  "  one  flesh,"  in  the  thorough 
blending  of  interest,  of  affection,  of  ministry.  Im- 
porting, as  it  does,  a  full  reciprocal  devotion  of  each 
to  the  other,  it  utterly  forbids  the  thought  of  the 
union  being  other  than  for  life.  Its  obligations 
hence  continue  upon  each  party  as  long  as  fulfil- 


I/O  DUTIES    IN    THE   FAMILY. 

ment  is  practicable,  that  is,  till  either  the  death  of 
the  other  party  or  his  annulling  of  the  covenant  by 
actual  marital  alliance  with  another  party.  Hence 
the  allowance  of  divorce  by  civil  tribunals  on 
grounds  less  conclusive  than  those  of  death  or 
marital  alliance  with  another  person  is  to  be  depre- 
cated as  hostile  to  a  pure  and  sound  morality.  Ab- 
sence, estrangement  of  affection,  cruelty,  may  justi- 
fy separate  living ;  the  old  common  law  divorce 
from  board  and  bed — a  me7isa  et  thoro — may  be  ad- 
missible, while  yet  the  sanctity  of  the  marriage  vow 
be  maintained  by  withholding  a  full  divorce  from 
the  bonds  of  marriage — a  vinculo  matrimonii — dur- 
ing the  life  of  the  parties,  except  for  the  one  cause 
mentioned — marital  alliance  with  another.  The 
covenant,  it  should  be  remembered,  like  all  cove- 
nants, may  be  dissolved  by  reason  of  essential  fraud 
in  the  making  or  by  reason  of  its  being  made  be- 
tween parties  within  the  forbidden  lines  of  consan- 
guinity. The  fraud  which  shall  be  allowed  to  annul 
the  formal  covenant  must  pertain  to  the  essential 
nature  or  end  of  the  covenant — to  the  natural  com- 
petency of  the  parties  to  the  marital  union.  Parties 
within  the  lines  of  consanguinity  are  incompetent 
to  make  the  covenant.  Such  covenants,  although  in 
a  true  sense  null  and  void,  yet  leave  the  parties 
not  altogether  free  from  obligations.  They  are  of 
the  nature  of  unlawful  vows.     See  §  280. 

§  148.  The  marriage  covenant,  as  being 
ious  raSfication.  vitally  related  to  the  highest  interests  of 

civil  society,  as  also  of  morality  and  re- 
ligion, is  worthily  solemnized  by  established  formali- 


MARITAL   RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES.  I /I 

ties  which  evidence  its  ratification  and  the  open 
public  entrance  upon  the  new  life  which  it  begins. 
These  formalities  are  very  properly  both  of  a 
civil  and  religious  character.  They  are  imposed  in 
part  by  the  state,  for  its  protection,  and  in  part  by 
the  church,  that  the  new  life  may  be  pursued  under 
the  sanctities  and  benedictions  of  religion.  This 
solemnization  is,  however,  but  the  outer  indication 
or  evidencing  ;  the  true  life  of  the  marriage  compact 
is  in  the  free  covenanting  of  the  parties.  It  is  in  close 
analogy  to  the  entrance  upon  civil  office,  which  is 
evidenced  under  established  formalities,  including 
religious  sanctions  in  the  oath  that  is  administered 
and  in  the  proper  religious  rites  that  often  accom- 
pany it,  the  true  authority  of  the  official  life,  never- 
theless, being  derived,  not  from  the  formal  inaugura- 
tion, but  from  the  election  or  appointment  that  has 
gone  before. 

§  149.     The  rights  and   duties  of  hus- 
Parity  of  rights,   band  and  wife  in  relation  to  each  other 

rest  upon  a  basis  of  perfect  moral  equal- 
ity and  reciprocity. 

As  equally  endowed  with  full  moral  attributes 
and  having  a  like  origin  and  destiny  under  the  same 
moral  rule,  they  are  bound  to  render  each  to  the 
other  the  same  sympathy  and  affection,  the  same 
courtesy,  truthfulness,  beneficence,  and  justice, 
which  their  equal  personality  requires. 

§  150.    As  the  united  head  of  the  family 
Joint  parental   community,  their  authority  is  joint  and 

indivisible. 
In  the  guidance  and  control  of  the  family  inter- 


1/2  DUTIES    IN    THE   FAMILY. 

ests  their  participation  is  equal  and  common  The 
obedience  which  is  exacted  is  due,  not  to  either 
party,  as  separate,  but  to  the  united  head.  If  the 
specific  command  be  given  by  either,  it  is  given 
only  as  the  utterance  of  the  concurring  authority  of 
both.  Disobedience  to  one  must  be  held  to  be  dis- 
obedience to  both.  It  is  in  this  light  and  in  this 
spirit,  that  parental  authority  is  ever  to  be  adminis- 
tered and  to  be  obeyed.  The  parent  offends  if  he 
seeks  to  enforce  his  rule  by  his  own  right,  inde- 
pendently of  the  other  parent ;  and  the  child  offends 
if  he  seeks  to  please  one  of  his  parents  in  opposition 
to  the  known  will  of  the  other.  It  is  one  of  the 
puzzling  questions  in  casuistry  how  to  act  mor- 
ally when  the  conditions  of  moral  action  in  the  case 
are  immorally  determined,  as  when  the  commands  of 
the  parents  are  in  opposite  directions.  The  general 
principle  of  morality  here  is,  however,  indisputable  ; 
parental  authority  is  a  joint  authority  ;  the  adminis- 
tration of  it  by  one  parent  must  be  accepted  as  hav- 
ing the  sanction  and  support  of  both  ;  disobedience 
to  one  is  disobedience  to  both.  It  is  too  often  the 
bane  of  family  discipline  and  rule  that  it  is  exercised 
and  submitted  to  as  the  several  rule  of  one  of  the 
parents,  and  not  as  legitimately  but  the  joint  au- 
thority of  both. 

§  1 5 1.  While  the  basis  of  marital  rights 
^' mentar^^"   and  dutics,  as  between  the  husband  and 

the  wife,  is  that  of  equality  and  reci- 
procity, these  rights  and  duties  are  yet,  as  they  may 
in  perfect  consistency  with  this  idea  of  their  equality 
be  held  to  be,  truly  complementary  of  each  other. 


MARITAL    RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES.  1/3 

The  rights  and  duties  of  the  husband  towards  the 
wife  are  not  the  same,  although  of  like  rank  and  re- 
ciprocal obligation,  as  those  of  the  wife  towards  the 
husband.  The  antithesis  of  sex,  which  runs  through 
the  physical  and  spiritual  constitution,  and  which  is 
the  occasion  and  condition  of  the  marriage  cove- 
nant, gives  rise  to  separate  functions  and  duties  and 
rights  under  that  covenant.  The  physical  superiority 
of  man  in  respect  to  muscular  force  and  endurance, 
and  the  masculine  characteristics  of  spirit  corre- 
sponding to  them,  clearly  indicate  his  to  be  the 
sphere  of  the  sterner,  the  severer,  the  bolder  virtues  ; 
while  the  gentler,  tenderer,  more  sympathetic  nature 
of  woman  indicates  for  her  the  sphere  predominantly 
of  the  graces  of  trust,  tranquil  acquiescence  in  the 
orderings  of  Providence,  and  cheering  hopefulness. 
It  is  rather  his  part  to  lead,  her's  to  follow  ;  his  to 
provide,  her's  to  economize  and  encourage  ;  his  to 
attend  to  the  outer  duties  of  the  family,  her's  to  min- 
ister in  the  offices  of  indoor  life  ;  his  to  protect,  her's 
to  sustain  and  soothe  and  cherish.  Summarily, 
these  relative  offices  of  husband  and  wife  are  to  be 
regarded  as  properly  complementary,  one  to  the 
other  ;  each  party  ministering  to  the  needs  of  the 
other  and  to  the  common  wants  of  the  household, 
according  to  the  respective  capability,  convenience, 
and  general  suitableness  of  each. 


174  DUTIES    IN    THE   FAMILY. 


CHAPTER  III. 

PARENTAL   AND   FILIAL   RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES. 

§  152.  The  duties  of  parents  and  of 
Origin.  children,  as  also  their  correlative  rights^ 

have  their  origin  in  the  family.  These 
duties  and  these  rights  are,  consequently,  to  be 
measured  and  determined  in  the  light  of  the  family 
relation.  They  rank  as  secondary  and  subordinate 
to  the  general  rights  and  duties  subsisting  between 
the  family  as  a  whole  and  the  individual  members. 
The  true  interest  of  the  family  must  not,  therefore, 
be  sacrificed  for  the  supposed  good  of  individual 
parent  or  child.  On  the  other  hand,  the  general 
good  may  require  the  sacrifice  of  the  individual  in- 
terest. It  is  a  worthy  spectacle  when  a  father  or  a 
child  intelligently  and  freely  resigns  plans,  hopes,  in- 
terests, dear  to  himself,  for  the  good  of  the  other 
members  of  the  household. 

Parental  authority  and  direction  are,  accordingly, 
to  be  administered  in  the  general  interest  of  the 
family  ;  and  the  good  of  the  individual  is  to  be  se- 
cured through  the  well-being  of  the  family.     All  the 


PARENTAL   AND   FILIAL    RIGHTS,    ETC.  1 75 

duties  of  children  to  parents  and  to  one  another, 
also,  are  to  be  discharged  under  the  felt  obligations 
coming  upon  them  from  the  family  as  a  whole.  The 
individual  interests  should  be  harmonized  as  parts 
of  a  whole  comprehensive  interest.  When  doubt 
arises  as  to  which  should  be  preferred,  the  family 
welfare,  rather  than  that  of  the  individual  member, 
should  have  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  The  family 
rights  and  interests  are  the  paramount  rights  and 
interests,  and  must  measure  and  shape  those  of  the 
individual  members. 

§  153.  The  duties  of  parents  to  their 
brri"hfs?or-^^' children  are  the  correlatives  of  the 
relative.  rights  of   children   in  respect  to    their 

parents.  In  the  same  way  filial  duties  are  correla- 
tives of  parental  rights. 

What  the  parent  owes  to  the  child,  the  child  has 
a  right  to  receive  from  the  parent.  The  parental 
duty  of  protection,  for  instance,  is  the  filial  right  of 
protection.  Even  in  earliest  infancy,  the  child  has 
rights  ;  for  it  is  a  person,  not  a  thing,  no  mere 
animal.  It  has  a  right  to  protection  in  itself,  and 
not  merely  because  the  parent  owes  it  to  his  own 
self-respect  or  to  the  interests  of  society  to  protect 
his  own  offspring. 

§  154.  While  the  comprehensive  duty. 
Parental  duties,  alike  of   parent  and  of   child,   towards 

each  other  is  sympathetic  affection  and 
good  will,  to  be  expressed  in  all  appropriate  ways, 
the  specialty  of  the  relation  marks  out  some  special 
duties  arising  from  it,  in  which  this  love  is  to  be 
chiefly  shown.     This  relation,  as  the  basis  of  rights 


176  DUTIES    IN    THE   FAMILY. 

and  duties,  is  characteristically  the  relation  of  de- 
pendence. The  duties  on  the  part  of  the  parent, 
founded  on  this  relation  of  dependence  in  the  child, 
are  the  following : 

First,  Protection  from  all  physical  and  moral 
harm  ; 

Secondly,  Provision  of  whatever  is  needful  for  the 
well-being  in  body  or  in  mind  of  the  child  within 
the  resources  of  the  parent  ; 

Thirdly,  Counsel  in  all  cases  of  perplexity  or 
doubt ; 

Fourthly,  A  training  and  education,  physical  and 
mental,  suited  to  the  condition  of  the  family  and  the 
prospective  relations  of  the  child  to  society  and  to 
life  here  and  hereafter  ; 

Fifthly,  A  wise,  loving,  yet  authoritative  rule,  to 
which  obedience  shall  be  enforced  by  suitable  sanc- 
tions— by  rewards  or  by  penalties — in  physical  good 
or  evil,  or  by  some  proper  retributions  through  the 
conscience  of  self-approval  or  of  remorse  and  shame. 

The  rights  of  the  child  correlative  to  these 
parental  duties  are  those  of  protection,  support, 
counsel,  education,  and  rule,  on  all  occasions  when 
needful. 

§  155.     The  filial  duties,  springing  out 
FiUai  duties.      of  the  relation  of  dependence,  to  a  cer- 
tain   extent  correspond  to  these  duties 
of  the  parent.     They  are  : 

First,  Grateful  affection  in  return  for  parental 
kindness ; 

Secondly,  Cheerful  trust  in  parental  mainte- 
nance and  care ; 


PARENTAL   AND    FILIAL    RIGHTS,    ETC.  I// 

Thirdly,    Willing  obedience  to  parental  authority  ; 

Fourthly,  Faithful  service  in  the  interest  of  the 
family  ; 

Fifthly,     Reverence  to  parents  as  superiors. 

The  rights  of  parents  correlative  to  these  filial 
duties,  are  those  of  gratitude,  trust,  obedience,  ser- 
vice, and  reverence. 

§  156.  The  obHgations  subsisting  recip- 
^lld.'°"'  rocally  between  parents  and  children 
are  far  from  being  absolute.  They  are 
limited  by  the  finite  nature  of  the  relation  ;  by  the 
incapacities  and  the  delinquencies  of  the  parties, 
who,  at  best,  are  but  imperfect  men  ;  and  by  other 
relations  which  the  parties  sustain  to  society  and 
to  God. 

First,  the  relation  itself  is  finite  ;  it 
ness^f  fekt^n.  Hiorally  ccascs  with  the  maturity  of  the 
child,  elevating  him  above  the  condi- 
tion of  dependence.  The  duties  themselves,  on 
both  sides,  change,  and  gradually  modify  themselves 
with  the  advance  to  this  stage  of  maturity.  Less 
assiduous  protection  and  supply  of  wants  and 
instruction  and  authority,  are  required,  as  the  child 
grows  in  physical  and  intellectual  and  moral 
strength.  But  the  child,  if  life  is  continued,  ulti- 
mately becomes  a  man,  and  is  invested  with  the 
rights  and  responsibilities  of  a  man.  Infirmities, 
too,  creep  along  with  years,  and  ultimately  change 
the  relations  of  dependence  ;  the  aged  parent  comes 
to  depend  on  the  vigor  of  the  child.  The  child  is 
then  called  to  care  for  the  parent.  Grateful  love 
and  reverence  still  bind,  but   bind  to  other  duties 


1/8  DUTIES   IN   THE   FAMILY. 

than  those  incident  to  dependent  childhood  ;  they 
are  the  duties  of  affectionate  and  respectful  care 
and  solace  and  help. 

The  line  which  bounds  this  relation  of  filial 
dependence  cannot  be  drawn  in  moral  strictness. 
It  varies  with  the  peculiarities  of  families  and  of 
individual  members  of  them.  The  usages  of  society 
and  the  necessities  of  civil  order,  have  fixed  upon  a 
certain  age,  which  shall  be  generally  accepted  as 
determining  when  the  child  enters  upon  his  majority 
— his  freedom  and  right  to  act  for  himself.  This 
age  in  this  country  is  twenty-one  years,  at  which 
time  the  child  becomes  free  and  is  liberated  from 
the  control  of  the  parents.  Persons  under  this  age 
— minors — have  no  legal  rights  of  property  or  of 
covenant,  except  in  cases  specified  by  statute,  or 
through  the  medium  of  parents  or  guardians  or 
trustees. 

Secondly.  The  incapacity,  or  the  cul- 
2.  By  imperfec-  pable  rcmissncss  or  violation  of  duty;  in 

tion  of  parties.    *  •' 

either  party  in  this  relation,  so  far  im- 
pairs the  rights,  and  relieves  from  the  duties  imposed 
by  it.  The  father  who  neglects  to  maintain  and 
educate  his  son,  cannot  rightfully  claim  his  son's 
full  service  ;  and  the  undutiful  child  so  far  impairs 
his  rights  to  support.  Love  withheld  by  the  one 
party  so  far  hinders  the  responsive  affection  of  the 
other.  Immoral  authority  on  the  part  of  the  parent 
is  not  obligatory  on  the  child.  When,  however, 
there  is  doubt  as  to  the  morality  of  an  act  that  is 
required,  the  dependent  child  may  rightfully  pre- 
sume that  the  parent  is   right,  and  so  be  held  to 


PARENTAL   AND    FILIAL    RIGHTS,    ETC.  1 79 

obedience,  on  the  ground  of  the  positive  authority 
of  the  parent,  although  not  on  the  perceived  moraHty 
of  the  act  itself. 

Thirdly.  The  rights  and  interests  in 
to  s^ciety^anTto  ^^c  family  are  all  circumscribed  by  the 
God.  higher  and  broader  relationships  of  man 

to  society  and  to  God.  The  state  may  take  the 
child  from  the  care  of  its  parents  for  training,  or  for 
service,  in  cases  of  exigency  ;  and  all  parental  rule 
must  be  subordinate  and  subservient  to  the  divine 
rule.  There  are  rights  of  conscience  belonging  to 
minors  which  override  parental  control. 


l80  DUTIES    IN    THE    FAMILY. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FRATERNAL    RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES. 

§  157.  The  rights  and  duties  between 
meSir"^         brothers  and  sisters,  as  they  have  their 

root  and  origin  in  the  family,  are  to  be 
measured  and  determined  in  the  light  of  the  family 
relation. 

The  children  are  but  a  part  of  the  household  ; 
their  relations  to  each  other  are  the  relations  of 
parts.  Their  rights  and  interests  are  subordinate 
to  those  of  the  family,  and  cannot  morally  be  exalted 
above  them,  but  must  ever  be  kept  in  harmony  and 
subservience.  As  a  class,  fraternal  rights  and  duties 
rank  lower  than  the  parental  and  filial.  When 
collision  arises,  if  there  is  no  other  ground  of 
decision,  parental  right  must  override  the  right  of  a 
brother  or  sister ;  and  the  duties  of  children  to  their 
parents  outrank  those  which  they  owe  to  one 
another. 

§  158.  Fraternal  rights  and  duties  rest 
Parity.  upon  a  general  basis  of  moral  equality 

and  reciprocity. 


PARENTAL    RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES.  l8l 

Age  and  sex,  individual  capacity  to  serve  on 
the  one  hand  and  need  of  service  on  the  other,  only 
modify  these  general  claims  of  duty  based  on  natu- 
ral equality,  as  in  all  human  associations  the 
functions  of  the  respective  members  should  aim  to 
be  complementary  of  one  another. 

§  159.     The  special  duties  of  this  class 
Special  duties,    are  sympathetic  affection  and  kindness 

in  all  the  forms  of  courtesy,  truthfulness, 
trustfulness,  equity,  and  beneficence. 

The  obligations  here  are  closer  and  faster  and 
more  enduring,  than  those  between  neighbors.  The 
grounds  for  this  are  in  the  natural  instincts  in  the 
subject  of  duty  predisposing  to  sympathy  and  affec- 
tion ;  in  the  readier  and  larger  receptivity  on  the 
part  of  the  object  of  duty  for  fraternal  kindness  ; 
and  in  the  more  abundant  occasions  for  acts  of  good- 
will and  service,  supplied  in  the  ordinary  condition 
of  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  same  household. 


1 82  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 


PART    III. 
DUTIES  IN  THE   STATE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   STATE — ITS   END    AND    MORAL    NATURE. 

§  1 60.  A  State  may  be  defined  to  be 
Defined.  ^  natural  society,  organized  among  men 

occupying  a  defined  territory,  for  the 
furtherance  of  their  common  secular  interests. 

The  definition  embraces  some  leading  attributes 
of  a  state,  which  require  separate  consideration. 

I.       THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    STATE. 

§  161.  The  state  is  a  natural  society, 
^odety."^  It  comes  to  be  under  the  orderings  of 

Divine  Providence,  in  exact  analogy 
with  the  unfolding  of  the  flower  from  the  bud,  or  of 
the  branches  from  the  trunk.     The  first  glance  over 


THE   STATE ITS    END   AND    NATURE.  1 83 

human  history  and  condition  discloses  to  us  the 
great  fact  that  men  were  made  to  Hve  in  a  morally 
organized  society.  The  moral  order  which  his 
nature  demands  is  attained  for  the  smaller  circle  of 
the  family  under  the  parental  authority.  But  as 
men  increase  in  numbers,  the  parental  home 
becomes  too  scanty  ;  the  crowded  members  swarm 
into  new  homes,  families  multiply,  and  the  moral 
relationship,  that  human  nature  requires  ever  to  be 
recognized  and  that  at  first  directly  bound  only 
individuals  in  the  same  family  group,  now  extends 
to  the  different  family  groups  themselves.  The 
tribal  condition  generally  has  followed  the  first 
stage  of  expansion  from  the  family ;  but  the  ten- 
dency is  strong  and  constant  in  the  continued 
increase  of  numbers — the  multiplication  of  tribes,  it 
may  be,  as  well  as  of  families — to  the  full  mature 
condition  of  a  morally  organized  state — to  the 
national  condition.  This  is  a  law  of  the  human 
race.  It  is  established  in  his  nature  as  social. 
Political  society — the  nation — the  state — is  thus 
truly  and  fully  an  ordinance  of  God,  who  so  consti- 
tuted men,  and  determined  the  conditions  of  their 
existence.  "The  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of 
God." 


II.    THE    STATE    AN    ORGANIZED    COMMUNITY. 

§162.  The  State  is  not  a  merely  aggre- 
societyr^^^       gated  mass  of  individuals  or  of  families, 

without  any  common  bond  holding  them 
fast  together  in  the  pursuit  of  a  common  interest 


184  DUTIES    IN   TUE   STATE. 

It  involves  a  unity  of  aim,  in  reference  to  which  the 
collected  mass  is  ever  acting ;  a  relationship 
between  the  members,  which  binds  them  together 
and  which  originates  certain  rights  and  imposes 
certain  corresponding  duties  ;  a  common  participa- 
tion in  hopes  and  fears  and  in  a  common  destiny, 
prompting  a  reciprocal  sympathy  and  enforcing 
reciprocal  ministries.  It  involves  a  diversity  of 
functions,  corresponding  to  the  diversity  and  magni- 
tude of  the  particular  interests  which  are  combined 
into  the  single  whole,  with  successive  gradations 
from  higher  to  lower,  but  each  ministering  in  its 
place  and  in  its  way,  to  the  realization  of  the  one 
common  aim. 

As  is  true  of  living  things  generally,  the  begin- 
nings of  the  state-life  are  germinant,  nascent,  from 
rudiments  hardly  recognized.  Yet  a  number  of 
men  can  not  be  brought  together  into  permanent 
relations  without  being  sensible  that  a  kind  of  moral 
order  enfolds  them,  and  constrains  and  regulates 
and  animates  them.  The  fully  developed  political 
organism  appears  as  the  social  life  of  the  commu- 
nity advances,  and  the  state  proper — the  nation — at 
last  comes  to  be,  with  its  manifold  offices  and  minis- 
tries, forming  a  single  body  with  many  members, 
all  under  a  more  or  less  perfect  subordination,  and 
performing  their  several  functions  in  reciprocal 
helpfulness  and  sympathy.  In  a  true  and  most 
important  sense,  the  state  has  a  proper  life  ;  it  is 
truly  called  a  body  politic,  being  organized  with 
appropriate  official  appointments,  in  their  several 
ways  co-operating  for  the  common  good. 


THE   STATE — ITS    END    AND    NATURE.  1 8$ 

3. THE    SPHERE    OF    THE   STATE. 

§  163.  The  State  is  a  community  of 
Locality  of        persons  living  in  contiguous  territory. 

sphere.  ^  ,  ,      .  .        .    , 

Its  proper  boundaries  are  territorial. 
All  persons  living  within  its  proper  territory  are 
parts  of  it.  Generally,  indeed,  they  have  had  a 
common  origin  ;  the  family  has  expanded  into  the 
tribe,  and  the  tribe  into  the  nation.  But  commu- 
nity of  blood  only  helps  to  the  state  ;  it  is  not  the 
principle  of  its  proper  unity  and  being.  Nations 
have  arisen  from  the  union  of  peoples  of  different 
races.  They  readily  receive  into  their  common  life 
strangers  of  other  lineage.  All  residents  in  the 
recognized  territory  are  subject  to  the  national  rule 
that  is  established;  they  are  made  to  contribute 
their  support  to  it  ;  they  share  in  its  protection  and 
care  ;  their  social  activity  is  ever  going  out  into  the 
common  life  around  them  ;  their  interests  and  hopes 
and  destinies  are  bound  up  in  the  common  experi- 
ence. The  bond  of  the  family  is  identity  of  blood : 
that  of  the  nation  is  identity  of  residence. 

4. THE    STATE   A    POWER. 

§  164.  As  the  essential  nature  of  the 
A  power.  individual  man  distinguishing  him  from 

a  thing  is,  that  he  is  the  source  of  action 
— a  power— ,so  the  state,  as  the  collective  man,  is  pre- 
eminently and  essentially  a  power.  It  is,  indeed,  the 
aggregated  power  of  its  people,  organized  into  single- 
ness of  movement  and  action.     All  our  conceptions 


1 86  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

of  the  state  thus  regard  it  as  a  power.  It  is  so  abso- 
lutely in  its  essence,  as  being  but  the  collective 
power  of  individual  men,  and  also  .relatively  to  that 
of  individuals.  It  is  accordingly  a  common  thing 
to  speak  of  states  as  powers — as  the  powers  of 
Europe, — states  being  so  preeminently  powers,  as 
compared  with  individuals,  that  they  are  assumed 
to  be  the  only  powers.  State  and  power  are  used 
synonymously. 

The  state  exists  simply  because  it  is  needful  as  a 
power.  It  is  not  mere  condition ;  not  mere  rela- 
tion ;  it  is  a  substantial  power,  for  it  is  power  which 
is  needed  to  protect,  sustain,  and  effectively  further 
the  interests  of  beings  like  men.  As  a  power,  its 
being  is  to  act ;  and  as  aggregated  power,  its  action 
is  to  be  commensurate  with  the  community  of  men 
whose  power  is  collected  into  it. 

§  165.  Political  power — state-power — 
Seat  of  its        \[]^q  ^h  rational  power,  has  its  seat  and 

power.  ^  ^ 

source  in  the  free-will.  States  thus  act, 
as  individual  men  act,  by  willing.  The  strength  of 
the  state  is  measured  by  the  strength  of  the  collec- 
tive will.  Its  particular  actions  are  expressed  in 
the  terms  of  will :  they  are  resolutions,  determina- 
tions, orders,  statutes,  and  laws,  which  are  expres- 
sions of  purpose,  and  are  addressed  to  other  wills 
who  are  to  obey  and  execute. 

State-power,  as  the  aggregation  of  the  social  sec- 
ular power  of  the  community,  is  consequently  the 
predominant  power ;  as  the  predominant  will-power, 
it  is  the  ruling,  governing  power  in  the  community. 
Its   power   should   accordingly   be   the   prevailing 


THE    STATE ITS    END    AND    NATURE.  1 8/ 

power,  mightier  than  that  of  any  one  man  in  the 
political  community,  or  of  any  portion  of  the  com- 
munity. 

Political  power,  like  that  of  the  individual  man, 
works  itself  out  necessarily  and  legitimately  through 
material  instrumentalities.  It  avails  itself  of  their 
ministry.  It  hoards  up  its  accumulated  power  in 
them.  It  acquires  and  holds,  that  it  may  use,  all 
kinds  of  material  possessions  needful  for  the  pur- 
poses of  its  existence. 

§  1 66.  As  collective  power,  political 
Its  organs.  power  Can  express  itself  only  through 
individual  organs — its  officials.  Even  if 
this  power  be  devolved  in  part  on  collective  bodies, 
as  legislatures,  these  bodies  are  yet  composed  of 
individuals  that  speak  though  the  lips  of  individual 
men.  All  such  officials  represent,  it  is  true,  the  state ; 
they  bear  its  name,  are  invested  with  its  insignia, 
wield  its  authority,  and  act  solely  for  its  interest ; 
the  world  sees  the  state  only  in  their  persons  and 
acts.  But  they  are  more  than  mere  representatives  ; 
they  are  proper  organs  through  which  the  state  acts 
and  lives,  receives  and  imparts,  assimilates  and  gives 
forth  all  that  ministers  to  the  secular  social  life  or 
nourishes  and  expresses  that  life.  Officials  may  be 
imperfect,  unfaithful,  corrupt,  as  bodily  organs  may 
be  more  or  less  paralyzed  or  diseased.  But  as 
organs  are  necessary  to  the  physical  body,  and 
through  their  right  discharge  of  their  respective 
functions  the  body  maintains  its  proper  life,  so 
these  officials,  representing  the  state,  are  real  and 
necessary  organs  of  the  body  politic.     Unfaithful- 


1 88  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

ness  and  corruption  no  more  disprove  this  organic 
relation  to  the  one  collective  life  of  the  state,  than 
do  partial  paralysis  and  disease  disprove  the  living 
connection  of  the  hand  or  the  foot  with  the  physi- 
cal body. 

5. THE    END    OF    THE    STATE-LIFE. 

§  167.     The  state  exists  for  the  security 
Its  end  is  the      and  furtherance  of  those  secular  interests 

furtherance  of 

secular  interests  which  are  common  to  its  members.  The 
members.  immediate  end  which  its  legitimate  activ- 

ity respects  is  the  well-being  of  its  mem- 
bers in  their  collective  outward  or  worldly  relations. 
If  we  assume  the  family,  the  state,  and  the  church 
as  the  three  coordinate  classes  of  permanent  social 
organisms  which  naturally  come  to  exist  in  the  pro- 
gress of  the  human  race,  we  have,  first,  the  family, 
distinguished  by  having  its  end  in  the  well-being  of- 
the  immature  and  dependent  among  men — the  chil- 
dren still  in  their  minority ;  next  the  state,  by  its 
having  its  immediate  end  in  the  secular  well-being 
of  the  mature  man, — the  interests  pertaining  more 
properly  to  the  body ;  and  last,  the  church,  by  its 
having  its  immediate  end  in  the  religious  well-being 
of  the  mature  man — the  interests  that  pertain  to  his 
nature  as  immortal. 

That  the  proper  end  of  the  state-life  is  to  be 
found  in  this  furtherance  of  the  secular  well-being 
of  men  is  apparent  from  the  considerations,  "first, 
that  the  state  exists  only  for  man  while  in  the  body — 
it  has  no  immortality  of  its  own  ;  secondly,  its  sphere 


THE   STATE ITS    END   AND    NATURE.  1 89 

IS  bounded  by  purely  geographical  boundaries,  and 
its  notice  and  its  care  can  reach  directly  only 
outward  things ;  thirdly,  its  proper  activity  has 
in  all  history  been  of  this  secular  character,  so 
that,  when  transcending  this,  it  has  been  regarded 
as  acting  out  of  its  sphere  and  with  injurious 
results. 

The  secular  interests  of  men  regarded  by  the 
state,  embrace  more  than  those  interests  which  are 
purely  material ;  more  than  those  which  pertain  to 
outward  person — to  body  or  limb  or  to  material  pos- 
sessions. The  state,  it  is  true,  can  act  on  man  only 
as  one  man  can  act  upon  another,  through  the  me- 
dium of  outward  sense.  But  its  action  may  indi- 
rectly reach  other  than  material  goods.  A  man's 
reputation,  a  good  name,  is  a  secular  interest  of 
exceeding  value  to  him  ;  it  is  one,  in  fact,  properly 
guarded  by  the  state ;  but  it  cannot  be  measured  nor 
weighed  ;  it  is  not  material.  Intelligence,  morality, 
religion,  are  immaterial  interests  ;  they  pertain  not 
to  the  body  but  to  the  immaterial  spirit.  Moreover, 
there  are  interests  which  pertain  to  man's  immortal 
being,  and  shape  his  condition  through  his  eternal 
future.  Yet  so  far  as  secular,  so  far  as  they  pertain 
to  the  present  life,  they  properly  come  within  the 
regard  of  the  state.  The  decisive  reasons  why  the 
state  should  abstain  from  the  religious  supervision 
and  control  of  its  subjects  are  not  at  all  that  religion 
in  itself  is  absolutely  outside  of  the  province  of  the 
state,  and  excluded  by  the  essential  character  of  the 
state.  It  is  impossible  that  the  state  should  let 
religion  entirely  alone,  as  will  be  shown  in  another 


1 90  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

more  suitable  place ;  the  state  in  manifold  ways 
does  and  must  recognize  religion.  The  legitimate 
limitation  of  its  action  here,  as  determined  by  the 
very  idea  of  the  state,  is  given  in  the  secular  bear- 
ings of  religion  on  men.  Every  thing  secular,  com- 
mon to  the  political  community,  is  rightfully  within 
the  province  of  the  state.  But  weighty  reasons 
may  be  given  why  the  state  should  have  extremely 
little  to  do  with  religion.  It  can  rightfully  have  to 
do  with  religion  only  so  far  as  it  is  secular — for  this 
life  and  its  interests — which  is  the  least  considerable 
part  of  religion,  whose  main  concern  is  the  immor- 
tality of  man.  The  entire  care  of  religion  is  better 
entrusted  to  other  hands,  where  even  for  its  secular 
bearings  it  will  be  better  cared  for  than  it  can  be 
by  the  state.  It  is  eminently  wise,  therefore,  in  the 
state  to  abstain  from  all  religious  direction  and 
control,  except  as  most  demonstratively  shown  to 
be  necessary  for  the  secular  interests  of  its  people. 

Morality,  much  more  than  religion,  demands  the 
attention  of  the  state,  inasmuch  as  all  secular  inter- 
ests are  more  directly  affected  by  it.  Public  peace, 
public  security,  hopeful  industry,  all  secular  thrift, 
depends  directly  on  the  morals  of  the  community. 

Intelligence,  as  necessary  basis  of  morality  and 
religion,  and  as  indispensable  to  a  people  for  the 
right  exercise  of  its  proper  sovereignty  in  the  state, 
bears  a  still  more  significant  relation  to  the  secular 
well-being  of  a  political  community. — Just  so  far  as 
this  secular  well-being  requires,  education  is  a  legit- 
imate object  for  the  care  of  the  state. 

Every  thing  thus  of  a  proper  secular  nature  affect- 


THE    STATE ITS    END    AND    NATURE.  IQI 

ing  the  well-being  of  the  people,  comes  within  the 
purview  of  political  action. 

But  besides  the  limitations  to  state-action  even  in 
regard  to  secular  interests  already  intimated,  is  the 
further  limitation  that  this  secular  interest  must  be 
a  common  interest.  The  state  is  for  no  individual ; 
it  is  for  the  community.  It  is  for  each  individual 
only  as  a  member  of  the  community.  Its  action,  if 
ever  directed  to  an  individual,  as  must  indeed  often 
be  the  case,  should  be  not  from  any  private  favorit- 
ism, but  such  as  would  be  taken  for  any  other  indi- 
vidual or  class  placed  in  like  relation  to  the  state. 

This  characteristic  of  proper  political  activity 
indicates  the  wisdom  and  propriety  of  making  all 
legislation  as  general  as  possible.  To  bestow  on  an 
individual,  or  a  class,  or  a  section,  what  in  like 
conditions  is  denied  to  others,  is  in  violation  of  a 
fundamental  principle  of  political  morality. 

But  although  the  immediate  end  of  the 
s^pkS activity,  life  and  activity  of  the  state  is  thus  sec- 
ular, it  by  no  means  follows  that  this 
life  and  activity  are  in  no  relation  to  moral  and 
spiritual  interests.  In  the  first  place,  as  the  body 
is  for  the  spirit  and  the  secular  for  the  spiritual,  the 
state,  whose  immediate  concern  is  the  bodily  and 
the  secular,  must  ever  act  in  subordination  and  in 
subservience  to  the  moral  and  spiritual  interests  of 
men.  Its  action  does  not  directly  aim  at  these 
interests,  but  its  action,  to  be  legitimate,  must  ever 
be  helpful  to  them.  As  with  the  heart  in  the  natu- 
ral body,  while  it  beats  only  in  order  to  propel  the 
blood,  its  pulsations  must  yet  ever  be  influenced  by 


192  DUTIES    IN    THE   STATE. 

the  condition  of  the  whole  body  for  whose  nourish- 
ment the  blood  which  it  propels  is  designed.  The 
circulatory  system  exists  only  for  the  well-being  of 
the  whole  body ;  it  acts  only  in  sympathy  with  its 
condition  ;  it  measures  its  action  by  it.  So  the 
state,  whose  ministry  is  directly  for  the  bodily  or 
secular,  yet  indirectly  serves  the  spirit  for  which 
the  body  exists  ;  it  must  keep  itself  ever  in  true 
sympathy  with  the  demands  of  this  higher  nature 
and  measure  its  action  by  it. 

Secondly,  the  state  is  a  community  of  persons — 
of  moral  and  spiritual  beings — who  can  never  lay 
aside  these  higher  attributes.  The  moral  nature 
breathes  forth  and  acts  in  all  the  bodily  life.  The 
entire  free  action  of  the  state,  even  although  aimed 
directly  at  merely  worldly  ends,  is,  therefore,  so  far 
morally  determined  and  characterized. 

Thirdly,  the  action  of  the  state,  although  its  end 
is  to  be  found  properly  in  secular  interests,  must 
sometimes  seek  the  furtherance  of  those  interests 
by  the  enlistment  of  the  moral  and  spiritual.  Just 
as  the  art  of  medicine,  which  aims  only  at  the 
healthy  condition  of  the  body,  must  needs  often 
address  itself  to  the  mind,  prescribing  the  measure 
and  mode  of  its  action  in  order  to  bodily  health,  so 
the  state  often  finds  itself  under  the  necessity  of 
legislating  in  regard  to  the  religious  condition  of  the 
community  while  still  seeking  its  highest  secular 
well-being.  In  this  indirect  way  it  is  called  upon 
to  foster  intelligence,  the  culture  of  the  fine  arts, 
the  moral  and  religious  improvement  of  the  people. 

Thus  the  outward  social  life  of  man  is  held  like 


THE    STATE ITS    END    AND    NATURE.  1 93 

the  personal  life  of  the  body,  to  a  strict  subordina- 
tion to  the  collective  moral  well-being  of  the  indi- 
vidual members. 

6. THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  THE  STATE. 

§  168.  From  what  has  been  said  it  is 
Its  action  moral,  clcar  that  the  state  is  in  a  proper  sense 

within  the  sphere  of  morality.  Its  action 
is  exclusively  human  action,  which  is  essentially 
moral  ;  its  immediate  end  and  object  is  in  subordi- 
nation and  subservience  to  the  higher  moral  nature 
of  the  individuals  composing  the  national  commu- 
nity ;  it  has  to  do  with  beings  whose  natures  are 
moral,  and  whose  outward  welfare  depends  greatly 
on  moral  conditions.  It  is  accordingly  by  no  mere 
figurative  use  of  language  that  we  speak  of  "  a  na- 
tion's conscience."  The  collective  action  of  the 
state  is  felt  to  be  free  as  truly  as  the  action  of  the 
individual  ;  there  is  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong  in 
reference  to  it  which  is  impelling  and  constraining  ; 
a  feeling  of  shame  among  the  people,  also,  for  na- 
tional wrong-doing  ;  and  an  expectation  of  just  retri- 
bution for  the  right  or  wrong  in  the  life  or  actions 
of  the  body  politic.  Just  as  the  individual  man,  in 
laboring  for  mere  secular  interests  and  in  the  true 
secular  sphere,  must  bear  his  moral  nature  with  him 
and  penetrate  his  whole  outward  carriage  and  con- 
duct with  a  truly  moral  shaping  and  coloring,  so  the 
collective  man — the  state — even  in  its  secular  sphere, 
must  evince  everywhere  the  moral  nature  which 
characterizes  in  common  all  its  constituent  members, 

9 


194  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

The  ends  and  objects  which  it  proposes  to  itself 
in  its  action,  the  general  policy  by  which  it  gov- 
erns itself,  as  well  as  the  particular  measures  which 
it  adopts  in  carrying  out  this  "policy,"  must  all 
be  consistent  with  a  pure  and  sound  morality.  Its 
legislation,  its  adjudication  under  the  laws  of  the 
rights  of  the  citizen,  and  its  administration  of  the 
law  as  thus  adjudicated,  must  in  every  step  be  con- 
trolled by  moral  principles  and  rules.  An  immoral 
law,  an  unjust  sentence,  a  corrupt  or  wrongful  ad- 
ministration, every  man  disallows  and  reprobates. 
Everywhere,  thus,  in  its  ends  or  objects,  and  in  its 
modes  of  accomplishing  these  ends,  the  state  is  held 
to  act  morally — to  recognize  itself  as  subject  to 
moral  control,  and  to  yield  itself  freely  to  this  con- 
trol. It  can  never  drop  from  its  proper  life  this 
moral  attribute.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
how  the  state  may  thus  be  a  truly  moral  organism 
while  its  end  is  purely  secular,  any  more  than  in 
conceiving  how  a  carpenter  who  in  his  calling  airns 
only  at  the  finished  building,  must  yet  appear  as  a 
moral  man  in  all  he  does,  building  only  for  uses 
approved  in  morality,  building  honestly  in  accord- 
ance with  moral  requirements,  investing  his  handi- 
work with  the  dignity  and  beauty  of  his  own  moral 
nature. 

§  169.  The  state  has  been  defined  by 
M^s^Sty^      an  able  writer — Dr.  Francis  Lieber,  in 

his  Political  Ethics  —  to  \>q, '3.  jural  so- 
ciety, being  founded  on  the  relation  of  right  as  the 
family  is  founded  on  the  relation  of  consanguinity, 
having  for  its  principle  of  action  that  of  right,  as 


THE    STATE ITS    END    AND    NATURE.  1 95 

the  family  has  that  of  love  for  its  animating  prin- 
ciple, and,  moreover,  including  only  jural  relations. 
To  this  view  of  the  state  there  are  grave  objections. 
In  the  first  place,  the  relation  of  right  is  not  the 
characteristic  basis  of  the  political  society,  for  it  is 
not  exclusively  proper  to  the  state.  It  exists  as 
truly  in  the  family  as  in  the  state  ;  indeed,  in  every 
possible  association  of  men,  the  so-called  jural  rela- 
tion— the  relation  of  right — underlies  and  pervades 
its  whole  being  and  action.  In  the  next  place,  purely 
jural  relations  are  not  the  exclusive  relations  sub- 
sisting in  a  state  in  any  sense  of  the  statement  in 
which  it  is  not  true  of  the  family.  The  relation  of 
the  state  to  the  "  great  ends  of  humanity  "  origin- 
ates a  relation  of  right,  a  proper  jural  relation  ;  but 
precisely  as  the  relation  of  the  family  to  the  same 
great  ends  of  humanity  originates  certain  jural 
relations  between  it  and  its  parts,  which  we  desig- 
nate as  marital  rights,  parental  and  filial  rights,  and 
fraternal  rights.  Strike  out  this  relation  of  the 
state  or  the  family  to  these  ends  and  all  jural  rela- 
tion disappears  ;  it  has  nothing  to  stand  upon,  and 
has  no  support,  no  definable  limits,  no  sanctions. 
In  the  third  place,  if  the  jural  relation  is  the  proper 
relation  originating  the  state,  then,  inasmuch  as  that 
relation  exists  in  respect  to  religious  matters  as  well 
as  secular,  the  state  must  extend  its  rule  and  care 
as  well  to  religious  interests  as  to  secular  ;  and  thus 
we  find  all  practical. distinction  between  the  spheres 
of  the  state  and  of  the  church  obliterated.  Once 
more,  if  the  state  and  the  family  are  distinguished 
from  each  other  simply  by  this — that  right  is  the 


196  DUTIES  IN   THE   STATE. 

animating  principle  in  one  and  not  in  the  other— then 
the  principle  of  love  is  excluded  from  the  sphere  of 
the  state,  and  thus  patriotism,  loyalty,  love  of  coun- 
try, are  empty  names  ;  they  designate  no  virtues. 
This  whole  view,  plausible  as  it  seems  as  opposed 
to  certain  erroneous  doctrines  in  regard  to  civil 
government,  is  thus  logically  fallacious  and  practi- 
cally most  vicious  and  baneful.  Mere  legality,  mere 
outward  heartless  conformity  to  governmental  requi- 
sitions, does  not  fulfil  the  moral  obligations  of  the 
citizen  to  the  state,  even  were  it  true  that  the  state 
can  in  no  way  directly  enforce  its  claims  beyond 
the  outward  formal  obedience.  There  is  a  true 
allegiance  which  is  broader,  deeper,  earlier  than  all 
mere  jural  relations  which  "  began  before  laws,  con- 
tinueth  after  laws,  and  is  in  vigor  when  laws  are 
suspended  and  have  had  their  force." 

§  1 70.  As  a  true  moral  personality,  the 
Bound  as  a        state  is  oblis-ed  by  the  mere  force  of  its 

moral  person.  *=*  -^ 

moral  nature  to  cherish  a  sympathetic 
good-will,  towards  all  the  proper  objects  of  its  ac- 
tivity, to  practice  an  effective  beneficence  in  respect 
to  them,  and  to  carry  out  this  sympathetic  affection 
in  this  beneficence  in  strictest  uprightness. 

The  moral  relationships  of  the  state  are  of  a 
threefold  division  : — to  itself  ;  to  its  citizens  :  to 
other  states.  Its  relationship  to  God  properly  comes 
into  consideration  in  the  division  of  duties  pertain* 
ing  to  God,  and  is  accordingly  omitted  here. 


THE   RIGHTS   AND    DUTIES,    ETC.  IQ/ 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  RIGHTS  AND    DUTIES  OF  A  STATE    IN    RELATION 
TO  ITSELF. 1.    EXISTENCE. 

§  171.  As  in  the  case  of  the  individual 
Rights  of  the    man,  so  in  the  case  of  the  state  we  may 

state.  .  ^ 

properly  speak  of  certain  rights  and 
duties  as  pertaining  to  it  individually — to  itself. 

The  several  comprehensive  rights  and  corre- 
sponding duties  of  a  state  are  those  of  :  i,  Existence ; 
2.  Self-ncle  or  autonomy  ;  and  3.   Growth. 

§  172.  1.  It  is  the  right  of  a  state  to  be  : 
I.  Of  existence,  it  is  its  Corresponding  duty  to  maintain 

its  existence. 
It  is  not  within  the  proper  province  of  an  existing 
state  to  raise   the  question   whether   its  birth  was 
legitimate.     The  fact  of  its  existing  has  settled  that 
point.  / 

§  173.  States  come  to  be  in  fact  in 
Threefold  three  ways  :  First  by  regular  ^r^w///  of 
°"^'  the  family  into  the  tribe  and  then  of  the 

tribe  into  the  state.     Such  was  the  rise  of  the  ear- 
lier nations. 


iqS  duties  in  the  state. 

Secondly,  By  separation  from  existing  states.  As 
to  the  question  :  what  can  legitimate  a  rebellion  or 
secession,  it  may  be  answered  that  the  law  of  the 
state  from  which  the  separation  is  proposed,  must 
necessarily  prohibit  and  resist  it.  No  state  can  for 
light  cause  legalize  self-disintegration.  Further, 
nothing  but  extreme  necessity  can  justify  a  part  of 
a  nation  in  dismembering  itself  from  the  political 
body  to  which  it  belongs.  Such  disruption  natu- 
rally is  in  violence  and  brings  inevitable  distress. 
Intolerable  oppression  or  hindrance  of  sound  polit- 
ical life,  with  sufficient  magnitude  and  strength  to 
maintain  healthy  existence,  alone  can  warrant  dis- 
ruption. 

Thirdly,  By  aggregation  of  existing  communities. 
Bodies  of  people  conveniently  situated  for  a  proper 
state  organization,  whether  tribal  communities  or 
dependencies  of  some  one  state,  or  of  different 
states,  may  be  drawn  together  into  a  legitimate 
state-union  under  the  natural  instinct  of  man  crav- 
ing a  social  order  for  the  nurture  of  common  secu- 
lar interests. 

§  174.  But  a  state  having  under  provi- 
Threefoid  duty    dential  ordcrino^s   come   into  being,  it 

of  self-mam  ten-  °  .  . 

ance.  then   has  a   right,  as  it  is    its  highest 

duty  to  maintain  its  existence.  Sub- 
ordinate only  to  the  supreme  law  of  God  and  of 
universal  morality,  its  maxim  is  to  preserve  itself — 
Salus  popidiy  snprema  lex.  Its  right  and  duty, here 
are  threefold:  i,  of  support;  2,  of  defense;  3,  of 
enforcing  its  rightful  rnle. 

§    176.     The    support   required   for   the   state 


THE    RIGHTS    OF   THE    STATE.  1 99 

2.  Of  support,  comes  from  the  public  resources  or  from 
the  citizens.  Of  its  right  and  duty  to 
employ  its  own  resources  in  self-support  there'can  be 
no  question.  Equally  beyond  question  is  its  duty,  as 
the  general  rule,  to  use  these  resources  of  its  own  be- 
fore having  recourse  to  the  individual  citizen.  Of  the 
necessity  or  the  expediency  of  requiring  the  help  of 
the  citizen,  the  state  is  sole  and  supreme  judge.  It 
has  the  right,  and  if  it  judge  it  to  be  necessary  for 
its  own  existence  it  is  its  duty,  to  appropriate  the 
property  and  the  service  of  its  citizens. 

Of  the  extent  and  the  mode  of  bringing  into  its 
use  individual  property  and  service,  the  state  is 
sovereign  arbiter.  It  is  bound,  however,  by  the 
principles  of  political  morality  to  make  no  exactions 
beyond  the  public  necessity ;  to  distribute  the  bur- 
den as  nearly  as  possible  equally  and  fairly,  accord- 
ing to  ability ;  to  proceed  with  all  practicable 
tenderness  for  the  individual  interest;  and  to  have 
a  steady  regard  to  the  general  interest  of  the  com- 
munity. 

§  177.  The  state  has  a  right  to  take,  if  necessary 
and  in  proper  ways,  any  of  the  property  belong- 
ing to  the  citizen,  (i).  It  has  thus  the  right,  so 
called,  of  eminent  domain — of  superior  right  above 
the  individual  to  appropriate  any  of  the  lands  or 
.other  estate  of  its  citizens,  giving,  of  course,  reason- 
able compensation.  (2).  It  has  the  right  to  tax  its 
citizens  for  its  support.  (3).  It  has  still  further  the 
right  to  the  personal  service  of  its  citizens  for  war^ 
for  the  suppression  of  insurrection  or  other  crimes 
against  the  peace  and  order  of   the  community,  and 


200  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

for  civil  office.  Its  right  is  founded  in  the  very 
nature  of  civil  society  which  is  but  the  organized 
social  secular  life  of  men  and  enfolds  all  public 
secular  interests  and  rights.  The  property  which 
it  legitimates  and  protects,  and  the  personal  service 
which  it  upholds  and  fosters,  are  in  moral  reciproc- 
ity bound  to  minister  to  its  necessities,  as  the  mem- 
bers of  the  physical  body  must  minister,  even  to  the 
extent  of  entire  self-sacrifice  if  necessary,  to  the 
common  life  from  which  they  spring  and  thrive. 

§  178.     Generally  the  chief  reliance  of 
Kin^s  o  tax-     ^^^q  state  f or  its  support  is  on  taxation, 


which  may  be  direct — taxes  proper,- 
indirect — duties.  Direct  taxation  is  upon  the  per- 
son— capitation  or  poll-t3.x, — or  on  the  property 
of  the  subject — property  tax.  Indirect  taxation  is 
either  upon  property  produced  within  the  state 
—  excise  duty, —  or  upon  property  imported  from 
abroad — imposts  or  customs  ;  or  upon  business — as 
by  stamps  ; — or  upon  income. 

Of  the  relative  amounts  to  be  levied  by  the  state 
from  these  several  sources  of  revenue,  as  has  been 
already  stated,  the  state  is  sole  arbiter.  Its  judg- 
ment must  vary  in  different  communities  and  under 
different  conditions.  Some  general  considerations 
may  be  stated  which  will  influence  the  selection 
and  distribution. 

§  179.  I.  Direct  taxation  \'S>Ti\ox^s,QXv^\' 
i._  Direct  tax-     ^^^  £gj^  ^^^^^  indirect.    It  therefore  gives 

rise  to  friction  between  the  state  and 
the  subject,  and  also  to  temptation  of  concealment 
and  false  valuation,  and  consequent  unfairness  in 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  201 

the  listing  of  property.  On  the  other  hand  it  keeps 
aUve  and  active  the  sense  of  the  state-Hfe  in  the 
subject,  and  a  feeling  of  responsibility  in  the  legis- 
lator, restraining  him  from  excessive  levies.  Where, 
as  in  the  United  States,  the  nation  and  the  more 
local  communities — the  several  states  and  territories 
— collect  their  revenues  separately,  it  is  a  wise  dis- 
tinction, as  far  as  may  be,  to  allot  to  the  nation  all 
indirect  duties — customs — and  to  the  local  commu- 
nity—  the  state — all  direct  taxes.  A  twofold  system 
of  appraisal  and  assessment  in  the  same  territory 
must  necessarily  give  rise  to  much  chafing  as  well  as 
occasion  a  twofold  expenditure.  Moreover,  a  fun- 
damental provision  in  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States  requiring  that  all  direct  taxes  shall  be  dis- 
tributed according  to  the  census,  such  taxes  would 
work  unequally  between  the  states  by  reason  of  the 
unequal  distribution  of  wealth. 

Indirect  taxes  are  less  felt  by  the  payer  ;  they  are 
more  fairly  laid  and  more  fully  collected  ;  and  con- 
sequently give  less  occasion  for  chafing  and  fraud. 
False  valuation  of  merchandise  and  smuggling  are 
the  two  chief  temptations  to  be  guarded  against. 
Impost  duties,  however,  hamper  foreign  commerce, 
and  are  therefore  held  in  disfavor  by  some  advocates 
of  free  trade. 

§  1 80.  2.  Capitation  taxes  are  legiti- 
taxe?^    ^°"     mate,  inasmuch   as   persons,  alike  with 

property,  enter  as  constituents  into  the 
body  politic,  sharing  in  its  protection  and  care.  It 
is  well,  moreover,  that  every  citizen  be  reminded  in 
some  sensible  way  of  his   personal  relationship   to 

9* 


202  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

the  State.  Only  a  moderate  portion  of  the  neces- 
sary revenue  of  a  state,  however,  can  be  realized  in 
this  way;  and  the  great  burden  must  rest  on  the 
property  of  the  subjects. 

§  i8i.     3.  Excise  duties,  being  levied  on 

3.  Excise  duties,  the  products  of  home  industry,  are  ob- 

jectionable as  burdensome  to  production, 
which  it  is  a  leading  duty  of  the  state  to  foster. 
But  articles  of  which  there  is  danger  of  excessive 
or  injurious  or  wasteful  use,  such  as  distilled  liquors 
and  tobacco,  are  not  liable  to  this  objection,  and  are 
therefore  wisely  taken  to  bear  the  burden  of  taxation 
to  the  full  extent  which  they  will  bear. 

§  182.     4.  Imposts  ox  customs,  levied  on 

4.  Imposts.       imported  commodities,  constitute  a  lead- 

ing source  of  revenue  in  the  general  ad- 
ministration of  governments.  The  considerations 
that  favor  this  selection,  especially  for  national  as 
opposed  to  municipal  revenues,  are  manifold.  The 
collection  of  it  is  more  in  the  immediate  control  of 
the  government.  In  maritime  countries  it  inciden- 
tally furnishes  a  nursery  for  a  naval  force,  and  also 
a  ready  instrumentality  for  furthering  commerce, 
as  by  affording  aid  to  vessels  in  need,  furnishing 
protection  to  the  coast,  and  a  watchful  supervision 
over  the  needful  provisions  for  safe  navigation,  such 
as  lights,  beacons,  removal  of  obstructions,  and  the 
like.  It  necessarily  brings  the  whole  influx  of  for- 
eign goods  under  the  inspection  of  the  government, 
so  that,  the  kinds  and  quantities  all  l^eing  made 
known,  profitable  suggestions  may  be  derived  for 
any  needed  governmental  regulation — for  repression 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  203 

of  injurious  or  increase  of  desirable  products,  and 
also  for  the  encouragement  and  direction  of  the 
productive  industry  of  the  country. 

This  kind  of  taxation  is  less  sensibly  felt  by  the 
tax-payer.  He  pays  at  his  own  pleasure  and  con- 
venience, just  as  and  when  he  chooses  to  buy,  and 
pays  no  more  than  he  chooses.  He  does  not  come 
into  direct  conflict  with  the  government  or  its  gen- 
erally unwelcome  instrument  —  the  tax-collector. 
This  kind  of  taxation  is  therefore  generally  borne 
more  quietly. 

Where  the  revenues  for  national  and  for  state  or 
municipal  support  are  separately  levied  and  collect- 
ed, the  collection  of  imposts  for  national  revenue  is 
less  expensive  and  less  annoying  to  the  tax-payer. 

Further,  a  revenue  from  customs — by  a  tariff,  as 
it  is  familiarly  called — enables  a  government  indi- 
rectly to  foster  more  judiciously  and  effectively 
certain  interests  of  more  or  less  vital  concern  to  the 
community.  Every  wise  tariff  system  must  be 
more  or  less  discriminative.  An  exactly  horizontal 
tariff,  that  is,  a  tariff  of  equal  duties  on  all  imports, 
is  hardly  practicable,  and  certainly  would  be  most 
unreasonable. 

There  may  possibly,  and  probably  will,  be  discrim- 
ination required  in  reference  to  the  country  from 
which  the  imports  come — according  to  treaty-regu- 
lations with  the  different  nations,  reciprocating  free 
or  dutiable  admission  of  products. 

Discrimination  may  be  necessary  in  reference  to 
the  interests  of  revenue  itself ;  some  desirable  com- 
modities may  not  bear  the  full  measure  of  a  hori- 


204  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

zontal  tariff.  Indeed  it  must  ever  be  a  leading 
problem  in  adjusting  a  tariff,  what  amount  of  duty- 
will  afford  the  largest  revenue.  A  tariff  may  be  so 
high  as  to  be  prohibitory  ;  or  it  may  so  enhance  the 
price  to  the  purchaser  that  the  sale,  and  conse- 
quently the  importation,  will  be  so  far  lessened  that 
a  higher  duty  will  produce  less  revenue  than  a  lower. 
Moreover,  some  commodities  will  yield  too  small  a 
revenue  for  the  cost  of  collection.  A  wise  princi- 
ple in  adjusting  a  tariff  system  is  to  make  those 
commodities  pay  most  that  pay  best. 

Discrimination  may  be  required  in  the  interests  of 
public  morals.  Hurtful  commodities  may  be  kept 
out  of  the  country  by  prohibitory  duties ;  and  the 
introduction  of  dangerous  or  useless  articles  may 
be  hindered  or  repressed  by  relatively  high  duties, 
as,  for  instance,  distilled  liquors  and  tobacco. 

Discrimination  may  be  wise  in  reference  to  lux- 
uries, which  will  bear  and  justify  a  heavier  duty 
than  mere  necessaries  or  comforts.  Silks  and  wines 
are  thus  properly  discriminated  against  by  the  im- 
position of  higher  than  average  duties. 

Discrimination  should  be  made  in  the  interest  of 
classes  in  the  community  less  able  to  contribute  to 
the  support  of  the  state.  A  leading  objection  to  a 
revenue  by  tariff  is  that  no  difference  can  be  made 
directly  between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  Wealth  is 
not  taxed  as  wealth  ;  but  only  purchase.  If  all  the 
citizens  purchased  the  same  things,  under  a  hori- 
zontal tariff  the  poor  would  contribute  equally  with 
the  rich  for  the  support  of  the  state.  There  is 
weight  in  this  consideration,  although  the  burden 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE   STATE.  20$ 

of  this  kind  of  taxation  is  more  effectually  propor- 
tioned to  the  ability  of  the  payers  than  other  kinds, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  regulated  by  what  a  man  freely 
buys.  Hence,  as  in  equity  property  should  be  bur- 
dened according  to  its  amount,  it  is  requisite  in  an 
equitable  tariff  system  that  luxuries  be  taxed  heavi- 
est, conveniences  and  comforts  less,  and  the  necessa- 
ries of  life  which  all  must  have,  least  of  all. 

Once  more,  discrimination  may  be  needful  in  the 
interest  of  domestic  production.  As  the  augmenta- 
tion of  its  resources  is  one  leading  duty  of  a  state, 
and  as  the  resources  lie  mainly  in  the  possessions 
or  wealth  of  its  citizens,  resulting  from  productive 
labor,  the  fostering  of  all  the  legitimate  modes  of 
augmenting  the  wealth  of  the  country  should  be 
a  leading  object  with  a  government.  It  is  its  duty, 
therefore,  in  every  department  of  its  administration, 
and  especially  in  the  matter  of  its  tariff  system  to 
see  to  it  that  in  all  its  parts,  and  in  its  legitimate  ef- 
fects, it  shall  not  only  not  hinder  but  positively  pro- 
mote all  the  productive  and  distributing  industries 
of  the  country  whereby  its  resources  may  be  aug- 
mented. The  relative  condition  of  these  differ- 
ent industries  may  reasonably  require  intelligent 
discrimination  in  favor  of  one  rather  than  an- 
other. 

The  objections  to  imposts  as  a  source  of  revenue 
are:  i.  That  they  are  a  tax  on  the  productions  of 
foreign  countries.  But  they  are  so  only  as  for  the 
profit  of  the  producer  they  are  consumed  in  the 
country.  If  the  duty  was  prohibitory,-  he  would 
have  no  right   to   complain  :    for  every  purchaser, 


205  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

whether  nation  or  individual,  has  a  right  in  the  free- 
dom  of  trade  to  refuse  to  purchase. 

2.  It  hampers  trade  and  intercourse  between 
different  countries.  This  is  true  and  it  is  a  valid  ob- 
jection, so  far  as  it  goes  ;  but  it  suggests  rather 
carefully  considered  modes  of  collection  than  repeals 
of  tariffs.  It  is  the  frauds,  the  lawless  exactions,  and 
the  discourtesies  of  collectors,  rather  than  the  duties 
themselves,  that  so  exasperate  commercial  men  and 
travelers.  The  outcries  against  a  revenue  by  tariff 
are  mostly  from  these  classes  and  those  immediate- 
ly connected  with  them  and  those  whose  special  in- 
dustries happen  in  the  unavoidable  imperfections  of 
any  system  of  revenue  to  be  more  closely  touched, 
and  not  from  the  great  mass  of  the  people,  at  least 
when  free  from  political  partisan  bias  and  pressure. 

3.  The  collection  of  duties  gives  large  occasion  for 
corruption.  This  is  true  ;  but  the  evil  is  an  unavoid- 
able one  in  any  system  of  revenue  collection. 

4.  It  is  a  ground  of  international  alienation  and 
animosity.  This  is  true,  but  only  to  a  very  limited 
and  really  inconsiderable  extent. 

§  183.  5.  Stamps  and  all  taxes  upon 
5.  stamps.  business,  while  they  may  be  justified  in 
the  extremities  of  a  nation's  need,  are 
objectionable,  not  only  because  the  national  welfare 
imperatively  requires  that  the  ways  of  business 
should  be  as  unobstructed  as  possible,  but  because 
they  are  generally  inconvenient  for  the  payer,  and 
are  relatively  small  so  as  to  be  unworthy  of  a  great 
nation. 

§  184.  6.  Income   taxes   are,  perhaps,    the   most 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  20/ 

odious  to  the  payers.  Incomes  are  not 
6.  Income  taxes.  ^  f^-^.  ^ig^sure  of  ability  to  pay  ;  they 
are  not  easily  ascertained ;  they  are  apt  to  be 
disguised  and  understated ;  they  are  matters  of 
privacy  into  which  it  is  very  offensive  that  the  pub- 
lic eye  should  penetrate  ;  they  hinder  the  accumula- 
tion of  capital.  Income  taxes  thus  lead  to  fraudulent 
returns  ;  disturb  the  free  tendencies  of  investment 
by  capitalists  and  of  productive  enterprise;  and  oc- 
casion perpetual  friction  between  the  tax-payer  and 
state.  They  are  the  last  modes  of  revenue  to  be  re- 
sorted to  by  a  state  in  its  necessities.  They  are 
most  tolerable  in  old  and  wealthy  states  where  there 
is  a  large  surplus  of  capital  for  investment. 

§  185.  Self-defense  is  a  natural  right 
II.  Right  of       and  duty  of  the  state,  while  it  may  not 

self-defense.  •'  •' 

trespass  on  the  rights  of  other  states  or 
of  its  own  subjects  so  as  to  provoke  aggression  or 
rebellion.  When  assailed  it  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
laws  of  living  being  that  it  should  defend  itself.  As, 
against  the  violences  of  natural  forces — storms  and 
earthquakes  and  conflagrations, — against  the  ma- 
raudings of  animal  and  insect  life,  against  all 
physical  and  animal  force  and  harm,  it  is  bound  to 
protect  its  citizens,  so  equally  against  the  force  of 
men,  against  assault  upon  their  liberties  and  good 
order  and  possessions,  whether  from  foreign  force 
or  from  insurgents  at  home.  There  should  be 
patience,  forbearance,  as  in  the  case  of  assault  upon 
persons  ;  but  there  is  a  limit  beyond  which  unresist- 
ing sufferance  is  an  immorality.  War  should  be  the 
last  resort — ultima  ratio  ; — but  it  may  be  righteous 


208  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

as  such  resort.  As  the  spirit  of  philanthropy — good 
will  among  men — advances  in  the  world,  peace  will 
more  and  more  prevail ;  the  occasions  and  the  jus- 
tifications of  war  will  lessen.  But  while  imperfec- 
tion remains,  the  liability  to  lawless  oppression  and 
to  wars  will  continue. 

For  its  own  defense,  the  state  rightfully  holds 
the  entire  community  of  resources  within  its  do- 
main, subject  to  its  use  and  control.  Property  and 
personal  service  being  the  very  constituents  of 
the  united  social  interest,  the  ruling  power  in  it 
must  dispose  of  it  according  to  its  own  sovereign  de- 
termination. The  usages  of  peace  and  the  rights 
which  have  grown  up  under  these  usages,  even 
statutes  themselves,  may  be  compelled  to  give  way. 
Laws  are  dormant  in  war — inter  anna  leges  silent. 
The  state  in  war  appropriates,  or  even  destroys,  the 
possessions  of  individuals  ;  it  conscripts  their  per- 
sons. This  great  power  it  is,  however,  bound  to 
exercise  only  so  far  as  the  good  of  the  whole  shall 
require  on  the  clearest  occasions  of  necessity,  with 
the  utmost  forbearance  and  consideration,  and  with 
full  compensation  out  of  the  public  resources. 

§  1 86.  3.  The  maintenance  of  author- 
III.  Of  rule.       ixY — the  right  and  duty  of  enforcing  its 

rightful  rule — appertains  to  the  state 
by  virtue  of  its  very  being.  The  state  exists  as  a 
ruling  power  ;  it  ceases  when  its  rule  ends.  Its  will 
in  its  sphere  is  rightfully  supreme  :  it  is  its  right  and 
duty  to  exert  that  will  and  make  it  effectual,  other- 
wise it  would  be  preposterous  to  will  or  to  claim 
the  right  of  willing.     The   means  and   methods   b}' 


THE   RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  '    2O9 

which  it  may  rightfully  enforce  its  will  are  precisely 
determined  by  the  nature  of  its  province,  which  is 
the  secular  interest  of  the  community.  As  all  secu- 
lar interests  are  incorporated  into  it,  they  are  its  to 
use  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  end.  All  secular  power 
within  its  control  to  its  utmost  limit  it  may  thus 
lawfully  employ.  The  enforcement  of  its  laws  by 
penal  sanctions  to  the  extent  of  taking  property, 
personal  liberty,  life  itself, — all  secular  coercion  by 
secular  means — belongs  to  it  by  right  of  its  very 
being.  Only  a  perfect  community  can  dispense 
with  the  use  of  physical  constraint.  To  the  good 
the  constraints  of  civil  authority  will  be  no  terror ; 
in  the  sense  of  harm  to  their  persons  or  property, 
the  law  is  not  for  them  ;  but  so  long  as  there  are 
lawless  and  disobedient  members  of  civil  society, 
there  will  be  need  and  rightful  use  for  the  sword.  It 
is  a  grand  fallacy  to  reason  from  the  immortality 
and  the  higher  spiritual  nature  of  men  that  none 
but  proper  spiritual  and  eternal  motives  should  be 
addressed  to  them.  This  would  be  no  more  logical 
than  to  infer  from  man's  being  in  civil  society  gov- 
erned by  secular  influences  that  there  should  be  no 
family  rule.  The  grand  fact  that  man  exists  in  a 
physical  body,  in  time  and  in  place  on  earth,  places 
him  in  the  secular  sphere  where  he  must  in  truth 
to  his  condition  act  in  secular  relations  and  be  cor- 
respondingly acted  upon  by  secular  forces.  Secu- 
lar ends  are  legitimately  attained  by  secular  means. 
As  a  secular  power,  the  state  rightfully  employs  sec- 
ular constraint — outward,  physical  coercion — in  the 
enforcement  of  its  rightful  rule. 


2IO  ■  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

§  187.  The  legitimate  and  principal 
Sanctions  of  law.  jyieans  of  maintaining  political  authority 

are  found  in  the  sanctions  of  law. 
It  should  never  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the 
very  manner  and  spirit  in  which  the  government 
frames  and  executes  the  sanctions  of  its  laws,  are 
vitally  concerned  in  the  maintenance  of  its  author- 
ity. Unjust,  immoral,  barbarous,  partial,  or  capri- 
cious, arbitrary,  reckless  legislation  and  administra- 
tion are  fatal  to  authority,  which  must  rest  mainly 
on  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the  body  of  the 
political  community.  Wise  and  righteous  laws  are 
their  own  support  with  an  orderly  and  intelligent 
people. 

The   sanctions   of  law  are    either    reway'ds  for 
loyalty  and  obedience,  ox  penalties  for  disobedience. 

§  188.  Rewards  express  the  lawgiver's 
Rewards.  approval  of  loyalty  and  obedience.  They 

are  in  the  form  of  public  recognition  of 
patriotic  service  and  acts,  military  and  civil  distinc- 
tions, monuments,  bounties,  abatements  of  dues,  and 
the  like.  They  constitute  but  an  inconsiderable 
part  of  the  sanctions  found  necessary  for  the  en- 
forcement of  authority.  They  are  yet  a  needful 
help  in  encouraging  the  spirit  of  order  and  loyalty. 
Wisely  distributed  they  win  the  sympathy  and  affec- 
tionate confidence  of  the  people  towards  the  govern- 
ment. 

§  189.  Penalties  express  the  lawgiv- 
Penalties.  er's  disapproval  of  disobedience  and  his 

corresponding  determination  to  pre- 
vent it. 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  211 

They  are  a  necessary  part  of  law  ;  for,  as  it  has  been 
forcibly  asked  :  "  What  can  be  called  law,  which 
does  not  express  supreme  abhorrence  of  transgres- 
sion ? "  Penal  laws  which  are  characterized  by  a 
spirit  of  indifference  to  loyal  obedience  or  to  the 
great  ends  of  society  for  which  laws  are  ordained, 
are  a  mockery  of  proper  authority.  If  the  lawgiv- 
er is  indifferent,  why  should  not  the  subject  be  so  ? 
The  moral  sense  of  the  community — its  love  of 
right,  its  abhorrence  of  v/rong — must  pervade  all  its 
legislation,  and,  most  of  all,  its  penal  legislation. 
The  one  great  end  of  penal  laws  is  to  discourage  or 
prevent  disobedience. 
Secondar  ends  §  ^9^'  But  whilc  the  prevention  of  crimc 

of  penalty— in     jg  the   primary  immediate  end  of  pen- 
teaching,  r-  J  1 

alty,  there  are  other  ends  to  be  sought 

by    it.      These   ends   are  in  entire  harmony  with 

that  of  prevention  and  to  a  large  extent  helpful  to 

it.  A  second  end  in  penalty  is  thus,  t/ie  moral  teacJi- 

ing  of  the  coimmmity.     All  penal  laws,  as  has  been 

already    observed,    express     the    moral  sense    of 

the  political  community.    Such  expression   should 

have  its  full  legitimate  effect  on  the  minds  of  the 

people.     It  is  an  end  to  be  had  distinctly  in  view  in 

framing  penal  laws.     As  legislation  should  be  the 

expression  of  the  highest  wisdom  of  the  state,  penal 

laws  may  properly  be   somewhat  in   advance  of  the 

average  morality  of  the  community,  while  yet  not  so 

far  as  to   be    beyond   their  sympathy  and  respect. 

They  should  aim  expressly  at  inculcating  respect 

for  rightful  authority  and  for  the  majesty  of  law, 

love  of  order,  hatred  of  wrong. 


212  DUTIES    IN    THE    FAMILY. 

§  191.  A  third  legitimate  end  of  pen- 
In  reforming.      3.\ty,  to  be  applied  in  subordination  to 
the  two  ends  already  named,  is  the  ref- 
ormation of  the  offender. 

§  192.  The  modes  of  punishment  by 
Modes.  states  are    by  pecuniary   fines,  by  im- 

prisonment, by  personal  suffering.  They 
must  vary  with  the  state  of  society  and  with  the 
character  of  the  people.  In  early  stages  of  history, 
retaliation  of  the  wrong  done  in  mode  as  well  as  de- 
gree— wound  for  wound,  tooth  for  tooth,  life  for  life 
— was  well  nigh  a  necessity  ;  as  it  is  an  immediate 
suggestion  of  natural  instinct,  moreover,  punish- 
ments were  inflicted  wholly  or  in  part  by  the  party 
wronged.  Fines  are  collected  even  now  in  civil- 
ized states  sometimes  by  the  party  suffering  from 
the  offense  ;  even  prosecutions  for  crimes  against 
public  order  are  left  to  individual  complaints. 
But  in  the  progress  of  civilization,  the  law  of  exact 
retaliation — lex  talionis — gives  way  and  the  pros- 
ecution of  criminals  and  the  infliction  of  penal- 
ties on  the  guilty  are  wisely  taken  from  the  hands 
of  the  individual  and  committed  to  the  public 
official. 

The  second  end  of  punishment  named — the  moral 
teaching  of  the  community — ^forbids  all  such  modes 
of  punishment  as  unnecessarily  shock  humane  senti- 
ments or  offend  against  public  decency.  More  and 
more,  with  the  progress  of  society,  public  inflictions 
of  penalty  on  the  person  of  the  offender  become  of- 
fensive, and  are  wisely  replaced  by  more  private 
execution  of  the  law. 


THE    RIGHTS    OF    THE    STATE.  213 

§  193.  The  degrees  of  penalties  vary, 
^tfhefnoSJi'e^s  ^rst,  with  the  nature  of  the  offense, 
of  the  offense,  ^^iq  principle  of  natural  justice  enjoins 
this  ; — that,  aside  from  all  other  considerations,  the 
degree  of  the  penalty  should  in  some  way  measure 
the  heinousness  of  the  offense. 

§  194.  Secondly,  the  degrees  of  penalty 
2  With  difficulty  vary  with  the  difficulty  of  detection  and 

of  detection.  •'  ... 

conviction  of  offenders.  Those  offenses 
which  it  is  more  difficult  to  detect,  such  for  instance, 
as  those  committed  in  the  night,  must  receive 
heavier  penalties. 

§  195.  Thirdly,  the  degrees  of  penalty 
3.  With  preva-  yary  with  the  number  and  stren£:th  of 

lence  of  wrong.  -^  ^ 

the  offenders.  Conspirators  in  the  per- 
petration of  a  wrong  are  thus  more  severely  punish- 
ed than  individual  offenders. 

§  196.  Fourthly,  the  degrees  of  penalty 
senSnr^^''   vary  with  the  moral  sentiment  of  the 

community.  As  that  becomes  more 
pure,  more  firm,  more  pervasive,  less  severe  inflic- 
tions are  necessary. 


214  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 


CHAPTER  III. 


POLITICAL    AUTONOMY. 


§  197.  It  is  the  right  of  a  state  to  rule 
Defined.  itself  ; — to  shape  its  own  organic  law,  to 

enact  its  own  statutes,  to  interpret  and 
administer  its  own  laws  ; — generally  to  manage  its 
own  affairs  without  the  interference  of  other  powers. 
This  is  the  right  of  self-rule — autonomy. 

§  198.  The  right  of  self-rule  is  involved  in 
Ground.  the  right  to  be.  The  very  idea  of  a  state 

is  that  it  is  the  embodiment  in  a  single 
organic  whole  of  the  power  to  rule  all  the  secular  in- 
terests of  the  community.  Interference  from  with- 
out with  the  free  exercise  of  this  ruling  authority 
must  either  reduce  to  provincial  subordination  or  in- 
fringe on  the  integrity  of  a  state. 

The  right  of  autonomy  is  not  necessarily  impaired 
by  a  distribution  of  political  authority  into  the  more 
strictly  national  and  the  local  or  municipal  rule. 
But  in  order  to  the  unity  of  the  organic  life  of  the 
state,  the  municipal  must  be  held  ever  subordinate 
and  subservient  to  the  national.     With  this  subor« 


POLITICAL    AUTONOMY.  215 

dination,  it  is  wise  policy  to  subdivide  political  rule 
so  as  to  give  to  districts  or  provinces — States — the 
immediate  rule  over  what  of  secular  concern  lies 
within  the  State  or  province  ;  to  allot,  moreover,  to 
smaller  districts,  like  subordinate  rule  over  the 
political  and  civil  concerns  within  such  district,  till 
the  smallest  convenient  local  community  is  reached. 
Indeed,  it  is  in  the  same  line  of  wise  policy  to  leave 
ever  to  the  individual  citizen  all  of  freedom  to  rule 
and  manage  his  own  concerns  consistent  with  the 
good  of  the  whole,  §  208.  3. 

§  199.  It  is  equally  the  duty  as  it  is  the 
Autonomy  as     risfht  of   a    State  to   maintain   its    own 

duty.  ^ 

autonomy.  The  state  owes  it  to  its 
own  prosperity  and  vigor,  to  the  independence  of  its 
action  and  consequently  to  its  proper  relations  and 
degree  of  responsibility,  and  to  its  own  self-respect, 
with  unyielding  firmness  and  at  any  sacrifice  to  re- 
sist all  dictation  and  all  constraint  from  other 
powers.  A  subject  sovereignty  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms  and  a  monstrosity  in  being. 

§  200.  The  autonomy  of  a  state  is  ex- 
Spheres.  ertcd  chiefly  in  the  distinct  spheres  of 

its  organic  law  ;  its  legislation  ;  its  judi- 
ciary ;  and  its  executive  administration. 

As  all  finite  rule,  while  in  freedom,  is  yet  under 
responsibility,  in  these  several  spheres  of  autonomy 
there  are  respectively  in  part  distinct  modes  of  re- 
sponsibility in  each.  The  people  themselves  who 
constitute  the  state  are  for  their  collective  action 
responsible  to  God,  and,  in  a  certain  degree,  to  the 
fraternity  of  states.     The  departments  of  political 


2l6  DUTIES    IN    THE   STATE. 

administration  are  responsible  to  the  people  and  so 
far  as  courtesy  and  reciprocal  respect  are  concerned, 
also  to  the  co-ordinate  departments ;  as  also  more 
or  less  to  the  particular  political  power  which 
creates  or  appoints  the  officials  in  them.  The  meas- 
ure and  kind  of  responsibility  vary  with  the  relation- 
ship. There  is  no  absolute  autonomy  among  men. 
Accountability,  in  its  ten  thousand  forms  and  de- 
grees, enters,  as  an  element  not  to  be  got  rid  of,  in- 
to all  modes  of  human  activity — personal  or  social. 
The  only  questions  that  can  arise  are  :  to  whom,  to 
what  extent,  and  in  what  way,  is  this  accountability 
to  be  recognized  and  enforced, 

§  201.  The  organic  law  of  a  state  is 
^rganiciawde-  ^^^  exprcsscd  will  of  the  poUtical  com- 
munity in  reference  to  the  principles 
and  forms  of  its  government.  It  is  the  fundamen- 
tal law  by  which  the  entire  action  of  the  political 
community  is  to  be  ruled,  and  which  is  ever  to  be 
recognized  as  supreme.  From  it  there  is  no  appeal 
but  to  the  original  seat  of  all  political  authority — 
the  community  itself. 

This  organic  law  may  appear  in  full  and  proper 
form  as  in  written  constitutions,  or  only  in  parts  and 
fragments,  as  the  advancing  history  of  the  people 
has  developed  them.  In  communities,  properly  free, 
it  is  drawn  up  under  the  direction  of  the  people,  or 
at  least  is  formally  ratified  by  them  in  such  way  as 
the  circumstances  may  admit,  so  as  to  be  recognized 
as  the  expressed  will  of  the  people.  In  older  his- 
toric nations,  brought  together  and  constituted  into 
a  single  political  body,  perhaps,  by  outward  force 


POLITICAL   AUTONOMY.  21/ 

and  by  degrees,  it  appears  in  the  form  of  subsequent 
concessions,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Mag7ia  Charta  of 
King  John  of  England,  and  the  fuller  charter  of 
Louis  XVI 1 1,  of  France  ;  or  in  the  form  of  com- 
pacts entered  into  by  existing  powers  in  the  state 
between  themselves  or  with  the  governed.  Estab- 
lished usage,  moreover,  may  stamp  additional  features 
on  the  fundamental  law  of  the  state,  as  implying 
the  consent  and  will  of  the    sovereign  community. 

It  is  the  purpose  and  object  of  the  or- 
its  purport.       ganic  law  of  a  state  (i)   to  confer  the 

power  of  political  rule  possessed  by  the 
community  on  designated  individuals  or  bodies  of 
men  ;  (2)  to  define  the  limits  within  which,  and 
also  the  modes  and  forms  in  which,  this  conferred 
power  is  to  be  exercised. 

All  power  not  thus  conferred,  directly  or  by  fair 
implication,  is  reserved  to  the  community  itself. 
The  right  to  revoke,  or  alter,  or  amend  its  organic 
law  or  constitution  is  also  reserved,  although  the 
mode  by  which  such  revocation  or  change  is  to  be 
brought  about  may  be  properly  or  wisely  prescribed 
in  the  instrument  itself. 

The  organic  law  thus  creates  and  shapes  the  out- 
ward organism  through  which  the  social  life  of  the 
community  is  so  far  to  be  expressed. 

There  is  a  threefold  division  of  the 
LuuStloS?^'"' functions    of    the     political     organism 

adopted  generally  by  the  most  mature 
and  most  highly  perfected  states.  They  constitute 
the  other  spheres  mentioned  of  state  autonomy — 
the  legislative,  the  judicial,  and  the  executive.. 


2l8  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

§  202.  Th.Q  iunctionoi  the  state /eo^-isla- 
fun^don.^^^^''^  ///;r  is  to  ordain  law  for  the  government 
of  its  own  action  and  that  of  its  citizens. 
It  is  the  seat  of  authority  for  the  nation.  Its 
enactments  are  binding  on  the  conscience  of  the 
subject,  unless  contravening  the  higher  authority 
of  right  morals  or  the  fundamental  law  of  the  state 
— its  organic  law  or  constitution. 

In  nations  most  advanced  in  civilization,  the  leg- 
islative power  is  commonly  entrusted  to  the  joint 
action  with  the  executive  of  two  distinct  bodies  of 
representatives — one  more  popular,  elected  imme- 
diately by  the  people,  and  having  a  briefer  tenure  of 
office — the  House  of  Representatives,  the  House  of 
Deputies,  the  House  of  Commons  ;  and  the  other 
designed  to  be  the  more  conservative  body,  having 
a  longer  tenure  of  office  and  appointed  by  other 
functionaries  or  organisms  in  the  state.  The  union 
of  the  executive  with  these  representative  bodies  is 
wisely  required  for  a  more  perfect  adaptation  of  law 
to  the  practical  needs  of  administrative  power,  and 
to  existing  relations  with  foreign  powers. 

The  ordinances  of  the  legislature,  at  least  so  far 
as  pertaining  more  directly  to  the  general  welfare 
and  for  general  observance,  are  called  statutes. 
They  constitute  the  great  body  of  the  written  law 
of  a  nation — its  lex  scripta. 

§  203.     It  is  the  proper  function  of  the 
2.  Judicial.        yiLcliciary  to  interpret  in  their  applica- 
tion to  particular  cases  the  laws  of  the 
state — its  organic  law,  its  statute  law,  and  its  un- 
written law — lex  non  scripta.     This  unwritten  law 


POLITICAL    AUTONOMY.  2\g 

— the  common  law  as  it  is  sometimes  designated  in 
distinction  from  the  statute  law — it  interprets  and 
declares  out  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  as 
recognized  and  accepted  in  the  usages  of  society. 

The  only  allowed  occasion  for  the  action  of  the 
judiciary  is  a  case  of  question  among  citizens,  offi- 
cials, or  political  communities.  Its  authority  reaches 
no  further  than  the  points  controverted  in  some  ac- 
tual litigation  ;  its  function  being  solely  to  inter- 
pret the  law  in  its  specific  applications  to  existing 
occasions.  Its  decisions  rank  as  precedents  which 
are  binding  until  set  aside  by  higher  authority. 
They  are  regarded  with  peculiar  deference,  not 
merely  because  civil  judges  are  expected  to  be  both 
competent  and  upright,  but  because  the  controversy 
between  interested  litigants  is  supposed  to  bring 
out  the  full  light  of  truth  in  the  case  so  as  to  afford 
the  best  possible  opportunity  for  a  just  determina- 
tion. 

The  sphere  of  the  judiciary  reaches  to  all  kinds  of 
civil  and  political  law — organic,  statute,  and  common. 
It  interprets  all,  harmonizing  them  with  the  higher 
principles  of  morality  or  the  established  usages  or  un- 
written law  of  the  community.  If  it  finds  statute 
enactments  irreconcilable  with  the  organic  law  or 
with  common  morality,  it  declares  it  not  to  be  law 
applicable  to  the  government  of  the  citizens.  It  is 
competent  to  enact  no  law  ;  its  province  is  simply 
to  declare  what  is  law. 

§  204.  The  judiciary  recognizes  a  distinction 
between  le^^-al  rights — rights  existing  under  statute 
law  or  judicially  declared  common  law — and  equities 


220  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

— rights  not  covered  by  known  law,  which  perhaps 
no  general  law  could  be  framed  to  meet,  but  yet 
real  and  needing  to  be  protected.  Sometimes,  the 
state  creates  separate  tribunals  for  these  two  prov- 
inces of  judicial  action — courts  of  law  and  courts  of 
equity  or  chancery.  Sometimes  the  same  tribunal 
is  authorized  to  adjudicate  cases  both  of  law  and  of 
equity.  A  court  thus  may  have  its  law  side  and  its 
equity  side.  In  either  case  it  is  governed  by  fixed 
principles  of  practice  and  of  adjudication,  so  that  no 
collision  may  arise. 

§  205.  It  is  the  proper  function  of  the 
3.  Executive.     ExecuHve      of   a   state  to  execute    the 

statutes  and  ordinances  of  the  legisla- 
ture and  the  decisions  of  the  judiciary,  so  far  at 
least  as  is  not  otherwise  expressly  provided.  As 
the  political  head  of  the  state,  it  is  the  function  of 
the  executive  officer  to  represent  the  state  in  all  its 
intercourse  with  other  states.  He  is  properly 
charged  with  sucii  general  supervision  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  community  as  will  enable  him  to  re- 
commend suitable  measures  to  the  legislature  or  to 
the  people  for  their  adoption. 


POLITICAL   GROWTH.  221 


CHAPTER  IV. 

POLITICAL  GROWTH. 

§  206.  It  is  the  right  of  a  state  to 
Right  of  growth,  grow  ;  to   Carry  on   its  proper  poUtical 

life  to  its  maturity  and  highest  per- 
fection. The  great  comprehensive  end  of  the  state 
being  the  furtherance  of  the  common  secular  wel- 
fare of  a  contiguous  people,  it  is  at  once  the  right 
and  the  duty  of  the  state  to  promote  to  the  highest 
degree  this  secular  well-being  of  the  community  in 
all  its  departments. 

Growth  is  an  essential  attribute  of  life.  The  pre- 
dominant instincts  of  a  community  are  towards  the 
extension  of  the  common  good,  which  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  being  require  to  be  obeyed  and  grat- 
ified in  suitable  ways  and  within  proper  Hmits.  No 
moral  interest  is  necessarily  harmed  by  such 
growth  ;  all  moral  interests,  as  perfectly  harmonized 
and  organized  into  a  whole  of  universal  good,  under 
the  divine  direction  and  rule,  demand  this  growth 
of  every  existing  state.  Its  very  existence  imports 
increase,  improvement,  perfection. 

§  207.     This  growth  of  the  state  is  to  reach  all 


222  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

Sevenfold  de-  departments  of  its  being.  There  is  no 
partments.  good  ground  to  be  found  in  the  essence 
of  a  state  for  excepting  any.  As  finite,  it  is  subject 
to  manifold  limitations  ;  but  these  limitations  do  not 
lie  in  the  proper  being  of  the  state.  The  several 
departments  in  which  this  growth  is  to  be  sought 
and  furthered  are  the  following  : 

I,  Territorially ;  2,  in  population  ;  3,  in  strength 
of  political  union  ;  4,  in  wealth  and  material  re- 
sources ;  5,  in  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  people  ; 
6,  in  public  intelligence  ;  7,  in  public  morals. 

§  208.  Especially  applicable  to  this 
Maxims.  mode  of  political  activity — the  further- 

ance of  the  proper  growth  of  the  state — 
are  certain  maxims  of  political  action  which,  while 
indeed  of  universal  pertinence,  may  properly  be  ex- 
pressly stated  here. 

1.  All  furtherance  of  political  prosperity  must  be 
directed  steadily  towards  the  one  end  for  which  the 
state  exists — the  common  secular  well-being  of  the 
people.  Only  as  requisite  to  this  common  good  can 
personal  or  class  or  sectional  action  be  justified. 

2.  All  political  action  must  be  within  the  lines  of 
fundamental  morality,  as  for  instance  of  courtesy, 
justice,  and  beneficence. 

3.  What  can  be,  should  be  left  to  individual  care 
and  enterprise,  to  associations,  or  to  local  commu- 
nities. This  maxim  is  founded  on  the  principle  that 
the  highest  perfection  of  the  state  lies  in  the  richest 
right  activity  of  its  subjects.  This  activity  should 
be  therefore  stimulated  and  encouraged  in  all  prac- 
ticable ways.     There  are  in  support  of  this  maxim 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  223 

the  further  considerations  that  individuals  and  local 
communities  are  better  able  to  discern  what  the 
common  good  requires  ;  and  that  they  are  better 
qualified  to  devise  the  modes  of  execution,  and  gen- 
erally to  act  more  efficiently,  more  wisely,  more 
econcmic?,'ly  than  mere  official  representatives  of 
tlie  state.  §  221.  The  m3.xim/azsse^  fat 7r — let  the 
subject  do  what  the  public  interest  demands — is  a 
sound  maxim  ;  but  it  must  ever  be  applied  so  as 
not  to  set  aside  the  right  and  duty  of  the  state  to 
see  to  it  that  the  public  good  is  ever  protected  and 
furthered.  It  is  a  directive,  not  a  supplanting 
maxim. 

SECTION   I.       TERRITORIAL   EXTENSION. 

§  209.     The  state  has  the  right  to  grow  territo- 
rially. 

The  modes  of  territorial  extension  are 
toriafyowS"^"  threefold  :    by  annexation  ;    by  acquisi- 
tion ;  by  conquest. 

I.  Annexation  is  of  territory  not  belong- 
By  annexation,  ing  to  any  other  states.  Unoccupied 
lands  adjacent  to  its  borders,  a  state 
may  rightfully  incorporate  into  its  own  domain. 
There  may  arise  a  question  whether  lands  are  oc- 
cupied or  not.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  nomadic, 
wandering  tribes  acquire  no  permanent  right  of  do- 
main. As  they  begin  a  settled  life  and  give  indica- 
tions of  intention  to  hold  and  improve  for  permanent 
uses,  they  acquire  rights  which  more  powerful  na 
tions    are   bound    to   respect.     Only  on  the  clear 


224  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

ground  of  the  peremptory  demands  of  universal 
humanity,  as  in  a  spreading  conflagration  the  de- 
struction of  a  dwelling  may  be  justified  to  save  a 
city,  can  such  deprivation  by  a  powerful  state  of  a 
weaker  community  be  sanctioned.  The  earth  was 
to  be  populated  ;  it  is  in  violation  of  the  natural 
law  of  increase,  that  a  few  scattered  barbarians 
should  hold  a  relatively  large  territory,  keeping  it 
from  occupancy  and  from  improvement.  But  the 
case  should  be  a  clear  one,  a  strong  one,  to  justify 
the  dispossession  of  the  weak  few  in  the  interest  of 
the  mighty  many ;  and  the  gentlest  means  and  the 
fullest  recompense  are  enjoined,  when  such  dispos- 
session is  deemed  necessary  in  the  interests  of  the 
race. 

2.  Acquisition  is  by  purchase  from 
By  acquisition,   bordering  states.     Dismembership,  we 

have  seen,  §  173,  is  not,  except  for  the 
welfare  of  the  whole,  allowable  in  morals,  but  such 
exceptional  cases  occur.  Even  an  independent 
state  may  incorporate  itself  on  stipulated  conditions 
with  another  state. 

3.  Conquest  of  territory  is  justifiable 
By  conquest.      Only  in  casc  of  war  otherwise  justifiable 

and  in  the  way  of  compensation  for 
losses  suffered  in  rightful  defense. 

section  II.     increase  of  population. 

§  210.  The  State  has  a  right  to  grow  in  popula- 
tion. It  may  rightfully  thus  further  in  all  suitable 
ways  the  natural  increase  of  its  people,  by  promo- 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  225 

ting  the  public  health,  and  the  conditions  of  com- 
fortable subsistence,  with  distinct  reference  to  this 
remote  end.  It  may  also  encourage  immigration 
from  other  countries.  The  restrictions  on  its  ac- 
tion in  this  direction  are,  that  it  should  not  harm 
by  weakening  other  nations,  and  that  it  should  not 
jeopard  its  own  unity  and  strength  by  admitting 
elements  that  cannot  be  properly  assimilated  to 
its  own  life.  Especially  in  free  governments,  where 
the  participation  in  political  rule  by  suffrage  or 
otherwise  is  widely  extended,  the  state  owes  it  to  it- 
self not  to  incorporate  into  the  body  of  its  citizens 
strangers,  perhaps  ignorant  arid  indigent,  unless 
with  great  caution. 


SECTION  III.    PUBLIC  IMPROVEMENTS. WEIGHTS  AND 

MEASURES MONEY MAILS. 

§  211.  The  State  has  aright  to  grow  in  inter- 
nal strength,  to  promote  the  fullest  union  and  har- 
mony and  inter-communication  between  its  own 
members. 

The    leadino^    specific    modes    of    thus 

Threefold  ^  ^i         •         .i,  •  j 

modes.  strcngthenmg  the  union  and  organic  in- 

teraction of  its  members  are  by  the  pro- 
vision of  (i)  thoroughfares  of  travel  and  traffic  ;  (2), 
of  needful  means  of  commercial  exchange  ;  and  (3), 
of  methods  for  the  intercommunication  of  intelli- 
gence among  its  citizens. 

§  212.  Public  Improvements.  It  is  indis- 
Puti^c  Improve-  pgnsablc  to  the  full  life  of  a  community 

that  the  members  be  brought  into  the  bes/ 
10* 


226  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

possible  communication  with  one  another  in  respect 
both  to  person  and  property.  While  it  is  most  true 
that  the  opening  and  maintaining  of  public  roads,  of 
canals,  of  railways,  may  generally  be  left  to  private 
or  local  enterprise,  §  208,  3,  it  is  still  the  right  and 
the  duty  of  the  state  in  its  relation  to  the  highest 
good  of  the  entire  community  to  see  to  it  that  such 
thoroughfares  are  provided  and  maintained  ;  to  ex- 
tend in  clear  cases  of  necessity  its  aid  more  or  less 
directly ;  and  especially  to  see  that  the  use  of 
these  public  thorougf ares  be  not  hindered  or  mo- 
lested. 

§  2  n.    Weights  andMeastcres.  As  need- 

2.     Means  of  ex- ^   ,     r  ,        •  i  r 

change-weights  f ul  for  the  interchanges  01  property  as 

and  Measures.  ,      /-  i.       j       j  j 

are  roads  for  persons,  are  standards  and 
instruments  of  commercial  exchange.  Manifestly 
indispensable  thus  are  national  standards  of  weight 
and  measurement,  and  a  national  currency.  The 
determination  of  both  is  properly  held  as  the  pre- 
rogative of  political  sovereignty. 

Of  the  first  mentioned  means,  it  need  only  be  said 
that  the  great  requisites  in  regard  to  all  state  regula- 
tion are  that  the  system  of  prescribed  weights  and 
measures  be  stable  ;  be  uniform  for  the  whole  coun- 
try ;  be  simple  and  easy  of  use  ;  and,  so  far  as  may 
be,  in  accordance  with  the  systems  in  use  among 
other  nations.  The  parts  or  denominations,  as  in  the 
money  system,  have  generally  been  determined  by  the 
convenience  of  the  individual  community,  and  have 
been  gradually  introduced  in  the  progress  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  tendency  in  commercial  states  at  present  is 
to  a  general  adoption  of  the  decimal  ratio,  as  one  most 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  22/ 

familiar,  most  likely  to  be  universal,  and  most  con- 
venient. The  standard — the  respective  unit  in  a 
system  of  weights  and  measurements — in  order  to 
stability  and  universality,  it  has  been  wisely  sought 
to  fix  in  reference  to  some  dimension,  obtained  in 
physical  or  astronomical  science,  as  that  of  an  arc 
of  a  meridian  circle  of  the  earth,  or  the  force  of 
gravity  on  the  equator. 

§  214.  Money.  The  right  and  duty  of  a 
Money  State  in  reference  to  money  grow  out  of 

its  duty  to  promote  the  prosperity  of  the 
community  to  the  utmost  of  its  power.  As  the  in- 
crease of  wealth  depends  almost  entirely  on  the 
facility  for  making  exchanges  of  commodities,  a  con- 
venient instrument  for  this  purpose  becomes  a  ne- 
cessity. The  term  money,  while  having  other  as- 
sociated meanings,  in  its  stricter  sense  denotes  just 
this  instrument. 

Money  may  accordingly  be  defined  to  be 
Defined.  a  representative  medium  for  facilitating 

exchanges  of  commercial  values. 
Money  is  a  representative  of  value ;  it  is  not  a 
value  itself,  except  as  merely  representative.  A  piece 
of  money  may  have  an  intrinsic  value  of  its  own  ;  the 
mere  material  of  which  it  is  made  may  have  such  a 
value  before  it  was  made  into  money — before  it  was 
coined  ;  it  may  retain  this  intrinsic  value,  which 
may  be  equal  to  the  value  represented  or  less  than 
that,  after  the  stamp — the  coinage  mark — upon  it 
has  been  effaced,  and  so  it  has  ceased  to  be  money. 
Gold  may  be  coined,  may  receive  a  stamp,  and  be 
thus  made  into  money  ;    the  inconsiderable  value 


228      •  DUTIES    IN    THE   STATE. 

which  it  has,  irrespectively  of  this  intrinsic  and 
previous  value,  is  its  value  as  representative  ;  this  is 
all  the  value  which  a  gold  coin  has  as  mere  money. 
This  truth  is  fundamental  to  a  clear  and  accurate 
notion  of  money,  of  its  proper  nature  and  use.  Its 
sole  value  as  money  lies  in  its  being  representative. 
Hence  the  increase  of  money,  the  issue  of  more 
money,  does  not  add  to  the  wealth  of  a  com- 
munity, as  simply  stamping  a  piece  of  gold  weigh- 
ing 232  grains  fine,  or  258  grains  with  one-tenth 
alloy,  and  so  certifying  it  to  be  an  eagle  of  com- 
mercial value,  makes  no  considerable  addition  of 
value  to  it. 

The  sole  function  of  money  is  as  a  medium — an 
instrument  for  facilitating  exchanges  of  commercial 
values.  The  necessity  for  such  a  medium  is  easily 
shown.  The  farmer  produces  grain ;  he  does  not 
produce  clothes,  sugar  and  tea,  furniture,  dwellings. 
He  does  not  need  all  the  grain  he  produces,  and  he 
does  need  these  and  manifold  other  things  which  he 
does  not  produce.  He  must  needs  exchange  the  one 
for  the  other.  But  to  take  to  the  tailor  just  so  much 
grain  as  will  be  a  fair  equivalent  for  the  clothes  he 
needs,  and  to  the  grocer  so  much  for  the  sugar  and  tea 
he  needs,  and  so  on,  would  be  well  nigh  impracticable. 
If  he  can  take  his  surplus  grain  to  the  flouring  mill, 
or  to  the  mercantile  house,  and  get  from  the  miller 
or  the  merchant  what  will  enable  him  to  use 
just  what  he  needs  of  the  price  to  take  respectively 
to  the  tailor,  the  grocer,  etc.,  his  task  is  incalculably 
facilitated  in  getting  just  what  he  wants  of  clothing, 
groceries,  etc.,  for  his  grain.     Money  does  precisely 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  229 

this  for  him.       This  is  its  one  function — an  instru- 
ment of  exchange. 

The  exchange  which  money  facilitates  pertains  to 
commercial  values.  By  this  is  meant  that  money 
facilitates  the  exchange  of  anything  having  a  value 
in  the  market  for  any  other  thing  in  the  market  hav- 
ing an  equivalent  value. 

§  215.  But  money  as  an  instrument  of 
v^e'!^'^'^  °^       exchange  presupposes  a  standard  of  value 

and  a  unit  of  value  adopted  by  the  state. 
A  piece  of  money  represents  so  much  purchasing 
value  ;  that  is,  it  represents  what  will  be  received  in 
the  market  as  equivalent  to  so  much  value  in  any 
other  commodity  in  the  market.  It  is  clearly  ne- 
cessary that  there  should  be  some  standard  by 
which  things  that  are  bought  and  sold  or  exchanged 
in  the  market  should  be  valued.  For  this  purpose 
something  is  taken  in  reference  to  which  all  other 
marketable  things  shall  be  valued.  Different  na- 
tions in  different  ages  of  the  world  have  adopted 
different  things  to  be  standards.  Gold  and  silver, 
called  by  reason  of  this  use  the  precious  metals, 
have  more  generally  been  selected.  The  value  of 
a  commodity  depends  ultimately  on  the  cost  of  pro- 
ducing it.  The  relative  value  of  gold  and  silver  to 
each  other  has  changed  perhaps  less  than  that  of  any 
other  two  things  produced  by  men ;  and  the  cost  of 
producing  either  in  reference  to  the  average  cost  of 
producing  other  things  generally  has  changed  but 
inconsiderably  for  ages.  Gold  and  silver  are  accord- 
ingly preferable  as  standards  to  any  other  product  or 
products.     It  is  the  duty  of  the  state  in  prescribing 


230  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

the  money  standard  to  fix  the  value  of  the  material 
selected,  and  obvious  considerations  require  that 
this  value  should  fairly  represent  the  cost  of  its  pro- 
duction relatively  to  that  of  other  products  generally. 
It  will  equally  be  its  duty  to  determine  precisely 
what  quantity  of  this  material  shall  constitute  the 
unit  of  value  ;  to  determine,  for  example,  that,  when 
that  is  the  current  coin,  258  grains  of  gold  of  nine- 
tenths  purity,  shall  be  rated  as  one  eagle.  If  the  re- 
lative cost  of  production  should  change,  then  it 
will  easily  change  this  quantity  chosen  to  constitute 
the  unit.  The  parts  or  multiples  of  this  unit  will 
form  the  several  denominations  of  money,  which 
convenience  in  use  will  require.  Such  a  measure 
and  unit  of  value  are  presupposed  in  every  mone- 
tary system  ;  but  obviously  money  is  not  properly  in 
itself  such  a  measure  of  value.  It  is  the  quantity  of 
gold  taken  in  the  258  grains  with  one-tenth  alloy, 
which  constitutes  the  standard,  the  unit,  the  meas- 
ure of  value  ;  and  the  money,  the  coin — the  eagle 
— is  conformed  to  that. 

As  money  is  properly  representative 
The  material,     of  value,  it  would  sccm  at  a  first  glance 

to  be  a  matter  of  indifference  whether 
the  material  for  money  be  of  more  or  less  value — 
whether  it  be  equivalent  to  the  value  to  be  repre- 
sented as  gold,  or  comparatively  of  merely  nominal 
value  as  paper.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  commer- 
cial nations  have  adopted  both  kinds — a  gold  cur- 
rency and  in  connection  with  it  a  paper  currency  un- 
der various  forms  and  regulations.  This  has  been 
the  case  in  spite  of  the  recognized  and  obvious   desi- 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  23 1 

rableness  in  itself  of  a  single  kind  of  money.  The 
objections  to  a  currency  having  an  intrinsic  value, 
quite,  or  nearly,  equal  to  the  value  it  represents  as 
money  are  :  i,  that  the  only  material  in  nature  hav- 
ing the  requisite  qualities  for  money — gold — is  not 
furnished  in  quantities  sufficient  for  the  uses  of  the 
commercial  world  ;  2,  it  is  costly ;  and  3,  it  is  for 
many  commercial  uses  inconvenient,  not  easily  or 
safely  transmissible  in  large  amounts,  and  liable  to 
be  stolen  or  lost. 

The  objections  to  a  material  for  money  of  a  merely 
nominal  value — to  a  paper  currency — are:  i,  that 
being  confined  to  the  state  that  issues  it,  the  cir- 
culation is  necessarily  more  local ;  2,  that  it  is  not 
so  easily  convertible  into  values  for  use  in  other 
states ;  and  3,  that  it  requires,  for  obvious  consid- 
erations of  security,  precautionary  regulations  for 
its  conversion  into  international  equivalents  which 
a  state  or  its  officers  are  strongly  tempted  to  over- 
look or  omit. 

§  216.  From  this  brief  exposition  of 
us^needfuiquaii-^j^^  nature  of   money  it   will    be   easy 

to  determine  what  elements  and  attri- 
butes a  wise  and  sound  political  economy  pre- 
scribes to  a  state  to  incorporate  into  its  monetary 
system. 

I.  As  a  basis  for  its  money  or  currency 
iN^ixed  stand-  j^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  ^  proper  standard  and 

unit  of  value,  which  shall  be  character- 
ized by  stability,  uniformity,  and  accordance  with  the 
usage  of  other  nations,  and  be  carefully  estimated 
from  its  relative  cost  of  production  as  to  its  relative 


232  DUTIES   IN    THE   STATE. 

value,  as  compared  with  other   commodities  gene- 
rally. 

2.  The  parts  or  multiples  of  this  unit 
L^oSioSs.  should  be  determined  by  convenience  in 

use,  preferably  in  decimal  denominations. 

3.  In  respect  to  the  material  to  be  select- 
Material.       ^^'  ^heu  the  intrinsic  value  is  to  equal  the 

value  it  represents,  the  qualities  to  be 
sought  are  these:  it  should  be  stable  in  relative 
value  ;  durable  ;  receptive  and  retentive  of  distinct 
impression  ;  difficult  to  counterfeit :  convenient  for 
use  ;  and  neat  and  attractive. 

The  precious  metals  contain  these  qualities  in  a 
greater  degree  than  any  other  material.  But  as  no 
one  material  can  equally  well  answer  for  all  amounts 
of  value,  gold  has  been  wisely  selected  for  all 
larger  values,  silver  for  smaller,  and  some  baser 
metal  for  the  lowest  denominations. 

4.  If  the  two  kinds  of  currency  be  adopt- 
rency.^^'^  ^^^'  ^^>  ^^^^  divers  provisions  are  needful ;  as 

(i),  the  paper  currency  must  always  be 
readily  convertible  into  the  metallic  money,  or  some 
international  commercial  equivalent,  since  otherwise 
it  does  not  represent  truly  the  value — it  is  false 
money.  (2.)  It  accordingly  must  always  sacredly 
be  sustained  by  a  considerate  provision  of  means 
for  conversion  at  the  will  of  the  owner  into  gold  or 
some  other  commercial  equivalent.  (3.)  Security 
from  being  counterfeited,  durability,  and  neatness 
through  frequent  redemptions  and  re-issues,  are 
especially  requisite. 

5.     The   money  system  of   a   country  must  be 


POLITICAL   GROWTH.  233 

?  Legal  tender,  authoritativc  in  all  matters   of  dispute 
as   to   equivalents    in    commercial   ex- 
changes.    All  legal  money  should  be  legal  tender 
in  adjustment  of  all  commercial  claims. 

6.  The  money  system  should  be  sub- 
6.  stable.          JGCt  to  as  little  change  as  is  possible.    It 

would  be  manifestly  unjust  so  to  change 
the  value  of  the  circulation  as  to  oblige  one  party  to 
an  obligation  to  receive  from  the  other  party  a  less 
value,  or  to  pay  a  greater  value,  than  that  contem- 
plated at  the  time  of  creating  the  obligation. 

7.  The  amount  of  currency  should  be 
suppfy!^"^*^       adequate  to  the  needs  of  commerce. 

This  amount  of  course  varies  greatly. 
It  varies  with  the  varying  prosperity  of  a  country ; 
it  varies  with  the  population  ;  it  varies  with  the  sea- 
sons of  trade. 

There  is,  however,  no  absolute  necessity  for 
determining  upon  a  certain  fixed  amount.  For  if 
the  currency  of  a  country  be  in  excess  for  the 
commercial  wants,  it  must  necessarily  obey  the  law 
of  all  commodities  and  find  its  equihbrium.  If 
gold  coin  be  in  excess,  it  will  be  melted  up  for  use 
in  the  arts,  or  exchanged  for  foreign  valuables.  If 
the  paper  currency  be  in  excess,  it  will  be  returned 
for  conversion  into  its  commercial  equivalent. 
There  is  little  danger  of  over-issue  in  the  case  of  a 
true  money.  If  it  be  of  gold  undebased,  the  coin- 
age will  not  exceed  the  quantity  of  bullion  which  is 
furnished  to  be  stamped.  If  it  be  of  paper,  there 
is  an  analogous  necessity  of  providing  equivalent 
means  of  redemption  or  conversion.     An  unright- 


234  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

eous  nation  may  debase  coin  or  may  issue  paper 
money  with  no  means  of  redemption,  in  each  case 
for  corrupt  or  profligate  uses.  The  unrighteousness 
deserves  a  like  reprobation  in  each  case.  The  neces- 
sities of  a  state,  as  in  time  of  war,  may  compel  a 
resort  to  forced  loans  and  a  subsidizing  of  commerce 
and  trade,  just  as  they  may  compel  to  the  appro- 
priation of  the  property  and  the  conscription  of  the 
person  of  the  subject.  Necessity  has  no  law,  is  the 
loose  maxim  applicable  to  all  these  practices. 
When  no  necessity  compels,  simple  justice  requires 
that  the  money  of  a  country  be  ever  true  money — 
a  representative  of  a  real  value  corresponding  to 
its  face  or  stamp.  Of  such  true  money  there  is  no 
real  danger  of  excess  of  issue ;  all  the  principles  of 
trade  forbid  any  fear  of  it. 

Nor  is  the  evil  of  an  under-issue  so  very  formid- 
able. Commercial  exchanges  may  still  be  effected 
by  simple  barter — commodity  for  commodity  ;  or 
through  credits  on  accounts  ;  or  through  checks 
and  bills  of  exchange.  In  the  large  emporiums  of 
trade,  commercial  exchanges  and  adjustments  are 
mainly  in  these  ways,  even  when  there  is  an  ample 
currency,  nine-tenths  and  more  of  the  aggregate 
settlements  of  dues  being  effected  without  the  use 
of  any  money  other  than  checks  and  bills  of  credit. 
The  exact  determination  of  the  amount  of  money 
to  be  provided  is  accordingly  not  imposed  by  any 
necessity.  The  usages  of  trade  easily  suit  them- 
selves to  the  monetary  conditions  under  which  they 
exist.  The  great  requisites  are  security,  uniformity, 
stability,   with    a    medium  of   exchange   in    some 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  235 

reasonable  approximation  of  amount  to  estimated 
wants. 

§  217.  Liter-coinmunicatioii  of  Intelli- 
Postai  FacUi-     geiice. — Indispensable    to    the    highest 

social  life  of  a  people  is  the  free  com- 
munication of  mind  with  mind,  thous^ht  with 
thought.  The  sympathetic  interest  between  the 
parts  of  a  community  depends  on  these  exchanges 
of  information  ;  and  the  means  of  mutual  helpfulness 
are  equally  dependent  on  them.  Sound  political  wis- 
dom at  once  dictates  accordingly  the  provision  and 
effective  maintenance  of  all  postal  conveniences. 
If  needful  for  the  social  well-being,  the  state  may 
properly  take  the  telegraph  as  well  as  the  mail-ser- 
vice into  its  own  care  and  control.  How  far  it 
should  assume  the  expenses  of  maintenance  is  a 
question  of  political  expediency. 

SECTION    IV. — DEVELOPMENT    OF    RESOURCES. 

§  218.  The  state  has  a  right  to  grow  in 
Jo^ef"'^        external  power. 

The  power  of  a  state  is  necessarily 
purely  secular  ;  it  is  such  only  as  can  be  exerted 
in  the  interests  of  the  present  world. 

This  secular  power  is  of  two  kinds  :  moral  and 
material.  It  lies  in  the  state  itself  as  one  political 
body  or  is  distributed  among  the  citizens.  It  is 
the  right  of  a  state  to  seek,  and  equally  its  duty  to 
secure,  in  all  righteous  ways,  the  steady  increase  of 
this  secular  moral  and  material  strength,  both  as  it 
properly  pertains  to  'tself  and  also  as  it  may  be 


236  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

possessed  by  its  subjects.  It  will  be  convenient  to 
consider  this  growth  in  external  strength  without 
exact  discrimination,  in  all  the  particulars  to  be 
named,  between  these  two  repositories  of  power. 
The  increase  of  moral  power  will  be  more  readily 
presented  under  succeeding  heads  ;  and  our  view 
will  here  be  confined  to  the  increase  of  proper 
material  power — the  increase  of  the  material  re- 
sources and  wealth  of  the  state. 

The     natural     resources     of     a    state, 

Productive  in-  ,       ,  -    .  .  1      •         1  1 

dustries  to  be  whether  tymg  beneath  m  the  deposits 
of  mineral  wealth, — of  coal  and  iron, 
the  precious  metals,  and  the  like — or  on  the  surface 
of  the  earth  in  forests  or  fertile  lands  under  genial 
skies,  are  made  available  and  are  increased  only  on 
the  condition  of  human  labor.  Political  economy 
accordingly  very  justly  assumes  as  a  fundamental 
principle  that  material  wealth  is  the  product  of 
industry  and  that  the  exchangeable  value  of  par- 
ticular articles  depends  ultimately  on  the  labor 
expended  in  producing  them.  The  principle  is  of 
course  general  and  subject  to  divers  modifications. 
It  is  safe  to  assume,  however,  that  productive 
industry  is  the  condition  and  means  of  increasing 
material  wealth.  It  necessarily  follov/s  that  the 
state  in  effecting  its  growth  in  material  power 
must  foster  the  industries  of  the  nation  by  which 
wealth  is  increased. 

§  219.  These  industries  are  of  three  leading 
classes  : — (i)  developing  ;  (2)  productive  proper  ; 
and  (3)  distributive. 

The  Developing  Industries  are  those  which 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  23/ 

I.  Developing  simply  cxtract  from  nature  what  is 
industries.  valuable  for  man's  use.  They  are 
chiefly  applied  to  the  extraction  of  mineral  wealth ; 
and  the  principles  of  political  morality  are  suffi- 
ciently illustrated  in  their  application  to  this  par- 
ticular species  of  developing  industry — to  mining 
and  metallurgic  industry. 

The  Productive  Industries  proper 
duSvr''  ^"^^     embrace  as  the  two  leading  species,  the 

agricultural  and  the  majiufacturirig. 

The  Distributive  Industries  are  those 
3.  Distributive,  which  cffcct  the  nccdful  exchanges  of 

products  and  are  sufficiently  represented 
in  the  commercial  life  of  the  nation  ;  although  here 
evidently  belong  all  the  activities  of  a  people 
enlisted  in  the  carrying  business,  in  any  way,  on 
land  or  on  water. 

We  have  then  as  the  great  representatives  of  the 
productive  industry  of  a  country,  its  mining,  agri- 
cultural, manufacturing,  and  commercial  industries. 

§  220.  The  ethical  position  of  the  state 

Duty  of  the  State  ^  ^ 

in  respect  to  pro-  in   relation  to   all   these  departments  of 

ductive industries.  ,         .        .      ,      ^        .  -i       i    ^  •       j 

productive  industry  is  easily  determined 
from  the  nature  of  a  proper  state  organic  life 
viewed  in  itself  and  as  illustrated  in  actual  history. 
The  state  exists,  as  we  have  seen,  for  the  common 
secular  well-being  of  the  community.  All  right- 
eous endeavors  to  secure  this  common  secular  wel- 
fare in  the  highest  degree,  are,  therefore,  politically 
right  and  obligatory  on  the  state.  There  are 
no  limits  within  its  proper  boundaries  territorial 
and   teleological — within   its    geographical   sphere 


238  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

and  that  determined  by  the  end  for  which  it  exists 
— to  be  prescribed  to  this  increase,  so  long  as  no 
principles  of  morality  are  violated  in  effecting  it. 
Nothing  in  the  essential  nature  of  a  state,  nothing 
in  a  constituted  political  organism,  which  makes 
it  ethically  wrong  for  a  state  to  carry  on  any  one 
or  all  of  these  productive  industries  itself — in  its 
collective  and  organic  capacity — or  through  its  in- 
dividual citizens — or  the  smaller  local  communi- 
ties embraced  within  it.  History  reveals  to  us 
instances  of  a  government  prosecuting  mining 
industries  in  its  own  name  and  by  its  own  direc- 
tion ;  superintending  and  cultivating  its  forest  lands 
and  indeed  its  pastures  and  its  grain  lands  ;  produc- 
ing fabrics  needed  for  its  own  use  in  defense  or  for 
the  necessities  of  the  people ;  and  even  effecting 
the  distribution  of  commodities  by  providing  thor- 
oughfares and  conveyances,  and  directing  the  use 
of  them  for  its  own  needs  or  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people.  Nothing  is  more  contradictory  to  reason 
or  to  the  teachings  of  history  than  the  proposition 
that  the  function  of  a  political  government  is  lim- 
ited to  a  mere  negative,  a  mere  protective  sphere. 
On  the  contrary,  the  right  and  duty  of  every  state 
is  positively  to  promote  and  encourage  and  foster 
the  entire  productive  industry  of  the  political  com- 
munity. 

This  positive  fostering  care  must  of  necessity  be 
directed,  as  occasion  may  require,  to  this  or  to  that 
particular  department  of  productive  industry.  The 
state  is  an  organic  whole  whose  welfare  depends  on 
the  healthful  condition  and  ministry  of  every  member. 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  239 

If  a  particular  member  is  diseased  or  weak,  is 
suffering  in  any  respect,  it  is  the  obvious  duty  of 
the  state,  as  an  active  organism,  to  remedy  its  ills, 
to  provide  for  the  recruiting  of  its  strength  and 
the  stimulating  of  its  ministry.  This  is  a  plain 
principle  of  reason  and  of  common  sense,  and 
equally  the  dictate  of  analogy  and  of  experience. 

There  are,  however,  two  grand  limita- 
its  limitations,  tions  of  this  duty  of  the  state  to  promote 
the  productive  industry  of  the  country. 
First,  its  aim  and  end  in  this  must  be  solely  the 
common  welfare.  Not  for  the  sake  of  the  par- 
ticular productive  industry  itself,  but  only  for  the 
health  and  vigor  of  the  entire  political  body,  may  a 
state  engage  directly  itself  in  mining,  or  agriculture, 
or  manufacturing,  or  commerce  ;  nor  may  it  extend 
special  aid  or  stimulus  to  indivicluals,  or  associa- 
tions, or  local  communities  in  behalf  of  such 
particular  interest,  but  only  in  the  interest  of  the 
general  welfare. 

Secondly,  such  special  exertion  or  aid  should  be 
extended  only  in  case  of  well  ascertained  inability 
or  negligence  on  the  part  of  individuals  or  local 
communities.  The  grand  principle  here,  already 
stated  in  another  application,  §  208,  3,  is  :  leave  to 
individual  or  local  enterprise  all  that  safely  can  be. 
The  sufficient  reasons  for  this  limitation,  even  under 
the  full  admission  of  the  ethical  right  of  a  state 
to  engage  directly  in  the  productive  industries  of  a 
country,  are  : 

I.  It  is  for  the  highest  vigor  and  soundness  of 
the   whole   political   body   that   all   the   particular 


240  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

members  be  enlisted  in  the  active  ministry  to  the 
common  weal  to  the  highest  degree.  It  is  better 
for  the  physical  body  that  the  blood  vessels  them- 
selves throughout  exert  their  propulsive  power 
than  that  the  whole  force  in  propelling  the  blood 
through  the  system  be  left  to  the  pulsations  of  the 
central  organ  alone. 

2.  Individual  enterprise  is  more  wakeful,  more 
sagacious,  more  economical,  more  efficient  than 
collective,  especially  than  governmental,  enterprise. 

3.  The  temptations  to  abuse,  corruption,  mis- 
management in  the  prosecution  of  public  enterprises 
by  a  government  are  many  and  formidable,  and 
difficult  to  prevent  or  remedy.  So  great  are  these 
temptations  that  the  common  weal  may  require  of  a 
government  that  it  forego  many  enterprises  unques- 
tionably of  promise  and  utility  rather  than  expose 
its  officials  to  them. 

4.  Governmental  competition  in  productive  in- 
dustry is  discouraging  and  hurtful  to  individual 
enterprise.  The  mere  fear  of  it,  which  would 
generally  exist  if  governments  were  to  engage  in 
these  pursuits  except  in  prescribed  limits  and  in 
special  cases  of  necessity,  would  be  repressive  to 
individual  undertakings. 

It  is  accordingly  a  sound  maxim  of  political 
morality  that  a  state  should  not  embark  in  any 
productive  enterprise  unless  it  be  clearly  settled 
first,  that  individual  or  local  enterprise  cannot  or 
will  not  assume  it ;  and  secondly,  that  the  public 
good  requires  the  undertaking,  even  after  full 
allowance  shall  have  been  made  for  the  probable 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  24 1 

evils  from  official  corruption  or  incompetency,  and 
from  the  embarrassments  to  individual  enterprise 
arising  from  governmental  competition.  Generally 
the  presumption  is  against  the  government's  under- 
taking any  productive  work  ;  a  clear  case  of  neces- 
sity should  be  made  out  to  justify  it.  For  the  most 
part  all  proper  productive  industries  may  most 
wisely  be  left  to  individual  or  local  enterprise.  To 
this  the  progress  of  civilization  has  steadily  tended 
to  conform  the  practice  among  the  nations. 

§  221.  The  modes  by  which  the  state 
Modes.  may   foster    its    productive    industries 

through  its  citizens  or  local  communi 
ties,  are  twofold — direct  and  indirect. 

The  direct  modes  are  in  the  form  ol 
bounUe?  bounties,   as    for  the  encouragement  of 

certain  desirable  agricultural  products, 
the  preservation  and  increase  of  forests,  the  de- 
struction of  predatory  animals,  or  removal  of  obsta- 
cles to  production,  or  of  discoveries  and  inventions 
of  useful  processes  and  products. 

The  indirect  modes  are  by  furnishing 
2.  Indirect        t^g  conditions    of  safe   and    successful 

enterprise  to  its  citizens,  as  by  imposts 
on  foreign  competitive  production. 

The  state,  thus,  in  the  first  of  these 
t^^hl'endl°"     ways,  fosters    individual  enterprise    by 

such  legislation  as  shall  afford  adequate 
security  to  honest  industry  in  its  rights  to  its  pro- 
ducts. This  is  the  fundamental  condition  for 
healthful  individual  enterprise  in  a  country.  The 
legislation  of  every  prosperous  government  is  large- 


242  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

ly  in  the  form  of  general  laws  securing  the  rights 
of  productive  industry.  Special  legislation  also  is 
common  in  the  form  of  laws  regulating  patents  for 
inventions,  copyrights  for  books,  etc.  It  ma.y  also 
with  the  same  result  open  and  maintain  safe 
avenues  for  the  exchange  of  products.  Govern- 
ments thus  stimulate  and  foster  commercial  industry 
by  opening  harbors,  improving  navigation,  main- 
taining light-houses,  providing  help  for  vessels  in 
distress,  sending  its  navy  to  foreign  waters  for  the 
protection  and  promotion  of  commercial  enterprise. 
Probably  no  industry  receives  so  much  of  the  dis- 
tinctive protection  of  governments  as  the  com- 
mercial,   and  none  in  a  wiser  economy. 

§  222.  In  the  second  place,  it  may  be 
By  imposts.       ^g}}    {qj-  ^i  State  to  cncouragc    special 

productive  industries  by  impost  duties 
on  foreign  productions.  The  general  principles  of 
political  morality  applicable  here  are  the  following  : 
First,  we  have  the  fundamental  maxim  of  political 
wisdom,  that  the  choice  of  productions  should  be 
left  to  the  individual,  without  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  government.  Generally,  the  generous 
policy  dictated  by  the  consideration  that  what  is 
best  for  the  world  is  best  for  each  of  the  particular 
nations  that  make  up  the  world,  is  the  wise  policy. 
The  individuals  composing  the  respective  political 
communities,  left  to  their  own  choice,  will,  in  the 
long  run,  fall  into  the  production  of  those  articles 
which  they  can  produce  best  and  at  least  cost. 
Freedom  of  commercial  intercourse  between  the 
nations   moreover   is  eminently  desirable   for   the 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  243 

world's  advantage  in  divers  ways,  and  should  be 
assiduously  encouraged  and  promoted.  Free  trade, 
thus,  is  the  wise  policy  of  a  state  as  the  general 
rule.  To  this  general  principle,  however,  there  are, 
as  would  naturally  and  reasonably  be  anticipated, 
excepti")ns  in  its  practical  application. 

Secondly,  the  principle  of  free  trade  should  not 
be  applied  so  as  to  work  with  relative  disadvantage 
to  home  industries.  If  home  products,  thus,  are  for 
any  necessity  of  the  state,  subjected  to  taxation  in 
any  form,  the  same  products,  when  imported  from 
abroad,  should  be  subjected  to  at  least  an  equal 
burden. 

Thirdly,  special  state  necessities  may  require 
that  certain  articles  should  be  produced  at  home, 
independently  of  foreign  supply.  Those  things, 
thus,  which  are  of  indispensable  necessity  in  war, 
it  is  a  clear  dictate  of  wisdom  that  a  state  seek  to 
have  produced  within  its  own  limits.  Otherwise 
its  very  existence  might  be  suspended  on  the  pleas- 
ure of  a  foreign  power.  It  may  obviously  be  the 
clear  duty  of  a  state  to  secure  the  production  of 
such  necessaries  for  self-defense  by  its  own  sub- 
jects ;  and  the  best,  perhaps  the  only  effectual  way 
of  doing  this,  may  be  by  extending  to  them  in  this 
undertaking  all  needful  protection  from  envious 
competition  from  abroad.  The  principle  of  free 
trade  should  sometimes  give  way  in  regard  to  the 
production  of  military  supplies.  So,  also,  in  the 
same  interest  of  self-defense,  the  maintenance  of  a 
vigorous  commercial  marine  being  the  condition  of 
an  effective  naval  force,  the  state  may  wisely  sacri- 


244  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

fice  the  inconsiderable  advantage  from  free  trade 
for  the  encouragement  of  those  industries  which  are 
concerned  in  the  building  of  ships.  It  may  be 
wise,  thus,  to  encourage  the  production  of  timber, 
or  of  iron,  or  other  material  required  in  naval  archi- 
tecture, or  the  building  of  ships  at  home,  by- 
proper  discrimination  in  a  system  of  im.post  duties 
against  importation  from  abroad.  Dependence  on 
a  foreign  power  for  its  ships  may  be  incompatible 
with  self-security  in  these  days  of  universal  com- 
merce between  the  nations  of  the  world.  A  clear 
case  of  state  necessity,  thus,  may  justify  and  re- 
quire a  departure  from  the  policy  of  absolute  free 
trade. 

Fourthly,  it  is  clearly  supposable  that  exceptional 
cases  may  arise  in  which  it  may  be  the  duty  of  a 
state  seeking  the  complete  development  of  its  re- 
sources to  encourage  special  productive  industries. 
A  new  country,  thus,  with  large  undeveloped  nat- 
ural resources,  but  in  the  conditions  of  insufficient 
capital,  high  wages,  imperfect  machinery,  distant 
markets,  and  other  hindrances  to  cheap  production, 
may,  in  obvious  duty  of  self  interest,  provide  that 
private  enterprise  may  move  in  reasonable  security 
against  being  overwhelmed  in  its  incipient  struggles 
with  stronger,  more  advanced,  and  better  advan- 
taged producers  abroad.  Competition  is,  indeed,  the 
life  of  trade — its  needful  stimulus,  regulator,  and 
check ;  but  competition  among  men  is  often  over- 
bearing, hostile,  oppressive,  and  even  destructive. 
The  earliest  productions  of  a  new  industry  are  in- 
variably costly;   and  even  with  vastly  greater  ad- 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  245 

vantage  in  natural  resources,  infant  enterprise  may 
yet  be  unable,  if  unsupported,  to  stand  against 
jealous  and  unscrupulous  rivals  in  trade.  Wherever, 
therefore,  there  is  good  reason  for  the  belief  that 
temporary  support  may  insure  in  the  end  develop- 
ment of  resources  that  otherwise  must  be  unim- 
proved, or  may  permanently  cheapen  production  of 
commodities,  the  intervention  of  a  state  may  be  jus- 
tifiable for  the  help  of  private  enterprise ;  and,  cer- 
tainly, it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  particular 
mode  of  protection,  by  preventing,  through  a  ju- 
dicious tariff  of  imposts,  a  ruinous  foreign  compe- 
tition, is  forbidden  by  any  just  principle  of  political 
morality.  A  prohibitory  duty  may  seldom  be 
necessary ;  a  properly  regulative  duty,  which  shall 
simply  secure  against  an  excessive  reduction  of 
price,  may  be  imposed  in  consistency  with  a  wise 
political  economy,  applied  under  the  dictates  of 
common  sense. 

SECTION  V. PUBLIC  HEALTH. 

§  223.     It  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of 
5.  PubUc  health,  the  state  to  care  for  the  health  of  the 

community. 
Health  of  body  is  a  fundamental  blessing  of  the 
secular  class.  Care  for  it  finds  a  place  at  once  in 
the  sphere  of  secularity  occupied  by  the  state.  This 
care  cannot  always  safely  be  left  to  individuals  or 
to  local  communities.  In  divers  ways  the  positive 
interposition  of  the  state  may  be  indispensable  to 
the  highest  common  welfare.  Sanitary  laws  may 
not  have  been  always  judicious  ;  and  they  may  have 


246  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

been  badly  administered.  To  a  certain  extent, 
nevertheless,  they  seem  necessary.  Quarantine 
regulations,  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  con- 
tagious diseases,  as  well  as  sanitary  laws  for  the 
cleansing  of  streets,  the  ventilation  of  buildings, 
the  remxoval  of  garbage,  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  pest  houses,  hospitals,  and  dis- 
pensaries, the  provision  of  trustworthy  medical 
experts,  the  enforcement  of  universal  vaccination, 
and  the  like,  come  clearly  into  that  class  of  pub- 
lic necessities  which  cannot  be  trusted  entirely  to 
individuals. 

SECTION  VI. EDUCATION. 

§  224.  It  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  a 
6.  Education,  state  to  sccure  intelligence  in  its  citi- 
zens. 

Intelligence  is  a  crowning  blessing  in  the  present 
life  of  man.  While  it  is  a  condition  that  must  fol- 
low him  into  his  immortal  future,  it  is  yet  a  true 
secularity  within  the  proper  sphere  of  the  state.  As 
such,  a  true  secular  good,  so  far  as  it  is  a  common 
interest,  it  belongs  to  the  state  to  care  for  it  and 
foster  it. 

This  right  and  duty  belong  to  it  in  its  care  for  its 
own  security  and  the  safe  and  prosperous  adminis- 
tration of  the  government.  In  free  commonwealths 
the  proper  exercise  of  the  elective  franchise  in- 
volves as  its  condition  general  intelligence  ;  and  un- 
der all  governments  the  needful  check  on  power 
and  authority  under  a  sense  of  responsibility  to  the 
governed  also  involves  general  intelligence  as  its 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  247 

condition.  General  intelligence  is  necessary  to  the 
prosperity  of  the  state  in  material  resources.  Skilled 
labor  has  been  proved  by  ample  experience  to  be 
imaiensely  more  valuable  than  unskilled  in  all  de- 
partments of  productive  industry.  In  any  occupa- 
tion a  man  is  worth  more  than  a  mere  animal.  In- 
telligence is  a  means  and  condition  of  happiness  to 
men ;  and  it  is  within  the  province  of  a  state  to  pro- 
mote the  present  happiness  of  its  subjects.  Intel- 
ligence, moreover,  is  a  prime  element  of  man's  im- 
mortal condition  ;  and  inasmuch  as  the  state  is  for 
man,  not  for  itself,  and  as  its  sphere  and  function  is 
to  care  for  his  secular  condition  in  society  so  that 
the  highest  end  of  his  being  as  a  being  of  immor- 
tality shall  be  furthered,  intelligence,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted, is  to  be  one  of  those  secular  interests  which 
fall  within  the  sphere  of  the  state. 

It  may  be  that  in  certain  conditions  the  intei- 
ests  of  education  may  be  better  left  to  individual 
care.  It  is  still  the  duty  of  the  state  to  see  to  it, 
that  these  great  interests  are  thus  adequately  sus- 
tained. If  in  any  respect  such  individual  care  be 
inadequate,  the  state  is  bound  to  supplement  it 
as  well  as  always  to  supervise  and  regulate  and 
encourage  it.  It  is  a  fact  of  experience  that  these 
interests  have  not  been  fostered  to  excess  by  states 
hitherto. 

§225.  The  degree  to  which  th  e  state  sh  ould 
Extent.  seek  to  carry  the  general  education  of  its 

subjects  will  vary  on  the  one  hand  with 
the  wealth  and  ability  of  the  state,  and  on  the  other 
with  the  condition  of  the  people.     In  an  impover- 


248  DUTIES    IN    THE   STATE. 

ished  community  there  may  be  inability  to  spare 
even  the  time  and  labor  of  children  for  an  advanced 
education,  or  to  support  them  while  receiving  it. 
There  are  few,  if  any,  communities  desiring  to  be 
recognized  as  states  which  are  not  able  to  educate 
the  people  generally  to  a  degree  of  intelligence 
sufficient  for  the  ordinary  duties  of  a  citizen — for 
voting  safely  and  for  laboring  productively.  But, 
in  truth,  no  good  reason  can  be  given  why  the  state 
should  not  seek,  in  wise  consideration  of  its  own 
strength  and  the  competency  of  its  subjects,  to  carry 
up  the  education  of  its  people  to  the  highest  degree 
attainable  ;  to  make  this  its  ideal  in  its  educational 
administration.  Circumstances  will  sufficiently 
moderate  all  tendencies  to  excess.  The  mass  will 
only  reach  the  lowest  stages  of  educational  training ; 
fewer  than  could  be  desired  will  rise  to  the  stage 
reached  by  what  is  known  as  skilled  labor ;  fewer 
still,  and  still  less  than  could  be  desired,  will  find 
the  time  or  the  means  to  reach  the  highest  attain- 
ments even  with  the  most  municifent  educational 
establishment.  The  state  maxim  in  regard  to  edu- 
cation is  :  Supplement  private  provisions  for  fur- 
nishing the  highest  and  best  and  most  universal 
education  which  the  means  of  the  state  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  people  admit. 

§  226.  In  regard  to  the  modes  of  action 
Methods  proper  for  the  state  in  its  care  for  edu- 

cation, it  may  be  said,  first,  that  it  should 
enforce,  as  far  as  practicable,  attendance  on  educa- 
tional means  on  its  entire  people.  Compulsory 
education  is  within  the  legitimate  province  of  polit- 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  249 

ical  action,  as  embracing  the  entire  secular  well- 
being  of  the  community.  It  is  as  fitting  that  a 
state  see  to  it  that  the  children  be  decently  edu- 
cated, as  that  they  be  decently  clothed,  decently 
housed,  decently  fed. 

Secondly,  The  state  should  encourage  and  foster, 
in  all  suitable  ways,  all  endeavors  on  the  part  of  in- 
dividuals and  of  local  communities,  in  the  interest 
of  a  sound  general  education  ;  as  well  as,  in  the  man- 
ifold ways  open  to  it,  further  the  ends  of  general 
intelligence  and  sound  learning.  It  should  encour- 
age science  and  learning,  literature  and  the  arts,  as 
its  proper  right  and  function. 

Thirdly,  The  state  should  endow  and  adequately 
sustain  institutions  for  the  training  of  men  for  its 
own  needs,  as  for  its  army  and  its  navy.  An  ad- 
vanced stage  of  national  progress  may  render 
equally  necessary  schools  for  training  in  its  civil 
and  diplomatic  service. 

Fourthly,  The  state  should  provide  either  direct- 
ly by  its  own  agency,  or  indirectly  through  the  lo- 
cal communities,  schools  for  the  education  of  all 
the  children  in  the  commonest  branches  of  train- 
ing, and,  as  rapidly  as  circumstances  shall  allow, 
higher  schools  for  training  in  the  productive  arts. 
Even  proper  professional  training  comes  within 
its  legitimate  care  and  may  call  for  its  direct  sup- 
port II* 


250  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

SECTION    VII. PUBLIC    MORALS. 

§  227.  It  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  a 
7.  Morality.  State  to  promote  sound  morals  in  the 
community. 

Tlie  state  we  have  found  to  be  a  true  moral 
power.  It  is  not  less  a  power  because  a  collective 
power.  Its  action  has  all  the  moral  attributes  that 
belong  to  individual  action.  It  is  free,  above  the 
constraint  of  physical  necessity.  It  may  be  in 
sympathy  with  the  welfare  of  others — of  its  own 
members  and  of  other  states  ;  it  may  be  beneficent ; 
it  may  be  upright ;  or  it  may  be  the  reverse  of  this 
according  to  its  own  free  election.  It  is  under 
responsibility ;  men  judge  it,  and  approve  or  con- 
demn ;  retribution  is  visited  upon  it  in  the  estab- 
lished orderings  of  providence.  This  retribution 
is  not  less  retribution  because  it  is  limited  to  this 
world.  Retribution  to  a  nation  is  necessarily  secu- 
lar, inasmuch  as  the  state  is  a  secular! ty. 

As  properly  moral  in  its  being,  the  state  should  be 
true  to  itself — should  act  out  its  own  nature — should 
act  morally.  Its  action,  also,  should  be  in  harmony 
and  sympathy  with  all  that  is  properly  of  a  moral 
nature  like  itself.  It  should,  therefore,  in  obedience 
to  the  dictates  of  its  own  proper  nature,  promote 
morality  everywhere  and  in  all  ways. 

Moreover,  as  the  moral  interest  is  the  highest  in 
man,  and  as  the  state  exists  for  the  furtherance  of 
the  highest  interests  of  men  so  far  as  common,  its 
action  should  ever  regard  this  high  ulterior  end  of 
its  being. 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  2$! 

The  interests  of  sound  morals  cannot  safely  be 
left  to  the  sole  care  of  individuals,  or  of  the  family, 
or  of  the  local  community.  Even  if  this  were  the 
case  it  would  still  be  within  the  legitimate  province 
of  the  state,  and  therefore  its  proper  duty,  to  see 
to  it  that  this  care  be  in  fact  exercised.  But  the 
world  is  far  from  having  reached  that  state  of  per- 
fection in  which  the  state  may  safely  be  exonerated 
from  the  duty  of  supplementing  the  action  of  in- 
dividuals and  local  communities  in  the  interest  of 
morality. 

§  228.  There  are  manifold  ways  in 
Methods.  which   the   state   may  legitimately  and 

efficiently  act  in  the  promotion  of  sound 
morals. 

I.  Its  own  action  should  be  a  safe  and 
I.  By  example,    influential   example.     Its  legislation,  its 

administration  of  justice,  its  execution 
of  the  laws,  should  be  characterized  as  courteous, 
just,  beneficent ;  as  forbearing,  lenient,  and  merci- 
ful ;  as  unselfish,  impartial,  upright ;  as  kind,  gentle, 
and  helpful.  Its  selection  of  officials,  —  rejecting 
the  base,  the  corrupt,  the  dissolute,  and  exalting  the 
worthy,  the  honest,  the  pure  in  life  ; — its  control 
over  places, — banishing  all  the  incitements  and  in- 
struments of  vice,  and  maintaining  an  atmosphere 
of  purity  in  its  legislative  halls  and  surroundings,  its 
halls  of  justice,  its  prisons  and  other  state  institu- 
tions of  whatever  kind,  the  streets  and  public  places 
under  its  control ; — its  action  in  respect  to  persons 
and  places  under  its  control ;  should  exemplify  the 
principles  of  morality  before  its  citizens  and  before 


252  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

the  world.  In  truth,  the  entire  life  of  a  state  is  of 
moral  significance,  and  operates  with  incalculable 
power  in  the  way  of  example  on  the  lives  of  men 
and  on  the  character  and  actions  of  other  nations. 

2.  The    state    should    promote    sound 
ftion^  P''°^'^     morals  by  the  exclusion  from  the  com- 
munity of  whatever  tends  to  debase  or 

corrupt  the  morals  of  the  people.  It  may  prohibit 
the  publication  of  immoral  writings  and  pictures; 
it  may  disallow  corrupting  exhibitions ;  it  may  sup- 
press gambling-houses,  dram-shops,  and  brothels  ;  it 
may  forbid  open  indecencies,  brawls,  and  vicious 
amusements.  It  may  discourage,  by  discriminating 
taxes  and  impost  duties,  even  when  it  may  not  be 
wise  to  prohibit,  the  production  at  home  and  the 
importation  from  abroad  of  articles  tempting  to 
abuses  or  excesses,  and  hurtful  to  public  sobriety, 
purity,  and  virtue,  as  well  as  the  traffic  in  such  arti- 
cles. The  regulation  of  the  traffic  in  liquor,  by 
requiring  the  formal  permission  of  public  authorities 
and  payment  of  stated  fees — the  licensing  system, 
so  called — may  be  in  the  interest  of  true  morality, 
implying  no  sanction  or  approval  of  intemperance 
or  of  temptations  to  it,  as  the  design  of  the  legisla- 
tor may  be  wholly  for  its  restriction  or  removal. 

3.  The  state  may  more  directly  and  pos- 
encoura°emJnt   itivcly  promotc  the  interests   of   sound 

morals  in  the  community  by  lending 
encouragement  to  all  that  is  pure  and  virtuous  in 
tendency  or  in  fact  in  the  manners,  usages,  and  pur- 
suits of  its  citizens.  It  may  reward  acts  of  self-sac- 
rifice or  heroism  in  the  interest  of  the  state  or  of 


POLITICAL    GROWTH.  253 

humanity ;  it  may  commemorate  in  monuments  the 
lives  of  patriots  and  public  benefactors  ;  it  may 
second  in  manifold  ways  all  efforts  in  the  cause  of 
virtue  and  philanthropy  ;  it  may  incorporate  into 
its  whole  outgoing  life  a  true  sympathy  and  concern 
for  whatever  will  make  its  people  upright,  pure,  and 
virtuous.  Limited  to  the  secular  sphere  and  to  the 
use  of  secular  means  and  instrumentalities,  it  cannot, 
indeed,  look  directly  upon  the  heart  and  the  con- 
science— the  proper  seat  of  morality  ;  it  cannot  take 
cognizance  of  the  inner  workings  and  intents  of  the 
spirit ;  its  action  necessarily  confines  itself  to  the 
outward,  the  tangible.  But  all  the  outer  manifesta- 
tions of  the  spirit,  all. that  goes  out  of  the  heart  into 
the  external  life, — all  this  is  under  its  inspection 
and  for  its  cognizance  and  regulation.  Control  here 
reacts  upon  the  heart  itself,  inciting  or  depressing. 
Indifference  here,  unconcern  for  these  highest  in- 
terests of  men,  is  disloyal  to  God,  its  providential 
master  and  judge,  dangerous  for  its  citizens,  suicidal 
to  itself.  The  state  must  be  moral,  act  morally, 
enforce  morality  in  its  community,  or  it  must  de- 
clme  and  die.  History  is  predominantly  the  record 
of  the  retributions  visited  upon  nations  for  its  dis- 
regard of  the  public  morals. 


254  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE    STATE    AND    THE    CITIZEN. 

§  229.  The  second  grand  department  of  moral 
relationships  pertaining  to  the  state  is  that  which 
exists  between  it  and  its  members.  It  embraces 
the  rights  and  duties  of  citizens  in  respect  to  the 
state. 

The  term  citizen,  in  a  larger  but  looser 
Citizen  defined,  scusc,  extcuds  to  every  resident,  even 

every  transient  sojourner  within  the 
geographical  limits  of  a  state.  In  a  stricter  sense, 
it  is  limited  to  persons  either  born  in  the  country,  or 
naturalized — accepted  as  citizens — by  legal  author- 
ity. The  language  of  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  as  amended,  is  : — "All  persons  born  or  nat- 
uralized in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  States  wherein  they  reside."  Women 
and  children  are  included  in  this  definition.  In  a 
still  narrower  sense,  the  term  is  limited  to  a  person 
having  the  right  to  participate  in  the  government  of 
the  country — the  right  to  vote  and  to  be  eligible  to 


THE    STATE    AND    THE    CITIZEN.  255 

office.  The  rights  of  citizens  generally  are  denoted 
by  the  phrase  civil  rights.  But  sometimes  the  dis- 
tinction is  drawn  between  the  general  rights  of 
citizens  and  the  special  rights  of  voting  and  of  being 
voted  for ;  the  latter  being  designated  as  political 
rights  and  the  former  as  civil  rights  in  a  narrower 
sense.  Foreigners,  and  native  women  and  children, 
thus,  under  the  law  of  the  United  States,  have  civil 
rights,  but  not  political  rights. 

It  is  important  to  recognize  here,  as  elsewhere, 
the  double  correlativeness  between  rights  and  du- 
ties, and  between  the  subject  and  the  object  of  duty. 
Every  right  implies  a  duty  ;  and  every  right  or  duty 
of  the  subject  of  duty  implies  a  corresponding  duty 
or  right  in  the  object  of  duty. 

The  entire  field  of  the  moral  relationships  between 
the  state  and  its  citizens  will  therefore  come  under 
review  in  a  full  survey  of  the  rights  and  duties  of 
persons  in  the  state. 

SECTION    I. THE    RIGHTS    OF    INDIVIDUALS    IN    THE 

STATE. 

I.  To  pursue  the  §  230.  The  first  right  of  the  individual 
mortafbdig  IS"  person  in  the  state  is  the  right  to  exist 
molested.  ^^^  ^^  pursue  Unmolested  the  great  end 

of  his  being. 

Man  was  designed  by  his  creator  to  exist  within 
some  state,  inasmuch  as  states  were  designed  to  fill 
up  the  geographical  limits  of  the  earth.  He  was 
designed  to  live  as  organic  member  of  the  political 
community  within  whose  bounds  his  lot  is  cast 


256  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

He  can  rightfully  demand  that  this  right  be  recog- 
nized and  be  held  inviolable. 

Farther,  man  was  designed  to  outlive  the  state 
whose  existence  is  purely  secular — one  of  time  and 
of  earth, — to  live  into  an  eternal  future.  His  highest 
and  truest  interests,  indeed,  lie  beyond  all  secular 
confines  in  that  endless  hereafter.  As  social  and  as 
secular  in  a  certain  part  and  relation  of  his  nature, 
his  grand  destiny  must  be  wrought  out  in  social 
and  secular  conditions,  which  in  fact  are  in  divine 
wisdom  and  goodness  established  simply  for  the 
purpose  of  furthering  those  immortal  interests. 
The  state  is  for  man ;  not  man  for  the  state.  The 
state  cannot  therefore  rightfully  in  any  way  obstruct 
or  hamper  the  individual  man  in  his  paramount  duty 
to  secure  his  immortal  well-being.  He  has  the 
right  to  be  exempt  from  all  molestation  by  the  state 
in  his  endeavor  towards  this  high  end  of  his  being. 
It  is  clear  that  the  state  owes  it  to  itself  as  well  as 
to  the  individual  not  to  interfere  with  this  endeavor. 
The  personality  of  the  state  is  constituted  exclu- 
sively of  immortal  natures,  whose  instinctive  drift 
and  tendency  in  the  direction  of  their  eternal  well- 
being,  it  is  unwise  for  the  state  to  resist,  as  thereby 
it  opposes  its  own  proper  aim,  as  well  as  hinders 
the  highest  common  good  of  its  members,  and 
wastes  its  strength  as  well  as  moves  counter  to  its 
proper  aim. 

More  than  this  is  to  be  maintained.  Man  has  a 
right  not  only  to  pursue  unmolested  this  high  end 
of  his  immortal  nature,  unmolested  by  the  state, 
but  he  has  the  right  to  claim  from  the  state  that  it 


THE   STATE    AND    THE    CITIZEN.  25/ 

sympathize  with  all  his  just  endeavors  in  this  pur- 
suit,  and  while  not  transgressing  the  limits  of  its 
secular  and  social  nature,  second  and  aid,  as  it  may, 
those  endeavors.  This  sympathy  and  aid  are  not 
necessarily  to  be  extended  in  direct  action  designed 
to  affect  purely  spiritual  interests ;  it  is  enough  if 
the  state  keep  its  action  ever  in  harmony  with  the 
aspirations  of  its  citizens  towards  this  higher  life. 

§  231.  Secondly,  the  citizen  has  secu- 
certain  secular    lar  interests  which  lie  outside  of   the 

ends  unmolested.  .  -     ,  ,  •    1        1 

proper  sphere  of  the  state,  which,  there- 
fore, he  should  be  allowed  to  care  for  unmolested 
by  the  state. 

All  those  interests  which  pertain  to  him  as  an 
individual,  in  which  there  can  be  no  community 
with  others,  even  though  of  a  secular  nature,  are 
thus  outside  the  province  of  the  state.  It  is  his 
right  to  regulate  and  foster  those  interests  in  his 
own  way,  provided  always,  that  he  does  not  in  his 
care  of  them,  break  over  into  the  common  secular 
field  which  belongs  to  the  state,  and  in  which  he 
only  shares  with  others  in  his  degree  and  in  his 
relation  to  them.  Here  are  the  strictly  private, 
personal,  rights  of  free  thought,  free  opinion,  free 
conscience ;  here  are  the  innumerable  private  acts 
of  life  in  choosing  avocations,  companions,  dwell- 
ing  places  ;  in  determining  food,  dress,  and  physical 
regimen  as  well  as  the  culture  of  the  spiritual 
nature  ;  in  ordering  the  particular  steps  of  daily 
occupation.  If  he  do  not  offend  in  these  things 
against  public  decency,  public  morality,  public  inte- 
rest, he  has  a  right  to  move  on  without  molestation 


258  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

from  the  state.  Indeed,  more  than  this :  it  is  prac- 
ticable to  a  certain  extent,  and  to  this  extent  it  is 
obligatory  on  the  state,  to  maintain  itself  in  sympa- 
thy and  indirect  helpfulness  to  the  citizen  in  all 
these  properly  individual  interests.  The  principle 
is  all-pervading,  that  true  state-life  is  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  all  true  personal  life  ;  their  true  interests 
are  not  colliding  interests  ;  although  their  aims  and 
ends  may  be  diverse,  their  allotted  paths  run  ever 
parallel. 

§  232.     Thirdly,  more  directly  and  pos- 

3.  To  protection,  itivcly,  the  citizcn  has  a  right  to  claim 

from  the  state  its  protection  of  all  his 
lawful  interests  from  injury,  whether  by  fellow-citi- 
zens, by  state  officials,  or  by  foreign  power. 

The  citizen  may  claim  this  protection  at  home  or 
in  foreign  lands.  His  rights  of  person — of  life  and 
limb  and  free  movement ;  his  rights  of  property  in 
acquiring,  holding,  and  using ;  his  rights  of  reputa- 
tation  and  character,  the  state  is  bound  to  recog- 
nize, and  to  protect  against  all  unlawful  aggression. 
He  may  claim  both  protection  against  threatened 
injury  and  also  redress  for  inflicted  wrong.  It  is  a 
paramount  duty  of  the  state  to  bring  within  the 
reach  of  all  its  members  this  protection  and  redress 
to  the  fullest  extent  practicable. 

§  233.     Fourthly,    in   case  of  absolute 

4.  To  succor,      need  he  has  a  right  to  help  and  succor 

from  the  state. 
It  is  thus  the  duty  of  the  state  to  provide  for  its 
poor  and  helpless,  its  deaf  and  its  blind,  its  maimed 
and  diseased.     Its  help  and  succor  must,  indeed,  be 


THE  STATE  AND  THE  CITIZEN.        259 

secular,  by  outward  means  and  instrumentalities, 
and  for  secular  wants  ;  yet  its  ministry  in  this  direc- 
tion may  and  should  be  in  sympathy  and  indirect 
relief  and  solace  in  regard  to  the  needs  of  man's 
whole  nature.  The  bleeding  spirit  may  be  best 
healed  in  the  sympathetic  treatment  directed  im- 
mediately on  the  lacerated  body.  It  would  be  in- 
human to  withhold  this  higher  cure  when  possible 
to  bestow  it ;  it  were  most  impolitic,  contrary  to  the 
very  design  of  a  state  to  administer  to  the  relief  of 
physical  necessities,  in  heartless  indifference  to 
mental  distresses  which  attend  on  these  outer 
troubles. 

SECTION    II.      THE    DUTIES    OF    INDIVIDUALS    TO    THE 
STATE. 

I.  Of  loyalty.  §  ^34'  ^^^  fundamental  duty  of  the 
citizen  to  the  state  is  genuine  loyalty. 

Love  of  country  is  native  to  the  human  heart. 
Man  is  not  a  true  and  full  man  without  this  senti- 
ment in  full  and  vigorous  exercise.  One's  country, 
so  far  as  its  action  is  worthy  of  itself,  is  deserving  of 
his  true  and  warm  affection ;  its  best  support  and 
thrift  have  their  roots  in  the  generous  love  of  its  citi- 
zens. Reciprocal  sympathy  and  affection  is  a  prime 
law  of  nature  for  state  and  subject. 

This  fundamental  affection  on  the  part  of  the  citi- 
zen, shows  itself,  in  the  first  place,  in  the  form  of  re- 
spect or  reverence  towards  the  state  as  superior,  in  all 
its  organs  or  representatives,  its  acts  and  its  rights. 
He  is  therefore  forbidden  to  "  speak  evil  of  digni- 


260  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

ties ;"  he  is  required  to  "  honor  the  King  "  as  the  rep- 
resentative and  organ  of  the  poHtical  community. 
In  free  governments  the  habilities  to  offenses  against 
this  principle  of  morahty  are  many  and  great.  It  is 
the  more  necessary  in  them  therefore  to  inculcate 
the  principle,  and  to  insist  that  partisan  zeal  shall 
abstain  from  all  abuse  and  disrespect  towards  those 
who  represent  the  authority  of  the  state.  Measures 
of  policy,  acts  of  administration  may  be  freely  criti- 
cised, while  due  courtesy  and  respect  are  expressed 
to  official  persons,  and  due  deference  to  all  civil 
procedures. 

§  235.  A  second  specific  duty  of  the  cit- 
11.  Of  obedience,  [^en  to  the  State,  involved  in  the  fun- 
damental duty  of  loyalty,  is  obedience. 
The  state  is  the  rightful  seat  and  source  of  au- 
thority. Its  ordinances,  so  far  as  consistent  with 
general  morality,  are  to  be  obeyed  with  unhesitating 
obedience.  In  cases  of  doubtful  morality,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  state  is  the  higher  judge 
and  presumably  is  right.  The  case  should  be  a  clear 
one  in  which  the  civil  law  may  be  resisted  because 
supposed  to  be  opposed  to  the  higher  laws  of  moral- 
ity. Unless  the  conscience  of  the  individual  is  posi- 
tively offended,  obedience  is  due  even  to  a  law  that 
may  be  deemed  to  be  immoral  and  unjust.  A  war 
may  be  declared  on  supposedly  unjust  grounds  ;  the 
citizen  may  not  therefore  resist  taxation  or  conscrip- 
tion for  its  prosecution.  While  he  does  all  that  as  a 
citizen  he  may  lawfully  do  in  the  interest  of  peace^ 
inasmuch  as  the  moral  responsibilities  do  not  rest 
on  him,  his  individual  conscience  is  not  necessarily 


THE    STATE    AND    THE    CITIZEN.  26 1 

wounded  in  doing  the  duty  of  a  subject.  He  can- 
not, where  it  is  not  his  province  to  choose,  inter- 
pose his  private  conscience  as  an  excuse  for  declin- 
ing patriotic  service  Were  this  permissible,  the 
individual  judgment  would  be  exalted  above  that  of 
the  community.  All  social  order  would  be  under- 
mined, if  every  man  were  left  to  do  just  what  was 
right  in  his  own  eyes.  It  is  not  permissible  ethic- 
ally, further,  to  find  satisfaction  of  the  public  jus- 
tice in  paying  the  penalty  affixed  to  disobedience. 
The  authority  of  the  state  is  violated  if  the  will 
of  the  state  be  resisted,  no  matter  what  may  be 
true  of  the  sanction,  unless  it  be  clear  that  the 
state  intends  a  free  choice  between  compliance  and 
the  pecuniary  contribution.  Suffering  penalty  is 
not  meritorious  obedience.  "To  obey  is  better 
than  sacrifice." 

§  236.  A  third  duty  of  a  loyal  subject 
III.  Of  support,  is  personal  support  to  the  state. 

The  state  lives  and  acts  and  accom- 
plishes its  end  only  as  this  support  is  yielded  it 
from  its  members.  They  must  pay  the  taxes  and 
render  the  service  necessary  for  its  life  and  action. 
They  must  help  along  its  policy  and  its  measures. 
He  is  disloyal  who  opposes  or  obstructs  the  admin- 
istration of  the  government  for  the  furtherance  of 
personal  or  partisan  aims.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
citizen  to  aid  in  the  detection  and  punishment  of 
crime.  His  sympathy  for  the  suffering  culprit  must 
be  kept  subordinate  to  the  interests  of  political 
justice.  There  is  indeed  a  liability  to  err  in  this 
very  matter  of  patriotic  zeal.     Partisan  support  of 


262  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

an  administration  may  be  excessive,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  other  interests,  and  in  violation  of  other 
rights.  It  should  never  be  rendered  in  immoral 
ways.  Lying  in  politics  is  as  wrong  and  as  dis- 
graceful to  the  offender  as  lying  in  the  market,  or 
in  the  neighborhood,  or  the  family.  True  loyalty 
will  yield  a  ready,  cordial,  efficient  support  in  all 
righteous  ways  to  all  the  lawful  actions  of  the  gov- 
ernment, subordinating  all  personal  and  partisan 
aims  and  interests.  He  is  a  poor  patriot,  a  disloyal 
citizen,  who  sinks  his  country  into  a  means  of  pri- 
vate emolument,  or  of  factious  advantage. 

§  237.  It  has  been  a  disputed  question 

Expatriation.       ,  '  .  ,       ,  ,  . 

between  nations  whether  a  subject 
may  rightfully  transfer  his  allegiance  from  his  na- 
tive country  to  another.  The  maxim  "  once  a  sub- 
ject, always  a  subject  " — nemo  potest  exiiere  patri- 
am — formerly  was  generally  received.  But  in  the 
advance  of  civilization  involving  progress  in  person- 
al rights  and  personal  freedom,  the  maxim  has 
been  less  favorably  regarded  ;  and  the  right  of  self- 
expatriation  is  receiving  recognition.  A  freer  in- 
tercourse between  the  nations,  a  more  settled  inter- 
national law,  a  larger  allowance  of  personal  freedom, 
and,  moreover,  an  expansion  of  national  strength 
in  increase  of  territory  and  of  population,  are  re- 
moving the  necessity  of  this  restriction  on  individ- 
ual choice.  Inasmuch  as  it  is  simply  living  in  cer- 
tain geographical  limits  which  originates  the  rela- 
tion of  subject  and  state,  nothing  in  the  nature  of 
the  relation  forbids  a  change  of  citizenship  with  re- 
moval of  person. 


THE    STATE    AND    THE    CITIZEN.  263 

There  are,  however,  certain  ethical  restrictions  to 
which  the  exercise  of  this  right  of  self-expatriation 
should  be  held  subject.  It  would  be  wrong  to  de- 
sert one's  country  in  the  time  of  its  necessity  or 
distress,  when  the  support  and  help  of  every  citizen 
must  be  counted  upon.  Much  more  base  would  it 
be  to  transfer  one's  domicile  and  allegiance  in  be- 
trayal of  a  trust,  or  in  rupture  of  contracted  obliga- 
tions. Moreover,  citizenship  is  too  high  and  sacred 
a  relation  to  allow  of  fickleness  and  caprice  in  the 
change  of  allegiance.  Considerable  lapse  of  time  is 
requisite  in  order  to  indicate  that  the  residence  in 
the  new  state  is  to  be  permanent,  as  also  in  order 
to  fit  for  a  right  discharge  of  civil  duties  in  a  new 
community.  It  is  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
every  state  must  be  allowed  the  right  to  prescribe 
the  conditions  of  naturalization.  If  the  great  rights 
and  interests  of  humanity  forbid  a  state,  except  in 
extraordinary  emergencies,  to  shut  its  doors  against 
immigration,  the  principle  of  self-preservation  may 
require  of  a  state  to  refuse  admission  to  the  full 
rights  and  privileges  of  citizenship.  It  has  been  a 
mooted  point  in  international  law,  whether  a  man 
who  has  left  his  native  land  and  been  naturalized — 
admitted  to  citizenship — in  another  nation,  may,  on 
a  temporary  return  to  his  native  country,  be  held  to 
his  civil  responsibilities  just  as  if  he  had  remained 
at  home.  The  progress  of  international  law  in  this 
respect  is  in  favor  of  the  freedom  of  the  subject. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  in  this  connection,  that 
Cicero  ranked  among  the  strongest  principles  of 
Roman  freedom,  that  every  man  should  be  allowed 


264  DUTIES    IN   THE    STATE. 

to  retain  or  relinquish  his  jural  relations  at  his  own 
pleasure : — Hcec  stent  e7iim  fiindameitta  firmissima 
nostrcB  libertatis  sui  qiiemque  juris  et  retinendi  et 
demittendi  esse  dominum.  Pro  Balbo. 


INTERNATIONAL   MORALITY.  265 


CHAPTER    VI. 

INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY. 

§  238.     The  third  grand  department  of 
International      moral  relationships    pertaining    to  the 
state,  is  that  which  exists  between  it 
and  other  states. 

The  rights  and  duties  between  nations  compose 
the  subject-matter  of  what  is  called  International 
Law — yus  gentiitm,  or  more  exactly  ytts  mter 
genie  s. 

International  Law  has  been  distributed 
Divisions.  into  two  divisions  :  Public,  which  re- 
spects the  relations  of  states  to  one 
another  ;  and  Private,  which  respects  the  relations 
between  subjects  and  other  states  or  subjects  of 
other  states. 

§  239.  As  there  is  no  secular  authority 
Sources.  above  that  of  the  individual  state  sove- 

reignty, there  can  be  no  proper  legisla- 
tion over  nations  prescribing  law  to  them  in  com- 
mon and  enforcing  obhgations  upon  them.  The 
principles  and  rules  which  make  up  the  body  of  In- 
ternational Law  are  founded  on  reason  and  practice 

12 


266  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

— on  the  essential  nature  of  state  organizations, 
and  the  usages  and  special  acts  of  states.  The 
more  direct  and  specific  sources  are:  (i)  Text  wri- 
ters of  authority  ;  (2)  Treaties  ;  (3)  State  Ordinances, 
particularly  marine  ordinances  in  respect  to  cruis- 
ers and  prizes  ;  (4)  Judicial  precedents  ;  (5)  Profes- 
sional opinions  ;  (6)   History. 

From  the  nature  of  the  case,  international  law- 
must,  in  the  advance  of  civiUzation,  ever  be  subject 
to  growth.  As  morality  advances  among  men,  par- 
ticular rules  of  morality  must  be  modified  to  meet 
the  relations  arising  under  a  more  perfect  practice. 
States  have  ever  been  growing  into  closer,  more 
fraternal  relations  towards  one  another.  The  inter- 
changes of  peace  have  been  multiplied  ;  the  atroci- 
ties of  war  have  been  mitigated.  Reason  has 
gained  upon  brute  force  in  the  arbitrament  of  na- 
tional disputes.  The  principles  of  international 
morality,  too,  have  been  brought  into  clearer  light ; 
precedents  have  been  multiplied  ;  and  the  aggrega- 
tion of  international  rules  has  become  more  organ- 
ized, growing  ever  into  the  form  of  a  full,  systematic 
body  of  law. 

§  240.     As  a  true  moral  personality,  the 
Analogies  of  na- g^^te  is  the  subject  of  rights  and  duties 

tional  and  per-  ■'  "^ 

sonai  morality,  exactly  analogous  to  those  pertaining  to 
individuals.  The  important  points  of 
difference  are:  (i)  that  the  immediate  ends  and 
means  of  political  life  are  secular,  while  the  ends  of 
personal  life  reach  directly  through  time  into  the 
eternal  future  ;  (2)  political  life  is  collective,  while 
personal  morality  is  of  the  individual ;  and  (3)  the 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  26/ 

State  is  sovereign,  while  the  individual  is  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  subject  to  social  rule. 

Subject  to  these  modifications,  the  rights  and  du- 
ties of  states  may  be  systematically  comprehended 
under  the  same  specific  heads  as  those  of  persons, 
already  stated  as  given  by  the  threefold  constitu- 
ents of  all  duty — love,  beneficence,  rectitude, — and 
distinguished  as  one  or  the  other  of  these  elements 
is  more  predominant  and  characteristic. 

SECTION    I. INTERNATIONAL    GOOD-WILL. 

§  241.  States  are  subjects  of  those 
I.  Good-Will,  rights  and  correlative  duties  which  have 
their  seat  more  predominantly  in  the  sub- 
ject of  duty — sympathetic  interest  and  good-will. 

No  nation  lives  or  can  rightfully  live  for  itself 
just  as  no  man  can  live  for  himself ;  it  must  in  duty 
seek  the  good  of  other  nations. 

It  must  not  look  on  other  communities  with  in- 
difference. Laying  aside  jealousy  and  envy,  it 
should  rejoice  in  their  true  prosperity — in  their 
successful  prosecution  of  the  great  ends  of  national 
life  as  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  ends  of  human- 
ity and  conducive  to  them.  Equally  should  they 
sympathize  in  their  misfortunes  and  distresses.  Pes- 
tilences, famines,  conflagrations,  in  whatever  lands, 
demand  for  the  sufferers  the  commiseration  of  the 
world.  To  such  observed  and  commiserated  suffer- 
ings, states  are  under  moral  obhgation  to  cherish  a 
disposition  to  afford  all  practicable  and  reasonable 
relief. 


268  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

This  sympathy  and  good-will  is  the  rational 
ground  and  condition  of  all  proper  co-operation  for 
the  promotion  of  the  interests  of  humanity.  It  is 
the  ground  also  of  such  special  alliances  for  each 
other's  welfare  as  the  exigencies  of  their  changing 
condition  may  dictate. 

In  this  disposition  of  sympathetic  affec- 
Resentments.     tiou  and  good-will  are  embraced  the  re- 
sponsive   sentiments — the   resentments 
of  gratitude  for  kindness  received,  and  of  retalia- 
tion and  forgiveness  for  wrongs  suffered. 

Ingratitude  is  as  truly  base  in  a  nation  as  in  an 
individual  ;  and  forbearance  and  forgiveness  as  no- 
ble. Retaliation — redress  of  wrong  or  return  of 
evil  for  evil — has  a  somewhat  broader  ground  than 
in  personal  morality  ;  for  states  have  no  secular 
superior  to  redress  their  grievances.  States,  more- 
over, have  no  eternal  future  to  which  the  individual 
man  may  safely  defer  retribution  for  present 
wrongs. 

§  242.  The  principle  of  retaliation  for 
RetaUation.  wrougs— ;/V/J"  taliojiis — -cau  havc  no  ap- 
plication in  a  perfect  race.  It  is  only 
because  men  are  in  a  state  of  moral  imperfection 
that  relations  come  to  be  which  can  find  no  en- 
trance into  a  perfect  condition,  and  which  impose 
different  obligations  from  those  which  exist  in  such 
a  condition. 

The  following  considerations  seem    to 
Grounds.  justify  retaliation  by  states  :  i.    The  of- 

fender cannot  complain  if  his  offenses 
are  visited  back  upon  him  in  equal  justice.     2.  It  is 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  269 

due  to  the  interests  of  morality,  as  also  of  human- 
ity itself,  that  some  fitting  protest  be  made  against 
wrong-doing.  3.  The  instincts  of  the  race  prompt 
it  and  lend  their  sanction  to  it.  4.  The  divinely 
authorized  antediluvian  and  Mosaic  precepts  en- 
joined it;  in  itself,  therefore,  retahation  cannot  be 
wrong  ;  vengeance  cannot  be  exclusively  the  divine 
prerogative.  5.  The  evangelical  principle  of  for- 
giveness, while  admitted  to  be  governing,  cannot 
yet  be  proved  to  be  without  possible  exception.  6. 
The  safety  of  states  seems  to  necessitate  recourse 
to  retahation  in  certain  exigencies. 

Retaliation,  then,  may  be  justified  ;  but  the  case 
should  be  a  clear  one  and  a  strong  one  to  authorize  it. 
§  243.  Political  retaliation — retorsio — 
retaliation  ^  ^^  (i)  propcrly  Vindictive  or  (2)  amica- 
ble. 

Amicable  retaliation  is  without  violence,  and 
consists  in  applying  to  a  nation  the  rule  of  conduct 
which  it  has  practiced  towards  others. 

In  manifold  ways  may  such  retaliation  be  made  for 
practices  affecting  unfavorably  the  interests  of  oth- 
er nations.  Restrictions  on  free  intercourse  in 
trade  or  travel,  as  by  passports,  by  port  charges, 
impost  duties,  closing  of  ports  of  entry  at  home  or 
in  colonies,  and  the  like,  as  well  as  hampering  com- 
munication between  state  authorities  themselves, 
and  also  partialities  towards  certain  states  or  per- 
sons, may  justifiably  be  protested  against  in  exactly 
answering  restrictions.  So  also  the  gathering  of  a 
military  force  which  may  be  dangerous  to  a  nation 
at  peace — the  mobilization  of  armies  and  the  ag- 


270  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

gregation  of  fleets — may  warrant,  or  even  in  the 
interest  of  public  security  necessitate  a  like  pro- 
ceeding on  the  part  of  other  nations.  Such  are 
examples  of  amicable  retaliation. 

Proper  vindictive  retaliation  is  re- 
RetaSSOT.*'""^  sorted  to  as  a  forcible  means  of  redress 

of  national  wrongs  instead  of  regular 
warfare.  It  may  be  exercised  in  reprisals  upon  the 
persons  or  the  possessions  belonging  to  the  offend- 
ing nation.  The  tendency  of  recent  international 
law  is  to  the  exemption  of  innocent  persons  from 
such  reprisals,  and  to  the  abandonment  of  the  prac- 
tice of  granting  letters  of  reprisal  to  private  citi- 
zens— to  the  restriction  to  the  state  of  making 
reprisals,  and  "to  the  allowance  to  it  of  reprisals 
upon  the  property  only  of  foreign  subjects,  and  not 
upon  their  persons. 

section  ii. — international  courtesy,  truthful- 
ness,   JUSTICE,    beneficence. 

§  244.  States  are  subjects  of  the  rights  and 
duties  which  have  their  seat  more  characteristically 
in  the  object  of  duty — Courtesy,  Truthfulness^ 
Justice,  Beneficence. 

I.  Courtesy,  as  a  moral  principle,  re- 
Courtesy.  spccts  more  directly  the  outward  deport- 

ment of  nations  in  their  intercourse  and 
communication  with  one  another.  The  conduct  of 
nations  may,  like  that  of  individuals,  be  character- 
ized as  respectful  or  insolent,  as  cordial  or  repelling, 
as  complaisant  or  cross  and  testy,  as  courtly  or  rudC: 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  2/1 

There  are  manifold  ways  in  which  this 
{r°^'*y  °^  "^'  principle  may  be  acted  out  in  the  inter- 
course of  nations.  In  fact,  many  forms 
of  it  have  been  recognized  in  international  law  so 
as  to  make  up  a  body  of  rules  under  the  general 
designation  of  the  comity  of  nations. 

In  respect  to  superiors,  in  the  form  of  respect,  the 
general  principle  appears  in  certain  distinctions 
accorded  to  the  representatives  of  nations  as  supe- 
rior or  inferior.  The  equality  of  sovereign  states 
is  indeed  a  fundamental  principle  of  international 
law  ;  but  this  principle  is  not  violated  in  according 
a  certain  deference  to  greater  age,  or  power,  or 
some  other  like  attribute.  Certain  states  in  Europe 
are  recognized,  for  example,  as  entitled  to  what  are 
called  royal  honors,  which  accord  to  such  states  a 
precedence  over  all  other  states,  with  the  right  of 
sending  public  ministers  of  the  first  rank,  as  ambassa- 
dors, and  also  certain  distinctive  titles  and  ceremo- 
nial distinctions.  European  states  have  been  rank- 
ed in  their  order  of  relative  precedence,  and  serious 
contests  have  arisen  between  the  sovereigns  in  ref- 
erence to  it. 

§  245.  In  the  proper  comity  of  nations. 
Rules  of  comity,  resting  directly  on  their  equality  or  mor- 
al  personalities,  divers  usages  and  prac- 
tices have  been  established  which  are  recognized  as 
law,  the  violation  of  which  might  be  a  just  cause  of 
war.  Of  these  rules  of  comity  the  following  are 
leading  specifications : 

I.     It  is  a  rule  of  comity  that  the  ex- 
i.of  recognition,  istence  of  cvcry  nation  be  recognized 


2/2  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

as  such  in  all  appropriate  ways.  In  the  case 
of  a  new  nation  coming  to  be,  as  when  a  portion 
of  a  state  or  a  colony  rebels  and  succeeds  in  es- 
tablishing its  independence,  other  nations  are  bound 
in  comity  to  recognize  such  independence.  They 
are  each,  however,  to  judge  for  themselves  whether 
independence  is  fairly  established  and  the  perman- 
ence and  stability  of  the  new  nation  assured.  The 
same  courtesy  is  required,  when  a  change  of  gov- 
ernment or  of  ruler  has  been  effected,  in  formally 
recognizing  the  new  government  or  the  new  ruler. 
This  right  and  duty  of  national  recognitiojt  is  a  first 
principle  of  international  comity. 

2.  A  second  principle  of  international 

2.  Of  legation,  comity  cmbraccs  the  rights  of  legation. 

Every  state  has  a  right  to  send  public 
ministers  to  any  other  state,  and  to  receive  minis- 
ters from  it,  and  to  this  right  pertains  the  correla- 
tive obligation.  To  suspend  or  to  refuse  diplomatic 
intercourse  without  good  reason,  is  a  rank  discour- 
tesy that  may  rightfully  be  resented.  The  persons 
of  all  such  accredited  ministers,  are,  by  comity,  ex- 
empt from  the  ordinary  local  jurisdiction. 

The  Congresses  of  Vienna  {1815)  and  Aix-la 
Chapelle  (18 18),  established  the  four  following  class- 
es of  public  ministers  :  i.  Ambassadors  and  pa- 
pal  legates  or  nuncios  ;  2.  Envoys,  accredited  to 
sovereigns  ;  3.  Ministers  resident,  accredited  to  sov- 
ereigns ;  and  4.  Charges  d'  affaires,  accredited  to 
the  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 

3.  A  third  rule  of  international  comity 

3.  Of  salute,      requires  that  the  national  flag  be  prop- 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  273 

erly  saluted  whenever  met  at  sea  or  in  port.  The  flag 
is  the  symbol  of  the  state  ;  and  honors  to  it  or  insults 
to  it  are  justly  regarded  as  rendered  to  the  state  itself. 

4.  A  fourth  principle  of  comity  ac- 
fromfSiJiin.  cords  to  the  pcrsous  of  sovereigns,  and 

also  to  their  armies  or  navies,  exemption 
from  local  jurisdiction,  both  civil  and  criminal, 
when  within  the  territorial  limits  of  another  state. 

5.  A  fifth  principle  of  international 
exe^uSfaws.    comity  accords  to  the  executed  laws  of 

another  country,  their  legitimate  effect 
everywhere,  so  far  as  not  prejudicial  to  the  rights 
of  other  states  and  of  their  citizens.  Wills  made 
under  the  laws  of  the  state  where  the  testator  is 
domiciled,  are  carried  into  their  effect  in  regard  to 
the  disposition  of  personal  or  movable  property  in 
all  the  states  of  Europe,  and  in  regard  to  real  prop- 
erty everywhere  on  the  European  continent.  So 
also,  personal  qualities,  such  as  citizenship,  majori- 
ty, bankruptcy,  marriage  and  divorce,  which  have 
been  judicially  determined  under  the  laws  of  one 
country,  follow  the  person  into  other  lands  where 
they  may  come  to  reside. 

§  246.  II.  Truthfulness  in  all  com- 
Truthfuiness.     muuicatious  between  nations  rests  on 

the  same  moral  foundation  as  between 
individuals. 

It  has  been  the  practice  of  nations  to  allow,  to  a 
certain  extent,  modes  of  deception  towards  enemies 
which  would  not  be  allowed  to  others.  Ambus- 
cades, wooden   cannon,   false  flags,  are  justified  in 

war,  on  the  ground  that  the  enemies  have  no  right 
12* 


274  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

to  know  the  truth  in  such  cases ;  it  is  part  of  the 
very  act  of  warfare  which  both  parties  expect  and 
practice  without  complaint  or  protest.  It  seems 
clear,  however,  that  if  such  acts  of  deception  may 
be  not  blameworthy  simply  because  there  is  no  per- 
son concerned  who  has  a  right  to  know  the  truth, 
no  practice  can  be  justified  which  sullies  the 
worthiness  of  man  himself,  and  which  cannot  be 
allowed  by  his  Creator.  It  is  a  nice  distinction 
which  moralists  seek  to  draw  between  justifiable 
practices  in  deceiving  an  enemy,  as  by  laying  am- 
bush, displaying  men  so  as  to  mislead  as  to  the 
numbers  engaged,  and  the  like,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
such  practices,  on  the  other,  as  decoying  a  foe  into 
danger  by  false  signs  of  distress,  by  white  flags, 
and  the  like.  It  is  difficult  to  apply  perfect  morals 
to  a  condition  of  moral  imperfection  ;  to  enforce 
the  precepts  of  love  and  good  will  in  a  state  of  mur- 
derous warfare. 

§  247.  III.  Justice,  the  practical  recog- 
Justice.  nition  of  the  rights  of  other  nations  and 

of  the  individual  subjects  of  other  na- 
tions, is  equally  enjoined  on  nations  as  on  in- 
dividuals. 

The  prominent  rights  which  interna- 
possessTo^iS*^*  *°  ^^°^^^  justice  rcquircs  to  be  accorded, 

are  the  following : 
First,  each  nation  has  the  right  to  claim  that 
its  ownership  of  its  territory  and  other  property 
acquired  by  original  occupancy,  by  conquest,  or 
by  cession,  be  recognized  by  all  other  nations. 
As  with  individuals,  lapse  of   time  in    the    quiet 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  2/5 

use  or  occupancy  —  prescription  —  gives  to  na- 
tions a  valid  title  to  property.  All  the  property 
within  a  state  belongs  by  right  of  eminent  domain 
to  the  state,  §  177.  Vessels  at  sea  are  construed 
as  within  the  limits  of  the  nation  to  which  they 
belong ;  and  the  same  rights  of  property  attach  to 
them  and  the  property  on  board  of  them  as  to 
property  in  the  proper  territory  of  the  state. 

Secondly,  each  state  has  a  right  to 
subtectT"''°^  the  allegiance  of  its  own  subjects.  It 
is  in  violation  of  this  right  that  the  sub- 
jects of  one  state  are  forced  to  fight  against  their 
own  country.  This  right  to  allegiance  may  be  ter- 
minated by  self-expatriation  ;  but  till  this  be  the 
case,  the  right  remains. 

Thirdly,  each  state  has  the  right  to 
3.  At  sea.  unmolested  travel  and  traffic  over  the 
high  seas.  The  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  a  state  over  adjacent  waters  is  generally  recog- 
nized in  international  law  as  extending  to  a  line 
three  marine  miles  from  the  land,  and  as  embracing 
also  waters  lying  within  lines  drawn  from  headlands 
to  headlands.  The  right  of  visitation  and  search  of 
vessels  at  sea  is  a  recognized  right  of  a  belligerent 
in  time  of  war  ;  but  otherwise  it  is  disallowed,  ex 
cept  under  express  treaty. 

§  248.     IV.     The  duty  of  beneficence 
Beneficence.       fg  a  principle  of  international  as  of  per- 
sonal morality.      It  is   indeed  but  the 
effect  and  result  of  expressed  good-will.     More  and 
more  in  the  progress  of  civilization  have  the  ex- 


276  DUTIES    IN   THE   STATE. 

pressions  of  international  good  will,  in  sympathetic 
and  courteous  helpfulness,  appeared  in  history. 

SECTION    III. INTERNATIONAL    INTEGRITY. 

§  249.  The  class  of  rights  and  duties  vested 
more  directly  in  the  act  of  duty,  comprehended  un- 
der the  general  designations  of  uprightness,  hon- 
esty, rectitude,  pertain  as  truly  to  nations  as  to  in- 
dividuals. States  owe  it  to  themselves  as  well  as 
to  the  world  that  their  transactions  with  one  an- 
other, and  all  their  actions  affecting  one  another, 
should  be  in  the  line  of  perfect  rectitude,  never 
transgressing  the  rights  of  any,  and  ever  tending 
directly  to  their  professed  aim  and  end. 

SECTION    IV. WAR. 

§  250.  A  state  of  war  introduces  a  peculiar  class 
of  rights  and  obligations  between  nations,  called 
rights  of  war—jzira  belli. 

War  has  been  defined  to  be  a  contest 
War  defined.      ^^y  force  between  independent  sovereign 

states. 
The  question  has  been  mooted :  is  war  ever  justifi- 
able }  In  a  condition  of  perfect  morality,  where  good 
will  towards  men  and  among  men  universally  prevails, 
certainly  war  could  hardly  be  supposed  to  be  possible. 
A  war,  therefore,  implies  a  defect  in  practical  moral- 
ity somewhere.  But  the  same  may  be  said  of  most 
civil  litigation,  even  in  cases  where  no  special  im- 
morality could  be  fairly  charged  upon  either  of  the 
litigants.     There  may  be,  in  a  true  sense,  just  wars, 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  2// 

as  there  may  be  just  civil  litigation.  All  wars  are 
wrong  in  the  sense  of  being  incompatible  with  a 
condition  of  perfect  universal  morality ;  and  yet 
some  wars  may  arise  in  which  no  special  blame  can 
be  charged  on  either  party.  Offensive  wars  may  be 
as  justifiable  as  defensive  ;  as  aggressions  may  be 
made  on  the  rights  of  a  state  which  are  not  proper- 
ly acts  of  war,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are  as  offen- 
sive as  declared  warfare.  Generally  the  same 
grounds  may  be  alleged  in  the  justification  of  war 
as  have  been  stated  in  the  case  of  retaliation,  §  242. 

But  if  war  may  be  defensible  on  the  basis  of  the 
moral  imperfections  of  the  race,  they  are  occasions 
of  such  stupendous  evils  that  they  are  never  to  be 
resorted  to  except  in  the  extremest  necessity.  Only 
on  sore  provocation  or  urgent  need  of  self-defense, 
and  not  until  all  milder  methods  of  obtaining  jus- 
tice have  failed,  can  a  nation  justify  itself  in  expos- 
ing itself  and  its  subjects  to  the  incalculable  losses 
and  sufferings  of  war,  or  in  inflicting  these  evils  on 
other  communities.  War  should  ever  be,  as  it  has. 
been  said  it  is,  the  last  argument  of  sovereigns — 
tiltima  ratio  regiiin. 

War  is  a  fact  ;  the  rights  of  war  arise  as  soon  as 
the  fact  exists.  They  do  not  depend  on  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  causes  of  the  war,  or  on  its  righteous- 
ness. Certain  things  must  indeed  characterize  a 
contest  between  nations,  to  make  it  properly  a 
war  to  which  the  rights  of  war  pertain.  Thus 
it  has  been  said  with  some  authority  :  war  must  be 
characterized  as  a  contest  public,  with  arms,  and 
just.     ''  Bellum  est  contentio  publica,  armata,justay 


27?  DUTIES    IN    THE    STATE. 

§  251.  War,  accordingly,  must,  in  the 
I.  Must  be  public. flj-st  place,  be  public.     It  cannot  exist 

between  individuals  ;  only  sovereign 
states  can  be  parties  to  proper  war.  Hostilities 
may  indeed  exist,  in  which  only  parts  of  states  are 
engaged,  and  when  they  are  of  sufficient  propor- 
tions, in  the  interests  of  humanity,  certain  belliger- 
ent rights  may  be  recognized  and  enforced  in  these 
contests,  such  as  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  the 
commissioning  of  cruisers  by  letters  of  marque 
which  remove  from  the  vessels  and  the  crews  the 
character  and  liabilities  attaching  to  piracy.  In 
modern  warfare,  partisan  and  guerrilla  bands  are  be- 
yond the  protection  of  the  laws  of  regular  warfare, 
and  are  regarded  as  outlaws  and  punishable  as  rob- 
bers and  murderers.  The  individual  subjects,  in- 
deed, of  a  country  in  war,  are  construed  to  be  in  a 
state  of  hostility  to  all  the  subjects  of  the  hostile 
country ;  but  they  do  not  engage  in  the  contest 
with  force  except  under  the  regulations  of  the  state. 
Private  property  on  land,  therefore,  is  exempt  from 
the  ravages  of  war.  The  use  of  arms  against  a  de- 
clared public  enemy  by  individuals  acting  of  them- 
selves, without  the  authority  of  the  state,  on  land 
is  outlawry,  and  on  sea  is  piracy,  which  invalidates 
all  rights  of  protection.  The  sole  parties  in  regular 
war  are  sovereign  states. 

§  252.  War,  in  the  second  place,  must 
z.  With  force     be  with  forcc  of  arms.      The  use  of  poi- 

r.t  arms.  . 

son,  of  destructive  chemical  agents  m 
missiles  which  are  designed  to  torture  the  person, 
the  employment  of  savages,  and  generally  the  use 


INTERNATIONAL    MORALITY.  2/9 

of  Other  than  usual  agents  or  instruments,  are  en- 
tirely disallowed  or  regarded  with  disfavor  in  the 
adjustment  of  rights  in  war.  The  very  object  of 
war  is  so  to  distress  and  disable  the  enemy  as  to 
force  him  to  yield  what  is  demanded  ;  but  restric- 
tions on  the  means  and  instrumentalities  to  be  em- 
ployed have  been  constantly  growing  up  into  the 
authorized  customs  and  usages  of  regular  warfare. 
The  grounds  of  distinction  between  the  lawful  and 
the  unlawful  it  is  not  always  easy  to  perceive. 
Poisons  and  certain  torturing  chemical  compounds 
are  forbidden,  while  hot  shot,  explosive  shells,  tor- 
pedoes, are  permitted. 

§  253.  Thirdly, — war  must  have,  at 
3.  Just.  least,  an  ostensible  ground  of  being  pro- 

secuted for  some  just  claim.  It  must, 
in  this  sense,  be  just.  A  war  for  merely  frivolous 
pretexts,  a  war  for  mere  conquest,  a  war  for  mere 
entertainment,  modern  morality  would  reprobate. 
There  must  be  some  claim  of  right  as  the  ground 
of  war,  which  shall  serve  to  limit  its  range  and  ef- 
fect ;  and  it  must  be  prosecuted  in  fair  and  just 
methods.  Certain  arts  of  deception,  as  we  have 
noticed,  §  246,  may  not  be  condemned,  such  as 
stratagems,  ambuscades,  wooden  cannon,  and  the 
like ;  but  proper  fraud  is  prohibited.  Flags  of 
truce,  demand  of  parley,  offer  of  surrender,  must  be 
respected  in  good  faith,  as  also  all  agreements  for 
temporary  suspension  of  hostilities,  passports,  safe 
conducts,  licenses,  and  the  like,  are  to  be  kept. 
Spies  are  recognized  as  permissible  agents  in  war ; 
but,  if  captured,  they  are,  from  the  necessities  of 


28o  DUTIES    IN    THE   STATE. 

war,  punishable  with  death,  not,  it  is  said,  because 
they  are  morally  unlawful  agencies,  but  because 
they  are  dangerous. 

§  254.   Besides  the  parties  immediately 

Belligerents  and  engaged  in  War,  there  are  others  affect- 
non-combatants.  , 

ed  by  it.  There  is  thus  the  distinction 
between  the  rights  of  combatants — belligerents — 
and  the  rights  of  non-combatants. 

Non-combatants  are  either  individual  subjects  of 
a  belligerent  state,  or  neutral  states  and  their  sub- 
jects. 

The  effect  of  war  on  the  individual  subjects  of  a 
belligerent  is  the  immediate  interdiction  of  com- 
mercial intercourse  with  the  hostile  nation  and  its 
subjects  and  allies.  Private  contracts  with  the 
enemy's  subjects  are  accordingly  unlawful.  The 
property  of  the  citizens  of  the  hostile  state  is  liable 
to  be  confiscated ;  but  the  debts  of  the  nation  itself 
to  an  enemy's  subjects  are  held . inviolable.  The 
lives  of  non-resistants  and  of  captured  prisoners 
are  held  to  be  inviolable,  as  well  as  the  property  of 
individuals  on  land.  Buildings  devoted  to  civil  pur- 
poses, monuments  of  art,  repositories  of  science 
and  learning,  are  exempted  from  the  general  rav- 
ages of  war.  The  ravaging  of  a  country  is  permis- 
sible only  as  necessary  to  effect  the  general  object 
of  the  war. 

§  255.  The  existence  of  war  of  neces- 
Neutrais.  j^i^y  affects  the  interests  of  neighboring 

nations,  to  whom  accordingly  pertain 
certain  rights  and  obligations.  Generally  the  in- 
terests of  a  neutral  power  are,  so  far  as  practicable, 


INTERNATIONAL   MORALITY.  28 1 

to  be  protected.  Its  ships  on  the  high  seas  are 
not  to  be  molested,  even  although  conveying  the 
enemy's  property,  or  even  his  ministers  and  muni- 
tions of  war.  But  in  case  of  a  blockade,  the  right 
of  visitation  and  search  belongs  to  the  belligerent. 
On  the  other  hand,  neutrals  are  bound  to  observe  a 
strict  impartiality  between  the  contending  parties. 
They  must  not  allow  the  crossing  of  their  territory 
by  either  belligerent  ;  nor  the  arming  and  equip- 
ping of  vessels  or  enlistment  of  men  in  their  terri- 
tory ;  nor  vessels  of  war  to  lie  in  wait  in  their 
ports  ;  nor  cruisers  to  take  prizes  into  their  har- 
bors except  under  stress  of  weather  or  like  neces- 
sity. All  captures,  moreover,  on  neutral  territory, 
are  unlawful.  Such  are  the  leading  applications  of 
international  law  to  neutrals  in  time  of  war. 


282  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 


BOOK    11. 


DIVISION  III. 

DUTIES     TO     GOD. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURE    AND    CLASSIFICATION. 

§  256.  Duties    to    God    or  Religious 
Nature.  Duties  are  at  once  indicated  in  the  light 

of  the  moral  relationship  of  man  to  God. 
It  is  assumed  that  God  exists  ;  that  he  is  clothed 
with  all  the  attributes  of  rational  excellence  in  their 
highest  degree,  in  infinite  perfection — with  omni- 
presence, omniscience,  omnipotence,  with  perfect 
goodness,  righteousness,  and  holiness  ;  that,  more- 
over, he  is  the  creator  and  the  sovereign  disposer 
and  ruler  of  men. 

God  thus  exists  in  closer  relations  to  man  than 
is  possible  for  any  other  being  ;  ever  with  him,  ever 
upholding  him,  ever  caring  for  him,  ever  loving  him, 
ever  ruling  him.  Emphatically  in  God  man  lives 
and   moves  and  has  his  being.     The  infinitude  of 


NATURE    AND    CLASSIFICATION.  283 

God's  being,  and  the  perfection  of  his  character  ex- 
alt  this  unrivaled  intimacy  of  relationship  to  the 
highest  degree  conceivable.  The  duties  which  man 
owes  to  God  are  beyond  all  comparison  first  in  rank 
and  sacredness,  deepest  in  obligation,  and  most  con- 
stant in  their  claims.  Such,  indeed,  is  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  entire  universe  as  creator  and  governor 
that,  in  a  true  sense,  duty  to  God  comprehends  im- 
mediately or  remotely  all  possible  duty.  His  moral 
nature,  which  we  find  expressed  through  his  creative 
and  providential  will,  is  the  foundation  of  all  moral- 
ity—  of  all  rectitude  and  goodness.  As  ail  the 
capacities  of  man  and  all  the  relations  of  his  being 
are  established  by  God  and  controlled  by  him  in 
his  universal  rule,  all  human  duty  must  be  em- 
braced within  his  authoritative  will  ; — the  divine 
law  is  the  all-comprehensive  law  for  man.  Even 
the  ordinances  of  civil  authority  are  through  his 
appointment  and  so  receive  from  him  their  highest 
sanction.  Love  to  man  is  deepest  and  strongest 
when  rendered  in  the  spirit  of  the  brotherhood  of  all 
men  under  God  as  the  common  Father  of  all. 

God  is  not  only  the  original  source  of  all  morality 
by  reason  of  his  being  the  creator  of  all  moral  beings 
and  of  his  endowing  them  all  with  their  moral 
natures,  but  he  is  also  the  life  and  soul  of  all  true 
morality.  The  consciousness  of  God  as  ruler,  as 
sovereign  and  judge,  is  the  best  and  highest  induce- 
ment to  a  moral  life,  the  most  effective  restraint 
from  all  immoral  practice.  A  godless  morality  is 
shallowness  and  stagnancy  ;  it  has  little  endurance 
against  the  heats  of  temptation,  little  vigor  for  heroic 


284  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

virtue.  Hoping  in  the  favor  of  a  personal  God  and 
fearing  his  displeasure,  while  resting  firmly  in  his 
authoritative  will,  man  is  strong  to  bear  and  strong 
to  do.  Only  as  the  will  of  God  is  regarded  in  it  can 
there  be  full  satisfaction  to  the  conscience  in  the 
fulfilment  of  any  duty.  A  consciousness  of  his 
presence  and  of  his  authority,  must  pervade  all 
sound  moral  practice. 

§  257.  The  authoritative  will  of  God  is 
How  enjoined,    promulgated  in  the  moral  relations  which 

are  discoverable  in  his  works  of  creation, 
the  dispositions  of  his  providence,  and  his  express 
revelations  to  man. 

The  moral  nature  of  man  answers  with  exactness 
to  these  utterances  of  divine  authority.  Every  re- 
quirement has  its  answering  capacity  ;  the  duty 
claimed  is  exactly  commensurate  with  the  ability  in 
man  to  discharge.  The  divinely  imposed  sanctions 
of  obedience  are  re-echoed  in  the  consciences  of 
men. 

§  258.  The  particular  duties  which  man 
Classification,     owes  to  God  show  here,  as  before,  their 

readiest  distribution  and  classification 
when  viewed  from  the  threefold  element  in  all  duty 
— the  subject  of  duty,  the  object  of  duty,  and  the 
act  of  duty.  We  will  follow  this  order,  considering, 
first,  those  religious  duties  which  are  more  charac- 
terized by  their  being  seated  in  the  subject  of  duty 
in  man  as  morally  related  to  God  ;  secondly,  those 
seated  in  the  object  of  duty — the  character  and  acts 
of  God  in  relation  to  man  ;  and  thirdly,  those  char- 
acterizing the  act  of  duty  itself.      It  may  not  be 


NATURE    AND    CLASSIFICATION.  28$ 

entirely  superfluous  to  repeat  that  each  of  these 
enumerated  duties  implies  the  presence  of  all  of  the 
elements  mentioned  ;  as  we  have  before  found  that 
goodwill,  rectitude,  and  goodness,  necessarily  imply 
each  the  others.     §  21. 

We  find  here,  moreover,  the  distinction  of  duties 
into  personal  and  social.  These  two  classes  it  will 
be  convenient  to  consider  separately. 


286  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 


CHAPTER  11. 

PERSONAL    RELIGION PIETY   TOWARDS    GOD. 

§  259.  Piety  denotes  the  right  act  or 
Piety  defined,     state  of  the  subject  of  duty  towards  God. 

It  is  love  to  God  viewed  rather  from  the 
side  of  the  subject  of  duty  than  from  the  object  or 
act  of  duty. 

It  imports  a  loving  sympathy  with  all  the  mani- 
festations of  God  ;  a  loving  disposition  towards  him 
— a  true  godliness  of  spirit  ;  and  a  loving  purpose 
— a  true  devotion  to  God. 

I.  Made  in  the  image  of  God,  man  is 
It  imports         constituted  by  his  very  nature  to  be  in 

I,  sympathy.  .  r  -    ^        ^^       ^  ■  -I 

heartiest  sympathy  with  all  that  is  truly 
divine.  It  is  only  proof  that  his  nature  has  be- 
come fearfully  vitiated,  if  the  spirit  of  man  turns 
away  in  indifference  or  coldness  from  any  manifes- 
tation of  Divine  power,  or  wisdom,  or  goodness  ; 
much  more  if  it  is  positively  averse  to  recognition 
and  contemplation  of  these  manifestations  of  God. 
As  everything  that  is,  especially  everything  that 
moves  or  breathes,  is  of  God  and  is  a  revelation  of 


PERSONAL    RELIGION.  28/ 

him,  there  is  ground  for  perpetual  sympathy  and 
communion  with  him.  For  this  was  man  made  ; 
and  to  this  he  is  called  in  duty. 

2.  The   sympathy  which    is   awakened 

2.  A  g(jdiy  dis-    by   every   successive    display    of    God 

position.  "^     ,  ,  -  1         ,  , 

to  the  heart  of  man  should  pass  in- 
to habitual  disposition,  so  that  the  soul  shall 
be  the  seat  of  a  true  godliness.  The  allowance  of 
sympathetic  pleasure  in  the  works  and  ways  of  God 
on  the  several  successive  occasions  of  their  entering 
into  the  experience,  bends  the  spirit  God-ward  and 
determines  its  growth  under  the  laws  of  habit  into 
this  shape  and  character. 

3.  The  embrace  of  this  godly  sympathy 

3.  Love.  and  disposition  with  the  free-will  is  love 

to  God  in  its  essential  completeness — is 
true  devotion  to  him.  It  is  religion  in  the  subject 
of  duty.     It  is  proper  piety. 

All  duty  to  God,  all  religious  duty  implies  piety 
—implies  a  living  agent  in  hearty  sympathy,  in  lov- 
ing disposition,  and  loving  purpose  in  respect  to 
God.  All  other  denominations  of  religious  duty 
are  but  the  outworkings  of  this  pious  sentiment 
and  intention  towards  God.  Devoid  of  true  piety, 
all  else  is  morally  worthless.  Religious  profession, 
religious  worship,  religious  rites  and  ceremonies, 
religious  sacrifices,  and  religious  endeavors,  are, 
without  piety,  but  emptiness  and  vanity,  or  worse, 
hypocrisy  and  mockery. 

§  260.  The  responsive  affection  in  relig- 
Gratitude.  jon  is  gratitude  : — it  is  the  resentment 

of  the  divine  goodness.     The  other  re- 


288  DUTIES  TO   GOD. 

sentment,  that  which  has  by  its  predominating 
sway  among  men  crowded  out  its  sister  affection 
from  its  proper  recognition  in  common  modern 
speech— retaliation  for  evil  experienced — has  no 
place  in  reference  to  God,  since  his  work  is  all  in 
perfect  goodness.  Evil  comes,  indeed,  to  man,  and 
it  comes  from  divine  appointment.  Yet  is  all 
physical  evil  from  him  essential  love.  Punitive 
justice  is  in  the  interest  of  a  true  universal  benevo- 
lence ;  and  trials  are  disciplinary,  tending  to  bring 
about  the  perfection  of  character  in  man  which  is 
the  condition  of  highest  blessedness  to  him.  If 
God's  gracious  design  in  the  visitations  of  sorrow  is 
allowed  to  make  its  full  and  true  impression  on  the 
heart,  there  will  be  such  a  sense  of  the  divine  good- 
ness in  the  experience  of  trial  as  will  kindle  a  com- 
placent gratitude  that  shall  be  full  of  joy  and  satis- 
faction. 


PERSONAL   RELIGION.  28Q 


CHAPTER  III. 

PERSONAL    RELIGION. REVERENCE PRAYER. 

§  261.  Of  the  duties  to  God,  which  are 
Reverence.        more  distinctly  characterized   by  their 

reference  to  the  object  of  duty,  that 
class  which  are  seated  in  the  sensibility — the  capac- 
ity and  faculty  of  form — are  comprehended  under 
the  general  duty  of  revere7tce. 

As  in  the  intercourse  of  man  with  his  equals  this 
class  of  duties  take  the  general  form  of  courtesy 
which  towards  his  recognised  superiors  among  men 
passes  into  respect,  so  in  the  intercourse  of  man, 
the  finite  creature  with  God,  the  infinite  creator, 
they  take  this  form  of  reverence.  Every  manifes- 
tation of  God  in  his  word,  his  works,  his  ways,  should 
be  responded  to  by  man,  the  whole  answering  at- 
titude towards  him  should  be,  in  this  reverence. 
The  higher  stage  of  this  emotion  is  reverential 
awe — an  emotion  not  necessarily  painful  or  repul- 
sive, but  one,  it  may  be,  of  the  deepest  joy  and  satis- 
faction, as  the  form  in  which  the  most  loving  and 
confiding  affection  may  express  itself.     It  is  natu- 

13 


290  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

rally  inspired  by  the  greater  and  sublimer  demon- 
strations of  the  Divine  character. 

The  counterpart  on  the  human  side  of 
Humility.         t^jg  reverencc  is,  on  the  divine  side  in 

the  inter-communication  between  man 
and  God,  Jiumility.  The  one  ever  implies  the 
other  ;  the  spirit  that  is  reverent  towards  God  is 
ever  humble  in  view  of  itself. 

§  262.  The  reverential  carriage  and  de- 
Prayer  defined,  portmcut  which  sliould  characterize  all 

the  responses  of  the  human  soul  to  the 
manifestations  of  the  divine  preserver  finds  in  prayer 
its  more  prevalent  and  familiar  exemplification. 
Prayer  is  the  address  of  the  human  spirit  to  God. 

Prayer  embraces  all  the  proper  expressions  of  the 
soul  to  God.  As  the  respective  character  of  God 
and  of  men  is  regarded,  reverence  takes  the  form  of 
adoration  on  the  one  side,  of  self-humiliation  on 
the  other.  As  farther,  the  relation  of  man  to  God  is 
fundamentally  and  comprehensively  that  of  de- 
pendence, the  sense  of  this  dependence  express- 
es itself  naturally  in  praise  on  the  one  side,  and  of 

supplication  on  the  other.  The  natural 
Constituents,      constituents  of  prayer  as  the  form  of 

address  to  God  by  man,  are  accordingly 
adoration,  self-humiliation  taking  the  form  of  con- 
fession under  a  consciousness  of  sin,  praise,  and 
supplication. 

§  263.  As  God  is  omnipresent,  to  be 
f'^^Unceasin'^     rccognizcd    in  every  place   and   at  all 

times,  and  as  man  is  ever  dependent  on 
him,  prayer  becomes  the  unceasing  duty  of  man. 


REVERENCE PRAYER.  29I 

The  fundamental  and  most  essential 
*.  Reverential,   quality  of  prayer  is  that  it  be  reverential. 

Prayer  might  very  well  be  defined  as 
the  outgoing  of  a  reverential  spirit  in  a  sense  of 
dependence  and  so  of  want.  So  far  as  this  quality 
is  in  defect,  prayer  is  imperfect  or  fails.  All  light- 
ness and  flippancy  are  incompatible  with  true  prayer. 

Another  requisite  of  prayer  is  that  it  be 
3.  Trustful.      confiding    and    expectant,      "He    that 

Cometh  to  God  must  beheve  that  he  is, 
and  that  he  is  a  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently 
seek  him."  There  is,  of  course,  no  prayer  in  any 
proper  sense  where  there  is  no  sincerity — a  form  of 
words  does  not  constitute  prayer.  Only  where 
there  is  true  expression,  actual  address,  of  soul  to 
God,  is  there  prayer.  The  belief  in  God  as  he  is,  as 
real,  as  infinite,  as  good,  is  involved  in  all  sincere 
address  to  him.  Adoration  and  self-humihation 
can  spring  only  from  a  conscious  sense  of  his 
greatness  in  compassion  with  human  littleness ; 
praise  and  supplication  can  go  forth  only  from  a 
soul  conscious  of  the  divine  goodness  and  of  its 
own  needs.  This  apprehension  of  God  as  infinite- 
ly good — compassionate,  forgiving,  loving — and  of 
the  soul's  entire  dependence  on  him  and  of  its  ur- 
gent necessities,  must  make  prayer,  not  only  earn- 
est, but  believing — trustful  and  expectant. 

§  264.  The  duty  of  prayer  is  enforced 
Duty  enforced,   by  manifold  considerations. 

First,  it  is  natural  and  meet  that  man, 
being  made  in  the  image  of  God,  should  be  in  com- 
munion with  him,  as  a  son  with  his  father. 


292  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

Secondly,  the  addresses  of  God  in  his  works  and 
his  ways  to  man  continually  call  forth  suitable  re- 
sponse taking  the  form  of  prayer. 

Thirdly,  such  prayerful  communion  with  God 
as  the  all-perfect  one,  is  the  necessary  condition  of 
growth  into  the  highest  perfection  attainable  by 
man. 

Fourthly,  as  dependent,  as  ever  needy,  supplica- 
tion to  the  only  being  who  can  supply  the  needs  of 
man's  spirit  is  a  natural  duty.  To  withhold 
prayer  is  to  resist  the  most  sacred  instincts  of 
man's  dependent  nature.  If  these  instincts  may 
be  stifled  for  a  time,  occasions  of  distress  and 
danger  call  them  forth  and  give  them  their  proper 
power  over  the  human  spirit.  The  habitual  sense 
of  dependence,  equally  with  the  habitual  sense  of 
the  divine  greatness  ever  encompassing  them, 
should  keep  alive  in  the  hearts  of  men  a  true  spir- 
it of  prayer  that  shall  break  forth  in  full  and  for- 
mal expression  whenever  the  occasion  shall  allow. 

§  265.  The  objections  to  supplicating 
Objections.  prayer  founded  ostensibly  on  the  divine 
omniscience  and  goodness,  or  on  the 
uniformity  of  his  providence,  are  not  valid.  That 
God  must  know  all  our  wants,  and  that  therefore 
it  is  needless  for  us  to  tell  them  to  him,  and  that  as 
infinitely  good,  he  will  supply  them  so  far  as  can 
consist  with  wisdom  without  our  asking,  is  an  argu- 
ment that  would  by  necessary  implication  forbid  all 
communion  with  God  and  all  expression  of  our 
sense  of  absolute  dependence  on  him  for  all  good. 
It  runs  counter  to  the  strongest  instincts  of  the 


REVERENCE PRAYER.  293 

human  spirit.  The  loving  parent  knows  the  wants 
of  his  child  better  than  itself;  it  would  be  most 
unwise  to  hinder  the  communion  that  must  consist 
in  great  degree  of  the  expressions  of  felt  wants,  be- 
cause of  this  knowledge.  Supplication  is  the  nat- 
ural expression  of  the  sense  of  dependence  ;  certainly 
that  must  be  a  most  mistaken  conception  of  the  re- 
lations of  God  to  man  which  would  exclude  the  pro- 
priety of  expressing  this  sense  of  dependence.  In- 
deed, the  good  to  man  which  may  come  through 
the  communion  with  God  as  the  proper  expression 
of  this  sense  of  dependence  may  supposably  exceed 
the  good  that  could  come  from  the  granting  of  the 
prayer. 

The  argument  against  prayer  in  the  form  of  sup- 
plication for  blessings,  particularly  for  blessings  of 
a  temporal  and  outward  character,  which  is  ground- 
ed on  the  alleged  inviolable  uniformity  in  nature,  is 
equally  invalid.  It  assumes,  what  cannot  be 
proved,  that  the  element  of  prayer  cannot  be  incor- 
porated by  infinite  wisdom  into  uniformity  with  nat- 
ural sequences.  It  assumes  without  warrant  that 
the  sequences  in  nature  cannot  be  changed  from 
what  they  would  have  been  but  for  prayer,  by  an  in- 
terposition of  God  through  natural  causes  and 
means  without  any  violation  of  natural  law.  If  the 
hand  of  a  man  may,  without  disturbing  the  uni- 
formity of  nature,  prevent  the  withering  of  a  plant 
simply  by  conveying  to  its  roots  the  needed  supply  of 
water,  who  shall  dare  to  say  that  the  hand  of  omnip- 
otence is  incompetent  to  turn  the  cloud  in  answer 
to  prayer  from  wasting  itself  on  desert  or  ocean  to 


294  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

a  field  threatened  with  drought,  without  disturb- 
ing the  uniformity  of  nature.  The  argument 
limits  omnipotence,  denies  to  divine  power  what  is 
allowed  to  human.  Answers  to  prayer,  involving 
the  greatest  changes  conceivable  in  physical  se- 
quence that  real  human  needs  can  demand,  may 
be  without  miraculous  power.  Yet,  who  can  pre- 
sume to  say  that  miracles  may  not  be  wrought — 
works  in  nature  that  are  beyond  all  known  natural 
agency — by  Him  who  created  and  gave  laws  to  all 
that  exists. 

But  objections  to  prayer  for  temporal  blessings 
overlook  the  fact  that  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case  all  true  prayer  is  submissive  to  the  higher  wis- 
dom of  God.  "  Not  my  will,  but  thine  be  done," 
is  the  essential  characteristic  of  all  true  prayer. 
The  real  want  that  prompts  the  prayer  may  under- 
lie the  specific  desire  and  not  be  expressed  in  it  but  by 
implication.  At  least,  the  felt  want  may  often  be  best 
relieved  by  the  supply  to  the  soul  of  a  more  funda- 
mental good.  Not  infrequently,  doubtless,  is  the 
specific  desire  gratified  in  some  such  larger  supply 
to  a  deeper  and  broader  want.  The  feverish  child 
asks  for  water  ;  the  wise  and  loving  parent  withhold- 
ing the  specific  desire,  bestows  what  cures  the  fe- 
ver which  occasioned  the  thirst. 

§  266.  The  sin  opposed  to  reverence  is 
iireverence.  trrcvereuce.  Like  its  opposite,  irrever- 
ence rather  indicates  a  habit,  a  dispo- 
sition than  a  specific  act.  The  more  common  out- 
breaking form  of  it  is  profanity.  It  is  a  vicious 
indulgence  to  excess  of  the  natural  instinct,  to  em- 


REVERENCE PRAYER.  29$ 

phasize  certain  of  our  utterances.  Like  all  excesses 
in  habitual  character,  what  at  first  seemed  strong 
and  forcible,  soon  comes  to  seem  but  moderation  ; 
and  blasphemy  becomes  the  ordinary  utterance  of 
the  lips.  It  is  an  easily  entrapping  vice  ;  but  its 
effect  on  the  spirit  is  as  hardening  and  debasing  as 
the  sin  is  offensive  to  God. 

A  milder  form  of  this  vice  is  that  of  the  indul- 
gence of  ridicule  ;  and  a  still  less  heinous  form  is 
that  of  levity  in  respect  to  religious  objects  or 
themes.  When  not  positively  irreverent,  these 
habits  indicate  at  least  a  lamentable  deficiency  in 
the  spirit  of  reverence. 


296  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PERSONAL  RELIGION. — GODLY  SINCERITY. 

§  267.  By  SINCERITY  towards  God,  is 
Defined.  meant  truth  in  our  cherished  and  uttered 

thought  of  him.  It  has  two  sides,  in- 
ward and  outward  ;  truth  in  our  views  of  God,  and 
truth  in  our  utterances  to  him,  corresponding  to  the 
two  forms  of  truthfulness,  before  indicated  among 
the  duties  to  persons;  candor  and  veracity.  §  119. 

§  268.  In  the  first  place  this  duty  in- 
truJ"hought^    volves  a  true  thought  of  God.    It  implies 

a  candid  unbiased  apprehension  of  his 
character,  and  of  his  works  and  ways. 

God  manifests  himself  to  man  in  such  way  that  it 
is  practicable  to  form  a  true  notion  of  him.  His 
eternal  power  and  godhead  are  clearly  seen  from 
the  creation  of  the  world,  and  may  be  truly  known 
by  the  things  that  he  has  made.  His  righteousness 
and  his  mercy  are  revealed  in  history  and  in  his 
dealings  with  every  human  soul.  The  conscience 
testifies  of  him  ;  the  native  sense  of  dependence 
alike  witnesses  to  him  ;  the  experiences  of  his 
care  and  kindness  and  the  cravings  of  his  favor 
for  the  present  life,  but  especially  for  the  life  to 
come,  teach  truly  of  him.     It  is  man's  duty  to  re- 


PERSONAL    RELIGION — GODLY    SINCERITY.      29/ 

ceive  into  his  thought  these  impressions  concerning 
God  just  as  they  are  made.  Not  only  are  there  these 
manifestations  of  God  in  nature  and  providence,  and 
through  the  personal  experience;  more  fully  and 
impressively  are  they  given  in  his  express  revela- 
tions through  the  written  word.  He  is  in  these 
manifold  ways  set  forth  as  not  only  the  creator  of 
men,  but  as  their  moral  governor  and  judge ;  as, 
moreover,  their  gracious  redeemer  and  sanctifier. 
Nature,  history,  personal  experience,  written  revela- 
tion, harmoniously  testify  thus  of  God.  This  testi- 
mony it  is  the  duty  of  men  freely  to  receive ;  and 
to  allow  it  its  lawful  impression  on  the  mind. 

But  "  truth  in  the  inward  parts  "  involves  more 
than  this — a  candid  reception  of  the  testimony  given 
respecting  God  ;  it  involves,  besides,  a  candid  con- 
forming of  the  whole  thought  to  these  impressions. 
What  is  suggested  in  these  revelations  is  to  be  car- 
ried out  in  reverent  contemplation  into  all  its  law 
ful  results  and  conclusions  and  applications. 

Such  is  religious  candor,  embracing  a  free,  hearty, 
unbiased  reception  of  all  the  revelations  of  the 
divine  greatness  and  glory,  of  his  moral  rule,  of 
his  gracious  work,  also,  in  the  redemption  of  men, 
and  a  reverent  thoughtfulness  in  respect  to  them, 
conforming  the  whole  spirit  to  them,  and  applying 
them  to  all  the  specific  phases  of  personal  experi- 
ence. 

§  269.     In  the  second   place,  godly  sin- 
ex^nSom"^      ccrity  imports  a  truthful  expression  of 
our  thought  to  God. 

It  requires  that  in  all  communion  with  him   the 
13* 


298  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

addresses  to  him  be  more  than  empty  sound  or 
form  ;  be  positively  significant,  and  be  expressive 
of  the  real  thought  and  intent  of  the  heart.  All  re- 
ligious forms,  all  religious  acts  and  words,  thus,  are 
to  mean  something  ;  and  this  meaning  must  be  the 
tiue  meaning  of  the  heart. 

§  270.     The  vices  opposed   to  inward 
Idolatry  sincerity   are   idolatry  and  siipei'stition. 

Idolatry  substitutes  a  false,  an  un- 
real, for  the  true  God. 

In  its  grosser  form,  idolatry  elevates  creatures  to 
the  rank  of  the  divine.  Even  to  the  creations  of 
man's  own  hand,  in  its  lowest  form,  it  attributes  a 
kind  of  divinity  and  acknowledges  a  kind  of  reli- 
gious dependence  on  them.  In  a  less  debasing  form 
the  idolatrous  spirit,  turning  from  God,  who  is  the 
only  satisfying  portion  for  the  human  soul,  seeks  its 
supplies  from  lower  springs  ;  from  fellow  men,  or 
from  its  own  resources  ;  from  condition  or  circum- 
stance, or  attainment  other  than  in  the  line  of  virtue 
and  religion.  In  a  somewhat  mixed  form,  it  min- 
gles the  recognition  of  Jehovah  with  the  service  of 
other  gods  ;  it  pays  its  devotions  to  the  instruments 
or  helps  of  worship  ;  or  depends  on  the  abundance 
or  excellence  of  its  own  prayers  or  services.  Idol- 
atry substitutes  something,  as  object  of  worship  or 
ground  of  dependence,  in  the  place  of  the  true 
God. 

§  271.     Superstition  exaggerates  the 
Superstition,      j-cal ;   it  faucics  something  specially  di- 
vine in  what  is  only  the  ordinary  form 
of  the  divine  operation. 


PERSONAL    RELIGION GODLY    SINCERITY.      299 

It  misinterprets  what  is  revealed  of  God  in  his 
common  providence  by  imparting  to  it  a  higher  sig- 
nificance and  import  than  what  belongs  to  it. 
Dreams  that  are  but  the  vagaries  of  unregulated 
thought,  are  erroneously  interpreted  as  of  super- 
natural significance  ;  certain  events,  trivial  as  the 
thousand  experiences  of  every-day  life,  are  selected 
out  of  the  great  current  and  interpreted  to  be  the 
channels  of  special  divine  warning  or  promise.  All 
superstition  is  opposed  to  the  truth  concerning  God 
and  his  ways. 

§  272.  The  vices  opposed  to  outward 
Hypocrisy.         sincerity  are  Jiypocrisy  and  formality. 

Hypocrisy  is  false  expression  ;  it  pro- 
poses to  utter  what  it  does  not  mean.  It  assumes 
the  garb  of  religion  ;  it  appears  in  the  place  of  re- 
ligion ;  it  takes  the  attitude  of  religion  ;  it  uses  the 
ends  of  religion;  while  it  knowingly  simulates,  and 
aims  to  deceive  man  if  not  God  ;  it  utters  religion 
while  irreligion  is  consciously  in  the  heart. 

§  273.  Formality  is  the  mere  negative 
Formality.        opposite  of  outward  rcHgious  sincerity. 

It  is  form  without  indwelling  substance. 
It  is  empty  sound.  If  hypocrisy  is  more  the  sin  of 
the  ungodly  and  the  irreligious,  formality  is  more 
the  fault  to  which  a  really  religious  spirit  is  liable. 
Devotion  must  needs  be  habitual ;  and  what  is 
habitual  is  liable  to  become  merely  formal.  Re- 
pentance is  the  only  cure  of  hypocrisy;  God-fearing 
watchfulness  is  the  great  safeguard  against  for- 
mality. 


300  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PERSONAL  RELIGION. — RELIGIOUS  TRUST,  OBEDIENCE, 
AND  SERVICE. 

§  274.  There  are  other  cardinal  reh- 
Threefoid  duty  prious  dutics  which  resDcct  more  imme- 

from  attributes.    *^  ^ 

diateiy  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  and 
which  are  analogous  to  that  class  of  duties  to  per- 
sons which  are  characterized  by  having  reference  to 
the  moral  nature  of  men.  They  are  Trust,  Obedi- 
ence, and  Service. 

These  religious  virtues  severally  respect  the  attri- 
butes of  God  declared  in  the  three  successive  stages 
of  the  divine  revelation  of  himself  to  men.  To 
Abraham,  God  revealed  himself  as  the  Almighty: 
"  I  am  the  Almighty  God."  As  possessed  of  all 
power,  he  holds  the  destiny  of  all  his  creatures  in 
his  own  hands,  and  dispenses  good  or  evil  at  his 
pleasure.  He  is,  therefore,  the  one  comprehensive 
source  of  all  that  can  move  the  hopes  and  fears  of 
men.  As  hope  and  fear  are  the  fundamental  in- 
stincts of  man's  moral  nature,  and  as  the  good  and 
evil  which  they  respect  are  entirely  at  the  disposal 
of  God,  reliance  on  him  for  the  fulfilment  of  hopes 
and  removal  of   fears,  is   a  fundamental   religious 


TRUST,  OBEDIENCE,  SERVICE.  3OX 

duty.  Trust  in  Him  is  the  primal  virtue  in  re- 
ligion. It  is  presupposed  in  all  riper  graces ;  it 
manifests  itself  earliest  in  the  religious  experience  of 
man.  It  is  the  soil  in  which  obedience  and  love 
fasten  and  nourish  their  roots. 

§  275.     The  requisite  qualities  of  reli- 

1.  Trust.  gious  Trust  are  that  it  be,  i,  entire,  since 

no  good  or  evil  is  beyond  the  control  of 
God  ;  2,  perfect,  since  God's  disposition  to  bless 
with  all  good  and  to  save  from,  all  evil  is  infinite; 
3,  directed  upon  God  himself,  as  the  giver  of  all 
good,  not  on  the  gifts  themselves,  since  otherwise 
there  is  no  religion  in  trust,  and  it  sinks  to  selfish- 
ness or  to  idolatrous  reliance  on  false  gods  or  on 
creatures  ;  4,  loving,  since  all  that  is  moral  and  re- 
ligious must  be  from  a  loving  heart.  God,  as  good, 
as  loving,  beneficent  power,  is  the  immediate  object 
of  religious  trust,  which  penetrates  through  the  good 
it  craves  or  the  evil  it  fears  and  fastens  on  him  who 
holds  both  in  his  power. 

Religious  trust  regards  God  as  the  beneficent, 
all-wise,  and  all-powerful  providential  disposer  of 
the  interests  of  all  created  beings — it  respects  God 
as  providential  ruler. 

§  276.     To  Moses,  God,  in  the  second 

2.  Obedience.     Stage  of  his  Special  revelations  to  man, 

declared  himself  as  the  God  of  author- 
ity, "  I  am  Jehovah  " — the  appellation  significant  of 
sovereignty  and  rule.  To  this  attribute  in  God  the 
duty  of  obedience  in  man  is  the  proper  correlative. 
As  God  commands,  it  is  the  part  of  man  to  obey. 


302  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

Obedience  is  a  duty  of  natural  religion.  The 
conscience  of  man  testifies  of  a  law  imposed  on  him 
from  without.  Not  without  some  just  ground  in 
reason  has  the  first  proof  of  God's  existence  been 
found  by  some  philosophers  in  this  imperative 
which  is  felt  in  the  conscience ;  so  early  and  so 
commanding  is  this  witnessing  voice.  The  awe- 
inspiring  words  :  "  Thou  shalt,"  or  perhaps  in  the 
still  earlier  prohibitory  form,  "  Thou  shalt  not," 
break  upon  the  ear  in  early  childhood.  The  voice 
of  command  stirs  the  heart  through  a  presupposed 
trust — through  the  hopes  and  fears.  Obedience,  as 
already  intimated,  roots  itself  in  trust.  An  indif- 
ference to  one's  destiny,  recklessness  in  regard  to 
the  future,  is  as  fatal  to  true  obedience  as  it  is 
foreign  to  man's  true  nature  Obedience  is  fed  up 
and  made  strong  by  trust  contemplating  the  pos- 
sible evil  to  be  averted  and  the  possible  good  to  be 
realized.  The  deeper  and  richer  the  trust,  the  more 
perfect  will  be  the  obedience. 

Religious  obedience  regards  God  as  the  sovereign 
of  men,  who  has  made  known  his  will  in  a  law  that 
is  perfect,  wise,  and  good,  reaching  to  every  power 
and  affection  and  condition  of  man,  and  that  is  sup- 
ported and^  enforced  by  infinite  sanctions  of  good 
and  evil — promises  of  good  to  the  obedient  and 
threatenings  of  evil  to  the  disobedient.  God  is  ad- 
ministering this  law  over  men,  in  perfect  justice 
and  righteousness  and  truth.  Obedience  respects 
this  moral  rule  of  God. 

§  277.  The  requisite  qualities  of  religious  obe- 
dience are  that    it  be   i,  unlversaL  since  he  that 


TRUST,    OBEDIENCE,    SERVICE.  303 

offends  in  one  command  offends  in  all,  transgresses 
the  authority  of  the  whole  law ;  2,  wJioIe-soidedj 
with  all  the  mind  and  soul  and  heart  and  strength ; 
3,  directed  upon  God  the  law-giver  himself,  since  to 
have  a  sole  regard  to  the  sanction  of  the  law — 
the  good  of  the  promised  reward  or  the  evil  of  the 
threatened  penalty — is  not  obedience  but  self-seek- 
ing ;  4,  loving-,  since  the  law  is  good,  and  the  law- 
giver is  good  in  giving  and  administering  it,  and  as 
thus  good  is  worthy  of  a  loving  obedience.  A 
constrained,  a  servile  obedience  contradicts  both 
the  free  nature  of  man  and  also  his  filial  relation  to 
God.  Only  a  free,  filial,  in  other  words,  a  loving 
obedience  can  be  accepted  of  God  or  satisfy  man's 
conscience. 

§  278.  In  the  third  stage  of  God's 
3.  Service.        Special  revelations  of  himself  to  men, 

he  declares  himself  as  the  God  of  grace 
and  mercy,  forgiving  iniquity,  transgression,  and 
sin — "  the  Lord,  the  Lord  God,  gracious  and  merci- 
ful." As  having  thus  a  gracious  purpose  in  the  ac- 
complishment of  which  he  enlists  his  boundless  re- 
sources and  the  infinity  of  his  loving  heart,  in 
whose  final  and  complete  success  lies  his  whole 
pleasure  and  the  very  glory  which  is  the  end  of  his 
whole  rule  and  work,  God  presents  to  men  the  pos- 
sibility and  at  once  the  privilege  and  the  duty  of  a 
most  acceptable  service  and  ministry. 

There  is  a  service  of  God  that  does  not  so  prom- 
inently reveal  itself  as  an  act  of  obedience.  All 
service  is,  indeed,  commanded  ;  the  authority  of 
Jehovah  is  beneath  it  ;  and  all  service  must  be  in 


304  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 

obedience  as  done  with  the  authority  of  Jehovah 
and  in  deference  to  it.  But,  as  religious  duty  may 
be  characterized  sometimes  as  obedience  rather 
than  trust,  although  all  obedience  must  be  in  trust, 
so  religious  service  is  sometimes  characterized  not 
so  prominently  as  rendered  directly  and  exclusively 
in  reference  to  the  divine  commands.  God  has  an 
end  which  he  seeks ;  to  this  end  man  may  directly 
minister.  In  so  doing  he  may  in  truth  be  said  to 
be  ministering  to  the  pleasure  of  God  and  to  the 
glory  of  his  name.  God  is  building  up  a  kingdom 
of  grace  among  men.  In  the  progress  and  ultimate 
triumph  of  this  kingdom  his  pleasure  and  his  glory 
are  alike  concerned.  To  this  revelation  of  God  as 
a  God  of  grace,  religious  service  is  the  proper  cor- 
relative on  the  part  of  man. 

Religious  service  thus  regards  God  as  in  his 
gracious  economy  seeking  the  salvation  of  men 
with  an  infinite  mercy  and  compassion,  with  the 
enlistment  of  all  the  resources  of  heaven  and  earth, 
in  the  exercise  of  infinite  wisdom  and  boundless 
power,  as  also  of  infinite  goodness  and  love.  Re- 
ligious service  respects  God  as  such  a  gracious 
ruler. 

§  279.  The  requisite  qualities  of  true  religious  ser- 
•vice  are  that  it  be  (i.)  ivholc-hearted — that  with  all 
earnestness  of  zeal  and  full  consecration  in  spirit  in 
all  the  regulation  of  the  life,  in  the  choice  of  pursuits, 
the  framing  of  plans,  and  in  the  performance  of  par- 
ticular acts,  the  interests  of  God's  kingdom  be  held 
in  paramount  regard  ;  (2.)  jDiqucstiouiinr. — that  it 
minister  to  those  interests  in  whatsoever  field  they 


TRUST,    OBEDIENCE,    SERVICE.  305 

may  require  and  in  whatever  way  service  may  be 
effective  ;  (3)  personal  to  God — that  it  be  rendered 
to  God  personally  in  the  particular  interest  to  be 
advanced,  not  to  the  interest  itself ;  (4)  loving — 
that  it  be  in  hearty  sympathy  with  the  will  of  God, 
and  as  securing  his  highest  favor  and  thus  placing 
the  soul  in  that  condition  which  brings  to  it  its 
highest  joy  and  satisfaction. 

§  280.  The  formal  engagement  of  one's 
ReUgious  vow.    sclf  to  this  scrvicc  to   God  constitutes 

the  proper  religious  vow.  But  in  the 
wider  sense  the  vow  includes  all  engagements  to 
service  whether  to  be  rendered  to  God,  or  to  one's 
fellow  men,  or  to  one's  self.  It  is  thus  an  engage- 
ment under  religious  sanctions. 

The  special  principles  respecting  vows  are  :  i. 
They  should  not  be  made  rashly  or  inconsiderately 
nor  on  trivial  occasions.  2.  They  should  be  sacred- 
ly fulfilled.  3.  If  the  fulfilment  should  be  unlaw- 
ful or  impossible,  the  obligation  is  not  of  course  to 
be  regarded  as  satisfied,  but  is  to  be  discharged  in 
some  other  way  that  shall  in  its  effect  be  equivalent. 


306  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PERSONAL   RELIGION^— RELIGIOUS  INTEGRITY. 

§  281.  The  last  class  of  personal  re- 
Division,  ligious  duties  to  be  considered  are  those 

which  have  more  characteristic  refer- 
ence to  the  act  of  duty.  Here  are  to  be  noticed 
those  distinctions  in  duty  which  are  marked  more 
prominently  by  one  or  another  of  the  leading  ele- 
ments or  constituent  attributes  of  moral  rectitude. 
They  are  of  two  species  according  as  these  attri- 
butes are  essential  or  relative. 

The  first  species,  embracing  those  duties  which 
are  marked  by  an  essential  attribute  of  religious 
rectitude  or  integrity,  includes,  first,  shigleiiess  of 
heart  towards  God;  and,  secondly,  unswerving 
directness  in  duty. 

All  moral  rectitude  implies  an  aim  which 
he^t.^"^^^°^     is  single  and  true.     In  religious  duty 

this  aim  is  directed  towards  God  sin- 
gly. There  are  two  mistakes  here  to  which  men 
are  liable.  One  is  in  aiming  only  at  the  particular 
interest  concerned  in  the  duty,  without  a  governing 
recognition  of  God  in  it.     The  aim,  thus,  may  rest 


RELIGIOUS    INTEGRITY.  307 

solely  in  the  service  rendered,  the  act  of  worship 
done.  This  aim  may  be  a  worthy  one;  for  its 
accomplishment  there  may  be  worthy  and  success- 
ful endeavor ;  but  unless  God  be  recognized  in  it, 
the  act  is  religiously  defective.  The  aim  in  all  ac- 
ceptable religious  duty  must  reach  ever  to  him.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  aim  may  reach  beyond  him  to  the 
good  that  may  reward  the  fulfilment  of  the  duty. 
This  may  be  truly  worthy  and  desirable  ;  but  it  is 
to  be  sought  only  as  the  result  and  consequence  to 
follow  the  fulfilment  of  the  duty.  To  regard  this 
following  good  as  the  immediate  aim,  vitiates  the 
act.  The  aim  in  all  religious  duty  must,  thus, 
reach  on  the  one  hand  beyond  the  immediate  object 
to  be  accomplished  to  God,  and  on  the  other  must 
rest  in  him  as  the  one  end  in  all  relio:ion. 

§  282.  Further,  religious  integrity  im- 
dir^ct'nS'?'"^  P^^^^  unswerving  directness  in  the  per- 
formance of  duty.  It  is  opposed  to  all 
crookedness,  indirectness,  obliquity.  True  re- 
ligious activity  must,  to  be  perfect,  be  straight  for- 
ward in  its  movement. 

§  283.     The  second  species  of  religious 
Harmony  with    dutics,  marked  by  a  relative    attribute 

other  duties  m  \  -^ 

direction.  of  rcctitude,  cmbraccs  those   of   direc- 

tion and  those  of  decree. 
In  direction,  all  duty  must  be  in  harmony  and 
parallelism  with  all  other  duty.  The  lines  of  duty 
are  all  laid  in  perfect  wisdom,  and  can  never  cross. 
It  is  a  sign  of  moral  error  when  duties  clash. 
When  we  clearly  discern  the  boundaries  of  anoth- 
er's field  of  duty,  we  are  admonished  that  if  the 


308  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

path  we  are  pursuing  trespasses  upon  it,  we  are  in 
the  wrong,  and  need  to  retrace  our  steps  or  bend 
our  course.  In  the  same  way,  when  different  spe- 
cific duties  pertaining  to  ourselves  colhde,  we  may 
be  sure  there  is  moral  defect  somewhere.  Reli- 
gious rectitude  implies  that  all  duty  is  harmonious 
and  consistent ; — "  her  paths  are  peace." 

§  284.  Again,  all  specific  duty  has  its 
Moderation  in    q^^  just  mcasure  and  desrree  :   to  be 

degree.  •'  °  ' 

perfect  it  must  neither  exceed  nor  fall 
short  of  its  due  limit.  Religious  zeal  may  be  true 
and  single,  while  it  may  be  imperfect  either  through 
excess  or  through  lack  of  fervor. 


SOCIAL   RELIGION — FAMILY    RELIGION.         309 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SOCIAL  RELIGION FAMILY  RELIGION. 

§  285.  Inasmuch  as  man  is  a  religious 
Division.  being,  religion  may  legitimately  find  a 

place  in  all  associations  of  men,  even 
such  as  are  temporary  or  accidental.  But  it  is  in 
the  several  spheres  of  the  three  great  permanent 
societies  existing  among  men — the  Family,  the 
State,  and  the  Church — that  social  religion  is  best 
seen  in  its  native  and  special  obligations.  We  will 
consider  it  in  the  duties  which  it  enjoins  in  these 
several  spheres  in  order. 

§  286.  We  must  begin  with  a  full  and 
Religion  in  the  distinct  rccoofnition  of   the  close   rela- 

family.  ^ 

tion  which  religion  bears  to  all  the 
great  interests  of  man,  and  of  its  special  influence 
on  these  interests  through  the  family  organization 
and  life.  The  great  interests  of  man  lie  in  the 
eternal  hereafter ;  and  to  this  future  life  his  tem- 
poral life  is  to  be  made  subservient.  It  is,  more- 
over, in  his  relation  to  God  that  the  highest  inter- 
ests of  man  are  centred.  The  family  trains  for 
this  life  and  for  the  future.  This  training  must  be 
radically  deficient  if  religion  does  not  enter  into  it 


3IO  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

as  the  guiding  and  sustaining  element.  Indeed,  an 
irreligious  household,  that  is,  a  household  where  the 
relation  of  man  to  God  is  excluded  from  view,  must 
lack  a  chief  requisite  for  its  own  peace  and  well- 
being,  as  well  as  for  its  efficiency  in  effecting  the 
training  which  is  entrusted  to  it.  It  is  in  child- 
hood that  character  is  shaped  ;  it  is  in  the  family 
that  the  germs  of  piety  for  the  most  part  are  start- 
ed ;  it  is  there  that  religious  culture  should  be  be- 
gun and  carried  so  far  as  permanently  to  determine 
the  habits  and  the  conduct.  In  the  religious  home, 
all  unconsciously  to  itself,  the  spirit  of  the  child 
breathes  the  atmosphere  and  receives  the  shaping 
influences  which  form  character.  The  impressions 
of  the  earliest  years  are  the  deepest  and  the  most 
ineffaceable.  As  the  family  is  the  great  nursery 
for  the  state,  and  the  character,  and  consequently 
the  destiny,  of  the  nation  hang  on  the  character  of 
the  families  which  compose  it,  the  religious  house- 
hold is  a  necessity  of  national  as  well  as  of  individ- 
ual well-being  ;  while,  in  regard  to  the  individual 
man,  so  long  as  it  remains  true  that  "  Godliness  has 
the  promise  of  the  life  that  now  is,  as  well  as  of  the 
life  to  come,"  religion  in  the  family  affords  the  most 
hopeful  condition  to  him  of  success  here  and  here- 
after. 

§  287.     The  family  life  has  its  initiation 
In  marriage.       in  marriage.      Inasmuch  as  the  family 

sphere  is  inclusive  of  both  secular  and 
immortal  interests,  marriage  must  have  both  a  reli 
gious  and  a  secular  side.     Whether  the  state  and 
the   church   are    united   in    one   organization,  and 


SOCIAL    RELIGION FAMILY    RELIGION.  3II 

whether  the  head,  in  that  case,  is  properly  civil  or 
ecclesiastical,  or  whether  they  are  separate  and  dis- 
tinct in  organization  and  rule  and  duty,  in  every 
case,  marriage  must  be  both  civil  and  religious.  It 
is  a  civil  contract  which  reaches  to  secular  interests 
that  properly  lie  within  the  domain  of  the  state.  It 
very  properly,  therefore,  invites  civil  regulation  and 
civil  formalities.  It  is  the  ground  of  most  import- 
ant civil  rights — those  of  protection,  support,  in- 
heritance. But  marriage  not  less  vitally  concerns 
spiritual  and  immortal  interests.  It  is  fitting,  there- 
fore, that  it  take  place  under  religious  as  well  as 
civil  sanctions.  It  is,  indeed,  in  a  true  sense,  a 
sacrament,  in  so  far  as  it  involves  a  covenant  before 
God,  under  the  order  which  he  has  imposed,  direct- 
ly reaching  to  the  highest  spiritual,  as  well  as  to 
temporal  and  secular  interests.  The  family  life 
should  begin  in  religion. 

§  288.  Farther,  the  plan  and  ordering 
f"  the  ^o"se-  of  the  on-going  family  life  should  be  re- 
ligious. The  dwelling  in  its  arrange- 
ments, its  furniture,  its  library,  may  fitly  show  that 
the  home-life  contemplated  in  it  is  not  to  be  wholly 
godless.  The  ordering  of  this  life  from  day  to  day 
may  fitly  give  a  place  for  religious  observances. 
The  collective  life  of  the  family  circle  may  recog- 
nize God,  and  yet  not  infringe  at  all  upon  proper 
freedom  of  conscience.  Even  the  mere  outward 
and  formal  observance  is  better  than  none  ;  as  we 
expect  the  outward  deportment  to  be  civil  and  dec- 
orous from  even  the  boorish  and  base  in  spirit 
The  form  of  virtue  may  invite  the  inward  life. 


312  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

§  289.  Moreover,  the  family  life  should, 
Positifereiigi-    [^i  its  actual  proo:ress,  exemplify  relisri- 

ous  training,  x       o  i       ./  c 

ous  duty.  The  training  of  children  im- 
peratively demands  this  of  the  parental  head.  Just 
as  the  habitually  profane  will  set  a  guard  upon  his 
lips  when  his  children  are  by  him,  so  may  the  out- 
ward respect  for  religion  be  evinced  even  when  its 
spirit  doe§  not  rule  in  the  heart.  A  reverence  for 
all  things  sacred,  a  candid  and  honest  treatment  of 
religious  matters,  a  deference  to  religious  claims, 
may  be  shown  where  the  tremendous  responsibili- 
ties of  a  parent's  charge  may  not  have  inspired  a 
true  and  full  personal  consecration  to  a  godly  life. 

Still  further,  family  religion  involves  a  faithful 
inculcation  of  piety  on  the  subordinate  members  of 
the  family.  Religious  instruction  is  a  leading 
household  duty.  Parents  are  expressly  enjoined  in 
sacred  scripture  to  bring  up  their  children  "  in  the 
nurture  and  admonition  of  the  Lord." 

§  290.  The  true  religious  life  ever  seeks 
Family  worship,  iq    exprcss    itsclf     in     outward    rites. 

Family  religion  demands  its  observ- 
ances. It  is  sufficient  to  say  here  that  in  the 
family,  religious  rites  should  have  a  place  in  the 
regular  order  of  the  household  ;  they  should  be 
stated  and  regular ;  they  should  be  simple  and 
familiar  and  attractive.  They  may  well  enlist  all 
the  proper  elements  of  worship,  the  service  of  song 
as  well  as  of  prayer  and  meditation  of  religious 
truth.  As  the  table  is  at  the  centre  of  the  family 
life,  bringing  all  the  members  together  at  stated 
and    frequently   recurring    intervals,    it   seems   to 


SOCIAL   RELIGION FAMILY    RELIGION.         313 

present  the  best  occasions  for  the  common  religious 
services  of  the  household.  It  suggests  dependence 
and  calls  to  gratitude  for  realized  blessings,  as  well 
as  awakens  the  spirit  of  trustful  expectation  for 
future  good.  The  regular  recurrence  of  sleep  also 
brings  along  with  it  suggestions  to  devotion  and 
affords  convenient  occasions  for  united  service  of 
religious  worship  in  every  well  regulated  household. 

14 


314  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

SOCIAL    RELIGION, — THE    STATE. 

Thestateare-  §  ^9^'  The  Sphere  of  the  State  life,  as 
ligious  as  well   ^g  h^vQ  f ound,  is  Durelv  secular.     The 

as  a  moral  per-  . 

sonaiity.  one  immediate  end  of  its   action   is  the 

promotion  of  the  common  secular  interest  of  its 
citizens.  But  we  have  also  found  that  the  state  is 
a  truly  moral  personality  ;  it  must  in  its  secular 
sphere  act  morally.  Precisely  on  the  same  grounds 
must  the  state  be  admitted  to  be  a  religious  per- 
sonality. Man,  as  already  noted,  is  a  religious 
being  ;  and  this  religiousness  of  essential  character, 
like  his  moral  nature,  follows  him  every  where  into 
his  social  as  well  as  his  proper  personal  life.  The 
being  and  the  sovereignty  of  God  are  truths  which 
concern  man  every  where  ;  it  would  be  worse  than 
stolid  in  the  state  to  ignore  them.  The  state  is 
subject  to  the  providential  rule  of  God  ;  and  his 
righteous  retributions  wait  on  all  political  as  truly 
as  upon  all  personal  action.  The  religious  interests 
of  men  are  their  paramount  interests  ;  the  state, 
which  is  but  a  community  of  men  acting  in  a 
political   sphere,  cannot    wisely  be   indifferent   to 


SOCIAL    RELIGION THE    STATE.  315 

these  highest  common  interests  of  all  its  members. 
Even  the  best  secular  ends  common  to  them  cannot 
all  be  attained  except  through  religion.  The  sanc- 
tity of  the  marriage  relation,  the  veraciousness  of 
witnesses,  the  fidelity  of  officials,  for  example, 
invoke  the  sanctions  of  religion.  The  rights  of 
religious  freedom  and  of  religious  practice,  which 
reach  in  all  directions  into  the  pursuits  and  the 
possessions  of  men,  demand  the  protection  of  the 
state,  equally  with  other  rights.  The  state  is  ca- 
pable of  religious  action  ;  it  may  recognize  its  de- 
pendence on  God  in  manifold  ways  ;  it  may  admin- 
ister the  sanctions  of  religion  in  oaths  ;  it  may 
suspend  civil  administration  on  days  hallowed  by 
religion.  In  divers  ways,  thus,  it  is  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  acting  in  reference  to  religion. 

The  argument  for  the  entire  exclusion  of  all 
reference  to  religion  by  the  state  which  rests  on 
the  ground  that  all  such  action  must  of  necessity 
infringe  on  the  rights  of  conscience  of  some  of  its 
citizens,  is  one  of  inconsiderable  weight.  In  so  far 
as  the  religion  of  the  state  only  recognizes  the 
being  of  God,  his  attributes,  and  his  relations  to 
men,  as  accepted  by  all  who  believe  in  a  God,  and 
these  make  up  the  great  mass  of  the  members  of 
every  civilized  nation,  there  is  no  possibility  of  in- 
fringement upon  conscience.  For  those  who  believe 
in  God  certainly  have  no  grouilds  of  complaint  on 
this  ground,  and  it  is  difficult  to  comprehend  how  any 
others  can  have  any  conscience  at  all  to  be  troubled. 
History  abundantly  shows  the  practicability  of  a  true 
religious  freedom  even   under  a  national  church; 


3l6  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 

certainly,  it  may  exist  where  there  is  no  ecclesiastic 
establishment. 

It  is  not  necessary,  it  may  be  observed,  however 
desirable  it  may  be  held  to  be,  that  the  formal  rec- 
ognition of  the  being  and  rule  of  God,  be  incor- 
porated into  the  constitution  and  organic  law  of  a 
people,  any  more  than  a  like  formal  recognition  of 
the  existence  of  neighboring  nations.  It  is  enough 
that  the  rights  and  duties  in  each  case  be  faithfully 
observed  in  the  actual  working  of  the  state. 

§  292.  The  particular  rights  and  duties 
Special  duties,    pertaining  to  the  state  in  reference  to 

religion,  are  substantially  embraced  in 
the  following  enumeration : 

First,  The  state  must  in  no  case  act 
ktefdfgioul'ob- irreligiously— in  direct  and  positive  vio- 
ligations.  lation  of  religious  duty.     Such  practice 

must  ever  be  needless,  since  all  the  lines  of  duty 
in  all  the  spheres  of  human  activity  are  parallel. 
It  must,  at  least,  ever  be  unwise  and  impolitic.   . 

§  293.  Secondly,  the  state  is  bound  to 
rdi^ous^rights  protect,  so  far  as  lies  in  its  power,  all 
of  subjects.  the  secular  rights  of  its  members  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  religion.  It  must  lend  its  courts 
to  adjudicate  and  enforce  all  the  secular  obligations 
arising  in  their  religious  associations.  It  should 
hold  itself  in  favoring  sympathy  with  all  the  sin- 
cere endeavors  and  aims  of  religious  men,  not  an- 
tagonistic to  the  well-being  of  the  state.  As,  while 
men  remain  imperfect,  it  may  be  reasonably  expect- 
ed that,  with  the  best  intentions,  collisions  of  state 
interests  and  individual  convictions  m.ay  arise,  the 


SOCIAL   RELIGION THE    STATE.  317 

State  should  exercise  the  greatest  leniency  and  con- 
siderateness  towards  the  tender  conscience.  The 
state  does  wisely  thus  to  accept  pecuniary  contri- 
bution in  lieu  of  military  personal  service  of  those 
conscientiously  opposed  to  war ;  as  also  to  allow 
solemn  affirmation  in  lieu  of  the  formal  oath. 

§  294.     Thirdly,  the  state  may,  with  true 

3.  TohaUow      political  wisdom  secure,  and  therefore 

marriage.  ^ 

may  be  regarded  as  bound  in  duty  to 
secure,  for  the  marriage  relation,  so  vital  to  the 
best  interests  of  the  state,  all  the  sanctions  which 
religion  can  throw  around  it.  If  it  have  no  minis- 
ters of  religion  of  its  own,  it  may  accept  the  ser- 
vice of  those  properly  accredited  as  such  as  if  it 
were  the  service  of  its  own  officials.  It  may  accept 
religious  formalities  in  the  consummation  of  mar- 
riage to  a  certain  extent,  in  substitution  for  such 
civil  procedures  as  the  purity  of  the  family  life  and 
the  determination  of  rights  in  inheritance  as  well 
as  of  other  secular  rights,  may  require. 

§  295.     Fourthly,  it  may  recognize  the 

4.  Appoint  re-    observance  of  certain  religious  seasons 

hgious  seasons.  ^  ° 

by  forbearing  the  usual  routine  of  duty 
required  of  its  officials,  by  closing  public  offices,  by 
refusing  to  enforce  contracts  made  on  such  desig- 
nated occasions,  by  prohibiting  pursuits  and  prac- 
tices that  may  disturb  the  quiet  enjoyment  of  those 
seasons  on  the  part  of  a  portion  of  the  community. 
Civilized  nations  have  thus  generally  recognized  the 
weekly  rest — the  Christian  Sabbath — as  a  day  on 
which  public  offices  shall  not  regularly  be  opened 
for  business,  and  civil  service  by  its  officials  shall 


3l8  DUTIES  TO    GOD. 

not  be  allowed.  They  have  also  refused  to  recog- 
nize contracts  made  on  that  day  as  valid,  and  have 
forbidden  certain  kinds  of  business  to  be  prosecu- 
ted which  hinder  the  enjoyment  of  the  season  by 
the  mass  of  the  people.  The  state,  moreover,  has 
wisely  recognized  other  great  religious  days  as  legal 
holidays — that  is,  as  days  on  which  the  ordinary 
secular  activities  are  to  be  intermitted.  Indeed,  in 
this  case,  the  observance  of  a  weekly  rest  from 
secular  care  and  labor  has  been  found  to  be  so 
closely  connected  with  the  highest  secular  prosper- 
ity of  a  people  as  to  justify  the  recognition  of  it  by 
the  state  on  purely  secular  grounds. 

§  296.  Fifthly,  the  state  wisely  recog- 
Lpendencron*^  nizcs  its  dependence  on  God  as  the  su- 
^^  preme  arbiter  of  human  affairs,  and  on 

occasions  of  signal  successes  in  national  endeavors 
or  of  general  distress  and  fear,  appoints  special 
days  of  thanksgiving  to  God  or  of  humiliation  be- 
fore him  to  deprecate  his  displeasure.  It  wisely 
recognizes,  too,  the  constancy  of  this  dependence, 
in  stated  appointments  for  general  religious  service 
in  praise  or  supplication.  There  is  true  political 
wisdom,  also,  in  recognizing  this  dependence,  on 
important  occasions  of  administrative  service,  as 
the  opening  of  legislative  assemblies,  of  judicial 
proceedings,  the  beginning  and  the  ending  of  im- 
portant enterprises,  as  of  war,  and  the  like. 

§  297.  Sixthly,  the  State  may  wisely 
f;ii^i^ursanc-°^  enlist  the  aid  of  religious  sanctions  on 
tions— Oaths,  various  occasions  of  political  service, 
particularly  in  the  form  of  religious  oaths. 


SOCIAL    RELIGION THE    STATE.  319 

The  religious  oath  is  a  solemn  appeal  to  God 
for  the  sincerity  of  a  declaration  or  a  promise.  Its 
proper  design  and  effect  is  to  quicken  the  con- 
science by  a  solemn  recognition  of  responsibilities 
being  involved  in  relation  to  God,  the  All-seeing 
and  the  All- judging,  as  well  as  to  men  who  are  un- 
able to  read  the  heart. 

§  298.  Oaths  are  of  several  distinguish- 
ciasses.  able   classes.      The  most  common  are 

judicial  oaths,  taken  by  witnesses  upon 
themselves  in  giving  testimony  before  judicial  tri- 
bunals. 

Another  class  of  oaths  are  oaths  of  declaration, 
as  in  declaring  the  amount  or  value  of  taxable  prop- 
erty, innocence  of  bribery  in  elections,  and  the 
like. 

A  third  class  are  oaths  of  engagement,  adminis- 
tered to  civil  officers,  binding  them  more  solemnly 
to  a  faithful  performance  of  their  duties,  or  to  trus- 
tees or  administrators  or  guardians,  binding  them 
to  a  right  discharge  of  the  trusts  confided  to  them. 
Such  oaths  may  be  of  general  or  more  special  en- 
gagement. 

A  fourth  class  are  oaths  of  allegiance,  taken  by 
those  who  are  admitted  to  the  rights  of  citizenship. 
§  299.  In  the  interpretation  of  oaths 
Interpretation,  t^g  general  principle  is  that  the  oath  is 
to  be  taken  as  it  is  meant  by  the  au- 
thority that  imposes  it — seciuidnm  aniniiim  iinpojie?i- 
tis — that  is,  by  the  state,  and  not  in  the  under- 
standing of  the  person  to  whom  it  is  administered. 
An  oath  of  allegiance — that  is,  an  oath  to  maintain 


320  DUTIES   TO    GOD. 

the  constitution  or  organic  law  of  the  state — will 
thus  be  interpreted  by  the  state  as  to  what  is  meant 
by  any  particular  provision  of  the  organic  law.  It 
is  possible,  therefore,  that  while  before  the  tribunal 
of  his  own  conscience  one  may  be  clear  of  offense, 
yet,  by  the  civil  tribunal,  he  may  be  held  to  suffer 
the  penalties  of  perjury. 


SOCIAL   RELIGION— -TIIF.    CHURCH.  32 1 


CHAPTER    IX. 

SOCIAL   RELIGION — THE    CHURCH. 

§  300.  The  religious  nature  of  man 
Natural.  seeks  to  express  itself  in  his  social  life. 

A  religious  society  is  thus  as  natural 
among  men  as  a  political  society.  Their  common 
religious  interests  require  a  care  and  support  as 
truly  as  their  secular  interests.  To  suppress  all  re- 
ligious convictions  and  endeavors  in  social  life 
would  be  to  cramp  and  stifle  man's  highest  aspira- 
tions, and  his  best  and  tenderest  sympathies  with 
his  fellows.  The  secular  and  the  rehgious  have  in 
their  natures  no  formidable  antagonisms  to  threat- 
en the  peace  of  the  community.  If  religious  con- 
troversies have  arisen  and  religious  wars  have  oc- 
curred, they  are  to  be  attributed  not  to  religion  but 
to  depraved  passions,  working  in  spite  of  religion. 
So  ambition  and  cupidity  have  occasioned  bloody 
contests  ;  but  not,  therefore,  are  fame  and  property 
to  be  exorcised  from  human  experience.  All  the 
proper  effects  and  influences  of  religion  are  to  for- 
bearance, to  peace,  to  order.     The  community  in 

14* 


322  DUl'lES    ro   GOD. 

which  true  religious  convictions  sway  the  lives  of 
its  members  is  that  where  the  highest  order  and 
prosperity  may  be  expected  to  prevail. 

§  301.  The  forms  of  the  social  relig- 
Organization.  ious  Organization  will  vary  with  the  re- 
ligious system  which  is  embraced  and 
the  general  culture  and  condition  of  the  communi- 
ty. The  organization  may  reach  to  great  detail  of 
creed,  of  worship,  of  rules,  or  extend  only  to  a  few 
and  almost  inconsiderable  common  usages  and  ob- 
servances. The  religious  society  may  be  incorpor- 
ated into  the  civil  organization.  Nothing  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  or  in  history  forbids  that  the 
common  head  in  such  an  event,  should  be  either 
political  or  religious.  Mohammedanism  is  primi- 
tively and  essentially  religious,  yet  is  counted  a  sec- 
ular as  well  as  religious  organization.  On  the 
other  hand,  diverse  European  states  have  assumed 
to  themselves  the  regulation  of  religion.  Or  the  re- 
ligious society  may  exist  side  by  side  with  the 
political,  in  entire  harmony,  and  with  reciproca- 
ting offices  of  helpfulness,  yet  in  full  independ- 
ence. 

The  christian  church  is  the  best  existing  type  of 
a  religious  organization,  the  leading  characteris- 
tics of  which  may  be  instanced  as  type-forms  of 
every  permanent  religious  society. 

§  302.  Every  fully  organized  society  must 
have  prescribed  officials,  times,  places,  usages. 
The  church  has  in  its  organization,  offices,  religious 
seasons,  places,  and  rites. 

The  functions  of  religious  officials  are,  besides 


SOCIAL    RELIGION THE    CHURCH.  323 

Officials.  the  general   functions   of   representing 

and  ruling,  twofold : — those  of  teach- 
ing and  of  ministry  — prophetic  and  liturgical. 
It  belongs  to  them  to  preserve,  to  interpret, 
to  proclaim,  and  to  enforce  the  body  of  religious 
truth  which  is  held  by  the  community,  and  to  ap- 
ply it  and  make  it  effectual  in  the  life  and  practice 
of  the  members.  It  belongs  to  them  also  to  min- 
ister in  the  public  rites  and  ceremonies  of  the  com- 
munity. 

§  303.     The  religious  society  must  have 
Social  seasons,    its  social  scasons  for  social  rcligious  ob- 
servances. 

These  may  be  prescribed  by  divine  or 
by  merely  human  authority ;  they  may  be  tradi- 
tional or  temporary ;  stated  or  occasional.  The 
church  accepts  also  from  the  state,  appointments 
for  public  religious  observances,  as  has  been  already 
intimated. 

§  304.  The  weekly  Sabbath  stands 
The  Sabbath,  conspicuous  among  all  sacred  seasons 
by  reason  of  its  antiquity,  its  divine  or- 
igin, its  general  recognition,  its  proved  necessity  to 
all  the  interests  of  men.  The  principle  of  the 
Sabbatic  law  is  that  one  seventh  of  the  time  be 
withdrawn  from  secular  cares  and  pursuits  and  be 
consecrated  to  religious  uses.  The  law  does  not 
prohibit  necessary  secular  occupations,  which  in- 
deed, need  not  hinder  the  highest  reUgious  ends  of 
the  Sabbath  any  more  than  some  religious  obser- 
vances, as  at  morning  and  at  evening  and  of  taking 
of  food,  interfere  with  secular  labor.      The  nature 


324  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

of  the  institution  does  not  fix  the  precise  hours  to 
be  observed  as  sacred  to  religious  uses  ;  it  does  in- 
volve a  certain  proportion  of  time  ;  and  for  obvious 
social  necessities  the  same  hours,  to  be  fixed  by 
some  common  standard,  must  be  taken  for  the 
same  local  community.  The  Sabbatic  law  enjoins 
a  consecration  of  this  one  day  in  seven  to  proper 
religious  uses.  It  enjoins  the  duty  on  every  man's 
conscience  so  to  observe  the  day  as  to  make  it  most 
promotive  of  these  uses.  The  Sabbatic  law  is, 
moreover,  a  social  institution  ;  its  very  object  con- 
templates a  general  agreement  in  respect  to  the 
observance. 

§  305.      Divers   considerations    evince 
Grounds  of  the   ^]-jg  obligatory  character  of  thi«;  law  for 

duty  to  observe  ^  •' 

the  Sabbath.       the  entire  human  race. 

First,  the  religious  interests  of  men  de- 
mand this  appropriation  of  time ;  and  the  institu- 
tion must  fail  unless  it  be  observed  in  the  commu- 
nity generally,  so  as  to  secure  it  from  all  interrup- 
tion from  secular  pursuits.  To  avail  to  one,  it  must 
be  observed  by  all. 

Secondly,  the  secular  well-being  of  man  demands 
it.  Careful  induction  from  large  observation  and 
experience,  has  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  this 
weekly  religious  rest  in  order  to  the  best  condition 
of  worldly  interests. 

Thirdly,  the  law  was  originally  given  to  man  as 
man  in  the  earliest  stages  of  the  existence  of  the 
race  on  earth. 

Fourthly,  it  was  subsequently  incorporated  by  the 
express  authority  of  God  jnto  the  decalogue  of  Moses 


SOCIAL    RELIGION THE    CHURCH.  325 

— which  is  a  summary  of  the  rules  of  moral  and  re- 
ligious practice  of   universal  and   permanent   appli 
cation  to  all  nations  and  all  generations  of  men. 

Fifthly,  the  law  with  a  natural  and  justifiable 
modification  as  to  the  day  of  the  week,  yet  with  no 
infringement  upon  its  spirit  and  design  was  univer- 
sally recognized  and  enforced  in  the  Christian 
church. 

§  306.  Social  religion  requires  its  sacred 
Sacred  places,  places  as  Well  as  its  sacred  seasons.  The 
tabernacle  for  the  yet  wandering  life  of 
tribes,  the  temple  for  the  fixed  national  life,  is  a 
necessity  for  a  religious  community  in  the  expres- 
sion of  common  religious  beliefs.  The  Church — the 
Lord's,  as  the  etymology  of  the  name  indicates — is 
the  place  of  meeting  between  God  and  his  worship- 
ing people.  It  is  worthily  consecrated  to  him,  and 
should  be  freed  from  all  associations  that  hinder  the 
highest  reverence  towards  him. 

§  307.  Religious  rites  make  up  what  is 
^'es.  meant  by  religious  worship.      They  are 

a  necessity  of  social  religion. 
Worship  may  be  defined,  to  be  an  act  of 
Worship.  communion  between  God   and  his  peo- 

ple. God  meets  his  people  in  a  peculiar 
sense  ;  he  listens  to  his  people  in  their  praises  and 
their  supplications  ;  he  cor.iinunicates  his  will  and 
his  favor  to  them.  This  manifestation  of  himself  is 
made  representatively  through  his  recognized  min- 
ister in  the  ministration  of  the  divine  word.  The 
worshiping  people  express  to  God  their  thanks- 
givings and  their  entreaties  of  his  favor,  cither  rep- 


326  DUTIES    TO    GOD. 

resentatively  through  the  minister  or  personally  in 
united  voice  harmonized  in  song  by  means  of  ac- 
cording time  and  tune. 

There  may  be  a  ceremonial  worship,  besides  and 
beyond  this  proper  rational  worship,  consisting  of 
offerings  of  incense  and  the  like.  Especially  are 
offerings  to  God,  expressive  of  consecration  of  ser- 
vice and  of  possessions  to  him,  legitimate  constit- 
uents of  true  religious  worship.  But  in  so  far  as  this 
proper  rational  worship — merely  through  heart  and 
voice — is  concerned,  all  that  is  foreign  to  this  act  of 
rational  communion  between  God  and  his  people 
effected  in  the  way  just  specified,  is  foreign  to  true 
worship.  God  addresses  man  ;  man  addresses  God  ; 
this  is  all.  Collective  address  is  possible,  however, 
only  on  the  condition  either  of  a  single  mouth-piece 
— a  representative  head — a  minister  or  celebrant 
leading  the  assembly — or  of  united  voices  harmon- 
ized and  brought  into  unity  by  means  of  song  and 
chant — by  means  of  musical  time  and  tune.  Re- 
ligious worship,  on  the  side  of  man's  address  to  God, 
reaches  its  highest  elevation  in  accordant  ascrip- 
tions by  the  whole  worshiping  people  of  Glory  to 
God. 


THE  END. 


INDEX 


PAGE. 

Act  of  duty  ^  exemplified  in  the  story 
of  Regulus,  7  ;  duties  detenrined 
from,  159-163  ;  two  species,  159 

Activity,  requisite  in  a  moral  per- 
son, 1 1 
Aim  in  action,                                       159 
Anger,                                                    140 
Asceticism,                                              99 
Attributes  0/ duty,                                    13 
Authority,  77-83,  its  seat,  77;  ex- 
pressed in  a  two-fold  way,                  79 
Belligerents,                                          280 
Beneficence,      152  ;     distinguished 
from  justice,  153  ;   correlative  of 
benevolence,    154;   species,   155; 
modes,  155  ;  measure,   155  ;   ob- 
ject,                                                    156 
Benevolence,                                           T12 
Bible,  revelation  of  divine  author- 
ity,                                                       82 
Body,  duties  in  respect  to  the,  96- 
106  ;  ground,  96  ;  of  guarding,  98  ; 
nourishing,  100  ;  ruling,                   104 
Candor,                                                     147 
Capitation  taxes,                                  201 
Casuistry,     84-87  ;    defined,     84  ; 

leading  principles,  86 

Character,    duties    in   respect  to, 

118;  maxims,  121 

Church,  nature,  321  ;  organization, 
322  ;  officials,  322  ;  seasons,  323  ; 
places,  325  ;  rites,  325. 
Citize7i,  relations  to  the  state,  254- 
264  ;  defined,  234  ;  rights,  256  ; 
duties,  260 

Civil  Rights,  255 

Comity  of  nations,  2ji  ;  rules  of  re- 
cognition, 271  ;  of  legation,  272  ; 
of  salute,  272  ;  exemption  from 
jurisdiction,  273  ',  respect  for  laws,  273 
Condition,  duties  in  respect  to,  107-117 
Conscience,  synonym  of  moral  fac- 
tlty,  i6;  includes  three  functions, 
to  feel  duty,  to  oblige  to  perform- 
ance, to  praise  or  blame,  16-20  ; 
pleasure  or  pain  attending,  19 

Courtesy  to  persons,  its  nature,  143; 
obligation,  144  ;  sphere,  144  ; 
forms,  144 

Demerit,  21,  75 


PAGB. 

Desert,  21, 75 

Developing  industries,  256 

Discourtesy,  144 

Duties,  classified,  26,  88  ;  to  self,  92- 
134  ;  to  our  fellowmen,   134 ;    to 
persons,  135-162  ;  to  God,         282-326 
Duties  in  the  family,  163-181 

Duties  in  the  state,  182-281 

Duties  to  God,  nature,  282  ;  how  en- 
joyed, 284 ;  classes,  284 ;  per- 
sonal religion,  286-308  ;  family 
religion,  309-313;  in  the  state, 
314-320;  the  church,  321-326 

Duties  to  persons,  determined  from 
the  subject  of  duty,  137-142  ;  from 
the  object  of  duty,  143-158  ;  from 
act  of  duty,  159-162 

Duties  to  self,  nature  and  classes, 
92-95  ;  ground  of  obligation,  93  ; 
threefold  law,  95  ;  in  respect  to 
the  body,  96-106 ;  to  condition, 
107-117;  to  character,  1 18-13? 

Duty,  act  of,  exemplified  in  the 
story  of  Regulus,  7  ;  analyzed,  8  ; 
its  three  constituent  elements,  5 

Duty,  its  attributes,  13 

Duty,  object  of,  22-26  ;  a  person,         22 
Duty,  subject  of,  see  7tioral  person. 
Education  in  the  state,  246-249  ;  a 

duty,  246  ;  extent,  247  ;  methods,  248 
Equities,  219 

Ethics,  defined,  1  ;  different  meth- 
ods of  the  science,  i  ;  founded  on 
psychology,  2  ;  one  of  the  three 
departments  of  mental  science,  3  , 
method  pursued,  4 

Evil,-  opposite  of  good,  44  ;  natural 

and  moral,  42 

Excise  duties,  202 

Executive,  in  tJte  state,  220 

Exercise,  roi 

Expatriation,  263 

Family,  defined,  i''»3  ;  divinely  in- 
stituted, 163  ;  twofold  end,  163  ; 
rise  of  duties  in,  164 ;  moral  char- 
acter, 164 ;  seat  of  authority,  166  ; 
classes  of  duties  in,  166  ;  marital, 
168-173  ;  parental  and  filial,  174- 
179 ;  fraternal,  18c 

Family  religion,  309-313  ;  the  mar- 

327 


328 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

riage  covenant,  how  far  a  sacra- 
ment, 311;  in  the  household  hfe, 
311  ;  training,  312;  worship,  312 

Filial  rights  ami  duties,  174-179; 
correlation  of  parental,  175  ; 
enumerated,  176 

Food,  loo 

Forgiveness,  141 

Formality,  299 

Fraternal  rights  and  duties,  180 

Free  will,  requisite  in  a  moral  per- 
son, 14;  culture  of,  130 
Friendship,  duties  in  respect  to,       116 
Good,  essential  in  duty,  24  ;  the  end 
of  all  duty,  36;    twofold  sense, 
37  ;  chief  good,  39 ;  good  in  it- 
self, 42  ;  as  means.  42  ;   good  of 
condition  and  of  character,  42 
Goodness  or  beneficence,                       36 
Gratitude,  140  ;  to  God,                      287 
Happiness,    37  ;    gift    of    Creator 

alone,  42-44 

Hate,  opposite  of  love,  35 

Hypocrisy,  299 

Idolatry,  298 

Ill-desert,  21,  75 

Imposts,  202-242 

Income  taxes,  207 

Industries,  developing,  productive, 

distributive,  236 

Intelligence,   requisite  in  a   moral 

person,  13  ;  culture  of,  126 

International  morality,  265-281  ; 
divisions  of  international  law, 
265  :  sources,  265  ;  duties  classed, 
267;  good-will,  267;  resentments, 
268  ;  retaliation,  273  ;  courtesy, 
truthfulness,  justice,  beneficence, 
273  ;  integrity,  276;  war,  276 

Irreverence,  294 

yus  gentium,  265 

Justice,  distinguished  from  benefi- 
cence, 153  ;  defined,  157 ;  sphere,    157 
Kindliness,  138 

Law,  defined,  66;  physical  and 
moral,  67  ;  expression  of  will,  70  ; 
harrapny,  71  ;  obliging  power, 
71 ;  imports  responsibil'ty,  72  ; 
sanctions,  73  ;  natural  and  posi- 
tive, 79 
Love,  as  principle  of  duty,  32-35 ; 

defined,  33  ;  stages,  34 

Marital  rights  and  duties,  168- 
173  ;  parity  of  rights,  171  ;  joint 
authority,  171  ;  rights  comple- 
mentary, 172 
Marriage  covenarU,  basis  of  mar- 
ital rights  and  duties,  168  ;  indis- 
soluble, 169  ;  how  ratified,              170 


Merit. 


Money,  defined,  227 ;  function,  228 ; 


2i»73 


PAGB. 

Standard  of  value,  229  ;  material, 
230  ;  mixed  currency,  232  ;  legal 
tender,  232  ;  amount,  233 

Monoga  my,  1 68 

Moral  action,  27-31  ;  defined,  21  ; 

diversely  denominated,  28 

Moral  faculty,  defined,  16 

Mora^iaw,  66-76  ;  defined,  68 

Moral  obligation,  60-65  >    defined, 

60 ;  ground,  61 

Moral  person,  defined,  10  ;  requi- 
sites, 10 
Moral  Science,  see  Ethics. 
Moral  Sense,   synonym    of    moral 

faculty,  16 

Motives,  51-59;  defined,  51;  two 
classes,  53  ;  subdivisions,  53  ;  ul- 
timate and  proximate,  56 ;  not 
moral,  57  ;  wrong  selection,  58 

Mutilation  of  body,  78 

Natural  law,  79 

Nature,  duties  to,  108 

Neutrals  in  war,  280 

Oaths,  3 19  ;   classes,  3 19  ;  how  in- 
terpreted, 319 
Obedience,  religious,  301 
Object  of  duty,  22-26  ;  a  person,  22  ; 
duties  determined  from,  143-158  ; 
three  classes,  143 
Orgastic  law  oi  2i  %\3l\s.,                        216 
Parental  rights  and  duties,   174- 
179  ;  origin,  174  ;   correlative  of 
filial,  175;  enumerated,  175-176; 
limited  obligations,                           177 
Penalties,     210;     ends,     210-212; 

modes,  212  ;  degrees,  213 

Personal  duties,  92-134 

Personal  religion  or  piety  towards 
God,  286-308  ;  imports  sympathy, 

286  ;  godly  disposition,  287  ;  love, 

287  ;  gratitude,  287  ;  reverence, 
289  ;  prayer,  290  ;  godly  sincer- 
ity, 296  ;  religious  trust,  obedi- 
ence, and  service,  300;  integ- 
rity, 306 

Political  autonomy,  21^-220',  right 

and  duty,  214  ;  spheres,  2x5 

Political  growth,  221-249;   seven- 
fold departments,  222 
Political  power,  its  seat,  186 
Political    retaliation,   269 :     ami- 
cable, 269 ;  vindictive,                     270 
Political  rights,                                     255 
Polygamy.  :68 
Positive  law,  80 
Postal  facilities,                                   234 
Praise  and  blame,  function  of  con- 
science, 19;  sanctions  of  law,  76 
Practical  morality,                         88-326 
Practical  reason,  synonym  of  moral 
faculty,                                               16 


INDEX. 


329 


PAGE. 

Prayer,  its  nature^  290  j  qualities, 
290  ;  duty,  291 ;  objections  to,  an- 
swered, 292 
Productive  industries,  237  ;  duty  of 
the  state  to  foster,  237 ;  limita- 
tions, 239;  modes,  241 
Public  health,                                           245 
Public  imfrrovetnents,  225 
Public  morals,  250-253  ;  duty  of  the 
state  to  promote,  250  ;  methods — 
by  example,  251  ;  by  prohibition, 
252  ;  by  positive  encouragement,   253 
Recreation,  103 
Rectitude,  46-50  ,  implies  an  action, 

46  ;  relation  of  action,  47  ;  fitness, 

47  ;  directness,  48 ;  parallelism 
with  all  other  duty,  49 

Regulus,  story  of,  7 

Religious  duties,  282-326 

Resentments,     139  ;     of    gratitude, 

139  ;  of  anger  and  forgiveness,       140 
Rest  to  body,  103 

Retaliation,  140 

Rewards,  210 

Ri^ht,  correlative  of  duty,  23 

Right  0/ eminent  domain,  igg 

Sabbath,  weekly,  duty  to  observe,     324 
Sanctions  o/law,  210 

^^^/(TZ'^jdistinguished  from  selfish- 
ness, 93  ;    its  twofold  nature,  95 
Sensibility,  requisite  in  a  moral  per- 
son, 16 ;  culture  of,                          123 
Service,  religious,  303  ;  qualities,      304 
Social  religion,  in  the  faunily,  309- 
313  ;  in  the  state,  314-320  ;  in  the 
church,                                        321-326 
Stamp  duties,                                        206 
State,  duties  in,  182-281  ;  defined, 
182  ;  origin,  182,  197  ;   an  organ- 
ized   community,    185 ;    sphere, 

185  ;  a  power,  185 ;  seat  of  power, 

186  ;  its  end,  188 ;  moral  attri- 
butes, 193  ;  not  a  mere  jural  so- 
ciety, 194-196  ;  bound  morally, 
196 ;  rights  and  duties,  197  ;  of 
existence,  107-213;  of  support, 
198 ;  self-deiense,  207  ;  mamten- 


PAGB, 

ance  of  authority,  208  ;  autonomy, 
214-220  ;  organic  law,  216  ;  legis- 
lature, 218;    judiciary,  218;   ex- 
ecutive,   220 ;    right  of    growth, 
221-242  ;  sevenfold  departments, 
222  ;  maxims,  222  ;  territorial  ex- 
tension, 223  ;  increase  of  popula- 
tion, 224  ;  public  improvements, 
225  ;  weights  and  measures,  226  ; 
money,  227  ;  postal  facilities,  234 ; 
development  of  resources,    235 ; 
health,  245  ;  education,  246  ;  mor- 
als, 250;  in  relation  to  the  citi- 
leo,    254;   moral  relationship  to 
other  states,  265-281  ;  religion  in 
the  state.  314;  rights  and  duties 
of   the  state   in   reference  to  re- 
ligion, 316 
Station,  duties  in  respect  to,  114 
Straight/or-wardness,                          159 
Suicide,  98 
Suntmum  bonum,  37 
Superstition,                                             298 
Sympathy,                                                 in 
Systems  of  morality.  \}cix^tio\A,  29 
Taxes,   200  ;    direct   and  indirect, 
200;    capitation   taxes,   201;   ex- 
cise duties,  202  ;    imposts,    202  ; 
stamp  duties,  206  ;  income  taxes,    207 
Theoretical   tnorality,  1-87 ;    reca- 
pitulated,                                          88-91 
Trust,  religious,  301  ;  qualities,        301 
Trustfulness,                                          151 
Truthfulness,   145  ;    twofold,   147  ; 
inward  implies  candor  and  impar- 
tiality, 147  ;  outward  or  veracity,   148 
Veracity,  148;  sphere,  149;  modes,   150 
Vo7X3,                                                        305 
War,  defined,  276  ;  must  be  public, 
278  ,   with  force  of  arms,   278  ; 
just,  279  ;   belligerents  and  non- 
combatants,  280  ;  neutrals,             280 
Weights  and  measures,                       226 
Worship,   defined,   325 ;    constitu- 
^  ents,                                                    326 
Wrong,  opposite  of  right»  49 


IC 

^ 


L^"^iu^* 


mi 


/^ 


^ 


-tfj^i 


mm^ 


lUr^-i 


m^ 


